Medical Care and Sickness Benefits Convention, 1969 (No. 130) - Netherlands (Ratification: 2006)

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2022, published 111st ILC session (2023)

In order to provide a comprehensive view of the issues relating to the application of ratified Conventions on social security, the Committee considers it appropriate to examine Conventions Nos 102 (minimum standards), 121 (employment injury benefits), 128 (invalidity, old-age and survivors’ benefits), and 130 (medical care and sickness benefits) together.

The Committee notes the observations of the National Federation of Christian Trade Unions (CNV), the Netherlands Trade Union Confederation (FNV), and the Trade Union Federation for Professionals (VCP), received on 31 August 2021 and 31 August 2022.

Article 69 of Convention No. 102, Article 32 of Convention No. 128, and Article 28 of Convention No. 130. Suspension of benefits. The Committee takes due note of the information provided by the Government concerning the suspension of cash benefits in case the beneficiary is incarcerated in prison or in a judicial facility.

Article 69(f) of Convention No. 102. Unemployment benefit. Sanctions for misconduct. The Committee takes due note of the information provided by the Government indicating the 2018 guidelines of the Highest Administrative Court, according to which suspension of unemployment benefits may be applied only when the unemployment occurred due to wilful misconduct.

Article 72(2) of Convention No. 102. Collective financing of social security schemes. The Committee takes due note of the statistical data provided by the Government concerning financing of the social security schemes.

Article 14 of Convention No. 121. Assessment of incapacity for work. The Committee notes the observations of the FNV, the VCP, and the CNV indicating that the rules for the assessment of incapacity for work are obsolete and that, as a result of the current assessment procedure, persons with substantial or even severe limitations may be considered as persons with less than 35 per cent incapacity for work under the Work and Income (Employment Capacity) Act of 2006 (WIA). The Committee requests the Government to provide information on the procedure and criteria for the assessment of incapacity for work applied for the purpose of entitlement to benefits under the WIA.

Article 15 of Convention No. 128. (i) Increase in pensionable age. With respect to its previous comments concerning the increase in pensionable age beyond 65 years, the Committee notes the indication by the Government that the pensionable age under the national old-age pension scheme (AOW) is scheduled to increase up to 67 years in 2024 and will be linked to life expectancy thereafter. The Committee further notes from the information provided by the Government in its 2019 report on the application of the European Code of Social Security, and its Protocol, that the share of persons over 55 years in the labour market has substantially increased in the past two decades. Furthermore, the percentage of persons over 65 years will have increased from 15 to 26 per cent by 2040. The Committee also observes from the website of the Statistics Netherlands (CBS) that in 2040, the remaining life expectancy of 60-year-olds will have increased by around three years in comparison with 2016. In addition, the number of years without moderate or severe physical limitations will have increased from 16.3 to 20.6 years for women over 60 years and from 17.4 to 21.7 years for men over 60 years by 2040. The Committee takes due note of this information.

(ii) Early retirement for workers in arduous and unhealthy occupations. The Committee notes from the Government’s report on the application of the European Code of Social Security and its Protocol, that the national old-age pension scheme (AOW) does not provide for early retirement provisions. However, workers can receive payments before they are entitled to a national old-age pension under the contractual early retirement scheme “Regeling vervroegde uitreding” (RVU scheme). The Committee observes that contractual early retirement arrangements can be concluded at individual, company, or sectoral level. According to recent figures, 33 per cent of the workers covered by a collective labour agreement had access to a contractual RVU scheme as of December 2021 and that, for another 10 per cent of these workers, the possibility of a RVU scheme is being discussed. The Committee further observes that the RVU scheme provides for the payment of a levy of 52 per cent with a temporal exemption till 2025 for workers who are 36 months or less before the statutory pensionable age and provided that the gross payment does not exceed the amount of the AOW pension (the Lump Sum Payment, Early Retirement Scheme and Leave Savings Scheme Act of 2021).

The Committee notes the observations of the FNV and the CNV pointing out that the increase in pensionable age beyond 65 years is an unjust measure particularly for workers engaged in arduous and unhealthy occupations whose life expectancy is usually lower. The FNV considers that there is a need for a publicly funded permanent scheme to ensure early retirement for persons in hazardous work.

The Committee recalls that, as per Article 15(3) of the Convention, if the pensionable age is 65 years or higher, the age shall be lowered, under prescribed conditions, in respect of persons who have been engaged in occupations that are deemed by national legislation, for the purpose of old-age benefit, to be arduous or unhealthy. Taking into account the absence of early retirement provisions under the national old-age pension scheme (AOW) and the low coverage of the contractual RVU scheme, the Committee requests the Government to take measures to ensure that workers in arduous and unhealthy occupations are entitled to a full pension, meeting the requirements of Article 26 on level of benefits, at an age earlier than 65, in line with Article 15(3) of the Convention. For this purpose, the Committee strongly recommends to the Government that it considers the introduction of a permanent statutory early retirement scheme particularly for workers in arduous and unhealthy occupations. It also requests the Government to continue to provide information on the scope and the extent of the contractual RVU scheme, including the statistical data on its coverage.

Article 29 of Convention No. 128. Adjustment of benefits to the cost of living. The Committee takes due note of the information provided by the Government regarding the indexation of old-age and invalidity benefits.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2017, published 107th ILC session (2018)

The Committee notes the consolidated report (CR) on the application of the ILO social security Conventions ratified by the Netherlands (Conventions Nos 12, 102, 121, 128 and 130) and of the European Code of Social Security (ECSS), for the period 2006–16. It notes the Government’s statement in the letter transmitting the 50th annual report on the ECSS that the CR will be completed and updated before January 2018. The Committee hopes that the updated CR will contain full explanations and references to concrete provisions of national laws and regulations showing how effect is given in particular to the provisions of the Conventions mentioned below, on which the CR contains no or insufficient information.

The Committee notes the observations communicated in September 2012 by the Netherlands Trade Union Confederation (FNV), the National Federation of Christian Trade Unions (CNV), and the Trade Union Confederation of Middle and Higher Level Employees’ Unions (MHP) on the application of Convention No. 121, which highlight provisions of the Work and Income (Employment Capacity) Act of 2006 (WIA) and their incompatibility with the requirements of the Convention, as well as the deficiencies of their implementation in practice, as well as the observations communicated in August 2016 by the FNV and the CNV concerning the application of Conventions Nos 102, 128 and 130. The issues raised by the trade union organizations concerning the alleged negative impact on certain categories of protected persons of the changes in the legislation on old-age pensions, sickness benefit and health insurance, including enforcement and fraud, will be considered by the Committee on the basis of the updated text of the CR, which should include appropriate explanations with concrete references to the new legislative provisions in these social security branches.

Adjustment of benefits to the cost of living (Part XI of the CR). Article 29 of Convention No. 128. The Committee requests the Government to supply the statistical data on the adjustment of the old-age, invalidity and survivors’ benefits over the period of 2011–16, in accordance with the report form on the Convention adopted by the ILO Governing Body.

Part XIII of the CR (Suspension of benefits); Article 69 of Convention No. 102; Article 22 of Convention No. 121; Article 32 of Convention No. 128; and Article 28 of Convention No. 130. The Committee requests the Government to explain in detail the grounds for the suspension or reduction of benefits applied in national law and practice with regard to social security schemes giving effect to Parts II (Medical care), V (Old-age benefit), VI (Employment injury benefit), IX (Invalidity benefit) and X (Survivors’ benefit) of the CR.

Collective financing of social security schemes (Part XIII of the CR). Article 72(2) of Convention No. 102. The Committee requests the Government to demonstrate that the total of the insurance contributions borne by the employees protected do not exceed 50 per cent of the total of the financial resources allocated to the protection of employees and their wives and children, as requested in the report form on the Convention.

Part IV of the CR (Unemployment benefit). Sanctions for misconduct. Article 69(f) of Convention No. 102. According to section 24(2) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, an employee is considered to be culpably unemployed when the unemployment occurred due to compelling reasons as mentioned in section 678 of Book 7 of the Civil Code and the employee is culpable for becoming unemployed. Among such compelling reasons, section 678(k) and (l) mentions cases when the employee “neglects his duties in a flagrant way” or “is not able to perform his duties due to his own recklessness”. Taking into account that neglect and recklessness on the part of the employee leading to dismissal may not necessarily constitute “wilful misconduct”, which alone may be sanctioned under Article 69(f) of the Convention, the Government in a special letter has drawn the attention of the Institute for Employee Benefit Schemes (UWV) to the international obligation of the Netherlands to apply sanctions only in cases where neglect or recklessness amounted to wilful misconduct directly causing unemployment of the person concerned. In its 2011 Resolution on the application of the European Code of Social Security, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe asked the Government to monitor the effect of this letter and to compile statistics on the number of such cases. According to the statistics supplied in the 50th annual report on the Code, in 2016 misconduct was found in 96,160 cases. In 53,630 cases the benefit was temporary suspended for 66 days on average, and in 5,942 cases payment was permanently discontinued. The Committee notes from these numbers that sanctions for misconduct are being used by the UWV on a large scale without any legal safeguards or assurances from the Government that they are being applied only to cases of wilful misconduct. Taking into account that neither Convention No. 102 nor the ECSS permit to leave the decision making on the application of sanctions to the entire discretion of the social security administration, the Committee once again requests the Government to highlight those provisions in the guidelines to the deciding officers issued by the UWV that would formally require them, before deciding on the suspension of benefit, to ascertain that the misconduct was wilful and has directly caused the contingency in question.

Part V of the CR (Pensionable age), Article 15 of Convention No. 128. The Committee notes that in 2017 the pensionable age was raised to 65 years and nine months and will gradually reach 67 years in 2021. As from 2022, it will be linked to life expectancy. With regard to the international regulations on pensionable age, the Committee recalls that Article 26(2) of the ECSS allows the pension age of 65 years to be exceeded if the number of residents having attained the increased age is not less than 10 per cent of the number of residents under that age but over 15 years of age. Convention No. 102 in that case permits the pension age to be increased only with due regard to the working ability of elderly persons in the country. Article 15 of Convention No. 128 is more explicit in this respect obliging the competent authority fixing the higher age to take into account the demographic, economic and social criteria, which shall be demonstrated statistically, and to establish a lower pension age in respect of persons who have been engaged in occupations that are deemed by national legislation, for the purpose of old-age benefit, to be arduous or unhealthy. Taking into account that the capacity for work of manual employees, who constitute the main category of the persons protected by the ECSS, is likely to decrease substantially after the age of 65, the Protocol to the ECSS established a higher standard of protection by expressly prohibiting the increase of the pension age above 65 years where the pension scheme protects employees only. In the light of these provisions, the Committee requests the Government to justify the increase of the pensionable age beyond 65 years by reference to the demographic, economic and social criteria, which demonstrate statistically the working ability and the employability of elderly persons in the Netherlands. The Committee points out that, within the legal framework of Convention No. 128, the working ability of the elderly persons in the country concerned should be determined with respect to those persons who would have duly acquired the right to the old-age pension at 65 years, but have now to wait for its realization until such higher pension age as is currently fixed by the national law. The indicators generally used to compare the health status of populations through time and in the assessment of healthy ageing and fitness for work include the healthy life expectancy (HLE) which pertains to life spent in good health, and disability-free life expectancy (DFLE) which corresponds to life free from a limiting chronic illness or disability. The HLE and the DFLE of elderly persons as the measure of their capacity for work beyond 65 should be calculated in particular with respect to the categories of unskilled workers engaged in manual operations and physical labour, including in onerous and hazardous occupations entailing premature physical ageing. These categories could be obtained by using the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 2010 Sub-Major Group 91 – Elementary Trades and Related Occupations. From the labour market point of view, increasing the age of retirement would be justified only if such categories of elderly workers conserve not only their physical ability but also a fair chance to stay in the labour market and maintain their employability. Therefore, the Committee requests the Government to include statistics on the participation and unemployment rate for people aged 65–67 years and belonging to the SOC Sub-Major Group 91. The Committee also requests the Government to indicate how effect is given to Article 15(3) of Convention No. 128, which requires lowering the pensionable age for persons who have been engaged in occupations deemed to be arduous or unhealthy.

Part VI of the CR (Conditions of entitlement to the employment injury benefit), Articles 9 and 14 of Convention No. 121. In its observation of 2011, the Committee has drawn the Government’s attention to the incompatibility of certain provisions of the WIA with the requirements of the Convention. In their observations of 2012, the three national trade unions – the FNV, the CNV and the MHP – encouraged the Government “to find, in dialogue with the trade unions, a solution to the problems of the victims of employment injuries arising from the non-compliance by the Netherlands with Convention No. 121”. The Committee notes from the Government’s report of 2016 that there were no new policy developments with respect to the WIA since 2012 and that the Government has not pursued the dialogue with the trade unions on this subject. As the situation in law and policy has not changed, the Committee notes with regret that the cash benefits provided under the WIA for victims of employment injuries do not ensure the level of protection guaranteed by the Convention. Recalling the Government’s general responsibility under Article 25 of Convention No. 121 for the due provision of the benefits provided in compliance with this Convention and requests it to indicate measures taken or contemplated, in consultation with the organizations representing the persons protected, to bring the overall protection offered by the cash benefits granted under the WIA to the level guaranteed by the Convention.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2013, published 103rd ILC session (2014)

With reference to its observation, the Committee notes the Government’s report on Conventions Nos 102, 128 and 130 containing its reply to the direct request of 2012 concerning Convention No. 130, as well as the observations made in this respect by the Netherlands Trade Union Confederation (FNV) dated 30 August and 16 September 2013.

Part II (Medical care) of the report form and Article 13(a) of the Convention. Domiciliary visiting. In reply to the Committee’s previous comments, the Government states that domiciliary visits are covered by the basic insurance coverage, but a general practitioner is not obliged to perform such visits at the request of the insured person unless he or she deems it necessary due to the severity of the condition and the health-care history of the patient. The Committee recalls that the content and scale of medical benefits included in the basic insurance package under the Health Insurance Act are regulated by the Health Insurance Decree and the Health Insurance Ministerial Order. The Committee would like the Government to specify the provisions in these or any other relevant texts which expressly refer to domiciliary visiting by general practitioners, as required by Article 13(a) of the Convention.

Article 13(e). Dental care for adults. The report confirms that dental care for insured persons over 18 years is limited to specialized surgical dentistry (oral surgery), the associated X-rays and dentures, and therefore excludes essential dental care usually provided by dentists, such as preventive advice, check-ups, fillings, root canal treatment, extractions, dental supplies, etc. The FNV observes that most Dutch adults have to pay for dental care out of pocket or buy additional private dental insurance. As a result, the Dutch health-care system does not comply with the Convention. The Committee points out that dental care mentioned in Article 13(e) of the Convention forms part of medical care defined in Articles 8 and 9 in the form of care of a curative and preventive nature afforded with a view to maintaining, restoring or improving the health of the person protected. This definition is obviously much larger than oral surgery covered by the Health Insurance Act and would normally include, as in other European countries, the essential dental care mentioned above. The Committee would like the Government to explain the reasons for leaving the essential dental care outside the basic health insurance coverage and the accessibility of the additional private dental care insurance to persons of small means protected by the Convention.

Effectiveness of medical care. In its previous comments, the Committee noted that the Dutch Government limited its role in overseeing the health insurance to ascertaining whether the private insurer is fulfilling its obligation to provide insured persons with the services they are entitled to under the Health Insurance Act; it consequently pointed out that such limited supervision of the quality and effectiveness of the medical care provided by private insurers seeking to make a profit, and therefore interested in reducing the volume and cost of care, may pose a threat to fulfilling the obligation imposed on the Government by Article 9 of the Convention to ensure that the medical care conforms to the highest practicable standard with a view to maintaining, restoring or improving the health of the person protected. The Committee therefore asked the Government to explain whether the Health Care Inspectorate (IGZ), which is entrusted with overseeing the quality of public health, or any other public body has established a system of indicators measuring effectiveness of medical care and monitoring the health status of the population.

In reply, the Government states that since 2007 the project “Zichtbare Zorg” (Visible Care) was set up to develop indicators to measure the quality of health-care provision. Since 1 January 2013, it has been absorbed by the newly established Dutch Quality Institute. The Government further states that the Dutch health-care system uses indicators to measure the quality of the health care provided, but emphasizes that the basic assumption is that patients, health insurers and health-care providers are best placed to determine good, quality health care and therefore make agreements on quality standards. The Committee understands from this statement that in order to determine the quality standards of medical care provided for the population the Government relies on supply and demand outcomes and would like the Government to explain the respective roles played in this process by the Dutch Quality Institute and the Health Care Inspectorate. In order to demonstrate that the Dutch health-care system has not lost its effectiveness after privatization in 2006, the Committee would like the Government to show in its next report, on the basis of the available health statistics and quality indicators for the period 2006–13, that the health status of the Dutch population has been improving.

Part III (Sickness benefit). The report indicates that the conditions for entitlement to sickness benefit after the first year of illness have been made stricter through amendment of the Sickness Benefits Act (ZW) by the new Act limiting sick leave and incapacity entitlement for those covered by safety net provisions, which entered into force on 1 January 2013. Firstly, the existing criterion of the ability to perform “his/her work” (the work performed most recently) was replaced by the criterion applied under the legislation on incapacity for work (WIA), and the ability to perform “generally accepted work”. The FNV observes that this change results in an unacceptable deterioration of protection for workers with temporary employment contracts compared to workers with permanent contracts, creating two types of workers with unequal entitlements to cash benefits in case of sickness. Secondly, similarly to the WIA, entitlement to sickness benefit was divided into two parts: a wage-related benefit and a minimum benefit. The period during which the wage-related benefit is paid will depend on a person’s employment record. However, the introduction of an employment record requirement has been legally postponed to 1 January 2014, while an alternative solution is being sought under the Coalition Agreement. The FNV adds that legislation for withdrawing this requirement is being prepared. Thirdly, the FNV observes that the Government’s report failed to mention the introduction, similarly to the WIA, of the 35 per cent threshold of loss of earnings for eligibility to sickness benefit after one year of illness. Henceforth, those workers who because of illness have lost less than 35 per cent of their earnings are simply no longer considered sick. The FNV finds all of the above three new conditions for entitlement to sickness benefit contrary to the Convention. Recalling that sickness benefit in the Netherlands is payable for a maximum of two years (104 weeks), the Committee notes that the said conditions are introduced after the first year of illness with respect to entitlement to sickness benefit for the second year. The Committee observes that transposing the requirements contained in the WIA with respect to the disability benefit on the sickness benefit changes the nature of the latter so that in its second year of payment it resembles more a disability benefit than a sickness benefit and thus falls outside the scope of the Convention. The Committee recalls, in this respect, that Article 26(1) of this Convention allows for a limitation of the sickness benefit to 52 weeks in each case of incapacity. The Committee asks the Government to confirm that stricter conditions for entitlement and stricter obligations placed on recipients to return to work introduced by the abovementioned Act do not concern the granting of the sickness benefit during the first 52 weeks of incapacity.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2013, published 103rd ILC session (2014)

Article 31 of the Convention. Participative management of the health insurance scheme. In its previous comments, the Committee noted that in the Netherlands the administration of health insurance is not entrusted to an institution regulated by the public authorities but is entirely in the hands of private insurance companies, which run it for profit. For such schemes, Article 31 of the Convention requires the national legislation to prescribe conditions for the participation of the representatives of the persons protected in the management of the scheme. To promote its management on a tripartite basis, the legislation may also provide for the participation of representatives of employers and of the public authorities. Article 30(2) requires the Government to accept general responsibility for the proper administration of the health insurance institutions and providers of medical services, ensuring that the national health insurance scheme is managed in a democratic and transparent manner, with the proper participation of the trade unions and other organizations representing the persons protected together with the professional associations representing care providers and the medical profession. In the light of these explanations, the Government was asked to supply full information on the application of Article 31 of the Convention in the Dutch health insurance scheme. In reply, the Government states that Article 31 “is not applicable to the Dutch health care system”. The Committee understands from this reply that the provisions of Article 31 are not applied in Dutch law and practice and that the Government has no intention of changing this situation. Noting this development with concern, the Committee cannot but observe that the position of the Government perpetuates the violation by the Netherlands of its obligations under a ratified international treaty, which is this Convention.

The Committee is raising other points in a request addressed directly to the Government.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2012, published 102nd ILC session (2013)

With reference to its previous comments, the Committee notes the information and replies provided by the Government’s report for the period ending 30 June 2011, as well as the observations on the report communicated by the Netherlands Trade Union Confederation (FNV) in September 2011.

Part II (Medical care) of the Convention. Domiciliary visiting. Please indicate under which provisions of the Health Insurance Act care given by the general practitioners includes domiciliary visiting, as stipulated in Article 13(a) of the Convention.

Dental care for adults. The report states that dental care for insured persons aged 22 and over is limited to specialized surgical dentistry (oral surgery), the associated X-rays and dentures. People with an exceptional dental disorder, physical/mental disability or special dental problems resulting from medical treatment are entitled to complete dental care (subject to special conditions). The FNV points out that, as described, dental care is limited to oral surgery involving the jaw bone and performed by hospital-based oral surgeons and does not include essential dental care usually provided by dentists, such as preventive advise, check ups, fillings, root canal treatment, extractions, dental supplies, etc. These benefits are not covered by the Health Insurance Act, which, in the opinion of the FNV, is a violation of Article 13(e) of the Convention. The Committee points out that dental care mentioned in Article 13(e) forms part of medical care defined in Articles 8 and 9 as care of a curative and preventive nature afforded with a view to maintaining, restoring or improving the health of the person protected. This definition is obviously much larger than oral surgery covered by the Health Insurance Act and would normally include the dental treatments mentioned by the FNV. The Committee also points out that Article 13(e) covers “dental care, as prescribed”, which means as determined by or in virtue of national legislation (see Article 1(b)). In order to ascertain that the understanding of dental care in the Netherlands conforms to Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention, the Committee asks the Government to specify how the term “dental care” is defined in the national health care legislation and what medical acts and operations are included in the dental care for young persons covered by the Health Insurance Act.

Effectiveness of medical care. The Government stated in its report on the Convention that the care system in the Netherlands has been organized in a way that will reduce direct government involvement. This is achieved through the “functional description” of care covered by the insurance package. The Government lays down legal requirements only for the content and extent of coverage and the medical indications that trigger coverage. It is the responsibility of the care provider to decide who provides the care and where. According to the Government, the choice for having private insurance that assigns greater responsibilities to insurers who are allowed to make a profit makes it inappropriate for the Government to supervise the effectiveness of the way health insurance is operated. Therefore, the Government continues, the main objective in overseeing lawful performance of the health insurance is for the Government to ascertain whether the care insurer is fulfilling its obligation to provide insured persons with the services they are entitled to under the Health Insurance Act. The Committee points out that such limited supervision of the quality and effectiveness of the medical care provided by private insurers seeking to make a profit, and therefore interested in reducing the volume and cost of care, may pose a threat to fulfilling the obligation imposed on the Government by Article 9 of the Convention to ensure that the medical care conforms to the highest practicable standard with a view to maintaining, restoring or improving the health of the person protected. The Committee therefore asks the Government to explain whether the Health Care Inspectorate (IGZ), which is entrusted with overseeing the quality of public health, or any other public body has established a system of indicators measuring effectiveness of medical care and monitoring the health status of the population.

Participative management of the health insurance scheme. The Committee notes that in the Netherlands the administration of health insurance is not entrusted to an institution regulated by the public authorities, but is entirely in the hands of private insurance companies, which run it for profit. For such schemes Article 31 of the Convention requires the national legislation to prescribe conditions for the participation of the representatives of the persons protected in the management of the scheme. To promote its management on a tripartite basis, the legislation may also provide for the participation of representatives of employers and of the public authorities. Article 30(2) also requires the Government to accept general responsibility for the proper administration of the health insurance institutions and providers of medical services. In its report the Government states that the basic principle of health insurance in the Netherlands is that insured persons must be able to exert influence on the policy of the company that insures them. A care insurer’s articles of association must ensure that insured persons possess a reasonable degree of influence over the company’s policy. The Committee wishes to point out in this respect that reliance on the private care insurer’s articles of association is not sufficient to give effect to these provisions of the Convention, which require the right of the persons protected to be able to influence the company’s policy through participation of their representatives in the company’s management to be established in national law. Moreover, the Government carries the general responsibility for ensuring that the national health insurance scheme is managed in a democratic and transparent manner, with the proper participation of the trade unions and other organizations representing the persons protected together with the professional associations representing care providers and the medical profession. The Committee therefore asks the Government to supply full information on the application of Article 31 of the Convention in the Dutch health insurance scheme.

[The Government is asked to reply in detail to the present comments in 2013.]

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2008, published 98th ILC session (2009)

The Committee has examined the Government’s first report and the relevant legislation, which shows that the provisions of the Convention are largely applied. The Committee has also received comments on the application of the Convention from the Trade Union Federation for Professional and Managerial Staff (MHP), dated 12 August 2008, and from the Netherlands Trade Union Confederation (FNV), dated 29 August 2008, which were also addressed to the Government. The Committee expects the Government to reply to these comments in its next report.