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Effect given to the recommendations of the committee and the Governing Body - Report No 371, March 2014

Case No 2854 (Peru) - Complaint date: 19-APR-11 - Closed

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  1. 105. At its March 2012 meeting, the Committee made the following recommendations on the pending issues [see 363rd Report, para. 1045]:
    • – The Committee firmly expects that, in the future, there will be timely consultations with the trade unions concerned in respect of any contemplated restructuring or privatization processes prior to their being taken. The Committee calls on the Government to initiate without delay such consultation as regards the effects of the privatization.
    • – In view of the circumstances of this case, the Committee believes that penal sanctions should not be imposed on the trade unionists who participated in the strikes or on trade union organizations. The Committee requests the Government to inform it of the decision of the Public Prosecution Service concerning the complaint lodged against several strikers by the Office of the Attorney-General of the Ministry of Transport and Communications and expects that this decision will take into account the conclusions and the relevant abovementioned principle.
  2. 106. In communications dated 15 October and 10 December 2012 and 28 February 2013, the National Federation of Workers of the National Ports Enterprise (FENTENAPU) sent further information on new concessions of port terminals without the complainant federation being heard or allowed to participate. According to the allegations, the concessions are marred by issues of corruption and violations of due process, and the aim is to reduce the unionized workforce. Moreover, workers who have not accepted the enterprise’s financial proposals (retirement incentive programmes) would be exposed to sanctions if they reject the proposals. According to the complainant, most of the workers affected by the staff reductions are involved in collective bargaining, and the mass dismissals affect over 200 workers.
  3. 107. In its communication of 25 September 2012, the Government indicates that by a decision dated 21 March 2012 the Criminal Prosecutor of the Fifth Provincial District of Callao found that there were no grounds for bringing criminal charges against the strikers and, as a third party with civil liability neither against the Puerto de Callao Dockers Union, for alleged crimes against public security, attacks on collective transport services and the media, and for hindering the proper functioning of public services. The charges were therefore definitively set aside. The Committee notes this information with interest.
  4. 108. In its communication of 17 September 2013, the Government indicates that, according to the report of the Department for Investment Promotion, the processes for the promotion of private investment in relation to national port infrastructure have the objective of entrusting the successful bidder with the obligation to design, finance, construct, operate or subsequently transfer the new infrastructure to the State of Peru, for which reason it cannot be maintained that they are processes for the restructuring or privatization of the National Ports Enterprise (ENAPU), which would require prior consultation with the unions concerned, since the procedures are restricted to port property in the public domain owned by the State, and not the assets of ENAPU. Moreover, these promotional procedures do not envisage the dismissal of workers engaged in providing services for ENAPU, as the sole aim is to achieve greater efficiency in the administration of the port infrastructure owned by the State of Peru. Accordingly, the State is not violating any fundamental rights in that respect.
  5. 109. The Government reports the indications by the Ministry of Transport and Communications that: (a) the process of the concession of the Multipurpose Northern Terminal of the Port of Callao is one of the transport infrastructure and services projects that were entrusted to the private sector under concession; (b) Annex 21 of the concession contract refers to the revenue-sharing partnership agreement concluded between the concessionaire APM Terminals Callao SA and ENAPU SA, under the terms of which the latter provides the real estate and, in exchange for participating in the operation, receives a total of 17 per cent of the revenue shown on the accounts as at 31 December each year, prior to the determination of the taxation on profits; (c) one of the obligations of APM Terminals Callao SA is to offer employment, during a period of ten years, to a number of the workers of ENAPU SA equivalent to 60 per cent of the total operating workforce listed in Annex 23 of the concession contract; and (d) up to the present, APM Terminals Callao SA has taken on a total of 500 workers engaged by ENAPU SA, of whom 366 are on the list of workers contained in Annex 23, which corresponds to 73 per cent of the workers listed in Annex 23.
  6. 110. With regard to the transfer of the Chimbote Port Terminal, the Government indicates that the General Directorate of Water Transport of the Ministry of Transport and Communications explains that it was carried out as part of the process of the decentralization of the country, in accordance with article 188 of the Political Constitution of Peru, which provides that decentralization is a form of democratic organization which is a permanent and compulsory State policy, with the fundamental objective of integrated national development. In that respect, port transfers in the context of the decentralization process are not part of a privatization process.
  7. 111. The Government adds that the committee appointed for the transfer of Chimbote Port Terminal included representatives of the different sectors of ENAPU SA, and that as a consequence the workers participated actively in the process. With reference to the retirement incentive programme, Supreme Decree No. 044-2010-MTC established the Special Voluntary Retirement Benefit for Dock Work (BECVP) for all dockworkers in the Callao Port Terminal. The benefit consisted of the voluntary retirement of workers if they considered it appropriate in exchange for financial compensation. That does not correspond to a policy of mass dismissal, particularly as coverage by the BECVP was free and voluntary. In relation to the retirement incentive programme, Act No. 27866, the Port Labour Act, in section 13 establishes the labour system for dock work, specifying that it is included in the labour regime for the private sector, with the corresponding rights and benefits. Section 86 of Legislative Decree No. 728 sets out objective reasons for the termination of contracts of employment, including economic, technological, structural and similar reasons, and the liquidation, dissolution or bankruptcy of the enterprise. The retirement incentive programme is consequently considered to be totally lawful, and cannot therefore under any circumstances be regarded as an instrument of mass dismissal.
  8. 112. The complainant has also referred the present case to the Inter-American Human Rights System. With a view to avoiding duplication by international bodies, the Government therefore requests the Committee not to continue its examination of the present complaint, as a case is currently under review at the Inter-American level, on which the Inter American Court of Human Rights will issue a ruling in due course.
  9. 113. The Committee notes the Government’s reply, from which it can be deduced that there were no in-depth consultations with the complainant during the process of the concession of port terminals, except in the case of the Chimbote terminal. The Committee once again emphasizes the importance of holding in-depth consultations with the complainant on the impact of the decentralization that is being carried out in the enterprise.
  10. 114. With regard to the alleged anti-union nature of this process which, according to the complainant, affects most of the unionized workers involved in collective bargaining, the Committee notes the Government’s indication that the processes do not envisage the dismissal of workers and that their objective was the transfer of certain services to the private sector, and that there is a commitment to re-engage a significant percentage of the workers (those who gave up their employment and freely accepted the financial compensation), with 500 workers already being recruited. The Committee finds that the complainant has not provided firm proof of the anti-union motivation behind the decentralization process. The Committee recalls that its mandate is confined to violations of trade union rights, and does not cover restructuring, privatization and decentralization processes, nor determining whether or not the authorities have acted in breach of domestic law when carrying out these economic processes. Finally, noting that the complainant has referred the matter to a procedure which will give rise to a ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Committee recalls that it has examined the present case within the terms of its mandate, which consists in determining whether any given legislation or practice complies with the principles of freedom of association and collective bargaining laid down in the relevant ILO Conventions [see Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee, fifth (revised) edition, 2006, para. 6]. The Committee emphasizes that, within the context of this mandate, which differs from that of other international bodies, it issued its recommendations in 2012.
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