Informe en el que el Comité pide que se le mantenga informado de la evolución de la situación - Informe núm. 380, Octubre 2016

Caso núm. 3106 (Panamá) - Fecha de presentación de la queja:: 10-AGO-14 - Cerrado

Allegations: prohibition of strike action by Panama Canal workers in the absence of sufficient compensatory guarantees; obstacles to the exercise of privileges by workers’ representatives; failure to implement a collective agreement and unilateral imposition of changes in working conditions; failure to bargain in good faith and victimization of trade unionists

1. 767. The complaint is contained in communications dated 10 August and 20 November 2014 from the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), the Union of Tugboat Captains and Officers (UCOC), the Union of Panama Canal Pilots (UPCP), the Union of Marine Engineers (UIM) and the Panama Canal and Caribbean Union (SCPC).
2. 768. The Government sent its observations in communications dated 24 and 27 February 2015, and 24 October 2016.
3. 769. Panama has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98)

A. The complainants’ allegations

1. 770. In their communications of 10 August and 20 November 2014, the complainant organizations allege that the Government denies Panama Canal workers the right to strike, does not provide sufficient compensatory guarantees in that regard, hinders the exercise of privileges that should be enjoyed by workers’ representatives, does not meet some of the commitments established in a collective agreement, imposes unilateral changes in working conditions, fails to bargain in good faith and victimizes trade unionists.
2. 771. The complainants maintain that Panama Canal workers do not have the right to strike. They state that section 92 of the Organic Act establishing the Panama Canal Authority (LOACP) classifies the Canal as an international public service and establishes that its operation may not be interrupted in whole or in part or diminished for any reason by strike action, go-slows or any other unjustified work stoppage. They emphasize that this prohibition is based on the fact that the Canal is viewed not as an “essential” service but as an international “public” service. They consider that the conditions necessary as stipulated by the Committee to totally deny Panama Canal workers the right to strike are not present.
3. 772. The complainants also allege that the compensatory guarantees for workers who have been deprived of the right to strike are insufficient. They indicate that the LOACP provides two avenues for addressing labour disputes in the Panama Canal zone, both of which limit the potential to appeal the resulting decisions or awards: (i) the Labour Relations Board (JRL), which is empowered to impose binding settlements of disputes on bargaining rights, break deadlocks in negotiations and address complaints of unfair labour practices (its decisions may not be appealed unless they violate the LOACP); and (ii) collective bargaining and the established conciliation and arbitration mechanisms (the resulting arbitral awards may only be appealed on the grounds of misinterpretation of a law or regulation, clear bias on the arbitrator’s part or abuse of due process). The complainants report that although the LOACP places these restrictions on the right of appeal, the Panama Canal Authority (ACP) has appealed all decisions and awards that were unfavourable to it before the Supreme Court. They allege that these appeals are brought for the sole purpose of delaying application of the decisions since the appeals proceedings can take up to five years and the ACP refuses to implement decisions until they have been confirmed by the Supreme Court. The complainants therefore consider that the compensatory guarantees for workers who have been denied the right to strike are insufficient and that this is contrary to the principles of freedom of association. In support of this allegation, they mention six cases: (i) Complaint No. 05/10 on unfair labour practices, brought before the JRL on 26 January 2010, alleging failure to pay captains who had been required to report for work early without the usual prior notice as required under a collective agreement (on 25 February 2011, the JRL ruled in favour of the UCOC; the ACP lodged an appeal immediately and the Supreme Court’s decision is pending); (ii) Complaint No. 11/10 on unfair labour practices, brought before the JRL on 10 May 2010, alleging failure to pay overtime to marine engineers pursuant to a collective agreement (on 20 July 2012, the JRL ruled in favour of the UIM; the ACP lodged an appeal on 17 September 2012, and the Supreme Court’s decision is still pending); (iii) Complaint No. 18/10 on unfair labour practices, brought on 27 August 2010, alleging failure to provide lunch boxes to marine engineers pursuant to a collective agreement (on 17 January 2013, the JRL ruled in favour of the UIM; the ACP lodged an appeal on 24 June 2013 and the Supreme Court’s decision is still pending); (iv) a complaint, brought before the JRL on 7 April 2009, alleging that captains had been excluded from the collective agreement between the UCOC and the ACP on the grounds that they were “trusted employees” (the JRL ruled in favour of the UCOC; the ACP lodged an appeal immediately and in April 2014 the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the UCOC); (v) Complaint No. 34/06 on unfair labour practices, brought in 2006, alleging failure to follow the procedures governing health care (on 31 March 2014, the JRL ruled in favour of the UPCP; the Supreme Court’s decision is still pending; and (vi) Arbitral Cases Nos 79/10 and 80/10, alleging that the members of a bargaining unit had been denied access to ships whose operation required additional compensation (the hearings were held in July 2011 and July 2012; the arbitrators ruled in favour of the UPCP, the ACP appealed and the Supreme Court’s decision is still pending).
4. 773. The complainants further allege that the ACP puts obstacles in the way of the exercise of privileges by workers’ representatives. They recall that the LOACP allocates workers’ representation to an “exclusive representative”, defined as the trade union that represents the workers in a bargaining unit, and envisages “representation leave”: leave granted to the worker that the exclusive representative designates to represent it in a legally authorized activity. The complainants also report that, in December 2009, the UCOC signed a Memorandum of Understanding, supplementing the provisions on representation, under which the three designated area representatives are granted a collective maximum of 40 hours of representation leave. The complainants report that, deliberately misinterpreting this Memorandum of Understanding in order to deny access to representation privileges: (i) the ACP denies the trade union organization’s right to designate the representatives who are entitled to representation leave (in that regard, the complainants mention, as examples, Arbitration No. 14-002 on failure to grant representation leave to the General Secretary or the representative and legal adviser of a trade union, and disciplinary proceedings brought against two captains, in which the union representatives assigned to represent the workers in question were not granted representation leave); and (ii) in response to requests to hold meetings to be attended by other trade union representatives, the ACP maintained that workers’ representatives could only be granted such leave when the meeting was organized by the ACP (and refused to grant such leave when the representatives organized a meeting pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding, although that restriction is not envisaged in the LOACP). In order to show the negative impact of limiting representation leave to the three area representatives, the complainants explain that the trade union assigns and distributes cases to trade union secretaries on the basis of the subject matter and does not assign them to area representatives. They also mention other events as examples of an attempt to hinder the exercise of privileges by workers’ representatives, alleging that the ACP: (i) has begun to suggest that meetings should only be held on the trade union representative’s rest days; (ii) has altered the duty roster to ensure that representatives and/or workers who have been subject to disciplinary hearings have only a short rest period between shifts and meetings; (iii) does not give line managers full authority to grant representation leave (as was the practice, and although it is the line managers who best understand needs as regards duty rosters and representation), requiring them to follow direct oral instructions from their superiors; and (iv) with regard to the mid-term negotiations envisaged in the collective agreement with the UPCP, the negotiating team was granted only 75 calendar days of official leave whereas the ACP negotiating team had been granted paid leave in which to prepare for more than a year. The complainants maintain that their representatives should be able to communicate with management without delay and should be granted the paid leave that they require in order to fulfil their representation responsibilities, and that the trade unions have the right to decide who their representatives will be and, in particular, who may exercise representation privileges.
5. 774. The complainants also maintain that the ACP is failing to meet some of the commitments established in collective agreements, imposing unilateral changes in working conditions and failing to bargain in good faith. With regard to relations between the Canal authorities and the UPCP, they report that, first, the ACP has denied the trade union’s request for the joint development and implementation of a training programme for the Canal pilots who pilot ships through the new canals and locks, even though a Memorandum signed by the ACP and the UPCP on 31 May 2012, which is part of the collective agreement with the UPCP, specifically provides for such joint preparation. The complainants state that the UPCP plans to bring proceedings against the ACP for unfair labour practices in this matter. Second, the complainants report that on 9 May 2014, the ACP sent the UPCP written notification of changes in the current working conditions (and also future changes resulting from the opening of the third set of locks), implicitly denying the trade union’s right to full negotiations on these changes in the conditions of employment, including the right to negotiate on ways and means of carrying out the work as established in the LOACP. Similarly, the complainants allege, with regard to the working conditions covered by the collective agreement, that: (i) section 4 of the agreement establishes that its provisions may only be reopened for negotiation by mutual agreement; and (ii) although the UPCP did not consent to such reopening, the ACP persisted in imposing new rules, leading the UPCP to bring proceedings for unfair practices before the JRL.
6. 775. With regard to relations between the authorities and the UCOC, the complainants report that the ACP has failed to bargain in good faith and that, for almost five years – since December 2012 – the UCOC has been attempting to negotiate a new collective agreement but, despite those efforts, has been unable even to successfully negotiate the basic rules applicable to the negotiation of such an agreement. The complainants maintain that the negotiations on basic rules began in January 2013 and that, after just a few meetings, it was clear that the ACP was not acting in good faith. Specifically, they allege that: (i) the UCOC was not granted representation leave in order to prepare; (ii) the captains involved in the negotiations were required to work their usual shifts and, at times, were forced to attend meetings without having had their compulsory rest periods; (iii) the members of the UCOC team were still required to work whenever it suited the ACP, interrupting the continuity of the negotiations (whereas the ACP team members were allowed to take time off to focus on the negotiations); (iv) the UCOC was not allowed to bring lawyers or other advisers to the bargaining table; (v) the ACP tripled the length of the short list of issues proposed by the trade union and added issues related to the negotiation of a collective agreement, not to the basic rules of negotiation; and (vi) the ACP team stated that it did not have decision-making power and was acting on the orders of senior management. The complainants state that the negotiations on basic rules were terminated in September 2013 and that the UCOC reported this deadlock to the JRL.
7. 776. Lastly, the complainants allege that the ACP victimizes trade unionists. They report that, on one occasion during the negotiations with the UCOC on the basic rules for negotiating a collective agreement, when the trade union team had been given, exceptionally, a week of representation leave, the negotiations were stalled after just one meeting and the ACP ordered the trade union team back to work. The complainants report that when that team’s members refused to do so on the grounds that they had been granted representation leave, they immediately received written notification that they were subject to a disciplinary measure for failing to obey the order. The complainants add that, while the disciplinary measure was ultimately lifted, the show of force and the attitude displayed by the ACP added to the impression that management had no interest in negotiating a collective agreement with the UCOC.

B. The Government’s reply

1. 777. In its communications of 24 and 27 February 2015, the Government sends its reply, which is based on the ACP’s comments on the complainants’ allegations.
2. 778. Concerning the allegation that Panama Canal workers are denied the right to strike, the Government recalls that it does not prevent workers from exercising this right; the labour policy in question was the outcome of a tripartite decision in which the trade unions (which included members of the four complainants) participated with full knowledge and which resulted in article 322 of the Constitution. In that regard, the Government emphasizes that, not only is the prohibition based on a provision of the LOACP, it is established in Panama’s Constitution, article 322 of which establishes that because the Canal provides an essential international service, its operation may not be interrupted for any reason. On that point, the Government refers to the statement made by the representative of the Coalition of Panama Canal Workers’ Unions (American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL–CIO)) on 22 December 1993, during the regular session of the Legislative Assembly of Panama, recognizing that “there is no right to strike at the Panama Canal and we, the members of the Coalition of Unions, are at no time calling for the right to strike to apply”. The Government adds that, in order not to leave the workers unprotected, it was proposed that labour disputes between Canal workers and the ACP be settled between the workers or their trade unions and the Administration using the dispute settlement mechanisms established by law, with arbitration as the final administrative remedy. The Government stresses that the LOACP was the outcome of countless consultations and of a consensus reached by the various political, civil, environmental and labour groups of Panamanian society with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The Government adds that this prohibition not only reflects a decision taken by the Panamanian people; it was confirmed by the three branches of Government. In that regard, the Government recalls that the Supreme Court considered the issue in its decision of 27 April 2009, in which the plenary of the Court ruled that, while the right of workers to strike was constitutionally protected, it must be borne in mind that, following the principle of consistency with the provisions of the Constitution, priority must be given to uninterrupted provision of the essential public service that the Panama Canal provides, which is expressly enshrined in the Constitution. Lastly, the Government recalls that the provision of the Constitution on which the prohibition of strikes is based is consistent with Article II of the Treaty concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, which “declares the neutrality of the Canal in order that both in time of peace and in time of war it shall remain secure and open to peaceful transit by the vessels of all nations on terms of entire equality”. The Government explains that this commitment (which was signed by Panama and the United States on 7 September 1977 and to which 14 States are parties) is the basis for the obligation to keep the Canal open without interruption. The Government emphasizes that this is not merely a service that may be interrupted without risk to life or personal safety; the stability of our societies, the sustainability of the global system that links them even more closely and, ultimately, peace itself depend on its provision. For this reason, the Government considers it to be a service of global interest.
3. 779. Concerning the allegation of insufficient compensatory guarantees, the Government maintains, first, that the complainants have neglected to state that, in addition to access to the JRL and to collective bargaining procedures, Canal workers have other compensatory guarantees, including the principle of security of tenure, the freedom of information system, the right of trade union organizations to membership in international trade union organizations, the right to the procedure for the handling of complaints and resulting arbitration, and the right to establish a labour-management council that includes the Administration and the trade unions in order to improve labour relations, identify problems and find solutions. The Government also explains that the number of cases in which the trade unions have exercised their right to appeal arbitral awards or rulings of the JRL is greater than the number in which the Administration, with equal legitimacy under the law, has appealed (in support of this claim, in its latest communication the Government provides detailed data on the number of cases on labour issues involving the ACP between 2000 and 2016, including the number of charges brought by each party: 36 by the ACP and 55 by the trade unions). The Government further indicates that in none of the cases to which the complainants allude have the Administration’s appeals been brought at the whim of the ACP in an attempt to avoid implementing unfavourable decisions and to abuse the prohibition of strikes in the Canal zone; in every case, care was taken to respect both the guarantee of due process and the competency of the court and every appeal legitimately invoked violation of provisions of the law. Concerning the complaints of unfair practices (Nos 05/10, 11/10 and 18/10), the Government states that, under the law, the complaints did not concern unfair labour practices and should have been submitted for arbitration; thus, they were unlawfully judged receivable by the JRL. The Government was therefore obliged to appeal the rulings of the JRL in order to safeguard the integrity of the Canal’s labour regime. The Government states that one of these cases (Complaint No. 05/10) was settled by the Supreme Court on 5 February 2015, in a decision annulling the ruling of the JRL on the grounds that the latter had not been competent to consider the complaint, which could not be treated as involving an unfair labour practice (the Government considers that this same criterion should apply to the other complaints of the same type (Nos 11/10 and 18/10), which are still pending before the Supreme Court). With respect to the two arbitration cases, the Government reports that the Administration was also obliged to appeal the awards because it considered them unlawful (in one case because the arbitrator’s remit had been exceeded by the ruling and in the other because the arbitrator had departed from the issue under consideration).
4. 780. With regard to the allegations of denial of representation privileges, the Government states that the ACP merely carried out its role of obeying and enforcing the law, collective agreements and memoranda of understanding between the parties in order to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the service provided by the Canal. The ACP considers that the new tugboat captains’ union, the UCOC, disrupts the proper functioning of labour relations by encouraging non-compliance with existing agreements. In that connection, the ACP recalls that the Memorandum of Understanding that the UCOC signed in 2009 establishes that only the three area representatives (designated by the trade union, one for each operational sector) are entitled to representation leave. For this reason, the ACP could not grant representation leave to other workers’ representatives in the aforementioned arbitral and disciplinary proceedings; in order for it to do so, they would need to have been designated area representatives by the trade union. As an illustration, the Government states that in Arbitration No. 14-002, the trade union was not represented at various meetings because, since this requirement – established in the Memorandum of Understanding – had not been met, the requested representation leave could not be granted.
5. 781. With respect to the allegation of failure to negotiate in good faith with the UCOC, the ACP alleges that it was the UCOC that acted in bad faith at the bargaining table. The ACP reports that, after more than a year of attempting to agree on basic rules for the negotiation of a collective agreement with the UCOC, the trade union brought seven allegations of deadlock before the JRL, upon which the attempted negotiations were suspended. According to the Government, the JRL ruled in favour of the ACP on six of the seven issues (and, on the remaining issue, merely allowed the trade union to have five negotiators instead of four, as the ACP had proposed). The ACP explains that, once the rulings on the allegations of deadlock had been issued, the Administration sent the UCOC several invitations to resume the negotiations.
6. 782. In its communication of 24 October 2016, the Government makes additional observations and forwards further information supplied by the ACP. In general, the Government considers that the complaint does not fulfil the basic requirements of the precise identification of the facts and the provision of evidence, for which reason it considers that it would be difficult for the Committee to make recommendations on such delicate matters as compensatory guarantees, as it has not been demonstrated or evidence provided that the allegations are well-founded.
7. 783. The ACP indicates that it remains in continuous dialogue with workers’ organizations, as illustrated by the conclusion of four collective agreements in 2016, including one with the UPCP and one with the UCOC, and that negotiations are being held with machine engineers and firefighters for the conclusion of a new collective agreement with the workers in these bargaining units.
8. 784. The ACP reports that it signed a collective agreement with the UPCP on 9 May 2016. It adds, with reference to the allegations in the complaint concerning this organization, that: (i) during the course of the negotiations, the JRL in ruling No. 35/2015 of 6 April 2015 set aside the appeal lodged by the UPCP relating to the deadlock; and (ii) the parties included general clauses on training in the new collective agreement, and six paid training courses have already been agreed upon with the UPCP.
9. 785. The ACP adds that it concluded a collective agreement with the UCOC on 27 July 2016, and notes that the 2009 Memorandum of Understanding (referred to in relation to the issues concerning representation facilities raised by the organization) was included in the trade union representation clauses agreed to in the new collective agreement.
10. 786. The ACP also reports that, with reference to the collective agreement that is in force covering Canal pilots, the parties recognize that all work relating to the Cocolí and Agua Clara Locks (the expanded Canal) is new and that the parties will revise the standard times for the calculation of working time, which means that the channels of communication will remain open to improve operations and the labour climate. The ACP adds that the last four collective agreements concluded offer benefits, including significant financial elements, for 97.5 per cent of Canal workers.
11. 787. With regard to the expeditious nature of the procedures for dealing with complaints as compensatory guarantees, the ACP is of the view that consideration could be given to greater supervision of the work of the JRL, which it recalls is the institution that can offer the most appropriate response adapted to the specific labour regulations governing the Canal, as well as continuous training for arbitrators.

The Committee’s conclusions

1. 788. The Committee observes that the complaint concerns allegations of denial of the right to strike, insufficient compensatory guarantees for denial of this right, obstacles to the exercise of privileges by workers’ representatives, failure to implement a collective agreement, imposition of unilateral changes in working conditions, failure to bargain in good faith and victimization of trade unionists.
2. 789. Concerning the alleged denial of the right to strike, the Committee notes that, according to the Government, the fact that the right to strike does not apply in the Panama Canal zone arises from the country’s Constitution and is the outcome both of a tripartite national agreement and of the international obligations assumed by the State of Panama, as confirmed by the highest institutions of the State powers. The Committee also notes that, in a direct request published in 2001, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), in considering the question of the prohibition of strikes in the Panama Canal zone, expressed the hope that, within the protection of the LOACP, workers who were deprived of an essential means of defending their socio-economic and occupational interests (such as strike action) were, in practice, afforded impartial and rapid compensatory guarantees, for example, conciliation and mediation procedures leading, in the event of deadlock in negotiations, to arbitration machinery seen to be reliable by the parties concerned. The Committee will examine this case from the point of view of the need to ensure that the compensatory guarantees are sufficient, particularly as regards their effectiveness and rapidity, in light of the complainants’ allegations and the Government’s observations.
3. 790. In that regard, the Committee observes that, according to the complainants, the compensatory guarantees for denial of the right to strike are insufficient and, in particular, that the Administration has appealed all decisions and awards that were unfavourable to it before the Supreme Court in order to delay their application for years since, once an appeal has been brought, the authorities do not implement them until the Supreme Court has ruled. The Committee notes that the cases to which the complainants refer involve disputes concerning the implementation of collective agreements. In that connection, it recalls that restriction of the right to strike must be compensated by the right to have recourse to impartial and rapid machinery for individual or collective grievances concerning the interpretation or application of collective agreements. With regard to the specific cases mentioned by the complainants, the Committee takes due note of the Government’s explanation that the authorities were obliged to appeal the aforementioned rulings and awards because, in its view, they were unlawful. The Committee observes, however, that these cases show that the proceedings – from the lodging of a complaint or grievance to its settlement – can take several years (for example, the complainants indicate that in Complaint No. 34/06 on unfair labour practices, over eight years elapsed between the lodging of the complaint and the JRL’s ruling and the Supreme Court’s decision on appeal is still pending) and that, in the event of an appeal, the ruling or arbitral award is not implemented until it has been confirmed by the Supreme Court. The Committee also notes that the ACP, with regard to the expeditious nature of procedures for dealing with complaints as compensatory guarantees, envisages a better supervision of the work of the JRL and continuous training for arbitrators. The Committee emphasizes that the rapidity of the proceedings and the prompt implementation of the awards or rulings issued are a key element of compensatory mechanisms for denial of the right to strike. It therefore requests the Government, in light of all the statistics on the length of the proceedings established as compensatory guarantees, including the frequency of appeals to the Supreme Court, to facilitate dialogue with the social partners in order to ensure the efficiency and the rapidity of these procedures. The Committee requests the Government to keep it informed in that regard.
4. 791. Concerning the alleged refusal to grant representation privileges, the Committee takes note of the complainants’ statement that, misinterpreting a Memorandum of Understanding signed with the trade union, the ACP denies that workers’ organizations are empowered to decide which of their representatives are entitled to paid representation leave. The Committee also observes that the complainants mention other practices that hinder representation (allegations that representation leave was not granted for meetings organized by trade unions, demands that meetings only be held on the representative’s rest days, alteration of the duty roster to allow only a short rest period before meetings, requiring that senior management approve the granting of representation leave, and granting less leave to the workers’ team during the mid-term negotiations on a collective agreement). On the one hand, the Committee notes the Government’s explanation in its reply that, according to the Memorandum of Understanding, only the three area representatives designated by the trade union are entitled to paid representation leave (a maximum of 40 hours per week) and that in order for other representatives to be granted such leave, the union would need to designate them area representatives. The Committee also notes the Government’s indication that the Memorandum was included in the clauses on trade union representation agreed upon in the new collective agreement. On the other hand, the Committee regrets that the Government has not replied to the other allegations of obstacles to representation and observes that the ACP does not deny that limiting representation leave to the three area representatives can undermine the principles of freedom of association invoked by the complainants (in fact, the ACP recognizes that in one of the aforementioned arbitral proceedings, restricting privileges to area representatives prevented the trade union from attending several meetings). The Committee also observes that, as is clear from the wording of the Memorandum, two weeks’ notice of any change in the designated area representatives is required. While recognizing the need to ensure the effective operation of the service, as mentioned by the Government, the Committee would like to point out that trade union representatives should enjoy the appropriate privileges for the performance of their duties, including having the time needed to fulfil their representation responsibilities, and that trade unions should be able to decide, without undue restrictions, which representatives can enjoy the representation privileges provided for that purpose. The Committee therefore invites the Government to facilitate dialogue between the competent authorities and the social partners on the existing representation privileges and their implementation in practice in light of the principles of freedom of association.
5. 792. With respect to the allegation of failure to negotiate in good faith with the UCOC, the Committee takes note of the disparities between the complainants’ account and that of the ACP, each accusing the other of acting in bad faith at the bargaining table. The Committee also notes that the complainant has lodged a complaint on this matter with the JRL and that, on 30 January 2015, the latter issued a ruling in favour of the Administration on six of the seven issues raised by the trade union. Moreover, the Committee notes the Government’s indication that, once the ruling had been issued by the JRL, the ACP made several further invitations to the UCOC to resume negotiations, and that it reports in its recent communication that a collective agreement was concluded with the UCOC on 27 July 2016. Consequently, the Committee will not pursue its examination of this allegation.
6. 793. In relation to the allegations with regard to the UPCP of failure to implement a collective agreement (denial of a request to develop a training programme), unilateral imposition of working conditions and refusal to allow the trade union to engage in collective bargaining, the Committee notes that, according to the information provided by the Government in its latest communication: (i) negotiations continued with the UPCP, and the JRL therefore set aside the appeal lodged by the organization concerning the deadlock; (ii) on 9 May 2016 a collective agreement was concluded with the UPCP; and (iii) the parties included general clauses on training in the new agreement, and six paid training courses have already been agreed to with the UPCP. As a consequence, the Committee will not pursue its examination of this allegation.
7. 794. With regard to the alleged victimization of workers who carry out legitimate trade union activities, the Committee observes that, according to the complainants, when the trade union team was ordered to go back to work during negotiations and refused to do so on the grounds that its members had been granted representation leave, they immediately received written notification that they were subject to a disciplinary measure for failing to obey the order. The Committee also notes that the complainants add that the disciplinary measure was ultimately cancelled and that the complainants do not provide any other specific information or evidence in support of their allegation of victimization and anti-trade-union discrimination. In these circumstances, the Committee will not pursue the examination of this allegation.

The Committee’s recommendations

1. 795. In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:
   • (a) The Committee requests the Government, in light of all the statistics on the length of the proceedings established as compensatory guarantees, including the frequency of appeals to the Supreme Court, to facilitate dialogue with the social partners in order to ensure the efficiency and rapidity of these procedures for dealing with complaints as compensatory guarantees. The Committee requests the Government to keep it informed in that regard.
   • (b) The Committee invites the Government to facilitate dialogue between the competent authorities and the social partners on the existing representation privileges and their implementation in practice in light of the principles of freedom of association.