Definitive Report - Report No 367, March 2013

Case No 2778 (Costa Rica) - Complaint date: 10-MAY-10 - Closed

Allegations: Obstacles raised by the authorities to the reactivation of a federation of bank employees, and delaying tactics by the National Bank of Costa Rica in the collective bargaining process

1. 560. The complaint was presented in communications from the Confederation of Workers Rerum Novarum (CCTD-RN), the Federation of Financial, Banking and Insurance Workers of Costa Rica (FEBAS) and the Union of Employees of the National Bank of Costa Rica (SEBANA) dated 10 May 2010.
2. 561. Of the Government sent its observations in communications dated 24 January, 1 April and 8 December 2011 and 14 February 2012.
3. 562. Costa Rica has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. The complainants’ allegations

1. 563. In their communication of 10 May 2010 the CCTD-RN and the FEBAS allege that the FEBAS Congress met on 5 December 2008 with the fundamental objective of reactivating the organization to defend the rights of workers in the sector. However, although it met all the requirements set out in the Labour Code for its reactivation and submitted all the requisite documents to the Department of Social Organizations of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, between 11 December 2008 and 10 May 2010 (the date of the complaint), the Department failed to accept the request for the Federation’s reactivation, approve its by-laws or grant it legal personality, thereby restricting the its ability to engage in trade union action and in collective bargaining. Through the Department of Social Organizations, the Ministry of Labour has resorted to a series of delaying tactics to delay registration (imposition of new requirements months after the request was submitted, requests for corrections in matters of form).
2. 564. According to the complainants, the refusal to register the Federation is a violation of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and an act of interference in the life of banking unions designed to prevent wide ranging negotiations in Costa Rica’s banking sector. It can also be seen as an indication of working conditions in the country’s private banking sector. The complainants therefore request the Committee on Freedom of Association to guarantee the Federation’s immediate right to be granted legal personality.
3. 565. The complainants also allege that on 14 July 2009 the Union of Employees of the National Bank of Costa Rica (SEBANA) and the National Bank of Costa Rica denounced the collective labour agreement that was due to end that year and that negotiations, which began on 10 August 2009 by unilateral decision of the bank, were held up by a series of proposals and measures by the bank and have been at a standstill since February 2010.
4. 566. There is a Government policy to replace collective bargaining by “service and employment regulations” issued unilaterally by the institutional authorities, even though this is not backed by any legislation; like other banks, the National Bank is trying to impose service regulations in place of a collective agreement. Another obstacle to collective bargaining is the absence of legal machinery to resolve collective disputes of a social and economic nature ever since public sector arbitration awards, which were normal legal procedure for settling such disputes, were declared unconstitutional in 1992.
5. 567. According to the complainants the General Manager of the National Bank has done everything he can to disrupt the negotiations – postponing meetings, making proposals to abolish the main benefits that the workers had managed to have included in the agreement and through acts of interference in trade union activities. During the negotiations, the National Bank of Costa Rica sought to exclude new officials joining the staff from January 2013 onwards from benefiting from the financial advantages provided for in the collective agreement. The complainants add that the meetings of the Collective Agreement Bargaining Committee have now been suspended, not just because of the time-consuming and cumbersome practice of holding endless consultations on each and every point, but also because of the employer’s decision to condition further negotiations on SEBANA’s acceptance of a new system of remuneration known as the “single salary”, which entails raising the base salary for newly recruited employees and for any established officials wishing to join the scheme, and aligning their salaries with those on the labour market in the sector. It is the Government’s general policy to introduce a single salary for the public sector, which involves the disappearance of benefits obtained through collective bargaining. The current system of remuneration in the National Bank, which is set out in the collective agreement, regulates the various salary components, the payment of overtime, seniority increments and other incentives that have been acquired over the more than 30 years that the agreement has been in effect. Under this system, the base salary rises with years of service and other incentives which are not contrary to the labour legislation in force and are covered by the collective agreement. Following the administration’s proposal, referred to in the previous paragraph, the banking authorities proposed that a single salary be introduced in the National Bank as part of a single salary policy for the public administration as a whole. By way of justification the bank cites the need to introduce competitive market salaries so as to prevent the loss of skilled employees, and thereby boost the bank’s profits. More importantly, the single salary would mean a very significant reduction in its administrative and operating costs. Obviously, the fact that the salaries of National Bank employees are lagging behind the market rates is due entirely to the bank administration, which has negotiated salary increases based on the restrictive criteria of the cost of living, and has not conceded real salary increases.
6. 568. The complainants state that SEBANA is not completely blind to the reality of the national and international situation, but is simply trying to defend its basic rights and to avoid the creation of two categories of National Bank employees: those paid under the single salary scheme and those who stay with the present system. The administration wants to guarantee the rights embodied in the collective agreement only for “established workers”, and not for newly recruited employees. The proposal to create two categories of employees and a single salary does not bear analysis from the standpoint of protecting the workers’ human rights. It implies the total elimination of all financial advantages embodied in the existing collective agreement, both for new employees and for any others who agree to join the new scheme. Moreover, it is proposed that entitlement to redundancy benefits, which under the present collective agreement are payable for 25 years at a rate of one month for each of the 25 years of service, be reduced to eight years, or the equivalent of eight months’ salary, irrespective of the number of years of service, which is the minimum provided for in the Labour Code.
7. 569. The National Bank also wants to eliminate the rights acquired through the collective agreement in other areas, such as holidays, annual bonuses and family entitlements. Thus, the employer’s proposal would reduce the 30 days’ leave each year currently set out in the collective agreement; under the single salary, annual holidays would be reduced to 14 days for all newly recruited employees, as laid down in the Labour Code. Moreover, the proposal would eliminate annual bonuses and financial benefits for children under the age of maturity, and for children with disabilities or students. It is also seeking to eliminate any financial incentives for National Bank employees to pursue further studies. In other words, what the bank wants is to reduce all the improvements in workers’ rights embodied in the collective agreement to the minimum requirements of the Labour Code.
8. 570. The bank administration’s objective is to lower real salaries, eliminating everything agreed to in the collective agreement, which also means abolishing other salary benefits that have been established over the years, such as the payment of performance incentives for workers who qualify under the Performance and Incentive Assessment System (SEDI). The bank is proposing to deduct from its overall profits the contributions that it is required by law to make to other state institutions before paying its employees, which would reduce the total to be distributed. The administration also wants to end the binding nature of the awards of the Labour Relations Board sanctioning workers for professional misconduct, which would make the Board merely an advisory body and transfer the authority to take disciplinary action to the bank’s General Manager, with all the attendant negative consequences for its employees. Finally, the bank’s proposals would mean that the collective agreement would cease to apply once its present employees have retired and, whenever negotiations are held, they would be for a decreasing number of employers – until the union disappears.
9. 571. The complainants request of the Committee on Freedom of Association, in the name of the ILO, to urge the National Bank of Costa Rica to return to the bargaining table and to conclude the collective agreement through free and voluntary negotiations.

B. The Government’s replies

1. 572. In its communications dated 24 January, 1 April and 8 December 2011 and 14 February 2012, the Government states that on 21 January 2011 the National Bank of Costa Rica and SEBANA signed the Final Act of the negotiations on the collective labour agreement, to the satisfaction of both parties, which entered into effect on 23 December 2010 for a period of three years. Consequently, the main allegations of the complainants are now no longer relevant.
2. 573. Regarding the alleged delay referred to by FEBAS, the Government states that, when in 2009 the Federation requested the restoration of its legal personality, it requested the Department of Social Organizations of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security to register the organization as if it was a new federation. Consequently, the Department asked it to meet a series of requirements that were essential for it to be registered. This was why it made certain recommendations to Maríaelena Rodríguez Samuels, the FEBAS Secretary General, so that it could proceed with the Federation’s registration, as stated in its report DOS-304-S.4/Constitutiva of 21 September 2009 and document DOS-023-S.7 of 4 February 2010. When drafting the latter, the Department’s officials spoke directly to Rodríguez Samuels, who explained that she had made a mistake, as it had never been her intention to request its registration as a new federation, but only to reactivate its legal personality which had lapsed, as indicated in the communication of 2 March 2010.
3. 574. According to José Joaquín Orozco, the head of the Department of Social Organizations, the Federation’s legal personality lapsed in 1992, when it became inactive as a result of a break in relations between workers and employers in the banking sector and of a consequent reduction in the Federation’s activities until it ceased functioning altogether. This was borne out by the organization’s Secretary-General. During its period of inactivity, the representatives of SEBANA and of Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago assumed responsibility for the Federation.
4. 575. Once the situation had been clarified, the Department of Social Organizations processed FEBAS’ request, made the necessary enquiries for the organization’s reactivation and, in a communication dated 21 May 2010, submitted a report to the Minister of Labour and Social Security in favour of the Federation’s registration. FEBAS’ Secretary-General was duly informed of these developments by letter of 31 May 2010, since when the Ministry of Labour and Social Security has not heard any further news. The complainants’ allegations therefore have no legal substance and no basis in fact, since upon the request of the interested parties the authorities followed normal proceedings in accordance with the law.
5. 576. For the factual and legal reasons outlined above, the Government requests that the complaint be set aside, as it has been clearly shown that the public authorities acted in accordance with the law, with the principles of the ILO and with the laws in force.
6. 577. Notwithstanding the above, the Government wishes to refer to the situation in general in order to clarify the points raised. For this, it refers to report GG-231-10 which it received from the General Management of the National Bank of Costa Rica.
7. 578. To begin with, the trade union claims that both the Government and the higher institutional authorities were intent on undermining the collective agreement and SEBANA’s existence as a trade union. Such a claim is very far from the truth, and the fact that the collective agreement is still in force at the bank is evidence of the employer’s respect for its employees and invalidates the complainant’s argument.
8. 579. It goes without saying that the General Management of the National Bank of Costa Rica, given the inherent public nature of the institution, necessarily sets out to negotiate an agreement that is acceptable to the workers and at the same time is reasonable and in conformity with the country’s laws and regulations as they relate to the administration of public funds. This in no way inhibits the conduct of equitable and adequate collective bargaining, either for the workers or for the bank. It is important to emphasize that the whole purpose of collective bargaining is to reach a consensus through a meeting of minds, in which each party is prepared to yield some ground to the other in a bid to reach a mid-point that is satisfactory to both. In other words, neither party can expect the other to accept all its proposals; instead, the exercise of social dialogue is conducive to a narrowing of differences and to the attainment of a final position that is positive for all concerned.
9. 580. Regarding the allegation that the meetings of the Collective Agreement Bargaining Committee for the public sector were suspended at the request of the employers, the Government states that negotiation of the new collective agreement began in August 2009; and it is not true that they have been at a standstill since February 2010, as the parties remained in permanent contact. Indeed, the Government continues, it was SEBANA that broke off negotiations until June 2010 in an email from its Secretary-General, which reads:
   • In the light of the recent appointment of the General Manager announced by the bank’s Executive Board yesterday, just days after changes in the composition of the Executive Board, we consider it prudent to take a break before continuing with negotiations, so that a satisfactory outcome can be reached as soon as possible in the interests of social peace within the institution and those of the bank’s employees. We would be prepared to resume negotiations in June 2010 (signed: Maríaelena Rodríguez Samuels, Secretary-General of SEBANA).
10. 581. The bank’s management states that a bare 12 days later SEBANA presented its complaint to the ILO in Geneva, Switzerland, alleging inter alia (and untruly) that negotiations had broken down since February 2010, and adding:
    • The meetings of the Collective Agreement Bargaining Committee have now been suspended, not just because of the bank’s time-consuming and cumbersome approach of holding endless consultations on each and every point, but also because of the employer’s decision to make further negotiations conditional on SEBANA’s acceptance of a new system of remuneration known as the “single salary”.
11. 582. In other words, instead of waiting for negotiations to resume in June as it had requested, SEBANA decided maliciously to present a complaint claiming that the bank was responsible for suspending the negotiations (which they themselves had suggested). Such an attempt to discredit the bank and the State of Costa Rica in the eyes of the international community is unacceptable.
12. 583. It is quite clear that the negotiations on the new collective agreement were suspended at the request of the trade union, as the above email shows, and it is therefore paradoxical that the employer’s side alone should be held responsible. In other words, it is not true that the employer sought to prolong the meetings and negotiations on the collective agreement unnecessarily; as it’s good faith and readiness to negotiate has been demonstrated, there is a contradiction between what the union asserts in its complaint and what it actually did during the process. Furthermore, at SEBANA’s request, the collective bargaining was conducted with the mediation of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security.
13. 584. Regarding the allegation that it is state policy to replace collective bargaining by service regulations, the Government states that the suggestion is completely untrue. Costa Rica’s Constitution grants the public administration autonomy in administrative affairs, just as the General Public Administration Act confers on it the power to issue regulations. This means that an institution such as the National Bank of Costa Rica, if it deems it desirable, is entitled to issue its own organizational and service regulations whenever it considers it appropriate. That said, it is false to claim that for it to do so it needs the trade union or the collective agreement (which has been in force for decades) to disappear, since they are not mutually exclusive and can perfectly well coexist. Section 103 of the General Public Administration Act stipulates that “the hierarchically superior body shall, moreover, be the extrajudicial representative of the public administration within its sphere of competence and shall have the necessary authority to issue its own organizational and service regulations within and outside the administration, provided that, in such cases the regulations do not ultimately imply a power of decision over the general public”. As an autonomous state institution, the National Bank is thus empowered to issue general internal regulations in the interests of efficient management.
14. 585. Regarding the alleged proposal by the higher institutional authority to introduce the “single salary” system at the National Bank, the Government states that the Comptroller General’s Office defines the “single salary” as “the salary to which a worker is entitled in full, including the base salary, supplementary allowances, annual bonuses, benefits, etc. as such; in other words, wages payable under this scheme implicitly include such supplementary allowances as are recognized in the public sector”. On this point, the management of the National Bank observes that “the negotiations began in August 2009, and SEBANA appears not to understand (and says as much) that the collective agreement is a process of negotiation, of a meeting of minds and interests, in which the bank is obviously not obliged to agree with everything that SEBANA calls “its agreement”. The minutes of the Bargaining Committee show that the administration and the trade union have reached agreement on a very large portion of the issues dealt with in the agreement – the most critical, or controversial, issue being the administration’s proposal to introduce a new system of remuneration for new recruits known as the “total salary”, which will mean a substantial improvement for the bank’s new employees in that their salary will be more competitive in market terms without their having to accumulate many years of salary increments. To be quite clear, new employees will lose some of their rights in terms of days of annual leave, and their separation benefits will be reduced to the level stipulated in the Labour Code as well as other similar changes. But the bank’s proposal in no way obliges its current employees to switch to the new system of remuneration, nor does it limit their chances of promotion if they stay with the present system. Whether or not they changed their system of remuneration is entirely up to them, and the management of the bank has never had any other ambition than to enter into a process of negotiation in which it is essential to bear in mind the administration’s requirements for negotiating a new collective agreement. It is not imposing these requirements. They are simply the conceptual framework in which the bank intends to conduct its labour relations with its new employees, whereas SEBANA’s position is obviously that the bank should go along with its determination not to change anything in the present state of affairs, and that otherwise there can be no bargaining whatsoever, which is obviously not the way to proceed. The banking sector is governed by a set of standards and procedures that are designed to ensure that it is managed in a way that is in keeping with its assets and liabilities and with the concept of appropriate risk management. Negotiating a collective agreement is a process in which the parties discuss their positions and the outcome constitutes a meeting of minds. In all the bank’s previous negotiations, that outcome has been a marriage of what the administration wants and of what the workers’ representatives want, resulting in a collective agreement that is the property of neither the administration or SEBANA, but of the National Bank’s employees.
15. 586. As already stated, the bank’s administration has judged it desirable to introduce a system of remuneration known as the “total salary”, so that it can recruit skilled staff whose salaries reflect the market situation at the time of their recruitment, instead of depending on the accumulation of salary increments over years of service, as is the case at present. Workers currently employed by the bank have the option to join the new system of remuneration if it suits them, or to remain as they are, with all their acquired rights at the time. Employees recruited after the introduction of the “total salary” would inter alia be entitled to different annual leave and separation benefits which, although higher than those stipulated in the country’s labour legislation, are indeed lower than those to which the bank’s present employees are entitled. The essential point here is that this is all part and parcel of the bargaining process and, if some mid-point between the positions of the respective parties can be found, a new collective agreement will be concluded. But it is clearly unacceptable that the bank should be obliged to sign “SEBANA’s agreement” – to use the union’s own words. The bank’s proposal would allow it to recruit its new personnel at a salary level more in keeping with average salaries on the market, without new employees having to wait for years to reach that point. Its principal objective is to offer a more attractive salary for newly recruited officials, without in any way modifying the individual conditions of existing officials, who would be entitled to maintain the salary conditions to which they are currently entitled.
16. 587. To put it another way, it is the bank’s obligation to manage its available resources as efficiently as possible in order to meet its institutional objectives, which are set out by law, without in so doing infringing the labour rights of its labour force. Thus, each worker currently employed by the bank has the option to stay with the system of remuneration that is currently in force. For the bank to seek to regulate the conditions of recruitment of new employees does not violate any human right; it is simply exercising the obligation imposed on the institution’s administrators to maintain a system of remuneration that ensures the competitiveness of the salaries it pays in the sector within which it operates. The position adopted by SEBANA towards what it calls an illegal lowering conditions of remuneration is significant, since in the past it has gone along with the need to limit certain rights for new employees, as happened when annual leave was reduced from 30 to 20 days with the entry into force of the current collective agreement.
17. 588. It is therefore all the more important to stress that as early as 6 April 2010 SEBANA was informed of the proposal of the Cooperative Directorate for the Management of Resources of the Department of Human Resources that the National Bank would introduce the single salary system. The proposal was justified by the need for the bank to compete with the major international financial groups, which tend to attract the region’s better qualified personnel because of the salaries they offer. And experience has shown that Costa Rica’s many private and public financial institutions are operating with systems of remuneration based on market conditions (single or global salaries) that give them a competitive edge in attracting the best human resources available.
18. 589. The National Bank’s present salary structure consists of a base salary plus a series of increments for seniority, merit and the exclusive nature of employment at the bank, along with other financial benefits derived from the collective agreement. This is not an appropriate system for retaining the services of qualified professionals and technicians.
19. 590. To take an example, a bank employee has to work on average for over seven years before he or she can earn a competitive salary. But this is a long time for people to be convinced that they should stay where they are because in the medium term they will be earning as much as they can earn in Costa Rica’s financial sector from the moment they are recruited.
20. 591. It is this kind of situation that is behind the National Bank’s proposal for a single salary, backed as it is by Directive No. 25 published in Official Gazette No. 204 of 23 October 1997, which encourages Costa Rica’s commercial banks to introduce new salary schemes that simultaneously boost their employees’ productivity, make salaries more competitive and reduce the loss of employees to other institutions.
21. 592. Finally, other banking institutions have introduced the same system, such as the Central Bank of Costa Rica in 1999 and the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal in 2002, which applied it to general managers and district headquarters, before gradually extending it to the rest of its staff.
22. 593. The Government notes that the new collective agreement contains provisions on salaries. As to the so-called elimination of salary bonuses and the Labour Relations Board (SEBANA alleges in its complaint that the National Bank plans to deduct the contributions that it is required by law to remit to other state institutions from its overall profits before paying its employees, which it claims reduces the total amount to be distributed), the management of the National Bank states that it has no intention of abolishing the Performance and Incentive Assessment System (SEDI), a very dynamic system for assessing and rewarding group and individual performance among the bank’s collaborators. On the contrary, that is precisely one of the rights to which employees opting for the total salary will be entitled, as it is a valuable institutional tool for monitoring the performance and management targets of the bank’s employees and its various offices. That said, what the National Bank does want is that profit-sharing among its employees should be calculated after deduction of the contributions that the bank is legally bound to make, since it would not be appropriate to calculate the amount to be distributed before the necessary payments required by law have been made. It is simply a matter of avoiding a distortion in the amount allocated to the SEDI.
23. 594. As to the allegations that the National Bank intends to change the binding nature of the Labour Relations Board’s resolutions so as to make it a strictly advisory body, the Government states that for the bank’s general management this is strictly a legal issue. According to a ruling of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, making decisions reached by a labour relations board’s binding is unconstitutional (in the public sector), as the exercise of disciplinary powers is an inalienable prerogative of the employer, as stipulated in section 41(6) of the Organic Act on the National Banking System. The bank’s management adds that, in the course of the negotiations, the parties eventually agreed that the role of the Labour Relations Board did comply with section 68 et seq. of the Act, under which the Board has the authority to seek an amicable solution to any problems that arises between the bank and its employees. The new collective agreement also empowers the Board to rule on labour issues within its purview. To sum up, what the general management of the National Bank of Costa Rica is seeking is not that the Board should suddenly disappear, but that it should play the advisory role assigned to it by the Constitutional Chamber when the management is called upon to impose disciplinary sanctions.
24. 595. The foregoing considerations show clearly that the action taken by the general management and Executive Board of the National Bank of Costa Rica does not in any way stem from anti-union motives. On the contrary, it is designed to improve the bank’s internal functioning. Consequently, the Government requests that the complaint to be set aside.

C. The Committee’s conclusions

Allegations relating to the delaying tactics of the authorities in holding up the registration of FEBAS following the holding of a Congress to reactivate the organization

1. 596. The Committee observes that the complainants state that the representatives of FEBAS provided the Department of Social Organizations of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security with all the documents needed to reactivate the Federation, approve its statutes and recognize its legal personality on 11 December 2008, but that up to the date of their complaint the Ministry had resorted to delaying tactics by imposing requirements that were not stipulated in the law and asking for purely formal corrections.
2. 597. The Committee takes note that the Government ascribes the alleged delay to a misunderstanding and points out, inter alia, that in 2009 FEBAS requested the Department of Social Organizations of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security to register the organization as if it were a new federation. Consequently, the Government adds, the Department requested the completion of a series of requirements that were indispensable for it to be duly registered. That was why it made certain recommendations to Maríaelena Rodríguez Samuels, Secretary-General of FEBAS, so that it could proceed with the Federation’s registration. In February 2010, according to the Government, officials of the Department of Social Organizations spoke directly with Rodríguez Samuels, who explained that she had made a mistake, as her intention had never been to request the establishment of the Federation for the first time, but to recover its legal personality, which had lapsed (as stated in the communication of 2 March 2010). The Committee takes note of the Government’s statement that, once the situation had thus been clarified, the Department of Social Organizations processed the request, conducted the necessary enquiries for the organization’s reactivation and, in a communication dated 21 May 2010, submitted a report to the Minister of Labour and Social Security in favour of the Federation’s registration. The Government concludes by noting that Maríaelena Rodríguez Samuels was duly informed of developments by letter of 31 May 2010, since when the Ministry of Labour and Social Security had not heard any further news. The Committee regrets the delay in the procedure for reactivating the Federation’s legal personality (requested in December 2008) and requests that, in cases relating to the legal personality of trade union organizations, the Government ensures that the administrative authorities concerned act swiftly and take proactive steps to facilitate the exercise by workers of their basic rights, including the right to organize. However, noting the Government’s suggestion that the trade unions have apparently lost interest in reactivating FEBAS since at least May 2010, the Committee requests the complainant organizations to indicate whether the unions concerned continue to wish for the reactivation of FEBAS. If so, the Committee requests the Government to recognize the Federation’s legal personality without delay.

Allegations relating to practices violating the right to collective bargaining of employees of the National Bank in negotiations on the new collective agreement with SEBANA

1. 598. The Committee observes that, according to the complainants’ principal allegations: (a) the State wants to replace collective bargaining by “service and employment regulations” issued unilaterally by the higher institutional authorities; (b) the National Bank’s administration has held up the collective bargaining process for months and is trying to eliminate the main benefits that the workers have managed to have included in the agreement; (c) the meetings of the Collective Agreement Bargaining Committee have been held up and are currently suspended as a result of the employer’s position; (d) the bank administration’s proposal regarding the single salary and annual leave infringes its employees’ labour rights and introduces discrimination; (e) the bank wants the decisions of the Labour Relations Board to be no longer binding ; and (f) it wishes to make changes in order to undermine collective bargaining and the trade union until they disappear altogether.
2. 599. The Committee takes note that the Government denies that the bank has held up the meetings of the Bargaining Committee (initiated by the Government in 2009) unnecessarily and claims that SEBANA itself called for their suspension. The Committee observes that the Government denies any anti-union motives, presents the bank’s various proposals (“single salary”, annual leave, etc.) in a very different light from the complainants and suggests that negotiations entail concessions by the parties concerned so as to reach a mid-point that is satisfactory to both, whereas the union expected the bank to go along with its position that nothing should change in the present state of affairs. So long as the parties are bargaining in a manner consistent with freedom of association, the Committee wishes to point out in general terms that it is not for it to rule on the parties’ specific proposals in the bargaining process.
3. 600. The Committee notes with interest the Government’s latest replies informing it of the signing of the collective agreement on 21 January 2011 and, given the parties’ different versions of the way the negotiations took place, will not pursue its examination of the allegations. The Committee notes however that if, as the allegations claim, negotiations began in December 2006, then the bargaining process was considerably delayed. The Committee recalls that the ILO’s technical assistance is available to accelerate collective bargaining processes.
4. 601. As to the alleged absence of any mechanism for resolving disputes, such as arbitration, the Committee takes note that the Government emphasizes that the Ministry of Labour acted as a mediator in the bargaining process.

The Committee’s recommendation

1. 602. In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendation:
   • The Committee requests the complainants to indicate whether the trade unions in the banking sector still wish to reactivate the FEBAS. If so, the Committee requests the Government to recognize the Federation’s legal personality without delay.