Rapport intérimaire - Rapport No. 75, 1964

Cas no 341 (Grèce) - Date de la plainte: 03-JUIN -63 - Clos

1. 42. The original complaint of the Pan-Hellenic Federation of Textile Workers is contained in a communication dated 3 June 1963 addressed directly to the I.L.O; it was supplemented by a communication dated 29 July 1963.
2. 43. The complaint and the additional information in support of it were communicated to the Government by two letters dated respectively 19 June and 13 August 1963. The Government sent its reply in a communication dated 2 November 1963.
3. 44. When the case was brought before it at its 35th Session, held at Geneva on 4 and 5 November 1963, the Committee, considering that the Government's reply had reached it too late to enable it to examine it in substance, decided to postpone consideration of the matter until its present session.
4. 45. Greece has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and also the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. A. The complainants' allegations

1. 46. The allegations made by the complainants may be divided into two main groups: allegations concerning violations of the principles of Convention No. 98, and allegations concerning violations of the principles of Convention No. 87. These two main groups of allegations subdivide into several individual allegations. They will be considered separately below.
   • Allegations relating to Infringements of the Right of Collective Bargaining
2. 47. The Pan-Hellenic Federation of Textile Workers first states that it was founded in 1955 in conformity with the requirements of the relevant national legislation. According to the complainant, the Federation is a group of 12 unions spread over the whole country and has over 12,000 members in all; it was recognised in 1961 by the employers and the Minister of Labour as an authorised representative of the textile workers, and so acquired the right to negotiate and sign collective agreements on behalf of its members. The complainant further points out that on 10 March 1961 the Federation signed a collective agreement that was published in the government gazette and, since it has not been denounced in the manner provided by law, is still in force.
3. 48. After making these few preliminary remarks the complainant describes the course of events as follows. On 17 March 1962 the Federation, duly authorised for the purpose by the 12 unions that it represents, submitted to the employers' organisations concerned a request for the revision of the collective agreement in force. This request was based on the fact that many fundamental changes due to technological progress and rationalisation had occurred since the signing of the agreement, and that these changes had entailed an increase in production and the volume of work, and so modified conditions of employment. The Federation further considered that the application of the agreement was not in keeping with the new conditions in so far as concerned the classification of the various specialised jobs and rates of pay for work done ; it thus felt that a revision of the job classification was necessary in order to permit precise definition of the nature of the work to be done and the evaluation of each job.
4. 49. Confronted with these claims and the reasons for them, the employers are said to have offered a 10 per cent increase in wages, but to have refused to consider the proposal for a revision of the classification of the various specialised jobs.
5. 50. The Federation, considering that it could not accept the employers' position, made its own position public. Having made matters clear in this way, the Federation, in conformity with the law, submitted a request to the Minister of Labour on 23 May 1962 that in the event of a breakdown of the negotiations he would submit the case to an arbitration tribunal, the Minister being empowered to facilitate the conclusion of collective agreements.
6. 51. Following upon this step taken by the Federation, the competent conciliator is said to have summoned the three parties involved, namely the employers' associations concerned, the complainant Federation and the Federation of Greek Textile Workers. According to the complainant this last organisation has only about 1,000 members; unlike the complainant it is affiliated to the General Confederation of Greek Workers and the Textile and Garment Workers' Federation (International).
7. 52. The complainant states that the negotiations that took place broke down, and alleges that notwithstanding the rule that in such circumstances the case should be brought before the arbitration tribunal within a week, it had not been settled by the Minister by July 1962.
8. 53. " Knowing ", says the complainant, " that the employers meant to take advantage of the situation, as is shown by the fact that they tried to make us sign a collective agreement, and that the other federation of workers was willing to accept their conditions (since for their members they only asked for a certain percentage increase), rather than accept this, we preferred to submit the case to the competent arbitration tribunal (8 August 1962) so as to have the right of our Federation to represent its members established. The Ministry transmitted our petition to the competent judge on 23 August 1962, and by Decision No. 2 of 6 November 1962 he admitted that we were qualified to sign collective agreements on behalf of our members. This means that three months had to elapse before the question of our right of legal representation could be settled, although this right had been recognised in practice since 10 March 1961." (See paragraph 47 above.)
9. 54. Meanwhile, on 24 August 1962, the employers signed a collective agreement with the other federation, adds the complainant, and this agreement was deposited with the tribunal and has been in force since 18 September 1962. The employers repeatedly endeavoured to induce the complainant to sign a similar collective agreement, but, maintaining its original position, it persistently refused, and on the publication on 6 November 1962 of the decision recognising its quality of representative organisation demanded that the matter should again be referred to the competent conciliator. This new attempt at conciliation also failed, for the employers were obdurate.
10. 55. After this fresh setback, states the Federation, the Minister of Labour should have referred the case to the arbitration tribunal within a week. But the Minister refused to do this, and justified his refusal by the argument that having approved one collective agreement he could not approve another. In the complainant's view, this position is indefensible since, by law, agreements and arbitral decisions only apply to members of the signatory trade union organisations if they have been declared binding on all workers, which the agreement in question was not. Moreover, adds the complainant, the Minister is not empowered to extend the agreement signed by the other federation because this federation does not comprise three-fifths of the workers concerned, as the law requires if an agreement is to be extended.
11. 56. In these circumstances the Federation protested officially to the Minister on 8 May 1963, so as to be in a position, after the expiry of a three months' time limit, to lodge an appeal with the Council of State based on the fact that the Federation tried in vain for a year to have the dispute settled by arbitration, and that it was as a result of the refusal of the Minister to take the necessary steps that arbitration could not take place. " Now that the Council of State has the case before it ", concludes the complainant, " it will probably declare in the spring of 1964 whether or not the Minister is bound to transmit the case."
12. 57. In its observations the Government confirms the course of events as described by the complainant, but does not draw the same conclusions from them. According to the Government, by asking for the case to be referred to an arbitration tribunal, the complainant's intention was that the result of the arbitration should benefit only its own members. If the arbitration had gone in favour of the complainant-increase in wages and reclassification of specialised jobs-since, on the one hand an arbitration award declared binding by the Minister of Labour takes the place of a collective agreement, and on the other, there was already a collective agreement signed by the other federation, which agreement provided for no more than an increase in wages, there would have been two sets of conditions simultaneously applicable to the same categories of workers. But, states the Government, the agreement already in force was satisfied by the definition in section 7 (1) (b) of Act No. 3239 of 18 May 1955, which reads " national single-trade agreements relating to employees in a given trade and/or branches related to that trade throughout the country ", a type of agreement of which there can obviously be only one version in any one domain.
13. 58. The Government also states that since the complainant Federation, like the other federation, had been recognised as a representative organisation it could have asked the Council of State to declare null and void the agreement concluded by the Federation of Greek Textile Workers alone, basing itself on section 7 (3) of the Act referred to, which provides that "national single-trade agreements are negotiated and signed by the most representative organisations of the employers and employees". However, the complainant refrained from appealing on this point, and the Government considers that it cannot have an agreement signed by one organisation declared null and void merely because another organisation holds views different from those of the signatory organisation.
14. 59. Lastly, the Government states that the reason for which the arbitration requested by the complainant Federation could not take place resides in the application of section 19 (1) of the Act of 1955, which lays down that "compulsory arbitration proceedings shall cease if a collective agreement is reached in the course thereof ".
15. 60. In view of the allegations of the Federation and the observations of the Government, it is difficult to form a clear idea of the situation at the outset ; it will therefore be necessary to consider carefully the various pieces of evidence before the Committee.
16. 61. The Government first of all asserts that under section 7 (1) (b) of Act No. 3239 of 1955 it is impossible to conclude a national collective agreement in a given domain if one exists already. Reference to the text of the Act will show that there is nothing in the provision in question-which is quoted in extenso in paragraph 57 above-that warrants the conclusion that such a restriction exists. It must, however, be admitted that, if it is accepted that a "national" agreement should apply generally, a restriction of this kind would be in no wise abnormal.
17. 62. This being so, it seems that there is a difference of opinion between the complainant and the Government concerning the "national" or other character of the agreement in question. For its part, the complaining organisation states that, by the law itself, agreements bind only those who are parties to them, unless they have been declared generally binding, and it asserts that this has not been done in the case of the agreement in question in the present complaint.
18. 63. Once again, it is necessary to refer to the text of the Act Section 5 (1) reads as follows:
    • Where the territorial scope of a collective agreement is not explicitly stated in the document itself, the agreement shall be deemed to be binding on the parties only within the area of the court of the justice of the peace in which it was signed.
    • It would seem that it is on the basis of this section that the complainant intends to define the agreement under consideration. Section 5 continues as follows in subsection (2):
    • Where a collective agreement binds the employers of three-fifths of all the employees in the occupation within the area in which the agreement operates, and the provisions of subsection (3) of this section are not applicable, the Minister of Labour may, after consulting the Board mentioned in section 28, publish an order in the government gazette declaring the agreement to be binding on all employers and employees in the occupation or occupations to which it relates within the area for which it is operative.
    • On this point the complainant points out that since the federation that concluded the agreement has only 1,000 members whereas it has 12,000 itself (figures that have not been contested by the Government), the proportion of three-fifths is far from having been reached, and consequently section 5 (2) cannot be relied on for the purpose of extending the agreement.
    • In its observations the Government does not offer any comments on this point. Lastly, section 5 (3) reads as follows:
    • Such collective agreements as are made and signed in the presence of the Minister of Labour, or the agents specially authorised by him for the purpose, shall, be binding on all employers and employees in the occupation or occupations within the area to which the agreement extends.
    • The complainant asserts that the agreement has not been extended under this provision. For its part, the Government states that it had nothing to do with the negotiation and conclusion of the agreement between the Federation of Greek Textile Workers and the employers' organisations concerned ; it even adds that, in view of the critical state of the relations between the two federations in question, it deliberately abstained from endorsing the agreement by publishing it in the government gazette, and points out that it is only in virtue of section 20 (3) of the Act that this agreement has become, applicable. This section, in fact, lays down that in default of publication by the Ministry of Labour of an agreement in the government gazette within the prescribed time limits, whereby it would acquire force of law, "any of the parties shall be entitled to file the agreement at the justice of the peace court in Athens within ten days of the end of the time allowed", further, the section specifies that "the party so doing shall give notice thereof by bailiff to those affected and to the Ministry of Labour, and the agreement shall take effect from the day following notification of the last recipient".
19. 64. If the agreement in question has not been given general application either under section 5 (2) of the Act or under section 5 (3), as seems indeed to be the case, it is not clear in virtue of what provisions it could be looked upon as a "national" agreement. Further, as seen above (paragraph 58), section 7 (3) of the Act expressly states that national agreements must be negotiated and signed by the most representative organisations of employers and workers. Since only one of the workers' organisations concerned, and, moreover, the less representative of the two, has concluded the agreement, the condition imposed by this section does not appear to have been satisfied.
20. 65. It is true that at the time when the agreement was signed the complainant Federation had not yet been recognised as a representative organisation, and accordingly only the Federation of Greek Textile Workers was in the field. Nevertheless, on this point it should be noticed that the complainant Federation had been recognised as a representative organisation by 1961, and that the sole purpose of the procedure followed, incidentally on its own initiative, was essentially to have this representative character confirmed. However this may be, it would certainly seem that, in the circum-; stances of the present case, the action taken by the complainant Federation should at least have had the effect of suspending the negotiations in progress.
21. 66. There are only two alternatives : either the agreement only binds those who are actually parties to it; or, if it is intended to make it an agreement of general application, all the parties concerned, or at least the most representative of them, must necessarily have participated in its preparation and conclusion.
22. 67. It appears from the evidence available to the Committee that, profiting by a temporary incapacity of the complainant organisation due to action for the purpose of having its representative character confirmed, another organisation numerically much less important concluded with the employers a collective agreement that came into force ; that the Government intends that the agreement thus concluded shall bind all the members of the occupation although it is aware that this agreement runs counter to the publicly proclaimed desiderata of the organisation temporarily incapacitated, that is to say, the desiderata of the great majority of the workers concerned ; that the Governments taking its stand on the fact that the agreement in question is applicable generally deprives the complainant organisation of the right of negotiating and concluding another; and, lastly, that the Government-and this is the point that will now be considered-refuses to bring the dispute before an arbitration tribunal t
23. 68. As has been seen above, since it could not obtain satisfaction in other ways, the complainant Federation had asked for application of the procedure of compulsory arbitration. In its reply the Government states that the arbitration requested could not take place because of section 19 (1) of the Act, which lays down that compulsory arbitration procedure shall be suspended if a collective agreement is concluded before it is completed. At first sight, it seems that in the circumstances the section in question cannot be invoked. In fact it is difficult to believe that the intention of the legislature was that this section should mean anything but this : the arbitration procedure shall be suspended when the parties to this procedure have reached direct agreement. Actually, however, it is not the organisation that asked for arbitration which reached an agreement with the employers, but another organisation whose views were opposed to its own views; moreover, the agreement in question embodied exactly what the complainant aimed at avoiding by asking for arbitration.
24. 69. Here there is certainly food for thought, and it is not impossible that at a later stage of its procedure the Committee will be called upon to offer observations and comments on such a situation. However, since it appears from the statements of the complainant Federation that it has lodged an appeal with the Council of State against the refusal of the Government to apply the arbitration procedure, the Committee; considers it preferable not to go further into this aspect of the matter before learning the outcome of the procedure followed.
25. 70. In fact, in previous cases the Committee has followed the practice of not proceeding to examine matters which were the subject of pending judicial proceedings, provided that these proceedings were attended by proper guarantees of due process of law, where the pending judicial proceedings might make available information of assistance to the Committee in appreciating whether or not allegations were well founded.
26. 71. In the present case the Committee considers it advisable to follow the same practice by recommending the Governing Body to request the Government to be good enough to inform it whether an appeal has actually been lodged with the Council of State, and if so to acquaint it with the result of the procedure before the Council, and in particular, to supply the text of the decision and of its preamble and, further, if appropriate, to inform it of any other developments that may have occurred in the meantime; and to adjourn further examination of this aspect of the case for the time being.
    • Allegations relating to Interference by the Employers
27. 72. The complainant Federation alleges that, in violation of Article 2 of Convention No. 98, the Federation of Greek Textile Workers is controlled by the employers. In support of this assertion the complainant points out that this organisation, which during the conciliation procedure showed itself to be opposed to the signing of an agreement conforming to the employers' proposals, nevertheless subscribed to such an agreement after a certain time, in spite of the fact that it offered no advantages in default of a reclassification of jobs. In its reply the Government refrains from commenting on this aspect of the complaint.
28. 73. The Committee realises that a change of attitude on the part of a trade union organisation during negotiations may in certain circumstances be the result of abusive pressure by the employers, but is nevertheless of opinion that by itself such a change of attitude does not automatically justify the conclusion that there has been interference on the part of the employers.
29. 74. In the case in point, the complainant does not furnish any evidence that might lead the Committee to think that the change of attitude of the Federation of Greek Textile Workers was not the result of a decision freely made by it. This being so, the Committee, considering that the complainant has not proved that there has actually been interference by the employers, recommends the Governing Body to decide that this aspect of the case does not call for further examination.
    • Allegations relating to Governmental Interference in connection with Collective Agreements
30. 75. The complainant alleges that the validity of collective agreements is decided at the discretion of the Ministries of Labour and Co-ordination, which are empowered to modify their terms.
31. 76. Under section 20 (2) of Act No. 3239, in fact, "in the event of any collective agreement... being contrary to the general economic or social policy of the Government, or to any such policy in particular matters, the Ministers of Co-ordination and of Labour may... amend or withhold approval of all part of such agreement... by means of a joint order (with reasons).".
32. 77. In its reply, the Government points out that this provision of the law, dating from 1955, was introduced to meet the urgent need that existed at the time to ensure the economic and financial stability of the country. As the situation has greatly changed meanwhile, it was decided to amend the law in this respect, and a Bill for this purpose was laid before Parliament but, continues the Government's reply, the Bill was not passed owing to a change of government.
33. 78. When, in the past, the Committee has had to consider allegations concerning restriction on the right of collective bargaining, it has had occasion to point out that the need for prior approval of a collective agreement by official authorities was contrary to the whole system of voluntary negotiation envisaged in the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), and to emphasise the importance that it attaches to the principle that public authorities should refrain from all interference which would restrict the right of trade unions to seek, through collective bargaining or other lawful means, to improve the living and working conditions of those whom they represent, or impede the lawful exercise of this right. Moreover, in one case, the Committee, observing that by law collective agreements had to be submitted for approval to the competent authorities on their conclusion and did not come into force if they were not approved, recommended the Governing Body to draw attention to the incompatibility of such a requirement with the full development and utilisation of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers or employers' organisations and workers' organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements, envisaged in the said Convention No. 98.
34. 79. The legal provisions cited in paragraph 76 above certainly appear to be at variance with a number of the principles referred to in the preceding paragraph. Before examining further this aspect of the case, the Committee considers that it would be advisable to ascertain the Government's intentions concerning the amendments to the legislation that had been contemplated by its predecessor. For this reason it recommends the Governing Body to request the Government to be good enough to inform it whether it intends to alter the section of Act No. 3239 referred to above, and if so, to specify the nature of the alterations contemplated or made, and meanwhile to postpone consideration of this aspect of the case.
    • Allegations relating to Restrictions on Freedom to Conclude Collective Agreements
35. 80. The complainant alleges that restrictions have been imposed as regards the form of collective agreements; according to it, it is practically impossible to conclude company agreements (works agreements). In its observations the Government declares that this is a purely gratuitous assertion, and that in point of fact a large number of such agreements are in force.
36. 81. In fact, if one consults the text of the Act, it will be seen that section 7 provides for, among other categories of agreements, "special agreements, relating to employees in one or more businesses or undertakings in a town or an area or the whole country, in so far as they are not covered by a national single-trade agreement" (section 7 (1) (d)) ; and section 7 (5) lays down that "special agreements are negotiated and signed by one or more employers' occupational associations and the occupational organisation of the employees of one or more undertakings".
37. 82. In these circumstances, the complaining organisation not having adduced any information of a kind to support its contention, the Committee, considering that it has not furnished proof of the actual existence of restrictions on the freedom to conclude collective agreements, recommends the Governing Body to decide that this aspect of the case does not call for further examination.
    • Allegations relating to the Composition of Arbitration Tribunals
38. 83. The complainant alleges that Act No. 3239 provides for compulsory arbitration by tribunals without allowing the organisations concerned to appoint their representatives to them, since the workers' representative is chosen by the Minister of Labour from among representatives nominated exclusively by the General Confederation of Greek Workers.
39. 84. In its reply the Government states that workers' representatives on arbitration tribunals are not chosen by the authorities from a list of persons nominated by the General Confederation of Greek Workers, but are appointed directly by this organisation as the most representative organisation of the workers.
40. 85. Section 10 (1) of Act No. 3239 fixes the composition of arbitration tribunals of first instance as follows : "(a) the president of the first-instance judges or another first-instance judge designated by him (as chairman) ; (b) one official of the Ministry of Labour designated by the Minister of Labour or, in his absence, another civil servant designated by the Minister concerned ; (c) one representative of the employees, designated by the General Confederation of Labour or by such occupational organisation as is designated by the said Confederation ; (d) one representative of the employers' organisation concerned." appointed in the manner prescribed in subsections (2) to (4) of section 10.
41. 86. While the workers' representatives on arbitration tribunals are not appointed by the Government on the proposal of the General Confederation of Greek Workers, but directly by this organisation, it is none the less true that, by the law itself, it is for this organisation alone to decide who shall be the workers' representatives on arbitration tribunals. But it is common knowledge that, side by side with the Confederation in question, there are other workers' federations in Greece. Without wishing to cast any doubt on the representative character of the General Confederation, the Committee considers that it would be better able to form an informed opinion if it possessed precise information on the numerical strength and the representative character of the various main trade union organisations in Greece.
42. 87. Accordingly, before formulating its final conclusions on this aspect of the case, the Committee recommends the Governing Body to request the Government to be good enough to furnish information on the matters indicated in the preceding paragraph.
    • Allegations relating to a Bill to Alter the System of Collective Agreements
43. 88. The complainant alleges that the Government has drafted a new Bill that would give binding effect to all collective agreements concluded by the General Confederation of Greek Workers, and abolish the six arbitration tribunals existing in the different provincial towns, to replace them by a single tribunal.
44. 89. In its reply the Government states that the Bill in question has not been passed.
45. 90. This being so, the Committee recommends the Governing Body to decide that it would be purposeless for it to pursue further its examination of this aspect of the case.
    • Allegations relating to the Financing of Trade Union Organisations
46. 91. The complainant alleges that under Greek legislation employers have been authorised to deduct from workers' wages at the end of each year the equivalent to the minimum daily wage of an unskilled worker as a contribution to the public institution called " Workers' Club ", which, according to the complainant, is under government control. The deduction, it is said, was prescribed for the purpose of financing trade union organisations. Under the system in force, all the organisations should receive every month a certain sum fixed by the administration of the Workers' Club with the approval of the Minister of Labour.
47. 92. However, the workers' organisations considered that this method of financing enabled the Government to interfere permanently in their economic affairs, and for this reason they unanimously demanded the abolition of the system.
48. 93. Thereupon, states the complainant, the Government applied Act No. 3239 of 1955 (section 22) to impose two national collective agreements, which were signed in the presence of the head of the Government and the Minister of Labour on 1 June 1962 by the General Confederation of Greek Workers and the employers' associations. These agreements authorise the employers to deduct annually from the wages of all workers a sum equivalent to half-a-day's pay, whether the workers concerned are members of the General Confederation or not.
49. 94. The complainant alleges that since 1 January 1963 neither it nor other organisations not affiliated to the General Confederation have received any subsidies, the only organisations continuing to receive them being those belonging to the Confederation. In the complainant's view, this discrimination is contrary to the provisions of the Act itself, which states that the Confederation is empowered to sign collective agreements providing for the levying of contributions "the yield of which shall be shared among all the organisations whether they are affiliated to the said Confederation or not".
50. 95. The complainant is of the opinion that the system in force is a breach of the provisions of Convention No. 87, because by making the collective agreements in question binding on all the workers the Government obliges some of them to pay contributions to organisations to which they do not belong. "It is true", says the complainant, "that the agreements referred to allow the workers to make a declaration stating that they refuse to pay contributions by means of deductions, but this provision is practically a dead letter because of the formalities and time limits involved."
51. 96. In its reply the Government confirms the version of the facts given by the complainant, but insists that the sole object of the various systems employed was to encourage the development of the trade union movement and, contrary to what has often been alleged, there was no intention at all of putting this movement under government control.
52. 97. The Government then states that the reason for the signature of the collective agreements attacked by the complainant was that the previous system was not approved by the workers. It appears, continues the Government, that the new system too has not found favour with the working class, and the dissatisfied workers' organisations have objected to it before the Council of State.
53. 98. The Government next states that the Council of State has given a decision from which it appears that the manner in which section 22 of Act No. 3239 has been applied is anti-Constitutional. According to the summary of the decision furnished by the complainant, the Council of State held that the compulsory payment of contributions by workers belonging to trade unions not affiliated to the General Confederation (which signed the agreements in question and collects part of the contributions) was not compatible with the freedom that every worker has of personally choosing the union that he wishes to join. This freedom, says the Council of State, is protected by the Greek Constitution (article 11), and hence neither the law nor trade union statutes can compel a worker to pay contributions to any but the union to which he belongs ; any contribution required of workers for the benefit of another union cannot be deemed a trade union contribution. Lastly, the Council of State declares that workers who are not members of any trade union organisation cannot be made to pay a contribution without restricting their personal freedom, which would be contrary to the Greek Constitution (article 4).
54. 99. The Government concludes its observations on this point by stating that following upon the decision of the Council of State the parties reverted to the earlier system, which is governed by the provisions of Act No. 3467 of 1955.
55. 100. Under this system, it is for the Workers' Club, whose administration apparently includes trade union representatives but which is nevertheless a public institution, to participate in the financing of trade union organisations, whose members pay the Club a regular contribution automatically deducted from their wages.
56. 101. The Committee has on several occasions been called upon to consider the questions raised by this state of affairs. In this connection it has pointed out that systems of subsidies to workers' organisations have very different consequences according to the form that they assume, the spirit in which they are conceived and applied, and the extent to which they constitute a statutory right or depend solely on the discretion of the public authorities. The Committee has also maintained that, depending on the circumstances, financial assistance may have serious effects on the independence of trade union organisations.
57. 102. In 1956, in the light of statements made at that time by the Government, the Committee felt justified in saying:
    • ... Far from having taken final shape, the mechanism of trade union financing is at present still undergoing development. The Government is progressively liberalising the system and gradually mitigating its severity.... There seems to be no question, however, that considerable progress has been made and that recent developments have shown an undeniable tendency to modify the system in such a way as steadily to bring it into closer conformity with the standards generally recognised in respect of freedom of association and the independence of occupational association.
58. 103. After thus expressing its views, the Committee recommended the Governing Body to express the hope that the Government, when working out the definitive system for financing workers' organisations, would give consideration to the principle that workers should be entitled to establish the organisations of their own choice, and that these organisations should be entitled to draw up their own statutes and internal regulations and to organise their own management and activities, rights that presuppose financial independence.
59. 104. However, today, over seven years after expressing the opinions set out in the preceding paragraphs, the Committee is compelled to observe that the situation has not changed in the way that it was thought could be hoped for, but has remained as it was. The system, against which a large part of the workers has not ceased to protest, and which was provisionally abandoned in favour of another system, which itself, as has been seen, has been deemed incompatible with freedom of association by the Greek Council of State, has been restored in its original form.
60. 105. The Committee must also observe that this state of affairs has persisted in spite of assurances given as long ago as 1956 by the Government that the system objected to was only a provisional one designed to form a link between the old system and the future system, which, the Government affirmed, would conform to the rules of free trade unionism.
61. 106. In these circumstances the Committee recommends the Governing Body:
    • (a) to draw the Government's attention to the fact that a system whereby workers are bound to pay contributions to a public organisation that finances trade union organisations constitutes a serious threat to the independence of these organisations ;
    • (b) to draw the Government's attention again to the importance which it attaches to the right, embodied in Article 2 of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), ratified by Greece, of workers to establish organisations of their own choosing, and to the right of such organisations, embodied in Article 3 of the said Convention, to draw up their Constitutions and rules, and to organise their administration and activities, rights which presuppose financial independence, and to the fact that financial independence implies that the workers' organisations shall not be financed in a manner that makes them subject to the discretion of the public authorities ;
    • (c) to express the hope that the Government will take the necessary steps to modify the existing system in such a way as to give full effect to the principles referred to above ;
    • (d) to bring these conclusions to the notice of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations.

The Committee's recommendations

1. 107. With regard to the case as a whole, the Committee recommends the Governing Body:
   • (a) to decide that, for the reasons indicated in paragraphs 72 to 74, 80 to 82 and 88 to 90 above, the allegations relating to interference by the employers, restrictions on freedom to conclude collective agreements, and a Bill to alter the system of collective agreements do not call for further examination ;
   • (b) to decide, with regard to the allegations relating to infringements of the right of collective bargaining, for the reasons indicated in paragraphs 47 to 71 above, to request the Government to be good enough to inform it whether an appeal has actually been lodged with the Council of State against the refusal of the authorities to apply the arbitration procedure, and if so, to furnish it with the text of the decision of the Council together with the explanatory introduction to it, and if appropriate, to inform it of any other developments that may have occurred in the meantime in the matter;
   • (c) to decide, with regard to the allegations relating to governmental interference in connection with collective agreements, for the reasons indicated in paragraphs 75 to 79 above, to request the Government to be good enough to inform it whether, like the preceding Government, it intends to alter section 20 (2) of Act No. 3239 of 1955, and, if so, to specify the nature of the alterations contemplated or made;
   • (d) to decide, with regard to the allegations relating to the composition of arbitration tribunals, for the reasons indicated in paragraphs 83 to 87 above, to request the Government to be good enough to furnish precise information on the numerical strength and representative character of the various main trade union organisations in the country ;
   • (e) to decide, with regard to allegations relating to the financing of trade union organisations, for the reasons indicated in paragraphs 91 to 105 above:
   • (i) to draw the Government's attention to the fact that a system whereby workers are bound to pay contributions to a public organisation that finances trade union organisations constitutes a serious threat to the independence of these organisations;
   • (ii) to draw the Government's attention to the importance which it attaches to the right, embodied in Article 2 of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), ratified by Greece, of workers to establish organisations of their own choosing, and to the right of such organisations, embodied in Article 3 of the said Convention, to draw up their Constitutions and rules, and to organise their administration and activities, rights which presuppose financial independence, and to the fact that financial independence implies that the workers' organisations shall not be financed in a manner that makes them subject to the discretion of the public authorities;
   • (iii) to express the hope that the Government will take the necessary steps to modify the existing system in such a way also to give full effect to the principles referred to in subparagraph (ii) above;
   • (iv) to bring these conclusions to the notice of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations;
   • (f) to take note of the present interim report, it being understood that the Committee will report further to the Governing Body when the additional information requested in subparagraphs (b), (c) and (d) above has been received.