Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment Convention, 1988 (No. 168) - Norway (Ratification: 1990)

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2022, published 111st ILC session (2023)

In order to provide a comprehensive view of the issues relating to the application of ratified Conventions on social security, the Committee considers it appropriate to examine Conventions Nos 102 (minimum standards), 128 (invalidity, old-age and survivors’ benefits), 130 (medical care and sickness benefits), and 168 (employment promotion and unemployment benefits) together.

Consolidated reporting on social security Conventions. Further to its previous request to complete the consolidated report on the application of the ratified social security Conventions, the Committee welcomes the Government’s initiative to review and update the information contained in the consolidated report. In doing so, the Government has replied to a range of questions previously raised by the Committee on the application of Conventions Nos 102, 128, 130, and 168. The Committee takes due note, in particular, of the statistical data provided on the persons protected, coverage and replacement rates of social security benefits, and of the information concerning the minimum duration of benefits, qualifying periods, and other conditions of entitlement.

Article 15(2) of Convention No. 128. Pensionable age. Further to its previous request on whether the increase in the pensionable age above 65 years met the conditions set out in Article 15(2) of the Convention, namely giving due regard to demographic, economic and social criteria which justify such an increase, the Committee notes the indication by the Government that from 1964 to 2019, life expectancy in Norway increased from 77 to 84.5 years for women and from 71 to 81 years for men. The Government further indicates that the number of pensioners increased to nearly one million persons by 2018. The Committee also observes from the OECD’s publication “The State of Health in the EU’s Country Health Profiles. Norway, 2019” that Norwegians at age 65 can expect to lead an additional 16 years of healthy life without disability. The Committee further observes from the website “Statistics Norway” that the percentage of employed persons of between 55 and 74 ages increased from 41.4 per cent in 1988 to 51.3 per cent in 2022. The Committee takes due note of this information.

Article 15(3) of Convention No. 128. Early retirement and entitlement to old-age pension for workers in arduous and unhealthy occupations. The Committee notes the indication by the Government that while the general pensionable age is 67 years, old-age pension can be drawn between 62 and 75 years of age (flexible retirement age). Entitlement to a pension between 62 and 67 years of age is possible if the level of the pension to which the person concerned would obtain at 67 is at least equal to the minimum pension level.

The Committee observes from the Government’s report that the total amount of old-age pension provided to a standard beneficiary, as defined in the Convention, at the age of 62 after a 20 year-qualifying period (NOK87,854) is higher than the minimum pension level at low rate based on an insurance period of 20 years (NOK79,311). The Government points out that a person under this scenario will therefore be entitled to an old-age pension at 62. The Government further indicates that the replacement rate of the old-age pension in this case would amount to 18.7 per cent of the standard beneficiary’s wage.

The Committee recalls that according to Article 15(3) of the Convention, if the pensionable age is 65 years or higher, the age shall be lowered, under prescribed conditions, in respect of persons who have been engaged in occupations that are deemed by national legislation, for the purpose of old-age benefit, to be arduous or unhealthy. The Committee further recalls that the purpose of this provision is intended to ensure additional protection, through a more favourable system, to persons employed on arduous or unhealthy work, by allowing them to draw an anticipated old-age pension, of which the rate and qualifying period must conform to Articles 17 (old-age pension’s rate) and 18 (minimum qualifying period) of the Convention. For this purpose, the calculation of the old-age pension drawn at 62 years must be based on a 30-year qualifying period, which is the standard qualifying period for the entitlement to an old-age pension at the minimum level required by the Convention, as stipulated in its Articles 17 and 26.

The Committee further observes that, in its calculations, the Government compares the total amount of old-age pension with the minimum pension level provided at low rate to a pensioner with a spouse who is in receipt of an old-age pension (NOK158,621 in 2020). According to the Government, however, a spouse who is inactive will not qualify for an old-age pension before attaining the age of 67. The Committee therefore considers that the total amount of an old-age pension should be compared with the minimum pension level provided at high rate when a pensioner’s spouse does not receive an old-age pension (NOK193,188) or at special rate for single pensioners (NOK208,690).

The Committee therefore requests the Government to provide information on the possibility of workers in arduous and unhealthy occupations to draw a pension at an age lower than 65, according to the following scenarios:

• -for a single person with the standard beneficiary’s wage who is 62 years old and with a 30-year qualifying period;
• -for a person with the standard beneficiary’s wage who is 62 years old, with a 30-year qualifying period and a dependent spouse of the same age.

The Committee further requests the Government to indicate the replacement rates of old-age pensions under both scenarios. It also requests the Government to provide information on any other possibilities for early retirement, apart from the provisions on the flexible retirement age, under which workers in arduous and unhealthy occupations may retire earlier than 65 years, in line with Article 15(3) of the Convention.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2016, published 106th ILC session (2017)

Coverage and conditions of entitlement. According to the publication of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs on The Norwegian Social Insurance Scheme, January 2015, previously earned income of a prescribed minimum amount is a condition for entitlement to certain benefits: an insured person must have an annual income of at least 0.5 basic amount (B.a. – 44,185 Norwegian krone (NOK)) in order to be entitled to daily cash benefits in the case of sickness; 1.5 B.a. (NOK132,555) in the preceding calendar year or at least 3 B.a. (NOK265,110) during the three preceding calendar years for entitlement to unemployment benefit. Please indicate whether the entitlement to benefits in case of employment injury is also subjected to having a certain previous minimum income from work. In terms of coverage, the report on Convention No. 130 states that persons protected by the sickness benefit scheme comprise all persons with an annual income of at least 0.5 B.a. (2,604,000 in 2014), while the report on Convention No. 128 counts as persons protected by the old-age and invalidity schemes persons with “registered gross earned income (‘pensionable income’) equal to or exceeding the B.a.” (2,618,467 in 2014), who constituted 85.8 per cent of the total number of employed persons in Norway (3,124,312 in 2015). Employed persons, according to this report, include “persons who have performed paid work of at least one hour’s duration”. The Committee understands from these figures that many thousands of employees whose earnings are below the minimum annual insurable earnings, are excluded from coverage by the Norwegian social insurance scheme. It notes however that the report on Convention No. 102 states that the number of employees insured under Part III (Sickness benefit), Part IV (Unemployment benefit) and Part VI (Employment injury benefit) is 100 per cent of the number of employees in Norway (2,765,000 in 2015). In view of the confusing nature of this data, the Committee would like the Government to clarify the situation as regards the legal and statistical definition of employees, income related conditions of social insurance coverage of employees, the number of insured employees and the total number of employees in Norway. It recalls in this respect that, under Conventions Nos 128 and 130, Norway has undertaken to extend coverage to all employees, including apprentices, irrespective of their previous earned income, and that the ILO social security Conventions do not permit to subject the entitlement to benefits to a condition of earning not less than a prescribed minimum annual amount of income. Convention No. 102, however, permits extending insurance coverage only to “prescribed classes of employees”, which may be determined by taking into account their contributory capacity, and to make the entitlement to benefits subject to completing a qualifying period of contribution.

Medical care. Part II of Convention No. 102, Article 11; Article 15 of Convention No. 130. Length of the qualifying period. The report on Convention No. 130 states that all persons residing in Norway are protected. Please indicate the length of the qualifying period of residence or stay in the country necessary to obtain protection and to preclude abuse.

Sickness benefit. Article 26(1) of Convention No. 130. Minimum duration of benefit. The report on Convention No. 130 states that sickness benefit is paid for 260 working days (52 weeks) per year. Please indicate whether the entitlement to 260 benefit days is renewed for each new case of sickness, in accordance with this provision of the Convention.

Unemployment benefit. Part IV of Convention No. 102, Articles 23 and 24(3) and (4); Articles 17 and 18 of Convention No. 168. Please indicate the length of the qualifying period and the waiting period and the relevant legal provisions. Please indicate whether these periods are adapted to the conditions of employment of seasonal workers.

Article 20 (suitable employment) in conjunction with Article 69 (suspension of benefit) of Convention No. 102; Article 21 of Convention No. 168. With respect to the previous request of the Committee under Convention No. 168 regarding decisions terminating payment of unemployment benefit, the Government indicates that, in 2015, 44 jobseekers had their benefits stopped during the first three months of unemployment because of refusal to take work offered or work in another part of the country, or part-time work. The Committee notes, from the detailed explanations given by the Government, that only one jobseeker had been sanctioned during the first three months of 2015 for refusing to accept jobs which did not correspond to his qualifications, and that the Government considers therefore that it is not necessary to amend the corresponding guidelines of the Directorate of Labour and Welfare.

Old-age benefit. Article 15(2) and (3) of Convention No. 128. Pension age. According to the report on Convention No. 128, old-age pension can be drawn between 62 and 75 years of age. There is a minimum old-age pension (garantipensjon) which is paid at a low, ordinary, high or special rate; the ordinary or high rates are paid respectively to a recipient who is married/cohabitates or lives alone. The guaranteed pension is determined on the basis of the insurance period (periods of residence) and is reduced proportionately in case of a shorter insurance period than 40 years. The Committee notes that the full ordinary rate of the guaranteed old-age pension after 40 years of insurance was NOK162,566 in May 2015, which is higher than the amount of the old-age pension granted to an insured employee after 30 years of earning pension points and 30 years of residence (NOK142,141), as calculated in the report. The Committee notes in this respect, from The Norwegian Social Insurance Scheme, January 2015, that in order to draw an old-age pension before attaining the age of 67, the pension must, when the person in question attains the age of 67, be at least equal to the minimum pension level for persons with an insurance period of 40 years. The Committee understands therefore, from the figures given above, that this condition would not be fulfilled by the pension acquired by the persons protected at the age of 67 under the standard scenario established by the Convention: with 30 years of contributions and earnings not exceeding the reference wage of the skilled manual male employee. Consequently, the effective age of retirement for all persons protected whose earnings do not exceed those of the skilled worker, would not be 65 but 67 years. The Committee points out in this respect that Article 26(2) of the European Code of Social Security (ECSS), as amended by the Protocol, which is also ratified by Norway, expressly prohibits increasing the pension age beyond 65 years where employees only are protected under the Code, as in Norway, while Article 15(2) of Convention No. 128 obliges the competent authority fixing the higher pension age to demonstrate statistically the need for such measure, taking into account the demographic, economic and social criteria. Moreover, as a counterbalance to the higher pension age, Article 15(3) of Convention No. 128 requires this age to be lowered in respect of persons who have been engaged in occupations that are deemed by national legislation, for the purpose of old-age benefit, to be arduous or unhealthy. Recalling that Norway is bound by all of the above legal limitations and prohibitions regarding the increase of the pension age above 65 years, the Committee asks the Government to clarify the situation with the effective age of retirement under the conditions of entitlement prescribed by Convention No. 128 on the basis of detailed calculation of the old-age pension replacement rate under the standard scenario, taking into account the Committee’s observations below.

Article 17 of Convention No. 128. Calculation of the replacement rate of the old-age benefit. The Committee notes that the old-age benefit of the standard beneficiary (man with wife of pensionable age) is composed of the basic pension and supplementary pension for the husband and the basic pension and the special supplement for his wife. The husband is born in 1951, starts drawing his pension at 65 and his annuity divisor is 1.156; his wife is born in 1949, starts drawing her pension at 67 and her annuity divisor is 1.030. The Committee observes that the selection of the standard beneficiary where the wife’s natural and pensionable age is two years older than her husband, is rather unexpected. Recalling that the old-age pension in Norway can be drawn already at the age of 62, the Committee asks the Government to recalculate, in accordance with Article 26 of the Convention, the replacement rate of the old-age benefit for a married couple with both spouses retiring under the standard scenario at reaching the lowest legal pension age of 62 years. The Committee draws the Government’s attention that this calculation can also be done under Article 27 of the Convention by establishing the replacement rate of combined guaranteed minimum pensions granted to a married couple after 20 years of residence (insurance) in Norway.

Article 18(1) of Convention No. 128. Length of the qualifying period of residence. With respect to the calculation of the replacement rate of the old-age benefit for the standard beneficiary done in the report on Convention No. 128, the Committee observes that it is based on 30 years of earning pension points for the husband and “on 30 years of residence for both spouses”. It points out that, according to Article 18(1)(a) of Convention No. 128, these calculations may include only those elements of the old-age benefit which satisfy the qualifying conditions prescribed by these instruments and are thus acquired after only 20 years of residence for both spouses. This is particularly important as regards the old-age pension of the dependent wife who acquires her pension on the basis of residence alone.

Article 18(2). Calculation of the reduced old-age benefit. The Committee notes that the calculation of the reduced old-age benefit is based on a residence period of 15 years for both spouses. It points out that Article 18(2)(a) of Convention No. 128 requires payment of a reduced benefit only where the old-age benefit is conditional upon a minimum period of contribution or employment and does not concern pension systems based on residence. A reduced pension under these provisions shall be secured after 15 years of contribution or employment without any qualifying period of residence. This means that pension elements, supplements and allowances, the entitlement to which is subjected to a qualifying period of residence, particularly with respect to the dependent wife, shall be excluded from calculating the amount of the reduced pension of the standard beneficiary. The Government is asked to explain whether provisions concerning reduced benefit are applicable to the pension system in Norway and, if they are, recalculate its replacement rate accordingly.

Employment injury benefit. Part VI of Convention No. 102/ECSS. (a) Article 36(2) and (3) of Convention No. 102. Degree of incapacity. According to the report on Convention No. 128, an insured person whose income capacity is permanently reduced by at least 50 per cent due to illness, injury or defect, is entitled to a disability benefit. If the disability is due to an approved occupational illness or injury, it is sufficient that the income capacity is permanently reduced by at least 30 per cent. Please indicate what employment injury benefits compensate loss of income capacity up to 30 per cent.

(b) The Committee notes from The Norwegian Social Insurance Scheme, January 2015, that employees are also covered by an occupational injury compensation act outside the framework of the National Insurance legislation. In view of the persistent lack of information in the reports since 2006 on the application of many provisions of Part VI (Employment injury benefit) of Convention No. 102 and of the ECSS, the Committee asks the Government to explain to what extent this act may be relevant to the application of this Part of the Convention.

Family benefit. Part VII of Convention No. 102/ECSS, Articles 43 (qualifying period) and 44 (total value of benefits granted). Please provide detailed information and calculations showing that Norway fulfils the obligations under these provisions of the Code.

Invalidity benefit, Article 10 of Convention No. 128. Calculation of the level of benefit. (a) Composition of the disability benefit. With respect to the composition of the disability benefit taken for the purpose of the Convention, the report mentions the basic benefit granted if the disability involves significant extra expenses; the attendance benefit granted if the disabled person needs special attention; the basic amount; the special supplement which is calculated as a percentage of the basic amount; the basic pension which is linked to the time of residence in Norway (insurance period); and the supplementary pension linked to the number of years with income exceeding the B.a. earning pension points. A married receiver of the disability benefit may also be entitled to the special supplement which may be calculated at 74 or 100 per cent of the B.a., or 200 per cent if the pensioner supports a spouse over 60 years of age. Receiving both the special supplement and the supplementary pension is subjected to the special rules prescribing their combined rates and limits. As each element of the disability benefit is subjected to different conditions of entitlement, the Committee asks the Government to specify which of them shall comprise the invalidity benefit for the purpose of the Convention and shall be taken into account in calculating its replacement rate under the standard scenario. Please explain the rules of combining the selected elements and calculating their resulting rates applicable to the standard beneficiary, bearing in mind the requirements of Article 26(3) of the Convention.

(b) Qualifying period and future period of insurance. The Committee notes that the method of calculation of the disability benefit takes into account, in addition to the actual insurance period completed before the contingency, the future period of insurance until the beneficiary reaches the age limit of 67 years (62 years in the examples given in the report). Consequently, the report gives examples of calculations based on the total insurance period of 32 or 40 years, including the actual insurance period of 15 years. The Committee observes that these examples do not follow the method of calculation prescribed by the Convention, inasmuch as the replacement rate of the invalidity benefit for the standard beneficiary is calculated on the basis of the insurance period being longer than the maximum qualifying period stipulated in Article 11 of the Convention for calculating the standard benefit under its paragraph 1 and the reduced benefit under paragraph 2. While including the future period of insurance significantly increases the replacement rate of the disability benefit for the beneficiaries who became invalids early in their life, this calculation formula might not guarantee the minimum level of the benefit prescribed by the Convention to the beneficiaries who have sustained the invalidity at more advanced age. The Committee therefore asks the Government to provide additional examples of the calculation of the replacement rate of the disability benefit for the standard beneficiary with 15 years of actual insurance period and very short or no expected future insurance period, as may be in the case of the beneficiary who arrived in Norway at the age of 45–50 and became disabled at 60–65.

(c) Minimum disability benefit. According to The Norwegian Social Insurance Scheme, January 2015 (p. 12), a beneficiary who has been a resident for less than 20 years, will be entitled to a disability benefit solely based upon previous income, the rate of which would fall much below the level of 50 per cent of the skilled workers’ wage guaranteed by Convention No. 128. The Committee notes however that, according to the report on Convention No. 128, the disability benefit is subjected to the yearly minimum of 2.28 B.a. for persons living with a spouse/cohabitant and 2.48 B.a. for others, which permits the Government to calculate the replacement rate of the disability benefit also under Article 27 of Convention No. 128 by reference to the unskilled workers’ wage. In 2015, the minimum amount paid at the ordinary rate for a married disabled person was NOK205,355 and would be higher than 50 per cent of the unskilled worker’s wage required by the Convention. The Committee asks the Government to specify the conditions under which the minimum disability benefit is granted at the ordinary or high rate and to show that the rate applicable to the standard beneficiary complies with the requirements of Article 27 of Convention No. 128.

(d) Child supplement. The Committee notes that calculations of the level of the disability benefit include a supplement for two children taken at the full rate of 40 per cent of the basic amount (B.a.) for each supported child under the age of 18, while the report indicates that this supplement is income-tested and may be granted up to 40 per cent of the B.a. on certain conditions. The child supplement is reduced if the annual income (pension and wages) exceeds certain limits (as from 1 May 2016, NOK462,880 for two children living with both parents). The Committee also notes that the child supplement is calculated in proportion to the total insurance period of the disabled pensioner including future years of insurance after the onset of the disability. If the Government would like to continue including the child supplement in the calculation of the replacement level of the disability benefit, the Committee would ask it to: (a) state the qualifying conditions under which the supplement is granted and the rules of calculating its amount; (b) specify the conditions and the rate which would apply to the standard beneficiary under Part II (Invalidity benefit) of Convention No. 128; (c) provide examples where the child supplement is calculated for the standard beneficiary who has completed the maximum qualifying period stipulated in Article 11 of the Convention without adding to it any future years of insurance; and (d) confirm that the income limit for the child supplement is set high enough to ensure that the supplement will be paid to all persons protected whose earnings do not exceed those of the skilled manual male employee. The Committee nevertheless would like to remind the Government that, in principle, income- or means-tested benefits or supplements are not taken into account for the purpose of calculating the replacement level of benefits under Article 26 of the Convention. Moreover, it may be useful to recall that, with regard to the disability benefit, Article 56(1)(b) of the ECSS, as amended by the Protocol, expressly stipulates that, even if the protection under Part IX (Invalidity benefit) is provided by way of the means-tested benefits, “a prescribed benefit shall be guaranteed without a means test to the prescribed classes of persons determined in accordance with sub-paragraphs (a) or (b) of Article 55, subject to qualifying conditions not more stringent than those specified in paragraph 1 of Article 57”.

Article 11(1) of Convention No. 128. Qualifying period and condition of insurance. According to The Norwegian Social Insurance Scheme, January 2015, the disability benefit is payable as long as the person remains insured, this requirement being waived if the person has been resident in Norway for at least 20 years. The Committee concludes that persons protected who have completed a qualifying period of only 15 years of contribution or employment or ten years of residence, will lose their disability benefit if their insurance is terminated. Please explain what other reasons, besides reaching the age limit of 67 years, might lead to the termination of insurance and the consequent loss of the disability benefit in such cases.

Article 12 of Convention No. 128. Age limit for the duration of benefit. According to the report on Convention No. 128, since 1 January 2015, new disability benefits are granted to an insured person between 18 and 67 years of age, while old-age pension can be drawn between 62 and 75 years of age. The Committee recalls that, according to Article 12 of the Convention, the disability benefit shall be granted throughout the duration of disability or until an old-age benefit becomes payable; its duration therefore cannot be limited by a prescribed age which in certain cases, as in Norway, might be lower than the pensionable age. With respect to the number of employees over 67 years of age who may thus be excluded from the persons protected under Part II of Convention No. 128, the report shows that the number of persons with insurable income at the age of between 17 and 67 constituted 85.8 per cent of the total number of employed persons between the ages of 17 and 74, which means that a substantial number of persons continued to work after reaching the age of 67 years. Recalling that under Convention No. 128, Norway has undertaken to provide the disability benefit to all employees until it is replaced by the old-age pension, the Committee asks the Government to explain how protection is ensured to disabled pensioners who, after attaining the age of 67, have not yet claimed their old-age pension. Please also explain why in the examples of calculation of the replacement rate of the disability benefit given in the report, the future periods of insurance are calculated up to the age of 62 years instead of 67, while in similar examples concerning the survivors’ benefit these future periods are calculated up to the age of 67 years, when the surviving spouse may be transferred to the old-age pension.

Survivors’ benefit. Part IV of Convention No. 128, Article 23. Calculation of benefit. The Committee asks the Government to recalculate the replacement rate of the survivors’ benefit for a standard beneficiary taking into account the following indications:

(a) Future period of insurance. The Committee notes that the method of calculation of the survivors’ benefit follows that of the invalidity benefit and takes into account, in addition to the actual insurance period completed by the late breadwinner before death, future expected periods of insurance (residency) and earning of pension points until the deceased breadwinner’s 67th birthday. Consequently, the report gives examples of calculations based on the total qualifying period of 37 or 40 years, including the actual insurance period of 15 years, for the calculation of the standard benefit, and 27 and 32 years, including an actual insurance period of five years, for the calculation of the reduced benefit. The Committee observes that these examples do not follow the method of calculation prescribed by the Convention, inasmuch as the replacement rate of the survivors’ benefit (basic pension, supplementary pension, children’s pension) is calculated on the basis of the insurance period being much longer than the maximum qualifying period stipulated in Article 24 of the Convention for calculating the standard benefit under its paragraph 1 and the reduced benefit under paragraph 2. The replacement level of the survivors’ benefit recalculated by the Committee for the standard beneficiary with only 15 years of actual insurance period will fall much below the level of 45 per cent of the skilled workers’ wage required by Convention No. 128. The Committee notes in this respect that apparently, unlike the disability benefit, there is no guaranteed minimum level of the survivors’ benefit in Norway.

(b) Income test. According to The Norwegian Social Insurance Scheme, January 2015 (p. 10), the survivors’ pension is subject to an income test. If the surviving spouse has, or may be expected to get, an annual income exceeding 50 per cent of the B.a., the pension will be equal to the difference between a full pension and 40 per cent of the exceeding income. A surviving spouse under the age of 55 is expected to have an annual earned income of 2 B.a. (NOK176,740). For a survivor without earned income, the pension will be reduced by NOK53,022, unless the person concerned has a reasonable cause for not having any income. Survivors who are not employed at the time of death, are allowed a reasonable transitional period. The Committee recalls in this respect that Norway applies Part X (Survivors’ benefit) of the ECSS to the wives and children of employees who shall be entitled, in accordance with Article 62 of the ECSS, as amended by the Protocol, to a prescribed benefit guaranteed without a means test or income test. However, Article 60(2) of the ECSS and Article 31 of Convention No. 128 permit to reduce the benefit, if contributory, where the earnings of the beneficiary exceed a prescribed amount, and, if non-contributory, where his earnings or other means or the two taken together exceed a prescribed amount. There are no provisions in the Convention or the ECSS which allow the reduction of the benefit in the case where the survivor is expected to have an annual earned income but actually has none. As the design of the survivors’ benefit in Norway appears to be rather peculiar, the Committee asks the Government to explain to what extent the Norwegian survivors’ benefit scheme complies with or makes use of these provisions of the Convention and which impact they have on the calculation of the replacement rate of the survivors’ benefit for the standard beneficiary.

Article 24(1)(a). Length of qualifying period. According to The Norwegian Social Insurance Scheme, January 2015, a surviving spouse under 67, who has not started drawing on old-age pension and who is not entitled to a disability pension, is entitled to pension benefits if she herself is insured with entitlement to pension benefits and the deceased was insured. If the deceased had earned a supplementary pension, the surviving spouse is not required to be insured to be granted a corresponding basic pension. The condition that the survivor shall be insured for the granting of a basic pension is also waived if either the survivor or the deceased has been a resident in Norway for at least 20 years. The Committee points out that the benefit under Part IV of the Convention is not conditioned upon the surviving wives and children being insured in their own right but is derived from the insurance rights of their deceased breadwinner accumulated after 15 years of contribution or employment, or ten years of residence. The Convention admits however that, for a benefit payable to a widow, the alternative condition may consist in the completion of a prescribed qualifying period of residence by such widow herself. If such condition is imposed by the national legislation, the Committee considers that the length of the qualifying period to be completed by the widow cannot be longer than the qualifying period prescribed for the breadwinner. Consequently, in order to comply with the Convention and the ECSS, the condition that the survivor shall be insured for the granting of a basic pension should be waived if the widow or her deceased breadwinner has been a resident in the country for at least ten years. Please explain to what extent the above conditions of entitlement to the survivors’ benefit in the Norwegian legislation may be brought in line with the requirements of the Convention.

Article 24(2)(a). Reduced benefit. The Committee notes that the calculation of the reduced benefit is made “in the case of a standard beneficiary whose breadwinner has completed a period of 5 years of residence and 5 years of earning pension points”. It points out that under Article 24(2)(a) of Convention No. 128 and Article 63(2)(a) of the ECSS, a reduced survivors’ benefit shall be secured after the late breadwinner has completed five years of contribution or employment without any qualifying period of residence. Please indicate whether a reduced survivors’ benefit would be payable to a standard beneficiary whose late breadwinner can prove five years of contribution or employment but no residence in Norway.

Article 25 (duration of benefit) in conjunction with Article 33(1) (coordination of benefits). According to The Norwegian Social Insurance Scheme, January 2015, a surviving spouse will, at age 67, be transferred to old-age pension, and receive his/her personally acquired supplementary pension, or 55 per cent of the aggregated supplementary pension of both the survivor and the deceased, if this is more favourable. The Committee recalls that under the Convention, unlike the invalidity benefit which can be replaced by an old-age benefit, the survivors’ benefit shall be granted throughout the contingency and cannot be limited by a prescribed age. In case the surviving spouse becomes entitled to an old-age benefit, which is another social security benefit provide for under Convention No. 128, she shall receive in total at least the amount of the most favourable benefit. Please explain how the rules for the coordination between social security benefits prescribed by Article 33 of the Convention, are observed in this case.

Standards to be complied with by periodical payments. Part XI of Convention No. 102, Articles 65 and 66. Determination of the reference wage. The Government states that, following the ILO guidelines of cross-tabulating ISIC rev.4 and ISCO-08/major group 7, the reference wage is determined according to Article 65(6)(b) of Convention No. 102 as the average annual pay for a male worker with an occupation in the category Crafts and related trades workers, in the industry Wholesale and retail trade containing the highest number of male employees in Norway. The pay is based on payment for normal working hours, seven and a half hours a day, five days a week, 260 days per year. It does not include pay for overtime, but covers basic salaries, variable additional allowances and bonuses. In 2015, the reference wage amounted to NOK422,400. While taking due note of this information, the Committee asks the Government to also determine the reference wage of an ordinary adult male labourer in accordance with Article 66 of the Convention. The Committee will examine the question of the adequacy of social security benefits, including guaranteed or minimum benefits, once the Government had reviewed the calculations of their replacement rates in relation to the reference wage of the skilled employee or an ordinary labourer, as appropriate, taking into consideration the detailed explanations given in the present comments.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2016, published 106th ILC session (2017)

Integrated management of Norway’s obligations under different social security instruments. The Committee notes the reports on the application of Conventions Nos 102, 118, 128 and 130, which together formed the annual report of Norway to the Council of Europe on the application of the European Code of Social Security (ECSS) and its Protocol. The supervision of these regional instruments is entrusted to the Committee in accordance with the arrangement made between the Council of Europe and the International Labour Organization under Article 74(4) of the ECSS. The resulting alignment of the reporting obligations under the ECSS and ILO Conventions Nos 102, 121, 128, 130 and 168 pursued the objective of reducing the administrative workload for governments and avoiding duplication of reports. For this purpose, the report form on the ECSS expressly stipulates that, if a government is bound by similar obligations as a result of having ratified Convention No. 102, “it may communicate to the Council of Europe copies of the reports it submits to the International Labour Office on the implementation of this Convention”. Where certain Parts of Convention No. 102 (for Norway – Parts III, V, IX and X) have ceased to be applicable due to ratification of the corresponding Parts of the more advanced Conventions Nos 128 and 130, governments may equally communicate to the Council of Europe copies of their reports on these Conventions. Conversely, the information provided by the Government in its reports on the ECSS and the relevant provisions of the European Social Charter is regularly taken into account by the Committee in assessing the application of ILO social security Conventions. To facilitate the integrated management of Norway’s obligations under different social security instruments, the Committee refers the Government to the coordination tables, reporting timelines and relevant comments of the supervisory bodies compiled in the ILO Technical Note on the state of application of the provisions for social security of the international treaties on social rights ratified by Norway, published in the country profile on the NORMLEX database.

Consolidated reporting on social security Conventions. Besides the reports, the Government has supplied its reply to the questions raised in the Committee’s previous conclusions on the ECSS and the publication of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs on The Norwegian Social Insurance Scheme, January 2015. In order to analyse this information within a unified legal framework for a comprehensive social security system, the Committee has consolidated it in a single report covering all branches of social security included in Convention No. 102 and the ECSS. Where appropriate, it was completed with the information extracted from the MISSOC database and Norway’s previous reports on the ECSS and ILO social security Conventions supplied during the period 2006–16. The Committee has not taken into account the reports prior to 2006 as the information contained in them is likely to be outdated. The resulting Consolidated Report (CR) thus contains all the relevant information provided by Norway over the last decade on the application of these instruments and permits to greatly improve the quality of reporting in terms of the completeness of the information available, coherence across different schemes and benefits providing protection, and the efficacy of the regulatory framework governing the national social security system.

With regard to the completeness of the available information describing the Norwegian social security system, the analysis of the CR reveals certain persistent information gaps which do not permit to assess compliance with the indicated provisions of the Conventions, as is the case for example with Article 69 of Convention No. 102 and corresponding provisions of other Conventions defining situations which may lead to the suspension of benefits. Not only these provisions are highlighted in the CR, but relevant questions of the report forms on the ECSS and ILO Conventions are included as a reminder to complete the CR with the requested information. The Committee draws the Government’s attention to the fact that, since 2006, its reports do not contain any information on the following provisions:

Convention No. 102 – Part II (Medical care), Articles 8, 10(1)(3) and (4), 11 and 12; Part VI (Employment injury benefit), Articles 32, 34, 35, 37 and 38; Part VII (Family benefit), Articles 43 and 44; Part XIII (Common provisions), Articles 69 (for Parts II, III, V, VI, VII, IX and X), 70 (for Parts II and VII), 71 and 72 (for Part II);

Convention No. 128 – Articles 13, 25, 31, 32 and 33;

Convention No. 130 – Articles 7, 9, 13, 15, 16, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32;

Convention No. 168 – Articles 7, 18, 24, 25, 26 and 30.

With respect to the clarity of the information provided, particularly as regards rules and elements taken into account for the calculation of the level of benefits, in many instances it requires technical clarifications from the national experts and concrete references to the corresponding provisions of the national regulations. In order to facilitate the experts’ dialogue on these highly technical issues which depend upon the context in which they are used, the statements in question are highlighted and appropriate marks and questions are entered by the Committee directly in the text of the CR. In view of the significant volume (120 pages) and the complexity of the CR covering all branches of the national social security system, it is also equipped with user friendly navigation signs and summary tables. The information included by the Government in its reports but which is not directly relevant to the legal obligations under the respective Conventions, is reproduced in the annexes to the CR. The Committee attaches the Consolidated Report to the present conclusions and asks the Government to complete it following the indications inside with the missing information, technical clarifications, provisions of the national legislation and statistics.

The Committee raises the most important issues in the request addressed directly to the Government.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2011, published 101st ILC session (2012)

The Committee notes that the Government’s report has not been received. It must therefore repeat its previous observation which read as follows:

Repetition

Article 21 of the Convention. Suspension of benefit. In the Committee’s previous observation, the Government has been urged to review the guidelines of the Directorate of Labour and Welfare (LWS) so as to ensure that unemployed persons are not sanctioned for refusing to accept unsuitable job offers at least during the initial period of 26 weeks provided for in Article 19(2)(a) of the Convention. The Government emphasizes that during the first three months of unemployment, the jobseeker has the primary responsibility of finding a job, and will therefore determine which jobs the jobseeker finds suitable. However, as time passes, the jobseeker must be ready to adjust expectations and expand the job search. On the basis of the jobseeker’s curriculum vitae and the labour market, the job request will be evaluated every third month. This evaluation can result in an agreement between the jobseeker and the LWS to expand the job search. The Committee understands from these explanations that, in practice, the suitability of jobs searched for and offered is being assessed for every new period of three months with a view to expanding the acceptable types of jobs by relinquishing certain criteria of suitability. It understands also that under this arrangement special rules apply for the initial period of unemployment of three months when the decision on the suitability of available jobs is largely left at the discretion of the jobseeker himself. The Committee invites the Government to consider how the existing practice of giving unemployed persons primary responsibility for a job search during the initial three months of unemployment and therefore a certain discretion in the selection of job offers could best be reflected in the guidelines of the Directorate of Labour and Welfare. Such consideration would assist the implementation of section G.4.1 of the guidelines, which forbids applicants for employment to make reservations as regards the type of occupation they will work in and requires them to accept work even in occupations for which they are not trained or in which they have no previous experience.

As regards sanctions imposed on unemployed persons, the Government reports that in 2007 less than 200 jobseekers got their benefit stopped during the first three months of unemployment because of refusal to accept: offered work, work in another part of the country or part-time work. The Committee would like the Government to verify that in all these cases the jobseekers concerned were not sanctioned for having refused to take up jobs that were not suitable to their acquired professional status. It therefore invites the Government, if necessary, to follow the example of Denmark where, in order to assess the extent to which the unemployed persons refuse job offers due to the job not being “suitable”, the National Directorate of Labour, which deals with complaints and supervision in relation to the Unemployment Insurance Act, had in 2005 manually examined all cases (352 files) of sanctions for refusal to take up a job offer. The Committee hopes that the results of this verification would help the Government to decide whether or not the guidelines of the Directorate of Labour and Welfare need to be changed in order to ensure that the discretionary power to sanction the behaviour of the unemployed persons in the current labour market situation is being applied with due respect for their acquired professional and social status.

In this connection the Committee further notes the assurances of the Government that the unemployed will normally not get offered jobs from the Labour and Welfare Service, unless it is a job that corresponds to his or her education and qualifications. The LWS will initially devote a lot of time, to identify the jobseekers’ qualifications, working experience and job requests. The goal is to help the unemployed to get a suitable job. When considering whether the work is suitable, the LWS should – according to the Directorate of Labour and Welfare’s guidelines, section A, article 4.18 – also consider:

• – how long the jobseeker has been unemployed;
• – the probability of getting a job which corresponds to his or her qualifications;
• – whether the offered job can give valuable working experience; and
• – whether the remuneration offered for the job involves an unreasonable reduction of income compared to what the person is receiving by way of unemployment benefits.

The Committee would like the Government to explain how this last criterion, which requires the jobseeker to consider job offers remunerated at the level below the unemployment benefit, could still be retained in the guidelines of the Directorate of Labour and Welfare after the abolition since 1 January 2006 of the legal provisions, which previously made it possible to compel unemployed persons to accept jobs offering less income than the unemployment benefit.

The Committee hopes that the Government will make every effort to take the necessary action in the near future.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2008, published 98th ILC session (2009)

The Committee notes the information furnished by the Government in reply to its previous observation and, in particular, that concerning the application of Article 26 of the Convention.

Article 21 of the Convention. Suspension of benefit. In the Committee’s previous observation, the Government has been urged to review the guidelines of the Directorate of Labour and Welfare (LWS) so as to ensure that unemployed persons are not sanctioned for refusing to accept unsuitable job offers at least during the initial period of 26 weeks provided for in Article 19(2)(a) of the Convention. The Government emphasizes that during the first three months of unemployment, the jobseeker has the primary responsibility of finding a job, and will therefore determine which jobs the jobseeker finds suitable. However, as time passes, the jobseeker must be ready to adjust expectations and expand the job search. On the basis of the jobseeker’s curriculum vitae and the labour market, the job request will be evaluated every third month. This evaluation can result in an agreement between the jobseeker and the LWS to expand the job search. The Committee understands from these explanations that, in practice, the suitability of jobs searched for and offered is being assessed for every new period of three months with a view to expanding the acceptable types of jobs by relinquishing certain criteria of suitability. It understands also that under this arrangement special rules apply for the initial period of unemployment of three months when the decision on the suitability of available jobs is largely left at the discretion of the jobseeker himself. The Committee invites the Government to consider how the existing practice of giving unemployed persons primary responsibility for a job search during the initial three months of unemployment and therefore a certain discretion in the selection of job offers could best be reflected in the guidelines of the Directorate of Labour and Welfare. Such consideration would assist the implementation of section G.4.1 of the guidelines, which forbids applicants for employment to make reservations as regards the type of occupation they will work in and requires them to accept work even in occupations for which they are not trained or in which they have no previous experience.

As regards sanctions imposed on unemployed persons, the Government reports that in 2007 less than 200 jobseekers got their benefit stopped during the first three months of unemployment because of refusal to accept: offered work, work in another part of the country or part-time work. The Committee would like the Government to verify that in all these cases the jobseekers concerned were not sanctioned for having refused to take up jobs that were not suitable to their acquired professional status. It therefore invites the Government, if necessary, to follow the example of Denmark where, in order to assess the extent to which the unemployed persons refuse job offers due to the job not being “suitable”, the National Directorate of Labour, which deals with complaints and supervision in relation to the Unemployment Insurance Act, had in 2005 manually examined all cases (352 files) of sanctions for refusal to take up a job offer. The Committee hopes that the results of this verification would help the Government to decide whether or not the guidelines of the Directorate of Labour and Welfare need to be changed in order to ensure that the discretionary power to sanction the behaviour of the unemployed persons in the current labour market situation is being applied with due respect for their acquired professional and social status.

In this connection the Committee further notes the assurances of the Government that the unemployed will normally not get offered jobs from the Labour and Welfare Service, unless it is a job that corresponds to his or her education and qualifications. The LWS will initially devote a lot of time, to identify the jobseekers’ qualifications, working experience and job requests. The goal is to help the unemployed to get a suitable job. When considering whether the work is suitable, the LWS should – according to the Directorate of Labour and Welfare’s guidelines, section A, article 4.18 – also consider:

–      how long the jobseeker has been unemployed;

–      the probability of getting a job which corresponds to his or her qualifications;

–      whether the offered job can give valuable working experience; and

–      whether the remuneration offered for the job involves an unreasonable reduction of income compared to what the person is receiving by way of unemployment benefits.

The Committee would like the Government to explain how this last criterion, which requires the jobseeker to consider job offers remunerated at the level below the unemployment benefit, could still be retained in the guidelines of the Directorate of Labour and Welfare after the abolition since 1 January 2006 of the legal provisions, which previously made it possible to compel unemployed persons to accept jobs offering less income than the unemployment benefit.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2007, published 97th ILC session (2008)

Article 21 of the Convention (suspension of benefit). With reference to its previous comments which it has been making for a number of years, the Committee recalls that, according to section G.4 of the guidelines of the Directorate of Labour, in order to be regarded as a genuine jobseeker, an applicant for unemployment benefit must be willing and able to accept any work that is remunerated according to a collective wage agreement or a local custom. Section G.4.1 details that the obligation to take any work means that applicants for employment cannot make reservations as regards the type of occupation they will work in and must be willing to accept any work they are physically and mentally fit for, even in occupations for which they are not trained or in which they have no previous experience. The applicant’s acquired experience and length of service in former occupations – criteria which are expressly mentioned for assessing the suitability of employment in Article 21(2) of the Convention – are not taken into account when the decision on the withdrawal of the benefit is taken following the jobseeker’s refusal to accept the employment offered on these grounds. Such guidance of the employment offices leads astray of the aim of the Convention which consists precisely in offering unemployed persons protection during the first 26 weeks of unemployment from the obligation to take up jobs that are not suitable to their acquired professional and social status. The Committee regrets to note that the Government’s report merely repeats the “reasons why there is no initial period in which the beneficiary may refuse jobs offered”. The Committee therefore once again urges the Government to bring the guidelines of the Directorate of Labour into conformity with Norway’s obligations under the Convention and the European Code of Social Security, which forbid applying sanctions for refusing to accept unsuitable job offers at least during the initial period of unemployment.

Article 26 (special provisions for new applicants for employment). In the direct request of 2006, the Government was asked to specify, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Convention, which three of the ten listed categories of persons it undertakes to protect, what concrete social benefits and services are placed at their disposal, and what additional categories of the new applicants for employment would benefit from such protection in line with paragraph 3 of this Article. In reply, the Government has provided information on the social benefits to persons who are temporarily or permanently outside the workforce due to sickness, disability, rehabilitation, unemployment or social assistance. The Committee wishes to point out that these categories of persons do not correspond to those expressly mentioned under items (a) to (j) of Article 26(1). It would therefore ask the Government to indicate measures taken or contemplated to give full effect to the provisions of Article 26 of the Convention in law and in practice.

[The Government is asked to reply in detail to the present comments in 2008.]

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2006, published 96th ILC session (2007)

With reference to its observation, the Committee notes the information provided by the Government in reply to the Committee’s previous comments.

Part VII (Special provisions for new applicants for employment), Article 26 of the Convention. The Committee notes the Government’s explanations concerning the social assistance provided by the municipalities under Chapter 5 of the Social Services Act, with special reference to young people who have finished their vocational training. As regards other categories of new applicants for employment mentioned in Article 26 of the Convention, the Committee recalls that certain social benefits are offered also to young persons who have completed their compulsory military service, adults, including disabled persons, who have completed a period of training, as well as persons whose spouse had died, when they are not entitled to a survivor’s benefit. As social benefits under paragraph 1 of Article 26 have to be provided for at least three of the ten specified categories of persons seeking work who are not covered by existing unemployment schemes, the Government is asked to specify, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, which of the listed categories of persons it undertakes to protect and what concrete social benefits and services are placed at their disposal for this purpose. In addition, the Committee would also like the Government to indicate further categories of persons to which it plans to extend progressively such benefits and services in line with paragraph 3 of Article 26.

[The Government is asked to reply in detail to the present comments in 2007.]

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2006, published 96th ILC session (2007)

In its previous comments, the Committee pointed out that the possibility, under sections 4-5 and 4-20 of the National Insurance Act of 28 February 1997, of compelling unemployed persons to accept jobs offering less income than the unemployment benefit to which they would otherwise be entitled as of right, or to accept self-employment, which would deprive them of further social security coverage against unemployment, if abused by the employment service, could completely undermine the nature and purpose of unemployment benefit as foreseen by the Convention. In reply, the Government states in its report that the legal provisions compelling unemployed persons to accept jobs offering less income than the unemployment benefit or to generate income from self-employment have been abrogated by the decision of the Storting of 16 December 2005. The Committee notes with satisfaction that the corresponding amendments to the National Insurance Act came into force as of 1 January 2006.

As regards other provisions of the National Insurance Act under which a person could be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefit for having refused an unsuitable job offer, the Committee recalls that, according to section G.4 of the guidelines of the Directorate of Labour, in order to be regarded as a genuine jobseeker, an applicant for unemployment benefit must be willing and able to accept any work that is remunerated according to a collective wage agreement or a local custom. Section G.4.1 details that the obligation to take any work means that applicants for employment cannot make reservations as regards the type of occupation they will work in and must be willing to accept any work they are physically and mentally fit for, even in occupations for which they are not trained or in which they have no previous experience. The applicant’s skill, qualification, acquired experience and length of service in the former occupation – criteria which are normally used for assessing the suitability of employment – are not taken into account when the decision on the withdrawal of the benefit is taken following the jobseeker’s refusal to accept the employment offered on these grounds.

The Committee wishes to observe in this respect that, according to the definition of the contingency contained in Article 10, paragraph 1, the aim of the Convention consists precisely of offering unemployed persons protection during the initial period of unemployment from the obligation to take up jobs that are not suitable to their acquired professional and social status. In line with this aim of the Convention, Article 21, paragraph 1, specifies that the entitlement to the benefit in the case of full unemployment may be withdrawn or suspended only when the person concerned refuses to accept suitable employment, taking into account, under prescribed conditions and to an appropriate extent, the criteria of the suitability of employment laid down in paragraph 2 of this Article and, in particular, the length of service in the former occupation and the acquired experience. The Committee would appreciate therefore if the Government would consider the possibility of including in the above guidelines of the Directorate of Labour the reference to the international obligations of Norway under Convention No. 168, so as to instruct the employment offices not to apply sanctions for refusal to accept unsuitable job offers at least during the initial duration of unemployment specified in Article 19, paragraph 2(a).

[The Government is asked to reply in detail to the present comments in 2007.]

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 1999, published 88th ILC session (2000)

With reference to its previous comments, the Committee notes the information provided by the Government in its report on the Convention and the 32nd annual report on the application of the European Code of Social Security, as well as the English translation of the relevant provisions of the National Insurance Act, the Regulations on Unemployment Benefit and the current guidelines for the employment market service issued by the Directorate of Labour supplied by the Government. It would like the Government to furnish additional information on the following points:

1. Article 10, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 21 of the Convention. In its previous comments, the Committee noted that the new National Insurance Act of 28 February 1997 obliged a "genuine jobseeker" to take up any employment offered to him by the employment market service, irrespective in particular of its level of remuneration, location in Norway and of whether it was a full-time or part-time job (section 4-5), and provided for the withdrawal of unemployment benefit from eight weeks to six months in cases where the insured person refused, "without reasonable grounds", to accept an offer of such employment (section 4-20), as well as for the withdrawal of the entitlement to the benefit for as long as the insured person did not fulfil the conditions of being a genuine jobseeker (section 4-21). The Committee observed that, by virtue of these changes in the National Insurance Act, the previously applicable rule by which a person could be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefit for having refused "suitable employment" was replaced by the apparently more restrictive concept of withdrawal of the benefit for refusing employment offered "without reasonable grounds". To assess the practical effect of the new legislation, the Committee asked the Government to supply a copy of the guidelines followed by the employment market service in making offers of employment to an unemployed person and in determining whether such person has a reasonable ground for refusing it, indicating in particular to what extent account was being taken in practice of such considerations as skills, qualifications, acquired experience and length of service in the former occupation, as well as the personal and family situation of the person concerned in case the job offered implied a change of residence. It also asked for the statistical information on the number of cases in which unemployment benefit was suspended due to refusal to accept the job offered for the whole period since the entry into force of the new legislation on 1 January 1997.

The Committee notes from the statistics supplied by the Government that the number of cases in which unemployment benefit was suspended due to refusal to accept the job offered by the employment market service actually decreased in 1998 (2,202 cases) in comparison with 1997 (2,349 cases) when the new legislation was first introduced, and showed a further downward tendency in the first quarter of 1999. As explained by the Government, this trend coincided with the period of lowering unemployment (the unemployment rate in Norway has decreased from 3.3 per cent in 1997 to 2.4 per cent in 1998) during which, compared to the periods of high unemployment, the practice of imposing sanctions on recipients of unemployment benefit who refuse to take jobs offered, is somewhat stricter. The reason for this is that during periods of low unemployment when the demand for labour is strong and the employment market service has more jobs to place people into, it may be necessary for it to fill jobs that are not very suitable to the unemployed people to whom they are offered. Nevertheless, the Government considers that current legislation permitting withdrawal of unemployment benefit for refusing employment "without reasonable grounds" is less restrictive than the old one referring to "suitable employment", since it opens the possibility to take into account in favour of the recipient matters that relate to family and care situations rather than the job. It refers in particular to sections G.5 and G.7 of the guidelines issued by the Directorate of Labour which lay down exceptions from the obligation to take full-time work and the requirement of full geographical mobility of unemployed persons based on such criteria as impaired health of the jobseeker, care of small children, care, nursing or sole responsibility for other close members of the family, the need for the child to stay in the same school, and the like. The Committee observes that such criteria are in line with those normally used in assessing the suitability of employment as far as the personal and family situation of the unemployed person is concerned.

As regards assessing the suitability of employment offered on the basis of criteria which relate to skills, qualifications, acquired experience and length of service in the former occupation, the Government states that qualifications and individual possibilities to obtain employment will be considered by the Labour Market Administration during the initial conversation with the jobseeker in cooperation with him or her, with the necessary assistance offered. Jobseekers are then encouraged to be active in their jobseeking process in order to find work without further assistance from the Labour Market Administration, if possible. If they have difficulty in finding work or are uncertain about their possibilities, they are offered further guidance, either individually or in groups, and after three months are followed up by the employment office. In all contacts with the jobseekers the importance of their own engagement and activity in obtaining a job suited to their theoretical and practical competence and personal situation is stressed. And in each individual case an assessment of the person's skills, qualifications, acquired experience and length of service in former occupation, as well as his or her personal and family situation, is made. However, the Government specifies that, when it is decided whether to withdraw his or her benefit for a limited period of time or not, no account is being taken of the person's length of service in the former occupation or of the acquired experience, and there are no formal guidelines to this effect. Moreover, if the person in question has been unemployed for a long time, this may be considered a reason for applying the principles that are in force in a stricter way than otherwise. In its report on the Code, the Government adds that, in practice, a standard for what is suitable employment is set by the employer himself when reporting a vacancy and accepting the person offered by the employment service; any public employment service, working to place unemployed persons into employmet, must take these employer's considerations into account.

The Committee notes this information. It agrees with the Government that supplying workers meeting the standard of suitability established by the employer for the job offered is an important function of the public employment service in regulating the labour market from the supply side. The effectiveness of the employment market service in this respect is confirmed by the lowering rate of unemployment in Norway in recent years. However, in matching jobseekers with vacancies, the public employment service is also called to fulfil the not less important task of ensuring that, on the demand side, the jobs offered are of such quality that corresponds to the professional skills and qualifications of the prospective jobseekers. From this perspective, it appears from the explanations given by the Government that, under the new legislation, the task of finding quality jobs suited to the theoretical and practical competence of the jobseekers has been shifted from the employment market service on to the jobseekers themselves to become primarily their own responsibility. Disregard by the employment market service of the jobseeker's competence in judging the reasonableness of his or her refusal to accept the employment offered might result in compelling the jobseeker concerned to take up a lower quality job unsuitable to his qualifications, but which the employment service has to fill, particularly during periods of low unemployment. Nationwide, if skilled workers, disregarding their higher qualifications, were to be systematically placed in less skilled jobs, such labour market policy would inevitably lead to a lowering of the skills level of the national workforce and the substantial reduction of the employment opportunities for unskilled workers at the low end, pushing them into long-term unemployment and exclusion. Thus, favouring the supply-side over the demand-side approach in regulating the labour market, orienting the employment market service to providing workers suitable for jobs rather than jobs suitable for workers, would in the long run lead to labour market imbalances and inefficiencies and to situations of underutilization of the human resources potential. On the contrary, in the logic of the Convention which seeks to strike a balance between supply and demand in the labour market in terms of quality and not only quantity of employment, such situations are to be prevented through the systematic application by the public employment service of the concept of suitable employment in its placement policies -- a concept which is no more used in the current Norwegian legislation on unemployment insurance.

In this respect, the Committee notes that, according to section G.4 of the guidelines of the Directorate of Labour, in order to be regarded as a genuine jobseeker, an applicant for unemployment benefits must as a general rule be willing and able to accept any work that is remunerated according to a collective wage agreement or a local custom. Section G.4.1 stipulates that the obligation to take any work means that applicants for employment cannot make reservations as regards the type of occupation they will work in and must be willing to accept any work they are physically and mentally fit for, even in occupations for which they are not trained or in which they have no previous experience. It is the employer's assessment of the applicant's qualifications which is decisive. Applicants for employment must also be willing to take up work at a lower rate of pay than their previous income and, in special cases, even lower than their daily cash benefit. The Committee further notes from the explanations provided by the Government that while skill, qualification, acquired experience and length of service in former occupation may be taken into consideration in negotiations between the jobseeker concerned and the Labour Market Administration, these criteria for assessing the suitability of employment offered are not formally taken into account when the decision on the withdrawal of the benefit is taken following the jobseeker's refusal to accept the employment offered on these grounds. The Committee recalls in this respect that in its previous report, in explaining the purpose of the regulations to be worked out under the new legislation which no longer used the concept of "suitable employment", the Government emphasized that they aimed at providing the best possible motivation for the unemployed to get ordinary jobs.

In this situation, the Committee cannot but observe that, apart from the few exceptions provided, the new provisions of the National Insurance Act referred to above and the guidelines for their practical implementation are likely to have the effect of legally compelling unemployed persons, under the threat of the withdrawal of the entitlement to the benefit, to take up any ordinary job for which they are physically and mentally fit, notwithstanding their professional skills, qualifications, acquired experience and length of service in former occupation. The Committee would therefore once again like to draw the Government's attention to the fact that, according to the definition of the contingency contained in Article 10, paragraph 1, the aim of the Convention consists precisely of offering unemployed persons protection during the initial period of unemployment from the obligation to take up any job which is not suitable, so as to leave open the possibility to provide them with suitable employment ensuring the most effective utilization of their human resources potential for the benefit of the workers concerned and the society as a whole. In line with this aim of the Convention, Article 21, paragraph 1, specifies that the entitlement to the benefit in the case of full unemployment may be withdrawn or suspended only when the person concerned refuses to accept suitable employment, taking into account, under prescribed conditions and to an appropriate extent, the criteria of the suitability of employment laid down in paragraph 2 of this Article and, in particular, of the length of service in the former occupation and the acquired experience. In the light of these provisions of the Convention, the Committee would appreciate if the Government would reconsider the question with a view to ensuring that, in all cases covered by Article 10, paragraph 1, of the Convention in relation to Article 21, unemployment benefit is paid at least during the initial duration of unemployment specified in Article 19, paragraph 2(a). The ommittee would also like the Government to continue to supply in its future reports the statistical information on the number of cases in which unemployment benefit was suspended due to refusal to accept the job offered by the employment market service.

2. Article 20. In its previous comments, the Committee asked the Government to indicate how the provisions of sections 4-5 and 4-20 of the new National Insurance Act which subject entitlement to unemployment benefit to the condition that unemployed persons should seek income from the creation of self-employment, are being applied in practice, taking into account that such condition is not mentioned among the grounds for the refusal, withdrawal or suspension of benefit listed in Article 20 of the Convention. In reply, the Government indicates that these provisions very seldom lead to any withdrawal or suspension of unemployment benefit. It refers to the abovementioned guidelines which recognize that it is often difficult to decide if a recipient of unemployment benefit is in a position to gain income from the creation of self-employment. Therefore, according to the Government, it is recommended to suspend unemployment benefit in these cases only after close consideration.

The Committee notes this information. It recalls that section 4-5 of the National Insurance Act defines a genuine jobseeker as a person who is willing, among other things, "to generate income from the creation of self-employment", while section 4-21 provides for the withdrawal of the entitlement to the daily cash benefit for as long as the insured person stops fulfilling this condition of being a genuine jobseeker. It further notes that section 4-6 authorizes payment of the daily cash benefit for a period of nine months while the jobseeker is planning and creating a self-employed activity, while section 4-20 provides for the withdrawal of the entitlement to the daily cash benefit for a specified period in the event that the insured person, without any reasonable grounds, refuses to seek income from the creation of a self-employed activity during the benefit period. As regards the way these provisions of the law are to be applied in practice by the employment market service, the Committee notes that sections G.8 and P.5.3 of the guidelines highlight an obligation of jobseekers to do their utmost to obtain the necessary income; recipients of daily cash benefit are not only obliged to try to earn an income through paid work in someone else's service, but must also do what they can to earn an income through self-employment. In this connection section G.8 mentions in particular the situation of people who work partly as employees in someone else's service and partly as self-employed, stating that if they become unemployed in someone else's service and have the possibility of expanding their work as self-employed persons, they must make use of this opportunity instead of receiving daily cash benefits. However, section P.5.3 of the guidelines recognizes that it is often difficult to determine whether a recipient of daily cash benefit is able to earn money through self-employment and whether his right to benefit must be discontinued for that reason, and recommends to exercise caution in reaching decisions to discontinue benefits on this basis.

The Committee observes from these provisions that, notwithstanding any recommendation for caution in their practical application, the aim of the law appears to consist in compelling unemployed persons who have the capacity of doing so, to move from formal employment into self-employment, under the threat of the withdrawal of the unemployment benefit at the discretion of the employment market service officials. By forcing such unemployed persons into self-employment the employment market service would automatically push them outside the scope of the unemployment protection scheme, taking into account that under section 4-3 of the National Insurance Act unemployment benefit does not extend to self-employed persons. This might lead to a rather paradoxical situation where the institute of unemployment benefit would actually deprive the persons concerned of the protection against unemployment in future in case their self-employment activity fails. The Committee considers that, to the extent that this may be the case, such method of providing unemployment benefit could not be deemed compatible with the Convention, which, on the contrary, aims at extending unemployment protection progressively to additional categories of persons by, inter alia, bringing previously self-employed persons under the coverage of the unemployment protection scheme (Article 26). As designed by the Convention, unemployment benefit is intended to serve as a transitional wage replacement to help unemployed persons to return to suitable employment carrying full rights to unemployment protection and other social security benefits (Articles 10 and 14), but not to direct them into self-employment where they are likely to lose any of those rights. Read together with these provisions of the Convention, Article 20 therefore would not permit to withdraw unemployment benefit on the ground that the person concerned refused to earn income from self-employment instead of from suitable employment.

The Committee fully understands that, besides formal employment, the development of self-employment, micro-enterprises and entrepreneurship constitute in themselves important elements of an active policy designed to promote full and productive employment in the broadest sense. It recalls however that the employment to be promoted by such policy under Article 7 of the Convention using all appropriate means, including social security, should also be freely chosen. By implication, the principle of the free choice of employment should also extend to such other forms of productive activities which society deems necessary to promote through its labour market policy. Furthermore, under Article 19, paragraphs 1 and 5, of the Convention, the right to freely chosen employment of unemployed persons is to be safeguarded throughout the contingency, even when their unemployment continues beyond the initial period of benefit and the persons concerned become the subject of special employment assistance programmes for the long-term unemployed. From this perspective, the Committee wishes to emphasize that the element of compulsion present in the abovementioned provisions of the National Insurance Act, exercised through the threat of the withdrawal of the entitlement to unemployment benefit in case of refusal to earn income from self-employment, can be hardly reconciled with the requirement that social security means in general and the methods of providing unemployment benefit in particular should contribute to the promotion of freely chosen employment (Articles 7 and 2 of the Convention). The Committee therefore expresses the hope that the Government will give thorough consideration to this question. In the meantime, it is asked to provide detailed statistics on the number of cases in which unemployment benefit was withdrawn in application of the corresponding provisions of sections 4-5 and 4-20 of the National Insurance Act, the number of the appeals lodged by insured persons in these cases, as well as examples of the decisions taken by the employment market service and the appeal bodies.

3. Article 20(f). In its previous comments concerning the requirement of sections 4-5 and 4-20 of the National Insurance Act which subjects the entitlement to unemployment benefit to participation in labour market programmes, the Committee recalled that, according to Article 20(f) of the Convention, refusal or withdrawal of benefit is authorized only in cases where the person concerned has failed without just cause to use the facilities available for placement, vocational guidance, training, retraining or redeployment in suitable work. Taking into account that participation in labour market programmes did not dispense unemployed persons of the obligation to take up an ordinary job, the Committee asked the Government to explain in detail the rules and criteria applied in offering labour market programmes and in assessing the reasonableness of the ground in case participation in them is refused by the unemployed person concerned, particularly on the ground of their unsuitability in the light of his or her education, qualifications, length of service in former occupation and acquired experience.

The Committee thanks the Government for the detailed explanations provided, according to which the same rules and criteria that are applied when it comes to accepting job offers also apply to participating in labour market programmes. If the person in question is physically and mentally qualified for the programme, he or she has no acceptable reason not to accept it. This means that if the person is asked to participate in the programme and refuses to do so, or discontinues his or her participation in the programme, unemployment benefit will normally be suspended for a limited period of time. Taking into account that, according to the Government, no formal procedures have been laid down for jobseekers who refuse to accept the labour market programme on the ground of its unsuitability in light of his or her education, qualifications, length of service in former occupation and acquired experience, the Committee would like the Government to refer to the comments it has formulated in this respect under point 1 above.

4. Article 26. The Committee notes that the Government's report contains no reply to its previous comments concerning the application of this Article of the Convention. It therefore hopes that the Government will not fail to include in its next report full information on the terms and conditions under which social assistance is paid by municipalities to the persons in need, particularly those belonging to category (a) (young persons who have completed their vocational training), and to supply the text of the corresponding legal provisions. In addition, taking into account that, under sections 4-5 and 4-20 of the National Insurance Act, the entitlement to unemployment benefit is subjected to the condition that unemployed persons should seek income from the creation of self-employment, the Committee would like to receive information on the measures taken or contemplated to extend protection under Article 26 of the Convention to the previously self-employed persons (category (j)).

5. Finally, the Committee once again asks the Government to provide the most recent consolidated version of the Act respecting measures to promote employment, No. 9 of 27 June 1947, together with an English translation, if available.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 1998, published 87th ILC session (1999)

With reference to its previous comments, the Committee notes the information provided by the Government in its report and, in particular, that concerning the application of Article 7, Article 10, paragraph 3, and Article 18, paragraph 3, as well as (with respect to insured persons receiving education or training or engaged in unremunerated work) Article 20 of the Convention. It also notes the text of the National Insurance Act (NIA) No. 12 of 28 February 1997, supplied by the Government, which incorporated changes made in the legislation regarding unemployment benefit which took effect on 1 January 1997. The Committee would like the Government to furnish additional information on the following points:

1. Article 10, paragraph 1, in relation with Article 21. In its previous comments, the Committee asked the Government to explain by supplying relevant rules and guidelines the notion of the term "suitable employment" and to provide statistics on the number of cases in which unemployment benefit was suspended due to refusal to accept the job offered by the employment market service. The Committee notes that, according to section 4-5 of the new National Insurance Act, to be entitled to the benefit, an insured person must be a genuine jobseeker defined as a person who is capable of work, and who is willing: (a) to accept work which is proposed and is remunerated according to agreed or normal rates, and even in certain cases, at a rate that is lower than the daily cash benefit; (b) to accept work anywhere in Norway; (c) to accept work irrespective of whether it is full time or part time; (d) to generate income from the creation of self-employment; (e) to participate in labour market programmes. On the grounds of age or significant social considerations related to health, caring responsibilities for young children or the needs of a close family member, the insured person may be considered to be a genuine jobseeker if she/he only looks for part-time work, or only looks for work in a geographically restricted area. Section 4-20 further stipulates that, where the insured person refuses, without any reasonable grounds, to accept an offer of work or labour market programme, as defined in section 4-5 above, his entitlement may be withdrawn for a period of eight weeks on the first occasion or more on subsequent occasions. There are no explicit exceptions from this provision on grounds of age, health or caring responsibilities, but the withdrawal of the benefit is not applied in the case of a person who has resigned from work in order to move with a spouse or partner to a new job or another town in the country, in which case he may be considered to be a genuine jobseeker. Finally, section 4-21 provides that entitlement to the benefit shall be withdrawn from the time that the insured person no longer fulfils the condition of being a genuine jobseeker, and shall only be renewed from the time that this condition is once again fulfilled.

Explaining the above legislative changes the Government stated in its report that the expression "suitable employment" is no longer used in the legislation in force since 1 January 1997, which aims at providing the best possible motivation for the unemployed to get ordinary jobs. According to the Government, the guidelines for determining whether a person who is offered a job has an acceptable reason for refusing it, are rather complicated. The general principle is that if the unemployed person is physically and mentally qualified for the job, he or she has no acceptable reason to refuse. It is considered irrelevant whether the person considers himself too well or too poorly qualified for the job; this question is for the prospective employer to decide. The jobseekers must be willing to take jobs anywhere in the country, to move where the job is or to commute. They must also be willing to work at inconvenient times, during the evening, the night and at weekends. In certain cases they must accept jobs that mean lower pay than their unemployment benefit, although suspension of unemployment benefit is seldom used in such cases. At the same time, the Government points to certain exceptions. Persons who are above 60 years of age, or in poor health, or else take care of close relatives, may refuse to take more than part-time jobs and jobs which mean that they have to move or commute. If there is no fixed wage or salary for the job but only a commission, or if the working conditions violate the legislation in force, the unemployed person can normally refuse the job without a suspension of unemployment benefit. The Government also indicates that in the first quarter of 1998 altogether 667 persons had their benefit temporarily suspended for having refused the employment offered without reasonable grounds.

The Committee observes that, by virtue of the above-mentioned changes in the NIA, the previously applicable rule by which a person could be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefit for having refused "suitable employment", is replaced by the more restrictive concept of withdrawing the benefit for refusing employment offered "without any reasonable grounds". From the explanations provided by the Government, it would appear that, apart from the few exceptions mentioned above, the aim of the new legislation consists in compelling unemployed persons, under the threat of the withdrawal of the entitlement to the benefit, to take up any ordinary job for which they are physically and mentally fit. The Committee recalls in this respect that, according to the definition of the contingency contained in Article 10, paragraph 1, the aim of the Convention consists precisely in offering unemployed persons protection from the obligation to take up any job which is not suitable, so as to ensure for the benefit of the workers and society that the most effective utilization is made of human resources potential. Article 21, paragraph 1, further specifies that the entitlement to the benefit in the case of full unemployment may be withdrawn or suspended only when the person concerned refuses to accept suitable employment. In this respect, the Committee would like the Government to indicate whether and to what extent the employment market service, in assessing the reasons advanced by the unemployed person for refusing the job offered to him leading to the withdrawal of the benefit, takes account in practice of the criteria of suitability of employment laid down in paragraph 2 of Article 21. Please indicate, in particular, whether at least during an initial period of unemployment, consideration is given by the competent authorities when proposing an offer of employment to an unemployed person to his skills, qualification, acquired experience and length of service in his former occupation, as well as to his personal and family situation in case the job offered implies change of residence. The Committee would also appreciate receiving a copy of the guidelines, referred to by the Government, for determining whether a person who is offered a job has an acceptable reason for refusing it, as well as the statistical information on the number of cases in which unemployment benefit was suspended due to refusal to accept the job offered by the employment market service for the whole period since the entry into force of the new legislation on 1 January 1997.

2. Article 20. The Committee would like the Government to indicate how the provisions of sections 4-5 and 4-20 of the new National Insurance Act cited above, subjecting entitlement to unemployment benefit to the condition that unemployed persons should seek income from the creation of self-employment, are being applied in practice, taking into account that such condition is not mentioned among the grounds for the refusal, withdrawal or suspension of benefit listed in Article 20 of the Convention.

3. Article 20(f). As regards the requirement of sections 4-5 and 4-20 of the National Insurance Act, subjecting the entitlement to unemployment benefit to participation in labour market programmes, the Committee notes, from the Government's report, that the phrase "labour market measures" refers to the whole range of measures in force, including, for example, AMO (training and education), KAJA (creation of competency and jobs and work-training for unemployed persons), public employment for disabled persons, jobs for which the employer gets a subsidy from the state to employ people for a limited period of time, etc. The Government adds, with reference to section 4-4 of the NIA, that after 1 January 1997 it has not been possible for the unemployed persons to earn the right to unemployment benefit through participation in such programmes, the reasoning behind this curtailment of the right being that, if a person can qualify for several successive periods of unemployment benefit through participation in labour market measures, the person in question may not do his or her best to get an ordinary job. The Committee wishes to remind in this respect that, according to Article 20(f) of the Convention, refusal or withdrawal of benefit is authorized only in cases where the person concerned has failed without just cause to use the facilities available for placement, vocational guidance, training, retraining or redeployment in suitable work. Taking into account that, as stated by the Government, participation in labour market programmes does not seem to dispense unemployed persons of the obligation to take up an ordinary job, the Committee would like the Government to explain in detail the rules and criteria applied in offering labour market programmes and in assessing the reasonableness of the ground in case participation in them is refused by the unemployed person concerned, particularly on the ground of their unsuitability in the light of his or her education, qualifications, length of service in former occupation and acquired experience.

4. Article 26. In reply to the Committee's previous comments concerning social benefits provided to categories (a) and (h) of the new applicants for employment, the Government indicates that there are still no social benefits with prescribed terms and conditions for young persons who have completed their vocational training (category (a)). However, individuals in this category may be entitled to social assistance paid by the municipality, like everybody else in Norway, if they have no other source of income and are without means to sustain their livelihood. In addition, as regards adults, including disabled persons, who have completed a period of training (category (h)), the Government indicates that, according to section 11-8, subsection 2(c), of the National Insurance Act, persons who have completed a rehabilitation programme and who are regarded as genuine jobseekers, are entitled to rehabilitation benefit for one year, which is to provide financial security for the time the persons in question are trying to get a job. The Committee takes note of this information. It would like the Government to specify the terms and conditions under which social assistance is paid by municipalities to the persons in need, and to supply the text of the corresponding legal provisions.

5. Finally, the Committee once again asks the Government to provide the most recent consolidated version of the Act respecting measures to promote employment, No. 9 of 27 June 1947, together with an English translation, if available.

[The Government is asked to report in detail in 1999.]

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 1995, published 82nd ILC session (1995)

The Committee notes the detailed information and explanations provided by the Government in its reports. It would like the Government to furnish additional information concerning the application of the following provisions of the Convention:

Article 6 of the Convention. Please explain the content and supply the text of the rules adopted, if any, under section 1-2, subsection 2, paragraph 4, and subsection 3, last paragraph, of the National Insurance Act.

Article 7. According to the Government's first report, to achieve a more effective labour market policy several projects have been initiated to review employment programmes and to evaluate the unemployment benefit scheme in an overall perspective. The Committee would like to be informed of the outcome of these projects. Taking into account that the application of Part II of the Convention is closely related to the Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 122), the Committee would also like to draw the Government's attention to its comments concerning the application of Convention No. 122.

Article 10, paragraph 3. According to the Government's first report, unemployment benefit may be combined with partial employment and is granted to persons who are partially unemployed because they are unable to obtain full employment. Please indicate the conditions, the amount and the duration of the unemployment benefit paid to part-time workers actually seeking full-time jobs, with reference to the relevant provisions of the laws and regulations.

Article 18, paragraph 3. Please indicate the content of the rules adopted, if any, pursuant to section 4-2, subsection 2, paragraph 4, of the National Insurance Act.

Article 20. The Committee notes, from the information supplied by the Government in the twenty-sixth annual report on the application of the European Code of Social Security and the Protocol to the Code, that Parliament has decided to abolish, as of 5 July 1993, entitlement to cash unemployment benefit while the insured person is receiving education or training or is engaged in unremunerated work. Please supply detailed information on the application of these measures in practice, as well as the texts of any relevant legal, regulatory or administrative provisions.

Article 20(f). According to section 4-2, subsection 3(d), of the National Insurance Act, entitlement to unemployment benefit shall lapse if the insured person refuses without due reason to participate in vocational training, retraining or rehabilitation qualifying for public grants, or in other labour market measures organized by the Labour Market Service. Please provide detailed information on what is meant by "other labour market measures".

Article 21, paragraph 2. Please supply a copy of the rules and guidelines for determining "suitable employment" adopted under section 4-2, subsection 3, of the National Insurance Act and provide statistical information on the number of cases in which the benefit was suspended due to refusal to accept the job offered by the employment market service.

Part VII of the Convention. In its statement under Article 4 of the Convention the Government indicates that "Norway has excluded Part VII from ratification". The Committee recalls in this respect that Article 4 authorizes a Member to exclude the provisions of Part VII from the obligations accepted by ratification only by a declaration accompanying the ratification of the Convention. As no such declaration was made at the time of ratification, the Committee considers that Norway remains fully bound by the obligations of Part VII of the Convention, which requires the Government to ensure social benefits, in accordance with prescribed terms and conditions, at the first stage to at least three of the ten categories of new applicants for employment mentioned in Article 26 of the Convention. The Committee further takes note, from the Government's first report and the legislation, of measures taken to provide certain social benefits in line with the Convention for persons seeking work and belonging in particular to categories (c) and (e). In these circumstances the Committee hopes that the Government will reconsider the question and in its next report indicate measures taken or contemplated to ensure the application of Part VII of the Convention to other categories of persons covered by it. The Government is in the meantime requested to provide additional information with regard to categories (a) and (h).

In addition, the Committee would be grateful if the Government would supply the latest consolidated versions of the National Insurance Act, No. 12 of 17 June 1966, and of the Act respecting measures to promote employment, No. 9 of 27 June 1947 (the consolidated versions available to the Committee in English date back to 1988 and 1971 respectively), together with an English translation, if available.