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Demande directe (CEACR) - adoptée 1998, publiée 87ème session CIT (1999)

Convention (n° 81) sur l'inspection du travail, 1947 - Maroc (Ratification: 1958)

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With reference to its observation on the Convention, the Committee notes the information supplied by the Government in reply to its previous comments. It would be grateful if the Government would provide additional information on the following points:

Articles 3, 10 and 16 of the Convention. The Committee notes from the statistical table on the supervisory activities of the labour inspectorate that, despite the efforts announced by the Government to strengthen the staff of the inspectorate, the number of inspections carried out in workplaces fell considerably between 1996 and 1997 (22,768 and 16,894 respectively) and that there was a consequent significant reduction in the number of observations concerning occupational safety and health and reports of violations. However, the Committee notes that the conciliatory activities of labour inspectors was intense in 1996 and 1997. In 1997 alone, they addressed some 30,842 cases of individual disputes, including 60,156 complaints, and settled 37,282 disputes, or 62.5 per cent of all the complaints registered in 1996. The Government states that these activities do not prejudice the impartiality of labour inspectors and do not undermine the spirit of rigour and intransigence in the strict application of the law and that they are considered to be an extension of supervisory activities. However, the Committee expresses its great concern at the decline in the activities covered by Article 16 of the Convention, which provides that workplaces shall be inspected as often and as thoroughly as necessary to ensure the effective application of the relevant legal provisions. With reference in this respect to its 1985 General Survey on labour inspection, the Committee emphasizes that what happens in practice under this clear and simple provision is the basic test of the entire concept of labour inspection (paragraph 235) and that it is important that the management of labour inspection services ensures that inspectors spend most of their time (for example three or four days a week) actually doing field work, rather than sedentary office work (paragraph 248). The Committee hopes that the Government will take the necessary measures to ensure that priority is given to inspection visits and that, in accordance with the requirements of Article 3, paragraph 2, any further duties which may be entrusted to labour inspectors shall not be such as to interfere with the effective discharge of their primary duties or to prejudice in any way the authority and impartiality which are necessary to inspectors in their relations with employers and workers. It requests the Government to provide full information in its next report on the measures which have been taken or are envisaged in this respect.

Article 5. The Committee notes that the Government's report does not contain information in reply to its previous comments concerning cooperation with the social partners represented on tripartite commissions in which the labour inspectorate participates. It once again hopes that the Government will provide information in future reports on the implementation of this cooperation in practice.

Article 7, paragraph 3. With reference to its previous comments, the Committee notes with interest the information that strengthening the skills of labour inspectors is one of the priorities of the Employment Department. However, it notes that the two training courses provided for 40 labour inspectors in the National Labour and Social Insurance Institute covered industrial relations. In the above General Survey, the Committee admitted the beneficial results of the involvement of labour inspectorates in industrial relations, but it also noted that these activities are often an obstacle to the full discharge by labour inspectors of their fundamental function of enforcing labour laws and regulations because of the time they devote to their conciliation duties, which is often considerable. The Committee notes the information concerning the participation of four labour inspectors in training courses abroad and requests the Government to provide information in its next report on the content of these courses and, in general, to provide information on the content of the further training provided, according to the Government's report, by the National Labour and Social Insurance Institute to enhance the skills of labour inspectors in each of the fields of labour and social insurance.

Article 13, paragraph 1. The Committee notes once again that the Government's report does not contain information in reply to its previous comments. However, it notes that a Bill to issue a Labour Code, which was submitted by the Government to the ILO for examination, contains measures in sections 458 and 459 to give effect to these provisions. The Committee requests the Government, while awaiting the adoption of the definitive texts of the Labour Code, to provide information concerning the legal basis of the current powers of inspectors in cases in which defects observed in plant, layout or working methods constitute in their belief a threat to the health or safety of the workers.

Articles 17 and 18. The Committee notes that the Government's report does not contain information in reply to its previous comments. It notes that the above draft Labour Code contains provisions establishing the amounts of the fines applicable for violations of each relevant provision and it recalls that it emphasized in the above General Survey that it is essential for the effectiveness of inspection services that the penalties referred to in Article 18 should be fixed at a sufficiently high level to have a dissuasive effect and that, when the penalty consists of a fine, the rate of the fine should be periodically reviewed. If this type of penalty is laid down by law, the level of the fine should be set by regulations which can be revised more easily. The Committee also notes that, except in the case of violations related to occupational safety and health (section 17(1) in fine), the above draft Labour Code does not contain provisions concerning the general procedures for the reporting and follow-up of such violations. In contrast, provisions of this type were contained in a previous draft of the Labour Code which was submitted to the ILO for examination by the Democratic Confederation of Labour. With a view to strengthening the powers of the labour inspectorate, a provision provided for the direct collection by the tax offices of the fines imposed by the regional delegate based on reports of violations drawn up by labour inspectors. The Committee hopes that the definitive text of the Labour Code will contain provisions governing the general procedure for the reporting and follow-up of violations of labour law and regulations which are in conformity with Article 17, paragraph 2, with regard to the discretion that should be left to labour inspectors to give warning and advice instead of instituting or recommending proceedings. In the meantime, the Committee once again requests the Government to provide new information in future reports on the manner in which inspectors recommend legal proceedings in cooperation with the judicial authorities.

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