Definitive Report - Report No 251, June 1987

Case No 1389 (Norway) - Complaint date: 28-NOV-86 - Closed

1. 191. In a letter dated 28 November 1986, a complaint was made against the Government of Norway by the Norwegian Oil Workers' Federation (OFS) alleging infringement of trade union rights. The reply of the Government was contained in a letter dated 20 February 1987.
2. 192. Norway has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. The complainant's allegations

1. 193. The complaint relates to the use of compulsory arbitration in the North Sea oil industry, and specifically to legislation enacted on 5 May 1986 which put an end to a strike and referred a pay claim for settlement by the National Wages Board.
2. 194. The complainant begins by referring to earlier complaints which it had made concerning similar circumstances which had arisen previously and had been dealt with by the Committee in 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1984, as well as to comments which it had addressed to the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations in 1986. It then points out that it is an association of four different federations - the Operator Workers' Federation (OAF); the Catering Workers' Federation (CAF); the Oil Drillers'm Federation (OBF); and the Union of Shipping Company Employed Oil Workers (ROF).
3. 195. The complainant goes on to outline the circumstances which led up to a dispute resulting in strikes and lock-outs which commenced on 6 April 1986 and which were brought to an end by the introduction of legislation on the establishment of a compulsory wages board by the Government. According to the complainant, the first three of the federations referred to above started wage negotiations with two employer federations (the NAF and the NOAF) after the termination of existing wage agreements, but the CAF broke off these negotiations and on 19 March 1986 gave notice of a strike involving its members; and, two days later (21 March) the employer federations gave notice of a lock-out of members of the OAF and OBF. Both the strike and the lock-outs were the subject of a prohibition by the National Conciliation Officer on 22 March, and, following this, compulsory conciliation proceedings were instituted on two occasions i.e. on 25-26 March and 4-5 April 1986. The strike and the lock-out then took place from 6 April (it was extended on 20 April by OAF to include members on the British part of the continental shelf) and was only ended after the Minister of Labour had submitted an Act to the Cabinet on the application of a compulsory wages board, which was discussed in the Parliament on 30 April and adopted on 5 May.
4. 196. The complainant continues by stating its view that the legislation, and the entire system of compulsory arbitration as applied to the North Sea oil industry, contravene the guarantees provided by Convention No. 87, by depriving workers in that industry of the right to strike and by undermining the possibility of genuine negotiations between the parties to disputes. It adds that the reasons given in the parliamentary discussion of the recent legislation are inconsistent with ILO criteria for the use of compulsory arbitration.
5. 197. The complainant points out that the system of compulsory arbitration has been in existence since 1980 but that, as its application in relation to each dispute involves either the adoption of an Act of the Parliament or a provisional ordinance of the Cabinet when Parliament is not in session, there has been an opportunity for the Government to adduce arguments on successive measures in a way which complicates the position of the OFS as regards the obligations under ILO Conventions. The Government has thus been able to argue in relation to a current labour dispute that the use of the compulsory wages board does not violate these. Reference is in particular made to arguments advanced by the Government and by a committee of the Parliament which concern, in the first place, the length of the strike which is in turn related by them to its economic implications and next to alleged risks to the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population.
6. 198. On the matter of the economic implications, the complainant submits that the fact that the strike was allowed to last 20 days was in itself a reflection of a prevailing climate in which there had been a reduction in oil prices and in which Norway had been criticised by OPEC for being unwilling to cut production. It states further that it is false to claim that a strike of the kind in question results in a loss of revenue, because its real effect is only to postpone such receipts, and that in any event any calculation of the cost must depend on an estimate of crude oil prices far into the next century. It continues by stating its view that a principal motive for the introduction of the legislation was of a commercial nature, namely the possible effect on the ability to fulfil contractual obligations for the supply of gas, as evidenced by the absence of any consideration of the introduction of compulsory arbitration until the involvement of Norwegian workers on the British side of the Frigg gas field.
7. 199. On the question of alleged effects on safety in the North Sea, the complainant regards this as a mock argument. It points out that the workers have not been opposed to the continuation of maintenance work during the course of the strike, and that it is very much in their interests that these matters be attended to as it is their lives and their safety that are at stake in the North Sea. There cannot be any reference to a conflict with the federations on this point, as the matter has never been raised with the parties to the labour dispute: the arguments on safety are only put forward in reference to allegations of Norway's violation of the ILO Convention.
8. 200. In the view of the complainant, the reference by the Government in its argumentation before Parliament to safety risks is imprecise and hypothetical, whereas the ILO criteria require a more direct relation between the danger to life or health of persons or groups in the population than has been stated by the Government. The particular reference by the Government to the dangers arising from a long stoppage in the Ekofisk field and to the work which has begun on the resolution of problems concerning sinking platforms is not regarded by the complainant as bearing out the argument on this point as neither the authorities nor the employers have sought exemption from the Convention; and a postponement of this work for the weeks or even months of a strike would not result in dangers of the kind envisaged by the ILO as a permissible basis for the prohibition of a labour stoppage.
9. 201. The complainant concludes by drawing attention once again to the consistent use since 1980 of the compulsory wages board against the oil workers of the North Sea, emphasising that this is not an isolated incident and that this consistent use of compulsory arbitration is contrary to the intention of the Convention.

B. The Government's reply

1. 202. In its letter of 20 February 1987, the Government refers to the breakdown in the spring of 1986 of parallel negotiations relating to six collective agreements concerning the North Sea, involving the employers' and workers' organisations mentioned in the complainant's allegations and, in addition, the Norwegian Oil and Petrochemical Workers' Union (NOPEF) which it states is part of the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions and is concerned in three agreements covering operator activity, drilling and catering respectively. In effect, the Government confirms that, following a breakdown in negotiations and the failure to arrive at a settlement through compulsory mediation, strike action and a lock-out were implemented from 5 April 1986 leading to a total halt of all oil and gas production in the Norwegian shelf.
2. 203. The Government goes on to state that further attempts at mediation during the course of the work stoppage also produced no new wage agreements and that there still appeared to be complete deadlock after three weeks despite additional efforts on the part of the State Mediator. It states that there was reason to fear that the conflict would be very long-lasting, and that the Government introduced legislation at this point for compulsory arbitration in the form of the compulsory referral of the dispute to the National Wages Board after a close assessment of the damaging effects of the work stoppage in which it gave considerable weight to the safety aspect of the conflict.
3. 204. The Government refers to the technological complexity of oil activity at sea and the attendant risks to safety, which it states are increased by climatic factors and by stoppage of the equipment or failure to observe careful planning as to the stage at which equipment designed for continuous operation may be subjected to stoppage for maintenance purposes. The safety risk, it says, is greatly increased by a complete close-down of all installations on the Norwegian shelf as compared with those which are more limited in scope.
4. 205. The Government believes that the application of Conventions must be considered with reference to the type of activity in question. A stoppage of three weeks is, in the view of the Government, a fairly long-lasting one, taking into account the nature of the activity and the extent of the stoppage. It points out that the safety risk increases the longer a close-down lasts. As it bears supreme responsibility for safety in the oil sector, the Government, after assessing the situation on a continual basis, concluded after nearly three weeks that the absence of any prospect of a voluntary solution being arrived at by the parties meant that it was duty bound to see to it that the conflict was brought to a conclusion.
5. 206. The Government states that it has taken due note of ILO statements relating to encroachments on the right to strike, and refers in particular to the limitation on compatibility with the Conventions concerning circumstances involving clear and imminent effects which endanger the life, health and personal safety of the whole or part of the population. It states that the question is whether the damaging effects are of such a magnitude and nature that infringement of the right to strike can be said to be compatible with its commitments pursuant to international law, and that it endeavours to comply with the requirements imposed by the ILO Conventions on the authorities of member countries.
6. 207. It is the Government's view that the passage of the measure for compulsory arbitration in order to put an end to the conflicts in the North Sea was compatible with the Conventions. If such an option were not available the result would be that, in order to fulfil the requirements of the Conventions, greater safety risks would have to be faced during a labour conflict than would be acceptable in other situations. Such a state of affairs would be unjustifiable and difficult to comprehend.
7. 208. In concluding, the Government draws attention to its previous accounts of the trade union situation in the North Sea and of the central position of the oil industry in the Norwegian economy.

C. The Committee's conclusions

1. 209. It would seem clear to the Committee that the circumstances described in, and the issues raised by, the present case are similar to those which it dealt with previously in regard to Norway, namely Cases Nos. 1099 and 1255 (see 217th Report of the Committee, approved by the Governing Body at its 220th Session (May-June 1982) paragraphs 449-470; and 234th Report of the Committee, approved by the Governing Body at its 226th Session (May-June 1984) paragraphs 171-192). It, therefore, draws the attention of the Government once again to the principles in terms of which restrictions on or prohibition of the right to strike can only be accepted in the public service or in essential services in the strict sense of the term, that is to say services the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population.
2. 210. The Committee has also taken note of the consideration of aspects of the present case by the Committee of Experts on the Application of the Conventions and Recommendations in 1987.
3. 211. The Committee is aware that the Government has to a very large extent concentrated its reply to the allegations of the complainant (the facts of which do not appear to be a matter of contention) on the question of the potential effects on safety of the continuation of strike action in the North Sea installations. It has in particular noted the statement by the Government that it engaged in a process of continual assessment of this aspect of the matter before introducing the 1986 legislation on compulsory arbitration which put an end to strike action and gave rise to the complaint. The Committee is none the less conscious of the fact that the information contained in the Government's reply relates to generalised statements concerning the contingent effect of prolonged strikes in the context of the factors which create or influence potential hazards involved in North Sea oil exploration, rather than to factual evidence in relation to the 1986 strike of actual danger to the safety of any particular category of employees on the oil installations or any other part of the population. In the circumstances, the Committee is not convinced that any danger which may have been occasioned through lengthy work stoppages in the industry was of such a character as to meet the criteria established by the principles of freedom of association, i.e. that there existed a clear and imminent threat to the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population.
4. 212. The Committee notes that the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, after drawing attention to the principle already referred to, concluded its observations on this matter in 1987 with an invitation to the Government to consider taking the steps necessary to give effect to Convention No. 87, including the repeal or revision of provisions in the legislation which do not take account of the as above-mentioned criteria for the termination of strike action. The Committee reiterates those comments, and trusts that the Government will find it possible to undertake the requisite action to give full effect to the principle of freedom of association in question.
5. 213. The Committee has also given attention to the recurrent nature of the problems which appear to have arisen over the period 1980-87 as evidenced in this and the two previous cases of a similar kind relating to Norway which it has had under consideration, as well as the treatment of related aspects of the matter by the Committee of Experts in its reports in recent years. The length of time involved in the repeated raising of these matters lead it to the conclusion that difficulties may exist as regards collective bargaining in the North Sea oil industry whose nature may have a bearing on the obligations of the Government deriving from the principles contained in Convention No. 98. The Committee accordingly draws the attention of the Government to the availability of the technical advisory services of the International Labour Office.

The Committee's recommendations

1. 214. In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendation:
   • In regard to the use of legislative or other action to refer disputes in the North Sea oil industry to compulsory arbitration, the Government should take full account of the principles of freedom of association on the right to strike, and, in particular, that any restriction of that right should be strictly confined to essential services in the strict sense of the term, that is to say services the interruption of which would involve a clear and imminent threat to the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population.