Informe definitivo - Informe núm. 13, 1954

Caso núm. 62 (Países Bajos) - Fecha de presentación de la queja:: 01-JUL-53 - Cerrado

A. A. The complainants' allegations

• ANALYSIS OF THE COMPLAINTS
  18. 18 The complaints made by the Unified Trade Union Centre of the Netherlands and the Trade Unions International of Postal, Telegraph, Telephone and Radio Workers against the Government of the Netherlands contain the following allegations:
      • (a) The legislation at present in force in the Netherlands, which authorises the Government to dismiss a public official on the ground of his affiliation to the Unified Trade Union Centre and which does not ensure in case of dismissal the right of defence, infringes upon freedom of association.
      • (b) An Internal Security Bill, which was in preparation at the time the complaint was submitted and was promulgated on 23 June 1952, authorises the Government to suppress certain fundamental rights and, in particular, the right of combination.
      • (c) The Government refuses to recognise the Unified Trade Union Centre.
  19. Allegation concerning the Dismissal of Public Officials
  19. 19 Under article 97 (b) of the General Rules for Government Officials, the Prime Minister, as the Minister of General Affairs of the Kingdom, is said to have issued a Decree dated 17 December 1951, which provides that a public official may be discharged merely for belonging to the Unified Trade Union Centre. This organisation is included among those concerning which the Prime Minister has decided that they may endanger the satisfactory fulfilment of duties by a public official, by reason of the aims which they pursue and the means which they employ. It appears from certain statements made by the Prime Minister that this measure was taken because of the subversive activity of these organisations, which are particularly accused of preparing aggression, of organising sabotage, of advising certain groups of workers at secret meetings to cause technical disorders in due time so as to paralyse industrial activity for several days and of endeavouring to place in key posts a network of " reliable " officials who would be ready at an opportune moment to take control.
  20. 20 The complaining organisation states that it has vainly requested the Prime Minister to furnish evidence in support of these accusations and maintains that they are without any basis in fact, since the Unified Trade Union Centre has no other purposes than to raise the standard of living of the workers, to eliminate the housing shortage and to establish lasting peace.
  21. 21 Furthermore, the right of defence of the officials concerned is said to be unduly curtailed, whereas under article 97 (b) mentioned above, a commission should give its opinion before accused officials can be dismissed. A Decree dated 14 November 1951, modifying the provisions relating to the procedure before this commission, is said, in fact, to allow the chairman of the commission to hear certain persons in the absence of the public official concerned and of his lawyer. The officials are thus deprived of all legal guarantees.
• Allegation concerning the Internal Security Bill
  22. 22 An Internal Security Bill, which is in course of preparation, is said to enable the Government to declare a state of emergency. Under this measure, the Government is said to have the power to abolish certain Constitutional rights, such as the right of combination, secrecy of correspondence, freedom of the press, etc., and also to make arrests and place the persons arrested in preventive detention.
• Allegation concerning the Non-Recognition of the Unified Trade Union Centre
  23. 23 The Government is said not to recognise the Unified Trade Union Centre, although this organisation has been in existence since the end of the last war. In support of this allegation, the complainant puts forward the following facts:
      • (i) On 18 December 1949, the members of the Netherlands Union of Public Officials, affiliated to the Unified Trade Union Centre, are said to have been refused the right to participate in the activities of the Negotiating Committee of the City of Amsterdam, in which negotiations are said to have taken place between the Municipality and the organisations representing municipal staff concerning questions of a social character relating to the staff. This discriminatory decision is said to have been approved by the Government of the Netherlands.
      • (ii) The Unified Trade Union Centre, in opposition to the trade unions which support the policies of the Government, has not been recognised as an interested party by the Commission of Mediators, which has the duty of making obligatory collective agreements arrived at between employers and certain trade union organisations.
  24. ANALYSIS OF THE REPLIES
• Analysis of the First Two Replies (31 October 1953 and 23 January 1954)
  24. 24 In its communications dated 31 October 1953 and 23 January 1954 the Government of the Netherlands makes the following points:
• Allegation concerning the Dismissal of Public Officials
  25. 25 The purpose of article 97 (b) of the General Rules for Government Officials is to remove from public service unreliable officials, that is to say, in particular, officials with Communist or Fascist opinions who are opposed to the democratic régime and thus approve the use of methods which a self-respecting State cannot tolerate. By preventing as far as possible unreliable officials from infiltrating into the public service, the State not only ensures the maintenance of the democratic régime but also prevents the installation of a régime under which trade unions would be deprived of all freedom.
  26. 26 The Government emphasises, however, that it is not membership of the Unified Trade Union Centre of the Netherlands in itself which constitutes the motive for the dismissal of an official. In fact, the Government points out that the Decree of 17 September 1951 provides, not as the complainant states, that " the following associations compromise the satisfactory fulfilment of public duties ", but that " the associations may compromise the satisfactory exercise of public duties ".
  27. 27 The Government concludes that it follows that membership of one of the organisations listed in the above-mentioned Decree is merely an indication of evil intent justifying an inquiry, without being decisive in itself.
  28. 28 The amendments effected by the Decree of 14 November 1951 to the provisions relating to the procedure before the commission set up under article 97 (b) of the General Rules for Government Officials are designed to allow this body to obtain the most complete information and thus give full value to the opinion it pronounces. It is in the interest of the accused official himself that the commission should be in a position to form as objective an opinion as possible. This purpose is clearly brought out in paragraph 7 of article 5 of the above-mentioned Decree, which provides that officials should be informed of every accusation made in documents of which they have no knowledge, provided that no prejudice occurs by this to the public interest. The legal guarantees enjoyed by officials are therefore in no way diminished by the new provisions.
• Allegation concerning the Internal Security Bill
  29. 29 The Government points out that on 23 June 1952 an Act on the Extraordinary Powers of the Civil Authorities was promulgated. Under this Act, the Government has the power to take necessary measures to protect the democratic régime and the fundamental rights. This power is internationally recognised as belonging to governments, as is shown in articles 15 and 16 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms adopted in Rome on 14 November 1951, and articles 29 and 30 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights dated 10 December 1948.
• Allegation concerning the Non-Recognition of the Unified Trade Union Centre and Affiliated Organisations
  30. 30 The Government recalls that consultation and co-operation between the employers' and workers' organisations, and between these organisations and the Government, have reached an advanced stage of development in the Netherlands. Important progress has thus been made in the social field. A condition for co-operating with the Government is, of course, that the organisation should be representative. Whatever may be the criteria for determining whether an organisation is representative, the United Trade Union Centre does not have the necessary qualifications for participating in such co-operation. In fact, experience has shown that the Unified Trade Union Centre is unworthy of trust in respect of the Constitution and that it is neither willing nor able to take a constructive part in the organised consultation and to bear the resulting responsibility. The organisation therefore does not fulfil the basic requirements to be considered representative.
• Request for Further Information
  31. 31 After examining the case at its meetings on 6 and 9 March 1954, the Committee on Freedom of Association decided to request the Director-General to obtain certain further information from the Government of the Netherlands before it formulated its recommendations to the Governing Body. In accordance with this decision, the Director-General, by a letter dated 22 March 1954, requested information as to whether, under the terms of the procedure in force, an official who is dismissed is given, having regard to the requirements of public order, enough information as to the reasons for his dismissal to prevent him attributing it solely to the fact of his trade union affiliation.
• Analysis of the Third Reply (14 April 1954)
  32. 32 In its third reply, the Government of the Netherlands presents, in particular, the following arguments
  33. 33 By virtue of article 97 (b) of the Rules for Government Officials, an official may be dismissed only if he has demonstrated disloyal inclinations which have to be regarded as incompatible with the fulfilment of his duties in the service of the State. In this connection, the second paragraph of article 97 (b) contains a legal presumption enabling it to be determined in what circumstances such disloyal inclinations must be regarded as existing. By virtue of these regulations, therefore, it is not impossible that the mere fact of affiliation to one of the associations named in the Ministerial Decree of 17 December 1951, issued pursuant to article 97 (b) of the Rules for Government Officials (see below, paragraph 39), may lead to a dismissal based on the same article. This would be possible, for example, where an official occupied in the Administration a particularly vulnerable post with respect to which the interests of public order cannot allow any risk to be taken. All this is a consequence of the provision concerning legal proofs which has been referred to above. Materially, the dismissal is based on the disloyal inclinations of the official. A separate decision has to be taken in each particular case, having regard to individual interests and to the interests of public order. In this connection, the Government emphasises once again that the provision concerning dismissal is of an optional nature ; there can be dismissal but there is never an obligation to dismiss.
  34. 34 With regard to the procedure, the Government declares that the official is, generally speaking, made acquainted with the reasons and incriminatory evidence giving rise to his dismissal. Before ordering dismissal, the Government requests the opinion of a commission consisting of independent persons. This commission gives the official a hearing and offers him an opportunity to make himself aware of all the data on which the commission bases its opinion. The official has the right to avail himself of the assistance of a lawyer. The reply points out, moreover, that the Government can communicate information to the commission for its sole private use only when public interest so requires. The purpose of this provision is to make it possible for the commission to have documentation before in which is as complete as possible ; otherwise, the Government might find itself obliged, in certain cases, to supplement the opinion of the commission with information which, for reasons of public interest, has not been communicated to the official. The dismissal is then effected, not by the instance which proposed the dismissal, but by the Prime Minister.

Allegation concerning the Dismissal of Public Officials

1. 35. The Government of the Netherlands ratified, on 7 March 1950, the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87).
2. 36. In its allegation that under the terms of the legislation at present in force in the Netherlands a public official may be dismissed solely by reason of his affiliation to the Unified Trade Union Centre, the complainant appears to bring into question Article 2 of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, which provides that " workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing without previous authorisation ". Subject to the provisions of Article 9 of the same Convention, relating to armed forces and the police, this Article applies to public officials.
3. 37. It is essential, in order to realise the full implications of the allegations made by the complainants and the observations submitted by the Government, to turn to the texts to which both parties have referred, namely, article 97 (b) of the General Rules for Government Officials' and the Ministerial Decree of 17 December 1951 promulgated in application of article 97 (b).
4. 38. Article 97 (b) of the General Rules for Government Officials reads as follows:
5. (1) An official may be honourably dismissed if the authority competent to discharge him considers his conduct to be such that there is no longer any absolute guarantee that he will in all circumstances faithfully carry out his duties.
6. (2) Paragraph (1) of this article shall be deemed to apply to an official if, inter alia, he belongs to an association of which Our Minister, the President of the Council of Ministers, has declared that it may jeopardise or prejudice the proper fulfilment of the official's duties, by reason of its aims or the methods it employs, or if the official supports or assists such an association or its activities in any manner whatsoever.
7. (3) Dismissals under paragraph (1) of this article may be ordered only after consultation with or on the authorisation of Our Minister, the President of the Council of Ministers, who shall first consult a commission consisting of five members and five substitute members. A chairman and vice-chairman shall be appointed from among the members.
8. (4) The members and substitute members of the commission mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be appointed by Us on the recommendation of Our Minister, the President of the Council of Ministers.
9. ......................................................................................................................................................
10. 39. The Ministerial Decree of 17 December 1951, promulgated in virtue of article 97 (b), reads as follows:
11. The Prime Minister and Minister of General Affairs, acting on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers,
12. Having regard to paragraph (2) of Article 97 (b) of the General Rules for Government Officials ...
13. Decides that:
14. The following associations may jeopardise or prejudice the proper fulfilment of the duties of an official in the service of the Kingdom by reason of their aims or the methods they employ
15. 1. C.P.N. (Communist Party of the Netherlands) ;
16. 2. A.B.C. (Workers' Cultural Association);
17. 3. A.N.J.V. (General Federation of Netherlands Democratic Youth);
18. 4. N.V.B. (Netherlands Federation of Democratic Women);
19. 5. E.V.C. (Unified Trade Union Centre) and all its affiliated unions.
20. 40. It appears from the provisions of article 97 (b) mentioned above that a public official may be dismissed if, in the opinion of the competent authority, there is not sufficient guarantee of his faithfully fulfilling his duty as an official. An official does not offer these guarantees when he becomes a member of an organisation which, in view of the aims which it pursues or the means it employs, may endanger or harm the faithful fulfilment of his duty as an official.
21. 41. By means of the Ministerial Decree of 17 December 1951, promulgated in application of article 97 (b), the Prime Minister decided that the Unified Trade Union Centre and its affiliated organisations may, in view of the aims which it pursues or the means it employs, endanger or harm the satisfactory fulfilment of the duties of a public official.
22. 42. The Committee is of the opinion that it is not called upon to examine standards of loyalty which a government considers it must require officials in the service of the State to satisfy as a condition of their admission to or retention in such service, in so far as they may affect the free exercise of trade union rights. The Committee also considers that the question as to whether or not such regulations materially affect the free exercise of trade union rights must be examined as a question of fact in the light of the circumstances of each particular case circumstances which may or may not be of such a nature as to call for further examination of the case.
23. 43. In this particular case, it should be noted that in addition to the Unified Trade Union Centre several other trade unions of various tendencies exist in the Netherlands. They are, among others, the Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions, the Catholic Workers' Movement of the Netherlands, the Confederation of Evangelical Trade Unions of the Netherlands and the Confederation of Liberal Trade Unions of the Netherlands. The fact that officials may, in complete freedom, become members of any of these organisations, including the Unified Trade Union Centre - this fact is not questioned by the complainant - would seem to prove a priori that the purpose of these regulations is not to curtail the free exercise of trade union rights of officials.
24. 44. It appears also from the provisions quoted above that the regulations in issue empower the Government to decide that an organisation, in view of the aims which it pursues and the means it employs--terms which are not defined in the regulations-may endanger the satisfactory fulfilment of the duties of an official. The regulations, however, do not question the right of officials to set up organisations of their own choosing and to join them, a right specifically guaranteed by Article 2 of the Convention and sanctioned by article 9 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
25. 45. The only question remaining at issue, therefore, is the question whether an official who has made use of his right of free choice in joining an organisation may, under the regulations now in force, be dismissed on that ground alone.
26. 46. The Government maintains that the purpose of the regulations is strictly to exclude unreliable officials from government service, and particularly Communist- or Fascist-minded officials, whose conceptions are directed against the established Constitutional régime and who may be deemed capable of having recourse to means which no State, in its own defence, can tolerate.
27. 47. The Government adds that, by preventing as far as possible unreliable officials from infiltrating into the public service, it is seeking not only to protect democratic institutions but also to prevent the installation of a régime under which trade unions would be deprived of all freedom.
28. 48. The Government points out, however, that by virtue of paragraph 2 of article 97 (b) of the General Rules for Government Officials referred to above,,the affiliation of an official with the Unified Trade Union Centre of the Netherlands constitutes a legal presumption of disloyal inclinations on the part of the official towards the State. The Government adds that the possibility is not, therefore, excluded that the sole fact of such affiliation may lead to dismissal, especially where an official occupies in the Administration a particularly vulnerable post with respect to which the interests of public order do not allow the Government to take any risk.
29. 49. But even in this last hypothesis the dismissal must be based on the disloyal inclinations of the official. It is stated that a separate decision must be taken with regard to each particular case having regard to individual interests and to the public interest. Moreover, the dismissal is purely optional ; the Government may dismiss the official but is not bound to do so.
30. 50. The Government maintains, finally, that the dismissal of an official may not be pronounced, under the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 97 (b) referred to above, except with the agreement or authorisation of the Prime Minister, who must previously consult a commission of inquiry set up for this purpose.
31. 51. The complainant, while recognising that a commission of inquiry has been set up " to consider the cases of officials who are considered as being politically unreliable ", alleges, nevertheless, that the procedure followed before the commission, which has to give its opinion as to the dismissal of an official, in accordance with article 97 (b) of the General Rules for Government Officials, has been modified by a Decree dated 14 November 1951 in such a way that officials are deprived of all legal guarantees. It is stated that witnesses can be heard by the commission in the absence of the official concerned and of his lawyer.
32. 52. The Government on the other hand maintains that the purpose of the amendments to the procedure in question is to enable the commission to obtain the most complete information possible and thus form as objective an opinion as possible.
33. 53. The regulations at issue are paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 97 (b) of the General Rules for Government Officials, and the Decree promulgated in application of this article, dated 25 March 1939 (Staatsblad No. 180), amended by the Decree of 12 December 1939 (Staatsblad No. 189 B) and further amended by the Decree of 14 November 1951 (Staatsblad No. 488).
34. 54. The basic provisions of these regulations are as follows:
35. 55. As soon as the commission has received a request for an opinion and the documents relating to the particular case, it shall so inform the official concerned by registered mail. Within eight days, the official concerned may request that the dossier should be communicated to him. The commission then forwards the dossier to the Secretary-General of the department in which the official is working in order that he may study it or copy it. Certain documents, however, concerning which the Government deems that the public interest may be endangered if they were communicated to the official concerned, are not attached to the dossier sent to the official. A note should then point out that the dossier is incomplete.
36. 56. The commission shall hear the official concerned. He may be accompanied by a counsel. The chairman of the commission may, however, refuse to admit a particular counsel. The commission may also call before it any other person for the purpose of making a statement. If the chairman should so decide, these persons are heard in the absence of the official and of his counsel. The commission may also request the opinion of experts, ask the Administration to furnish certain documents, etc. The official and his counsel may study all the documents submitted to the commission with the exception of those which, in the public interest, may not be communicated to him. The commission may not take account of any document, statement or accusation made against the official concerned, of which the official has no knowledge, except when the public interest has to be safeguarded.
37. 57. Any public official called by the commission shall appear and furnish all the information requested from him unless he is bound by professional secrecy. The official concerned and his close relatives may abstain from making statements.
38. 58. The sittings of the commission are held in secret. The officials taking part in them, including the accused and his counsel, are bound to keep secret the discussions of the commission.
39. 59. An absolute majority of the votes cast by all the members of the commission is necessary for a decision. No member may abstain from voting. In case of a tie the chairman has the casting vote.
40. 60. In its report the commission must give the reasons for its opinion. This report is communicated as quickly as possible to the Prime Minister, who then takes a decision after having examined the report of the commission. The Prime Minister then communicates this decision to the commission and, should his decision differ from the opinion expressed by the commission, he shall also give the reasons for his decision.
41. 61. The main provisions of these regulations are therefore as follows.
42. 62. The commission of inquiry has the right and the obligation of expressing an opinion based on the most complete information possible. It is composed of five members and may not sit unless all members are present, none of whom may abstain from voting. Every care is thus taken for all opinions expressed within the commission to be reflected in the final vote.
43. 63. The official concerned is entitled, in particular, to be informed as to the institution of the proceedings, to avail himself of the assistance of counsel, to study the dossier to be heard by the commission, and to be present during the preparation for the hearing.
44. 64. However, the official and his counsel are not given access to information concerning which the Government considers that the public interest may be endangered if it were communicated to them. The chairman of the com mission may also decide-and this is the point to which the complainant takes particular objection-that certain persons shall be heard by the Commission in the absence of the official concerned and of his counsel. On the other hand, the decree provides that the commission shall not take account of charges made against the official concerned of which he has no knowledge, except when the public interest may be endangered by such knowledge.
45. 65. In explaining the scope of these provisions, the Government, in its communication dated 14 April 1954, points out that the commission must afford the person concerned an opportunity to make himself aware of all the data on which it bases its opinion. It would thus appear that the official, although he does not have access to certain items in the dossier or is not present during the hearing of certain witnesses, must nevertheless be informed of all the facts which are pertinent to the decision.
46. 66. From the analysis of this part of the complaint it would appear that the regulations complained against are not intended to bring into question the right of officials to affiliate freely with an organisation of their own choosing a right which is guaranteed by Article 2 of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (No. 87), ratified by the Government of the Netherlands-but are intended exclusively to eliminate from the public services, and especially from key posts in the Administration, officials whose disloyalty has been materially established. The Government admits, however, that article 97 (b) of the General Rules for Government Officials embodies a legal presumption of disloyalty in respect of officials who are members of the Unified Trade Union Centre, especially in the case of those who occupy key posts in the Administration. However, this presumption does not appear to be irrefutable because, materially, the dismissal must be based on the disloyal inclinations of the official. With regard to the guarantees offered to the official by the inquiry procedure, it would appear from the texts in question that, while the official must be informed of the reasons on which the proposal to dismiss him is based, he may nevertheless not be permitted to have information concerning certain items of evidence or depositions if public order requires that such information shall not be given.
47. 67. The Committee considers that it is not called upon to examine the reasons of public order invoked by a government in favour of not communicating certain items of evidence to an official subjected to an inquiry except in so far as the free exercise of trade union rights may be brought into question. It was on the basis of this principle that the Committee requested the Government to inform it whether, under the terms of the procedure in force, an official who is dismissed is given, having regard to requirements of public order, enough information as to the reasons for his dismissal to prevent him from attributing it to the mere fact of his trade union affiliation.
48. 68. In its reply the Government states that while certain items of evidence may not be communicated to the official on the ground of public order, the official, nevertheless, is offered an opportunity " of making himself aware of all the data on which the commission bases its opinion ".
49. 69. In these circumstances, the Committee considers it appropriate to emphasise the desirability of including in procedures for the protection of public security the safeguards necessary to avoid any infringements of trade union rights. Subject to this point, it considers that allegations of this nature raise questions of fact which must be considered in the light of the circumstances of each particular case. In this specific case, the Committee, noting the assurances given by the Government and interpreting them as meaning that an official may not be dismissed solely on account of his affiliation with a trade union of his own choosing without sufficient proof of his disloyal inclinations being furnished, considers that the complainant has not furnished proof that either the regulations as a whole or the procedure followed with respect to dismissal of officials infringe the exercise of trade union rights.
50. Allegation concerning the Internal Security
51. 70. The complainant alleges that an Internal Security Bill authorises the Government to curtail, by means of proclaiming a state of emergency, certain fundamental rights, such as the right of combination, and to keep certain persons in preventive detention.
52. 71. The Government, while pointing out that the legislation implicated by the complainant is the Act of 23 June 1952 on the Extraordinary Powers of the Civil Authorities, maintains that this Act confers on the Government a power which it is generally agreed is indispensable in order to protect the Constitutional régime and public order.
53. 72. Under this Act the Government has the power of declaring either a state of alert or a state of emergency when revolutionary movements, riots or similar events endangering the public order or national existence occur or may occur in the near future (Staatsblad No. 361).
54. 73. In previous instances when the Committee considered complaints concerning alleged infringements of trade union rights committed under a state of emergency or a state of siege or under the terms of an Internal Security Act, it expressed the opinion that it was not competent to come to a decision on the need or the advisability of such legislation, which is a question purely political in character. The Committee was, however, of the opinion that it should consider the repercussions which such legislation might have on the free exercise of trade union rights.
55. 74. The complainant alleges in the first place that the legislation at present in force authorises the Government to abolish the right of combination. Without making particular mention of the right of combination, the Act of 23 June 1952 provides in its article 13 that freedom of public assembly may be curtailed if a state of alert is declared, and in its article 20 that the holding of public meetings may be subject to prior authorisation if a state of emergency is proclaimed.
56. 75. On several occasions the Committee has expressed the opinion that, although the right of holding trade union meetings is a basic requisite of the free exercise of trade union rights, the organisations concerned must observe the general provisions relating to public meetings, which are applicable to all. This principle is set forth in Article 8 of Convention No. 87, which provides that the workers and their organisations, like other persons or organised collectivities, shall respect the law of the land.
57. 76. In view of the fact that the provisions mentioned above do not deal specifically with trade union meetings, the Committee considers that the complainants have not furnished sufficient proof that the free exercise of trade union rights has been infringed.
58. 77. The complainant further alleges that the above-mentioned legislation authorises the Government to place certain persons in preventive detention. Article 24 of the Act of 23 June 1952 does provide in fact that the competent authorities may keep in custody persons lawfully suspected of being capable of endangering the public order and internal peace and security.
59. 78. The Committee, while refraining from expressing an opinion on the political aspects of a state of emergency, has on previous occasions emphasised that any measures of preventive detention must be accompanied by adequate judicial safeguards applied within a reasonable period and that all detained persons must receive a fair trial at the earliest possible moment.
60. 79. Under articles 24 and 25 of the Act a person may not be placed in preventive detention unless the following requirements are fulfilled : in each particular case a report shall be drawn up and copies forwarded to the Ministry of the Interior, to the competent administrative tribunal and to the official concerned. An appeal against the decision may be made to the administrative tribunal. This tribunal must hear the official concerned at the earliest possible moment and at the latest within a month, if so requested. The tribunal must take a decision and communicate it as quickly as possible both to the Minister and the official concerned. The Minister shall take a decision as soon as possible after reception of the decision of the tribunal. If no appeal is made the tribunal may, on its own initiative, request from the Ministry of the Interior information on cases of detention of which it has been informed. It may also express an opinion and communicate it to the Minister. Measures shall be taken to ensure the safeguarding of the property of the official concerned. Any decision concerning the detention of a particular person must be confirmed by the government within three months. If it appears that a person has been detained wrongfully the Minister of the Interior will grant an adequate indemnity to the person concerned if that person so requests within three months after being released.
61. 80. It appears from these provisions that the measures of preventive detention are accompanied by adequate judicial safeguards and that the persons detained are given a fair trial at the earliest possible moment.
62. 81. In view of the requirements to which measures of preventive detention are subject, the Committee considers that the complainants have not furnished sufficient proof in support of their allegation that the Internal Security Act, by means of curtailing individual liberties, infringes the free exercise of trade union rights.
63. Allegation concerning the Non-Recognition of the Unified Trade Union Centre
64. 82. When it alleges that the Government does not recognise the Unified Trade Union Centre as a party entitled to participate in the elaboration of collective agreements, the complaining organisation invokes Article 11 of Convention No. 87, which provides that " each Member of the International Labour Organisation for which this Convention is in force undertakes to take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that workers and employers may exercise freely the right to organise ".
65. 83. In this connection the Committee has in several instances expressed the opinion that the right to take part in collective agreements constitutes an important aspect of trade union rights.
66. 84. In the present case, the question of co-operation between the Government and industrial organisations in respect of collective agreements is regulated by a Decree of 5 October 1945. Under the terms of articles 11 et seq. of this Decree, a Commission of Mediators has been set up which is empowered, either at the request of employers' and workers' organisations or ex officio, to draw up binding regulations concerning wages and conditions of work. The Commission is also competent to approve collective agreements freely entered into and to make them generally binding. The Commission is also empowered, in accordance with general instructions given by the Government, to establish rules concerning the regulation of wages and conditions of work. It appears from these provisions that the Government is authorised to lay down general rules of wage policy which the negotiating parties must respect.
67. 85. This wage policy is carried out with the assistance of the interested parties. Thus, before any of the above-mentioned measures bearing upon questions of a general interest are taken, the Commission of Mediators, in accordance with article 19 of the Decree, must request the opinion of the Labour Foundation, which is a body of voluntary co-operation set up at the end of the war in agreement with the main employers' and workers' organisations, with the exception, however, of the Unified Trade Union Centre. The Com mission of Mediators may also request the opinion of other employers' and workers' organisations.
68. 86. The Government maintains that an industrial organisation must be representative in order to take part in the procedure for consultation and cooperation. Whatever may be the criteria for determining whether an organisation is representative, the Government considers that the organisation should be reliable from the point of view of respect of the Constitution and that it should be willing and able to play a constructive part in the organised consultation and to bear the resulting responsibility. Experience has shown, however, that the Unified Trade Union Centre does not fulfil either of these requirements.
69. 87. In the case under consideration, the legislation does not make any distinction as between the various existing trade unions. It would appear, however, from the allegation made by the complainant that the Government has not in fact included the Unified Trade Union Centre in the procedure for the application of the measures provided by law. The Committee notes that the Unified Trade Union Centre has refrained from becoming a member of the Labour Foundation, which is a body freely set up and which should be consulted in accordance with the above-mentioned article 19. Although the Unified Trade Union Centre is not included among the organisations which should be consulted, it appears from the observations communicated by the Government that this organisation is neither willing nor able to play a constructive part in the organised consultation and to bear the resulting responsibility.
70. 88. Since free negotiations can only be based upon the free consent of the interested parties and not upon coercion, the Committee considers that the complainant has not furnished sufficient proof that the Government has infringed Article 11 of Convention No. 87 concerning freedom of association and protection of the right to organise.

89. The Committee recommends to the Governing Body to decide that, subject to the observations made in paragraph 69 above, the case as a whole does not call for further examination.