Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) - Uruguay (Ratification: 1954)

Individual Case (CAS) - Discussion: 2026, Publication: 114th ILC session (2026)

Written information provided by the Government

With regard to the views of the Committee of Experts that “all collective agreements establishing conditions of employment shall result from an agreement between employers or employers’ organizations, and workers’ organizations”, it should be noted that in Uruguay there is full freedom of association and collective bargaining at all levels (sector, enterprise, establishment and so forth), and, across all forms of bargaining (tripartite in Wage Boards and bilateral through collective agreements), there is 71 per cent collective bargaining coverage of the active labour force in the private and public sectors.

When this communication was being prepared, the second phase of the 11th round of meetings of Wage Boards was under way; these tripartite bodies, organized by branch of activity, have fixed the minimum wage since 1943. Since their reactivation in 2005, the meetings of the Wage Boards have taken place every two or three years, in line with the duration of the respective decisions.

It should be reiterated that the system of collective labour relations in Uruguay ensures the “free and voluntary nature of collective bargaining”, in as much as the Executive does not intervene whatsoever in the negotiation of collective agreements and that, with regard to collective bargaining in Wage Boards (the second form of collective bargaining in the country), its intervention is limited to fixing minimum wages by job category and by branch or sector of activity – a legal mechanism through which the country complies with the Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention, 1928 (No. 26), and the Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 131).

In this context, it should be emphasized that working conditions can only be agreed in this tripartite setting where there is an agreement between the employers’ and workers’ organizations, as clearly laid out in section 12 of Act No. 18.566. The Executive cannot intervene in the determination of the content of the agreements, which are left to the collective autonomy of the social actors of the world of work.

In view of this information, it is important to add that, to date, most of the 11th round of Wage Board meetings have taken place, involving 167 bargaining units across the 24 activity groups.

Specifically, while it is true that the Wage Boards are organized into 24 activity groups, in practice, bargaining is carried out in a partially decentralized manner, coordinated in “bargaining units or committees” within each group, so as to take better account of the differences among enterprises.

Of the 167 units or committees convened, 162 have completed the bargaining process, which required over 890 meetings. Overall, there was a very high rate of consensus in the decisions of the Wage Boards, reaching 83.95 per cent of the bargaining units or committees.

The agreements represented in that 83.95 per cent are broken down as: (a) 104 cases with tripartite agreements (unanimous); (b) 30 cases with agreements between employers’ and workers’ organizations, with the Executive Branch abstaining, which demonstrates the level of collective autonomy held by employers’ and workers’ organizations; and (c) two collective agreements adopted, bringing the total to 136 bargaining units, which fully accounts for the 83.95 per cent rate of agreements already reported.

Of these 136 units in which consensus was reached, 73 negotiated only minimum wages, 24 included tripartite agreements on adjustments to wages above the minimum rate for the relevant job category, and the remaining 39 units referred to base, nominal or general wages.

Given that Wage Boards have been the traditional way of fixing minimum wages in tripartite settings in our country since the adoption of Act No. 10.449 of 12 November 1943, in those minority cases in which a unanimous agreement is not reached (7.40 per cent of the bargaining units), a vote had to be organized in accordance with the provisions of section 14 of the above Act. With regard to the composition of the vote, in 6.17 per cent of cases, the vote was cast by the Executive with the employers, and 1.23 per cent by the Executive and the workers, with the remaining 8.64 per cent by the Executive with a dissenting vote and abstention by the social partners.

It is important to reiterate that the vote in the Wage Boards as a form of resolution has never been extended to decisions on working conditions since, by explicit legal provision, the Wage Boards are not competent to set such arrangements, which remains exclusively the purview of the employers’ and workers’ organizations (section 12 of Act No. 18.566). As recognized by all parties, the vote on the minimum wage falls within the scope of Conventions Nos 26 and 131.

In cases where the employers’ and workers’ organizations independently agreed on matters relating to working conditions (always without the intervention of the Executive), the analysis as of February 2026 shows that out of 127 committee meetings finalized at that time by agreement among the social partners, 51 per cent included references to duties such as caregiving, shared responsibility and conciliation (leave, funding for childcare centres, support for assistance or schooling), 33 per cent to gender equality and 25 per cent to situations of violence or harassment. Likewise, 29 per cent of the committees incorporated provisions related to mental health, and in other cases, the social actors chose to include occupational categories or vocational training, such as the establishment of working committees to address productivity and sectoral improvement, including technological and migratory issues.

In 90.5 per cent of the cases agreed by the employers’ and workers’ organizations without the intervention of the Executive, provisions on mechanisms of conflict prevention or peace provisions were included.

The practice of negotiating working conditions at the meetings of the Wage Boards is pursued traditionally by the employers’ and workers’ organizations. With a view to verifying their legitimacy, it should be noted that these same sectoral organizations propose and promote this negotiation.

Thus, at the 11th round of Wage Board meetings, which is currently under way and on which we are reporting, the workers’ organizations included in their platforms proposals to address the issues relating to the reduction of working time (the legal limit in our country remains at 48 hours per week), while the employers also proposed topics unrelated to the minimum wage.

For example, it should be noted that the business sector’s platforms for discussions with workers’ organizations at the current round of meetings of the Wage Boards included, in some cases, issues related to mental health – as is the case with the pasta-making industry (fideerías) committee (Group 1.7.2), where the business sector proposed the “promotion of mental health and occupational well-being (access to psychological support; workshops on stress management and promotion of emotional wellness; self-care campaigns on exercise, healthy eating and mental health)”, while in other cases, they proposed revisions of categories and aspects related to the organization of work, as well as aspects regarding the regulation of trade union activity (assemblies, conflicts and so forth).

Other examples that should be mentioned concerning proposals for non-wage provisions put forward by employers’ organizations included:

Chamber of Commerce (CNCS)

a proposal to strengthen the provisions relating to conflict prevention and resolution by assigning a more active role to the Wage Boards;

establishment in Group 10 (General commerce) of mechanisms for opting out, that is to say for partial non-application of a decision of the Wage Board owing to difficulties for one or several enterprises of a specific sector;

consideration of economic, geographic and size realities of the enterprises incorporated into the subgroup; and

regulation of the Domestic Workers’ Social Fund (Group 21).

Chamber of the Dairy Industry of Uruguay (CILU)

the need to include peace provisions and conflict-prevention mechanisms;

similarly, inclusion of provisions on technological innovation;

inclusion of additional adjustments for hidden wages and leave for gender-based violence (these two points were in response to a proposal by the Dairy Workers’ Federation (FTIL));

inclusion of a provision on installing video surveillance cameras;

provision for trade union security guards;

inclusion of opt-out clauses;

discussion of categories related to productivity; and

revision of awards for new workers based on each enterprise’s minimum wage and special systems for sugarcane harvesting work (individual and commercial).

Although at first (Act No. 10.449 of 1943) the Wage Boards were (and still are) empowered to fix the minimum wages by category and activity sector, gradually, in practice when bargaining, the employers’ and workers’ organizations incorporated other provisions – as happened with working conditions – which were agreed outside of the original legal framework of powers.

Act No. 18.566 of 2009 legalized this practice by making it possible for Wage Boards to determine working conditions but by clearly setting out a completely different system for their decision: section 12 of the above Act only allows for decisions on this matter in cases of agreement between employers’ and workers’ organizations. Freedom to bargain is thereby not infringed nor is the will of the social partners violated. On the contrary, the national law and practice followed in our labour relations system shows an extraordinary legitimacy and acceptance by the parties, to the degree that it is the same parties that introduce proposals to reach agreements on a wide range of labour issues on their platforms, which explains the very high rate of agreements reached at each meeting.

Freedom of association and collective autonomy, and freedom and the voluntary nature of collective bargaining (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and Article 4 of Convention No. 98) are therefore entirely protected in a system that achieves a very high degree of consensus.

Access to Wage Boards and Collective Bargaining: https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-trabajo-seguridad-social/tematica/consejos-salarios-negociacion-colectiva (Spanish only).

Discussion by the Committee

Chairperson – The second case this morning is concerned with the application of the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), by Uruguay. For the discussion of this case we have 29 speakers registered on the list. The Officers of the Committee have therefore decided to reduce the maximum time for individual speakers from five to three minutes.

I now invite the Government representative of Uruguay, the Deputy Minister for Labour and Social Security, to take the floor.

Government member – We would like to say at the outset that Uruguay should never have been included on this Committee’s list of cases. Nevertheless, having been placed in this situation, we are grateful for the opportunity since it will allow us to provide the Committee with information enabling a better understanding of the collective bargaining system in Uruguay, which exists in two forms: one of them tripartite, based on the Wage Boards established in 1943, the other bipartite, whose results are manifested in collective agreements at all possible levels.

As a whole, the law and practice relating to collective bargaining represent a system which is best described as embracing labour and human rights standards, the principle of progress and the pro homine principle.

We are appearing before this Committee in the same spirit which the country demonstrated with regard to other entities in the multilateral system for the protection of human rights, as occurred in February with the United Nations (UN) Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).

On that occasion, in its concluding observations, the CESCR noted – and I quote – “with satisfaction that the State Party has adopted a comprehensive framework of laws and policies, including the National Human Rights Plan 2023–2027, to promote the effective enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. The Committee welcomes the measures taken in the areas of employment and social protection, which have led to progress in reducing poverty.”

It is also worth highlighting Uruguay’s long-standing record of timely and systematic submission of the reports requested by the ILO. This sustained commitment to the system for the supervision of standards reflects a commitment to ongoing cooperation with the supervisory bodies, as well as a constant willingness to provide comprehensive, transparent and up-to-date information on the application of ratified Conventions. This consistent practice constitutes a concrete expression of Uruguay’s respect for the international labour standards system and for the regular and effective functioning of its monitoring mechanisms.

Our country has been guided by a spirit of cooperation in the field of human rights, remaining open to the guidance of supervisory bodies and to international scrutiny. This track record, based on a robust democratic culture and a long-standing record of fulfilling its international commitments, has earned it recognition and credibility that extend beyond its territorial and economic boundaries, enabling it to contribute actively to consensus-building and the promotion of peace.

As everyone knows, Uruguay ranks among the leading nations in terms of the ratification of international labour Conventions, having ratified 112 instruments and one Protocol, including all the fundamental and governance Conventions. In addition, in May of this year, the National Parliament approved the 1986 Amendment to the ILO Constitution, while a tripartite regulatory process is currently under way with regard to the Violence and Harassment Convention, 2019 (No. 190), and the Hours of Work and Rest Periods (Road Transport) Convention, 1979 (No. 153). The Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 144), is applied through consultations in a tripartite committee convened periodically by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (Ministry of Labour).

The labour relations system is underpinned by social dialogue, the governance of which relies on the participation of legitimate workers’ and employers’ organizations. This practice takes place at all levels and is institutionalized in areas such as occupational safety and health, through a broad network of tripartite and bipartite committees, as well as in social security, through the inclusion of representatives of workers, employers and pensioners in the Social Security Bank, the country’s leading institution in this field. Added to this is the recent experience of dialogue on social protection and social security, with an emphasis on children, the care system, and the protection of workers and pensioners.

In the field of employment, the National Employment Directorate interacts frequently with workers and employers, while the participation of the social partners is also channelled through the National Employment and Vocational Training Institute. Added to this are two recent developments that reinforce this approach to participation: the National Budget Act 2025–2029, which established a coordinating committee for employment policies with inter-institutional and tripartite representation, and the Bill on comprehensive employment, drawn up by the Ministry of Labour following an extensive consultation process across the country, which incorporates contributions from stakeholders in the world of work – in particular micro, small and medium-sized enterprises – regarding active employment policies.

Lastly, whilst this is by no means an exhaustive list of all ongoing initiatives, the “For life, health and safety at work” campaign by the Labour and Social Security Inspectorate – which focuses on the prevention of workplace accidents – involves employers’ and workers’ organizations in activities taking place across the country, primarily in the area of training. Furthermore, in collaboration with the ILO and social partners, a project on migration is being implemented, aimed at capacity-building for the public and private sectors to maximize the benefits of international migration and facilitate social and labour market inclusion in Uruguay.

It is also worth noting that an initiative on the “National Development Strategy” is currently being developed by the Executive Branch, which aims to strengthen competitiveness and boost productivity with the participation of employers’ associations and the trade union movement.

These contextual factors are essential to understanding the tripartite and democratic model of social dialogue, one of the most characteristic expressions of democratic practice in Uruguay, in a tradition upheld by all the parties that have been in government since the middle of the last century, when this model became established.

Strictly in terms of labour matters, the draft legislation promoted by the Ministry of Labour is currently under consideration by the social partners.

To date, the Chamber of Commerce and Services and the Chamber of Industries have not engaged in the social dialogue proposed by the Ministry of Labour to discuss the issue of reducing working hours, which remain at a maximum 48 hours per week in Uruguay, as stipulated by the Hours of Work (Industry) Convention, 1919 (No. 1).

We find it utterly inexplicable that the Chamber of Industries and the Chamber of Commerce and Services have refused to engage in dialogue on the prospect of reducing and reorganizing hours of work, as well as on two other issues raised by some members of the various associations that make up the Higher Tripartite Council: namely, the question of competitiveness and the restructuring of the Wage Board groups.

This is because social dialogue takes on greater importance precisely when views do not coincide, and it is therefore more necessary than ever to explore all possible avenues of rapprochement between the social partners and the Government.

We hope that these associations will be able to join the dialogue as soon as possible, just as other business organizations – which are equally representative in sectors of national production, such as the construction and transport industries – have been doing.

The ILO has commended this Uruguayan model of social dialogue on numerous occasions. The observations made by its supervisory bodies, in particular the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, have been duly taken into account by our country. Furthermore, social dialogue in Uruguay was given an exceptional opportunity to undergo appraisal, precisely at the beginning of May when the ILO Director-General visited us. He highlighted the strong tradition of social dialogue in Uruguay, the quality of its exchanges and the autonomy of the stakeholders, all of which Director-General Mr Gilbert F. Houngbo was able to verify for himself.

Furthermore, the Collective Bargaining Act No. 18.566 was amended by Act No. 20.145 of 2023, incorporating views put forward by employers’ organizations in their complaint of 2009.

This report by the Committee of Experts takes note precisely of these adjustments, which covered five of the six aspects highlighted by the employers in their complaint, including the abolition of the automatic extension of collective agreements. There was no consensus on this decision owing to opposition from the trade union movement but it was nevertheless incorporated into the law to address the observations of the Committee of Experts and employers.

In addition to these amendments, another demand from the employers was met, namely the requirement for trade unions to have legal personality in order to access enterprise information within the framework of collective bargaining.

It should be noted that this reform was carried out even though it was not strictly necessary (and this can be verified empirically), given that the majority of trade union organizations already possessed legal personality by their own decision, which also explains the modest growth in registrations: 81 organizations in 2023, 68 in 2024, 35 in 2025 and 6 so far in 2026.

Our Government also considers unnecessary the clarifications requested by the Chamber of Industries and the Chamber of Commerce and Services regarding these legal amendments, which were introduced in their favour by Act No. 20.145. Meanwhile, for example, there can be no doubt that under the current regime, the termination of a collective agreement brings an end to the benefits it contains, unless otherwise provided for independently by the parties within the agreement itself. Nor should there be any doubt that the party authorized to sign a collective agreement, under our legal system, must comply with the provisions of Article 2 of the Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154), as has always been the case in this country.

The aforementioned chambers, despite these amendments – which were made in their favour, that is to say, meeting their demands – nevertheless maintain their objection regarding the remit of tripartite collective bargaining (Wage Boards), which encompasses not only the setting of minimum wages by category but also the possibility of adjusting pay and agreeing working conditions, provided that there is – and this is absolutely fundamental – a shared willingness on the part of the employers’ and workers’ representatives, and without state intervention in the decisions taken by the social partners regarding working conditions within the context of the Wage Boards.

In this context, it is inappropriate to characterize this participation by the Executive Branch as a form of “interference”, since the State merely convenes and facilitates the operation of the system and participates in voting on decisions only in cases concerning minimum wages, which is entirely in accordance with the Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 131). The failure to convene the Wage Boards meant that in 1991, 1998 and 2003 – as some Officers of the Committee will recall perfectly well – our country had to resort to this Committee for failing to comply with the minimum wage-fixing method historically established in my country. There is therefore no such interference; the Executive merely intervenes by voting in cases related to minimum wages by category, as this is the method for setting minimum wages in accordance with Convention No. 131.

The evidence of this freedom is irrefutable: at the present stage, 40 per cent of the bargaining units within the Wage Boards did not follow the wage guidelines – not mandatory but suggested by the Executive – whilst 83.95 per cent of the resolutions were adopted by tripartite consensus.

These agreements between employers and workers included clauses of great significance for the advancement of labour law in Uruguay, and these clauses are fully in line with the ILO’s own initiatives. For example, care clauses were agreed in 51 per cent of the agreements; 39 per cent incorporated provisions on gender equality; 28 per cent included measures to prevent violence and harassment; 90 per cent included clauses on dispute prevention and settlement and industrial peace; and 29 per cent incorporated provisions on mental health, all of which were agreed upon through the full exercise of collective bargaining autonomy, without state interference, and without the State having intervened in the voting on these decisions.

A particularly significant outcome of this tripartite round of negotiations was the agreement reached by the Wage Board for the domestic sector, which created a system of job categories – something entirely unprecedented – establishing three categories (general, kitchen and care work) and differentiating between roles and levels of specialization in each case.

Our country’s experience in the field of collective bargaining and wage fixing in the domestic sector was held up as a successful example, it might be said, during yesterday’s celebration of the Committee’s centenary, because it is important to bear in mind that the observations our country received from the Committee, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, were motivated, in part, precisely by the lack of minimum wage provisions in the domestic sector. In other words, the legislation has evolved positively as a result of the observations made by this body.

Ultimately, this tripartite mechanism for negotiating minimum wages, including non-wage components freely agreed upon by employers’ and workers’ representatives, is the means by which our country complies with Article 4 of the Convention itself – the very Article which we are accused of failing to comply with. Why is this?

Because it is the “appropriate measure” that our country has historically chosen to encourage and promote the full development and use of voluntary negotiation procedures. By this I mean that the call for tripartism and collective bargaining not only ensures the security and protection of minimum wages, but also generates a highly positive dynamic in labour relations in Uruguay, creating further opportunities for negotiation at all levels. These negotiations are free and voluntary on the part of the parties.

This leads us directly to an issue that we consider truly fundamental, and to which we feel insufficient attention has been paid in these debates: the application of the ILO Constitution.

Article 19(8) of the ILO Constitution provides as follows: “In no case shall the adoption of any Convention or Recommendation by the Conference, or the ratification of any Convention by any Member, be deemed to affect any law, award, custom or agreement which ensures more favourable conditions to the workers concerned than those provided for in the Convention or Recommendation.”

This concerns the enshrinement of the so-called non-regression clause and the pro homine principle as applied to the field of labour – principles also enshrined in other international covenants on human rights and economic, social and cultural rights.

We are referring to a cardinal principle in the field of human rights, which establishes an interpretative preference to the effect that, where international standards and a country’s domestic standards coexist, the one that is most favourable to the individual – in this case, the worker, in the actual language of article 19(8) – must always be applied, regardless of the hierarchy of the standards. To this must be added that, where protected rights are concerned, recourse must always be had to the provision offering the broadest scope. Wage Boards are precisely a pre-existing factor offering greater protection and favourable treatment that must not be undermined by an international provision. Wage Boards were established in 1943, while the Convention was ratified in 1953.

In their social significance, Wage Boards are an appropriate instrument for promoting collective bargaining in all its forms and at all levels, all on the basis of Article 4 of the Convention and article 19(8) the ILO Constitution.

We firmly believe that the best way to assess the quality of a system of labour relations and its compliance with international standards – and, fundamentally, with the aims and objectives of the ILO – is, first and foremost, to examine the results achieved through the country’s policies, law and practice, rather than relying on literal interpretations of international Conventions.

Worker members – We would like to thank the Government of Uruguay for the information provided. We wish to begin our analysis of this case by noting that Uruguay stands as a prime example in the region. We can state without fear of contradiction that it is a global benchmark in the field of labour relations. This leading position is no coincidence; it is the direct result of having the highest levels of social dialogue, robust tripartite consultation and exemplary functioning of institutions for democratic governance.

It is no small matter that, according to the latest edition of the democracy index published by the British company The Economist Group, Uruguay has been recognized as the only country in South America with full democracy.

We are deeply convinced that Uruguay’s collective bargaining system has been a fundamental pillar in strengthening democracy, opening up real opportunities for workers’ and employers’ organizations to exert a direct influence on the country’s socio-economic policies.

We are aware that we are here in this Committee to verify compliance with these standards – our international labour standards; however, our group believes that the debate should be approached from a different perspective.

More often than not, this forum serves to exercise strict control over non-compliance with international standards, and in this instance we propose to view this debate as a historic opportunity to analyse a positive model of adherence to international labour law.

Collective bargaining in Uruguay is a genuine state policy, and since the restoration of democracy in 1985, through the various administrations of all political persuasions, the regulatory system has been consistently applied and defended as a shared national heritage. Even looking back, the country’s political parties have upheld these rules almost since the 1940s. We are therefore dealing with a long-term, collective democratic endeavour.

To understand the strength of the system, it is essential that we examine its history and its productive structure, not merely as statistical data but as the foundations underpinning the real situation in the world of work.

Let us first consider the historical roots, as already mentioned, dating back to 1943, with the provisions of Act No. 10.449. The country established an exemplary model, the coexistence of traditional collective bargaining with Wage Boards – tripartite bodies comprising the State, employers and trade unions. This dialogue forum enabled workers and employers to discuss not only pay, but also general working conditions and the nature of labour relations.

This is a democratic legacy that must be safeguarded, but this system is not merely a theoretical whim but responds to the reality of micro and small enterprises. Uruguay is a country where the vast majority of businesses have fewer than 20 workers. The productive fabric of the economy has these characteristics, and attempting to negotiate exclusively at the enterprise level would be unfeasible in practice. For this reason, collective bargaining by branch of activity has been, and continues to be, the only real tool for ensuring improvements in the living conditions of thousands of wage earners.

History also offers us a lesson from the past that we cannot ignore. When, between 1992 and 2004, the decision was taken to dismantle this system and not to convene tripartite negotiations, the consequences were devastating for Uruguayan society. Informal employment rose to 40 per cent of the economically active population, unemployment reached an all-time high of 16.8 per cent in 2003, and deregulation led to a sharp fall in real wages.

This experience demonstrated all too clearly that the market does not regulate fairly. It showed that state measures to promote and protect the right to collective bargaining are essential. It was precisely this realization that led to the subsequent legislative amendments introduced by Act No. 18.566 in 2009.

We wish to state quite clearly that, over the past 17 years, the laws analysed here have undergone amendments. Each and every one of these reforms was carried out with the sole aim of addressing the complaints and demands of employers’ associations and, it is worth noting, they were always (or in the majority of cases) met with explicit opposition from workers’ organizations. Yet the overall picture is clear: of the eight observations made, the Uruguayan State has already amended and adapted seven.

It is worth reviewing some of these: the requirement for legal personality, the reduction of state involvement, the curtailment of powers, the limitation of sectoral representation, the end of the “continuing effect” clause, the abolition of official approval, and employer guarantees.

Today, the Committee of Experts urges the Government to review the only remaining outstanding point, which is section 12 of Act No 18.566. The argument put forward is the need to fully guarantee the free and voluntary nature of collective bargaining.

We, the Worker members, respect the opinion of the Committee of Experts but also consider that the legal and practical reality of Uruguay must be assessed. The text of section 12 is unequivocal. The Wage Board may establish working conditions provided that these are agreed upon by the employers’ representatives and workers’ representatives in the relevant wage group. There is nothing that allows ambiguity. Under this model, no working condition may be imposed without the explicit consent of both parties.

The factual data available to the Workers’ group are irrefutable: in the last round of negotiations in 2025, a total of 83 per cent of the agreements reached reflected the shared will of workers and employers. There is no record of a single instance in which the employers were compelled to sign an agreement against their will.

The law requires parties to sit down and negotiate in good faith, but under no circumstances does it compel them to reach an agreement; when employers’ organizations, in some cases, decided to withdraw from negotiations or abstain from voting, proceedings took place in their absence and no working conditions were imposed because the law itself does not permit this.

We note that the economic guidelines presented by the Executive Branch do not, in our view, constitute unlawful interference; they are simply a guide setting out the State’s position within the Wage Board. Historically, these guidelines have been superseded and amended by voluntary agreement between the parties in the bargaining units.

Act 18.566 itself removed the old requirement that prevented the effects of a collective agreement from being extended if it did not align with official guidelines. Today, if workers and employers agree to this in a binding manner, the benefit applies to the entire branch of activity.

We want to be clear about what is truly at stake here in this arena. If the powers set out in section 12 are removed, what we are seeing is a weakening of collective bargaining for the vast majority of the country’s workers.

We ask ourselves: how can a trade union negotiate in an enterprise which has only four, five or ten workers? These production units may lack the infrastructure and the level of organization and bargaining capacity necessary to sustain this individual bipartite process. For this reason, insisting that bargaining take place purely and exclusively at the enterprise level may amount to decreeing the end of collective agreements.

The world is full of examples where deregulation has swept away all labour rights, fuelled the informal sector and shattered social dialogue. Uruguay has been the great exception to this rule thanks to the institutional strength of its tripartite model organized by sector of activity.

We believe that stripping the current system of these powers would not, in our view, improve it, but rather undermine its practical functioning, leave these workers unprotected – workers whom we have already described as vulnerable – and possibly weaken the fundamental pillar that underpins democracy in Uruguay.

An important point for us: the observation of the Committee of Experts commends Uruguay for its very high rate of collective bargaining coverage; in other words, it recognizes that these mechanisms, as applied in practice, have been effective in ensuring that workers in Uruguay enjoy one of the highest rates of collective bargaining coverage in the world.

We are therefore dealing with a collective bargaining system that promotes free negotiation and has achieved one of the highest coverage rates in the world.

Beyond what we have stated and what we shall say in our closing remarks following the discussion, we affirm that, as we have consistently maintained, systems can always be improved. Labour law, tripartism and social dialogue require constant updating, which must be guided by a progressive approach that depends on political will – in this case, on the part of the Government; that is why we reaffirm the unavoidable need, in this instance, to continue promoting dialogue effectively.

Employer members – We are today considering a case dating back to 2008, which has been the subject of repeated observations by the Committee of Experts and has also been the subject of discussion in this Committee for over a decade.

Since the submission of the complaint that gave rise to Case No. 2699, the Committee of Experts has made repeated observations regarding certain aspects of the collective bargaining system in Uruguay, highlighting its incompatibility with the Convention on at least ten occasions.

While some partial reforms have taken place, significant issues remain regarding the registration of collective agreements, the determination of those entitled to negotiate in the absence of a trade union, and legal certainty regarding the validity of collective agreements. Furthermore, these reforms did not address the key observations made by the supervisory bodies and, in some cases, gave rise to new legal uncertainties. However, the fundamental issues highlighted by the supervisory bodies remain unresolved.

One of the central aspects of the observations made over the years is the need to revise section 12 of Act No. 18.566, to which both the Government and the Workers’ group have referred. According to the Committee of Experts, this provision is not fully compatible with the principles of free and voluntary collective bargaining enshrined in the Convention, as it confers on Wage Boards powers that go beyond the fixing of minimum wages.

And to avoid giving the impression that this is merely the position of the Employers’ group, allow me to recall the exact words used by the Committee of Experts itself in the observation we are examining today:

The Committee once again recalls that, while the fixing of minimum wages may be subject to decisions by tripartite bodies, Article 4 of the Convention seeks to promote bipartite bargaining for the setting of working conditions, whereby all collective agreements establishing working conditions shall result from an agreement between employers or employers’ organizations and workers’ organizations. … The Committee urges the Government to … take the necessary measures to revise section 12 of Act No. 18.566, so that … the legislation fully guarantees both the free and voluntary nature of collective bargaining and the continued effective promotion thereof.

These observations are not new. They have been reiterated for years. However, the legislation remains essentially unchanged in this respect.

I note, in light of the statements made, that there is full awareness of the request and the proposal put forward by the Committee of Experts, which has been supported by this Committee’s decision, and that they do not consider it their responsibility to act upon it because, as I understand it, they also believe that their system provides favourable conditions for workers, overlooking the fact that in collective bargaining there are two parties: employers and workers, and this is precisely what the Convention is about. Indeed, Article 2 of Convention No. 154, to which the Government representative referred, specifically mentions collective bargaining carried out by two – not three – parties: workers and employers, and in tripartite rounds of negotiation this is not a relationship that arises naturally; it consists of the two parties plus a guest, which is perfectly acceptable for setting minimum wages but not for working conditions or other agreements that the parties must reach freely through a consensus of their wishes.

The Committee of Experts has repeatedly pointed out that Wage Boards should not set pay levels above the minimum wage, or establish working conditions that should be the subject of voluntary negotiation between employers and workers.

For its part, the Government maintains that the Uruguayan system fully guarantees the freedom and voluntary nature of collective bargaining and highlights the high percentage of agreements reached in Wage Boards.

We do not dispute whether or not the system produces agreements, nor that there is broad collective bargaining coverage. Nor do we dispute that numerous stakeholders participate effectively in it. That is not what brings us together today. The central issue is that the parties do not have the necessary autonomy to freely determine the content of collective bargaining and that, as determined by the Committee of Experts and this Committee, the current legal framework does not fully comply with the requirements of Article 4 of the Convention. As has been stated, the supervisory bodies have concluded time and again that incompatibilities remain which require rectification.

The existence of agreements – even numerous agreements – does not in itself prove that they are the result of fully free and voluntary negotiation between the two parties concerned.

The Committee of Experts has also identified that collective bargaining continues to take place under significant influence from the Executive Branch through the so-called “negotiation guidelines”. This is the Committee of Experts’ view, not ours; we are merely reiterating it. The Government maintains that these guidelines are not legally binding. However, the relevant issue is not their formal nature, but their practical effects. In practice, these guidelines constitute the framework within which negotiations take place. Where no agreement is reached, the role played by public authorities in setting minimum wages inevitably influences the behaviour of the parties and limits the effective scope for reaching freely agreed solutions.

Furthermore, these guidelines are often formulated in a uniform manner for broad sectors of activity, without necessarily reflecting the different economic, productive and business realities that exist within each sector and in each set of collective labour relations.

We also note with concern that, in the most recent tripartite round of talks, issues relating to working conditions have once again been included in the guidelines. This is particularly relevant because the concern expressed by the Committee of Experts is not limited to the fixing of minimum wages but extends precisely to the powers conferred on Wage Boards – as has been recognized here time and again – to deal with matters that should be the subject of direct negotiation between employers and workers.

The Government has pointed out that certain working conditions can only be incorporated by agreement between employers’ and workers’ organizations, as we have now been told. However, this does not fully address the concern raised by the supervisory bodies. The issue raised is not resolved simply because certain agreements have been reached by consensus. What remains a matter of concern is the legal and institutional framework within which these negotiations take place and its lack of compatibility with the principles of the Convention.

The Government has also pointed out that employers’ organizations themselves have on occasion participated in negotiations on matters other than minimum wages within the framework of Wage Boards. However, this does not alter the concern expressed by the supervisory bodies regarding the powers conferred upon them by law, nor does it change the need to ensure an appropriate balance between state intervention and the autonomy of the parties.

After more than 17 years of examination by the ILO, the central issue highlighted by the Committee of Experts remains unresolved.

This is neither a recent difference of interpretation nor a new issue. We are dealing with observations that have been repeated for more than a decade and a half regarding fundamental aspects of the legislation in force which remain unresolved, as has been clearly acknowledged here.

The partial progress achieved demonstrates precisely that it is possible to make headway when there is a willingness to address the observations made by the supervisory bodies.

The Employers’ group therefore requests the Committee to urge the Government of Uruguay to adopt, without further delay, the necessary measures to ensure full compliance with the outstanding observations relating to the Convention, in genuine and good-faith consultation with the most representative employers’ and workers’ organizations, and to provide information in this regard.

Worker member, Uruguay - As previously stated, since 1943 – with some interruptions – collective bargaining in Uruguay has been carried out under Wage Board Act No. 10.449, which established bargaining areas where not only were wages determined but also working conditions and labour relations regulations.

For over 80 years – with the exception of periods of interruption during the civil and military dictatorships and the long neoliberal decade of the 1990s – the Uruguayan system promoted collective bargaining through Wage Boards.

In practice, bipartite negotiations took place in a tripartite setting, and a practice developed of reaching bilateral agreements that, until the adoption of Act No. 18.566 of 2008, were formalized through decisions by Wage Boards, covering a wide range of issues that went beyond wages.

This design also took into account the country’s productive structure: the vast majority of Uruguayan enterprises have no more than 20 workers, which makes it very difficult to bargain solely at enterprise level.

It was therefore determined that bargaining by branch should be used to improve working conditions and quality of life for thousands of employees.

The experience of the 1992–2004 period, when no tripartite bargaining was convened, clearly revealed the importance of the system. Under the guise of freedom, there was a decline in union activity and collective bargaining, an increase in informality, and a deterioration in employment and real wages. This scenario highlighted the need for promotion and protection mechanisms that would effectively guarantee the right to bargain collectively.

With the reinstatement of Wage Boards in 2005, it became clear that the long-standing mechanism was no longer sufficient and that broader regulation of collective bargaining and tripartite bargaining by branch was needed.

Based on the premise that “collective bargaining makes viable and balances – from a perspective of equity and cooperation – an employment relationship that is inherently unbalanced, contradictory and conflictual”, Act No. 18.566 was enacted in 2009, which, together with Act No. 10.449, currently governs the Uruguayan collective bargaining system.

Let us be clear: since 1943 all political parties that took up government office preserved and applied the collective bargaining system regulated by Acts Nos 10.449 and 18.566.

This continuity spanned various political stages in the country, including the restoration of democracy in 1985, the suspension of meetings between 1999 and 2004, and their reinstatement in 2005, which shows that the system is well-established within Uruguay’s labour system and has become a long-term state policy.

In a country known for the strength of its democratic institutions, Uruguay according to the 2024 Democracy Index, is the only country in South America classified as a “full democracy.” This system has helped to strengthen that democracy by creating stable forums for debate and negotiation among workers, employers and the State.

Nevertheless, and despite these past events, we find it unacceptable that for 17 years in this forum, this system has been questioned and subject to examination.

In recent years, the legislation in question – primarily Acts Nos 18.566 and 10.449 – has been amended several times aimed at addressing the concerns raised by the complainant organizations, often without our consent.

These changes include the requirement for trade unions to have legal status and be registered; the reduction of Executive Branch representation within the Higher Tripartite Council; the repeal of provisions relating to the Council’s competence; authorization to negotiate and the application of collective bargaining agreements past their expiry; as well as clarifications on the registration and publication of Wage Board decisions.

In sum, of the eight observations made by the complainants, seven were addressed in recent years. From this perspective, the process does not reflect balanced negotiation, but rather the imposition of the stronger party over the weaker. We therefore regret that the Committee of Experts, in its comments, did not fully and properly weigh up these changes, even at the risk of losing some neutrality in its considerations.

The discussion today focuses on section 12 of Act No. 18.566, amending section 5 of Act No. 10.449. The Committee of Experts urges that this provision be revised to guarantee the free and voluntary nature of collective bargaining, even though no one has presented any evidence to prove that, from 2009 to today, any Government has violated these principles.

Section 12 provides that the Wage Board may set working conditions when these have been agreed upon by employers’ and workers’ representatives. In Uruguay, no working conditions may be established without the agreement of workers and employers, in full accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the Convention. In the last round of the Wage Board in 2025, 83 per cent of the agreements reached reflect the will of workers and employers, and establish working conditions – and I repeat – that are agreed upon by the workers’ and employers’ representatives.” Once again, to be clear, “agreed upon by the workers’ and employers’ representatives”.

In addition, in a country where very small businesses are in the majority, limiting collective bargaining to enterprise level would render this right futile. Branch-level bargaining, however, appears to be an appropriate response to national conditions and an indispensable tool for maintaining coverage, social dialogue and the effectiveness of collective agreements.

Hence, the case of Uruguay shows that a strong democracy also relies on robust social dialogue and effective collective bargaining. Undermining this system would mean eroding one of the pillars that have enabled the country to uphold its exceptional institutional and labour standards.

Ultimately, this is an exercise in subtlety, but what is at stake is not an isolated technical or legal discussion. What is being debated is whether Uruguay will continue to be a country where organized labour has a voice, rights and bargaining power, or whether room will be given to regressive reasoning, in which the will of capital prevails without bounds.

Weakening collective bargaining weakens workers, and weakening workers weakens democracy. That is why we defend this system emphatically and unreservedly, because it is a part of our people’s history of popular conquests and because it is still an indispensable tool for stalling inequality, tackling precarity and building a fairer society.

Employer member, Uruguay – The Uruguayan employers come before the Committee today with the peace of mind of people who know they have done what is right. We do not want to be here. We do not want Uruguay to become a case of historical non-compliance before the ILO, and we do not enjoy appearing every few years before this prestigious Committee. We believe that certain issues should remain the private matters of a country and should be resolved at the national level. As we will explain below, this has not been possible.

Some 18 years ago, when the Uruguayan employers discovered the Bill on collective bargaining, they had doubts about the scope of its provisions and decided to consult the ILO. The International Labour Standards Department analysed the Bill and informed our country that some sections were incompatible with fundamental labour Conventions ratified by Uruguay. In view of this communication from the ILO, the employers thought that the Government would amend its own Bill.

To our surprise, that was not the case. The Government paid no attention to the ILO’s timely communication and adopted an Act on collective bargaining, fully aware that its sections were incompatible with international labour Conventions. Since the introduction of the Act on collective bargaining, we have tried to avoid initiating this process. The information we are providing can be checked against the ILO’s archives.

A second reason leads us to include the cases for the Committee’s examination. Our country received various observations related to this case, but the Government only took action when it was called upon by this Committee – not before. We are here because this Committee is effective; its work is not limited to this room but serves a much broader objective of being a last refuge for reaffirming a right.

Various attempts have been made to discredit this case (Case No. 2699). First, the rulings on the complaint are mentioned as if they were the opinions of the Chamber of Commerce and Services or the Chamber of Industries of Uruguay, or the International Organisation of Employers (IOE). There is silence around the fact that these rulings are issued by tripartite bodies of the ILO itself or by its Committee of Experts, which contributes to misinformation and undermines the legitimacy of ILO procedures.

Another way of discrediting the complaint has been to present it only as an issue of these commercial chambers, rather than one that affects all Uruguayan employers. We must clarify that the Chamber of Commerce was founded in 1867 and is the oldest employers’ organization in Uruguay. The Chamber of Industries was founded in 1898, and this year will celebrate 99 years of participation in the Conference. The International Organisation of Employers was founded in 1920 and has supported and collaborated with the ILO since its inception. The Chamber of Commerce and Services, and the Chamber of Industries are the most representative chambers in Uruguay but, additionally, they present this complaint with the backing of all national employers.

Another way of discrediting this case has been to publicly request both chambers to withdraw the complaint, as if the Uruguayan employers could freely manipulate the ILO’s supervisory system. We consider it necessary to draw the Committee’s attention to this situation.

The Committee is revisiting the case of Uruguay because the Government’s agenda excludes addressing the ILO’s observations. The views of the Committee of Experts are clear but after noting the supplementary information submitted by our country’s Government, it is necessary to clarify a few points.

Firstly, it is indicated that collective bargaining in Uruguay covers 71 per cent of workers in the public and private sectors. We have a different interpretation of this indicator. If we exclude the salaries of ministers, legislators, authorities, the President of the Republic, the armed forces and informal workers – who, by their very nature, have no rights – the coverage is 100 per cent.

In our view, all formal workers in our country are covered by collective bargaining. Our question is: could coverage of this scope be achieved under a scheme where bargaining is truly free and voluntary? We do not think this is possible and for that reason the Committee of Experts has strived to ensure that the legal amendment requested of Uruguay also promotes collective bargaining.

A second piece of information presented by the Government refers to enterprise participation in the negotiations and the levels of the agreements signed. In this light, we can only say that the employers respect the law: they participate in negotiating committees, even with the legislation being monitored by the ILO and, as long as there are no changes, they will continue to participate. Some employers’ representatives will address this issue, so I will not go into further detail on it.

Lastly, the additional information provided by the Government indicates that in Uruguay the free and voluntary nature of collective bargaining is guaranteed, and that the involvement of Wage Boards is limited to setting minimum wages.

We have a different view of our collective bargaining system, and we will use an example to explain it. In the latest round of Wage Board meetings, which took place in the second half of 2025, the Government presented the guidelines for the negotiations. This document is available on the Ministry’s website.

In these guidelines, the Government established three wage brackets: level one for wages up to US$990; level two for wages between US$990 and US$4,100, and level three for wages over US$4,100 (approximate figures).

For each of these brackets, wage increases were set twice yearly, for a two-year period. In this way, the guidelines defined that level one will receive rises of 3.3, 3.6, 2.8 and 3.5 per cent, respectively, every six months.

For the other two brackets, it also established twice yearly increases of up to US$4,100 and over US$4,100, with different percentages, for a two-year period.

These guidelines also include the following provision that I will read out: “…in case of disagreement, the Executive will act in accordance with these guidelines…”. This line means that, where an agreement is not reached, the wage increases will be adopted, twice a year for two years, as set out in the guidelines.

Is this an example of free and voluntary bargaining as promoted by the ILO? Moreover, we should ask: Is this truly bargaining, given the example we have mentioned? It is true that employers meet to bargain and reach agreements but under these conditions, it is unacceptable. It is true that the wage guidelines are not legally binding but faced with a lack of agreement, it is evident what the Ministry of Labour will agree. Uruguayan employers respect the law and therefore actively participate in the system but we need a fair and balanced system, committed to the principles of the ILO.

Lastly, I wish to clarify a point raised by the Government representative of Uruguay. He mentioned the lack of employer participation in a social dialogue forum on the reduction of working hours. We must inform you that the employers’ position was explained in a timely manner to the Minister of Labour, who did not agree with the position but thanked us for the explanation provided without further comment.

Government member, Peru – I am taking the floor on behalf of a group of 15 countries: Chile, Argentina, Costa Rica, Brazil, Mexico, El Salvador, Colombia, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Ecuador, Paraguay, Barbados, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Peru.

Firstly, we wish to thank the Government of Uruguay for the information provided and to highlight its long-standing willingness to cooperate with the ILO normative system. We believe that the examination of cases submitted for consideration by this Committee must take into account both the observations made by the supervisory bodies as well as the historic, social and institutional context in which labour relations play out in each Member State. From that perspective, we understand that the reality in Uruguay merits balanced and comprehensive assessment.

Uruguay is a country widely recognized for its commitment to multilateralism, respect for international law and promotion of human rights.

In the specific setting of the ILO, that commitment is expressed through the ratification of 112 international labour Conventions and an additional Protocol, including all the fundamental and governance Conventions. That figure places Uruguay among the Member States with the greatest level of adherence to the international labour standards system and constitutes an objective indicator of its ongoing willingness to strengthen labour rights protection.

This commitment has been recognized repeatedly in different international spheres and contributes to the country’s credibility within the multilateral system.

We also note that, for decades, Uruguay has maintained a solid tradition of social dialogue based on the active participation of representative employers’ and workers’ organizations, as well as the regular operation of tripartite and bipartite consultation, negotiation and agreement mechanisms.

This model has helped create trust between the social partners and to consolidate a culture of the peaceful resolution of labour disputes. We particularly welcome the efforts made by the country to address the observations made by the Organization’s supervisory bodies.

The legislative reforms adopted in recent years demonstrate an attitude of openness to dialogue and an ongoing willingness to improve its internal standards in line with international recommendations.

We also believe that the analysis of this case should consider the specific results obtained by the Uruguayan system. The broad coverage of collective bargaining, the stability of labour relations, the existence of high levels of consensus between the social partners and the establishment of permanent forums for dialogue reflect the institutional strength of that model.

We therefore encourage the continuation of exchanges between the Government, employers’ and workers’ organizations and the Office, preserving the progress made and strengthening the cooperation mechanisms that have historically characterized the reality in Uruguay.

Interpretation from Chinese: Government member, China – The Chinese delegation thanks the representative of Uruguay for the information. We note that Uruguay firmly adheres to the principles and values of the ILO and has ratified multiple Conventions and Protocols, and has taken various measures to strengthen dialogue with all parties to protect the right to collective bargaining. It is clear that throughout the compliance process the Uruguayan Government attaches great importance to cooperation with all parties and respects the role of the supervisory mechanisms, demonstrating its good will in actively implementing the Convention. We encourage the Government of Uruguay to continue strengthening communication in exchange with the ILO and its relevant mechanisms, providing more information to the Committee and further promoting mutual understanding and cooperation. China calls on all parties to continue strengthening engagement and dialogue with the Government of Uruguay in a pragmatic and rational manner, carry out more cooperation and provide greater technical assistance so as to help the Uruguayan Government continuously improve relevant institutional mechanisms and better fulfil its obligations under international labour Conventions.

Worker member, Spain – Wage Boards were created in Uruguay in 1943 by means of Act No. 10.449. They enjoyed the participation of representative employers’ and workers’ organizations and the Executive Branch. Their legal remit was to fix minimum wages by category, although in practice they also negotiated general wage increases and certain working conditions.

Traditionally, when a branch agreement expired the Executive would bring together the parties and set out wage and labour guidelines. The agreements reached were not automatically applied to the entire branch, but required an executive decree to be implemented. This created a certain degree of conditionality, since the Executive could refuse to issue the decree if the parties deviated from its terms.

Act No. 18.566 amended the system by eliminating that power. Since then, the Wage Boards’ resolutions have been implemented automatically in the entire branch, and the Executive’s guidelines therefore took on an advisory, non-binding nature. According to this interpretation, the Executive does not intervene in the content of agreements, but promotes and encourages collective bargaining. This Act was challenged by some employers’ organizations before the ILO supervisory bodies.

In response, Uruguay introduced a range of reforms. Act No. 19.027 modified the composition of the Higher Tripartite Council, the body responsible for governing the system. Subsequently, Act No. 20.145 introduced significant changes: it required legal personality for certain organizations, abolished the representation by branch unions of workers who were not members of enterprise unions, made changes to the duration of bipartite collective agreements and clarified that the publication of resolutions and agreements did not imply the State’s authorization or registration. Later, Act No. 19.889 regulated aspects linked to strikes, guaranteeing the income of non-striking workers and enterprise owners. Uruguay’s experience demonstrates an established tradition of collective bargaining.

In the light of observations made by one of the parties involved, the country introduced significant normative amendments, leaving unchanged only aspects deemed part of a deeply rooted practice.

In reality, workers and employers continue to negotiate wages and working conditions, while the Executive lacks legal mechanisms to impose its will. The system can therefore be characterized as an instrument for promoting collective bargaining that, over the years, has contributed to high levels of coverage and labour protection in the country.

Government member, Mexico – I am making this statement on behalf of the Governments of Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala and Mexico. We have listened attentively to the statement made by the Government of Uruguay. We thank it for the information provided in relation to the application of the Convention, as well as its willingness to maintain an open and constructive dialogue with this Committee and with the ILO supervisory bodies.

We would like to highlight the importance of this Convention as a fundamental instrument to ensure protection of the right to organize and the development of free and voluntary collective bargaining between employers and workers. In that regard, we recognize Uruguay’s long institutional tradition of social dialogue and collective bargaining, which sets an example in the region owing to its inclusive nature and broad coverage.

We welcome the information provided by the Uruguayan Government on the functioning of its labour relations system, in which tripartite bargaining in the Wage Boards and bipartite bargaining through collective agreements coexist, covering a significant proportion of the workforce.

We draw attention to the high number of agreements reached through the Wage Boards, with a large degree of consensus between the social partners, reflecting the vitality of social dialogue and the ability of the actors to build agreed solutions.

Similarly, according to the information submitted, working conditions are defined exclusively through agreements between employers’ and workers’ organizations, without the intervention of the Executive, constituting a central element in guaranteeing collective autonomy and the voluntary nature of collective bargaining.

We also take note that the Uruguayan system has evolved dynamically, incorporating into collective bargaining processes important issues such as gender equality, mental health and dispute prevention, demonstrating its ability to adapt to new realities in the world of work.

At the same time, we recognize that the Committee of Experts has identified some elements that merit follow up, particularly with regard to the functioning of collective bargaining mechanisms in the Wage Boards and the need to fully ensure their voluntary and autonomous nature, in line with the principles of the Convention.

We believe that these aspects should be analysed in the context of the overall functioning of the Uruguayan system, which demonstrates high levels of participation, coverage and consensus between the social partners.

We are of the opinion that the progress and characteristics of the Uruguayan model reflect a clear willingness to ensure respect for freedom of association and collective bargaining, in an institutionalized framework of social dialogue. Against this backdrop, we believe that this case should be addressed using an approach of constructive dialogue that allows the existing positive aspects to be supported and strengthened while addressing the observations made by the Committee of Experts.

We respectfully encourage the Government of Uruguay to continue working in close cooperation with the representative employers’ and workers’ organizations to further consolidate its labour relations system. Lastly, we reiterate our support for the Government of Uruguay, a country that occupies first place in Latin America in terms of the number of Conventions that it has ratified, and sixth place globally, in its commitment to continuing to make progress in the application of the Convention.

Employer member, Spain – Our delegation wishes to call the Committee’s attention to a fact that, on its own, is revealing: the ILO supervisory bodies have been dealing with the case of Uruguay for more than 17 years, without resolution. More than 17 years of reiterated and uninterrupted observations by the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts. More than 17 years without the substantive issues having been resolved.

That fact in itself constitutes the most conclusive evidence that social dialogue has failed in Uruguay as a means of addressing shortcomings in the collective bargaining system, because if social dialogue worked, we would not be here today discussing the same problems that were flagged in 2009.

The partial progress that the Government points to confirms, paradoxically, the persistence of the problems and growing interference in collective bargaining. By way of example, the provision on the automatic and undefined continuing effect of collective agreements after their expiry set out in section 17 of Act No. 18.566 was abolished. This abolition, however, occurred in the absence of substitute regulation and not only failed to resolve the matter but also created a significant legal loophole.

In fact, three years later, uncertainty persists on the very existence of that continuing effect in Uruguay, its possible scope and the consequences of its non-existence.

The Government has thus replaced an imposed solution that discouraged collective bargaining with a legal loophole which only serves to complicate it.

We see the same thing with enterprises’ bargaining power. The replacement of section 14 of Act No. 18.566 with Act No. 20.145 has not corrected the shortcomings highlighted by the Committee on Freedom of Association.

Ultimately, each attempt at reform raises new issues, while the main problems remain unresolved.

Our delegation maintains that the passage of time does not lessen international obligations; on the contrary, it increases them. Seventeen years of proceedings are proof of the failure of national social dialogue. We therefore urge this Committee to take due note of the situation and require the Government of Uruguay to adopt concrete, effective and verifiable measures to ensure compliance.

Worker member, Portugal – The discussion of this case is not merely technical. Beyond the interests that could be behind this discussion, what is in play is a structural matter: the balance of power in labour relations. The ILO recognizes that asymmetry and, for precisely that reason, also recognizes the need for strong trade unions that contribute to balancing the relationship between labour and capital.

The Wage Boards were conceived as a tool to correct profound inequalities and improve workers’ living conditions. Their main objective was to fix minimum wages by branch of activity.

The results were clear: better wages, improved living conditions, stronger trade unions and robust collective bargaining. For more than 25 years, this model consolidated a trade union structure organized by sector of activity and strengthened collective bargaining by branch, contributing significantly to worker protection and also to a more just distribution of wealth.

This era came to an end in 1968 with the freezing of wages and the beginning of a period marked by the erosion of democratic institutions that would culminate in the dictatorship. The Wage Boards were suspended and began to function again with the return of democracy.

From 1992, however, the Government stopped convening Wage Boards in most sectors. With the exception of some specific activities, there was a deterioration and later decline in collective bargaining. At the same time, negotiation by company was promoted, to the detriment of negotiation by branch, and greater wage liberalization was imposed, leading to a pronounced fall in real wages.

In a country where around 90 per cent of enterprises are small or medium-sized, this meant that the determination of wages was, to a large extent, subject to the power of the employers. The result was a fall in real wages and the weakening of trade union organizations.

The erosion of collective bargaining, when added to unemployment and informality, tips labour relations in favour of the business sector, leading to a deterioration in workers’ living conditions.

A brief analysis of the historical time frames clearly demonstrates what happens when collective bargaining instruments are weakened. On the other hand, when negotiation by branch is promoted and supported by law, trade union organizations are strengthened and workers achieve better living and working conditions.

So let us not be under any illusion: we are not simply discussing a technical legal point. The true backdrop to this discussion is the continuity or not of a strong trade union movement able to negotiate working conditions in Uruguay.

Removing provisions aimed at promoting and encouraging collective bargaining will weaken trade union actors, returning the country to an era that we thought was over and where the decreasing rates of collective bargaining coverage seen today would not exist. These results are not coincidental; they are a consequence of policies. Weakening these mechanisms will not allow us to maintain, and much less improve, the current situation. Nothing could be further from the objectives of the ILO and the international standards analysed in this body.

Government member, Spain – The Government of Spain wishes to recognize Uruguay’s sustained commitment to the principles, values and objectives of the ILO. In an international context marked by significant challenges for the world of work, we believe that the path of a country that for decades has built a solid reputation in respect for labour rights, institutional strengthening and the promotion of social dialogue is particularly important. Uruguay is among the countries that have ratified the most Conventions, a figure that currently stands at 112 Conventions and one Protocol. This reality is not just a statistic; it reflects a political decision sustained over time to adhere to the international standards promoted by the Organization and to gradually incorporate those commitments into the national legal order. This commitment has been widely recognized by the international community and constitutes one of the most notable aspects of the country’s actions within the multilateral system.

We have taken note of the observations made in this case and we highlight that the Uruguayan labour relations system displays particularly significant indicators in terms of collective bargaining coverage, the participation of the social partners and the creation of agreements. The complainants’ observations cannot hide the significant results of the labour policies on collective bargaining. We have observed how collective bargaining in Uruguay reaches exceptionally high levels at the regional and international levels, allowing a large majority of workers and employers to benefit from the results of dialogue and negotiation processes. This demonstrates the capacity of the Uruguayan labour institutions to promote agreements and strengthen social cohesion. We also commend the willingness expressed by the Government to continue to examine these matters in consultation with the social partners and with the ILO’s technical assistance.

We therefore encourage the Government of Uruguay, with the support of this Organization, to continue to strengthen a model that reinforces collective bargaining, decent work, social inclusion and stable labour relations.

Employer member, Guatemala – I will address one aspect that I believe to be vital to correctly assess the case of Uruguay: the presumption that certain partial results demonstrate that the collective bargaining system is working correctly.

Firstly, we must question the very premise that these results reflect success. As has already been indicated in this Committee, the agreements reached in the Wage Boards emerge from a context of negotiation that is neither free nor voluntary. The government guidelines operate as a floor, the threat of a ruling by decree and without a peace clause eliminates any real alternative for the employer sector, and consent obtained in such conditions cannot be deemed an achievement of the system.

But even if we accept that some results have been partially positive, that does not validate the system as a whole, and this is owing to a structural reason that cannot be ignored: every change of government creates a change in the policy line that directly determines collective bargaining. Guidelines are not the product of an objective technical criterion or tripartite consensus; they are the expression of the economic policy of the government of the day. What one government gives, the next takes away, or changes according to its own agenda

This dependence on the political cycle means that any progress is inherently precarious and unstable. A collective bargaining system whose results are subject to the political line of the government of the day is not a system that meets the principles of the parties’ autonomy and the voluntary nature of collective bargaining as enshrined in the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and Conventions Nos 98 and 154.

What the Conventions demand is not a system that functions well under certain political conditions, but one that functions independently of them, and this normative framework ties the fate of collective bargaining to the will of the Executive Branch.

Lastly, the Uruguayan system must be assessed not in the light of supposed circumstantial results, but according to its structural guarantees. We must therefore require the Government of Uruguay to undertake reforms that ensure autonomy in collective bargaining, independent of the political direction of each government

Worker member, Italy – Seventeen years have passed since February 2009, when the first complaint against Act No. 18.566, then still a Bill, was lodged. In that time, the regulation has been in force under all Uruguayan governments, and the results of collective bargaining have been objectively positive.

The Committee of Experts, however, maintains its last observation and insists that the Act must be reformed, without evaluating those results.

In those 17 years, Acts Nos 18.556 and 10.449 were amended repeatedly to accommodate the complainants. Almost all the reforms were adopted contrary to the workers’ express positions, disrupting the balance of social dialogue that the Convention requires.

There are clear examples: trade unions were required to have legal personality without the workers’ agreement; the Executive Branch’s representation in the Higher Tripartite Council was reduced to avoid interference – and yet today there are, once more, allegations of interference owing to the guidelines; branch organizations’ legitimation was abolished; and changes were made to the duration of bilateral agreements, in all cases prioritizing the employers’ position.

More recently, section 392 of Act No. 19.889 and Decree No. 281/2020 introduced the concepts of “freedom of work” and eviction, and in August 2025 the complainants once again invoked section 12 of Act No. 18.566.

In summary, almost all the demands of just one party have been addressed, without the agreement of the workers, and today “consultation” is being requested, when the workers have already rejected and set out their opposition to the dismantling of the system.

This is not, therefore, merely a formal discussion. The Committee of Experts’ observations have outlined only the position of the employers, ignoring the workers’ arguments. There is an obvious promotion of one of the parties, contrary to the tripartite spirit of this House and Article 4 of Convention No. 98.

We request this Committee to urge Uruguay to re-establish tripartite balance and respect the autonomy of the parties in collective bargaining.

Employer member, Honduras – The Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts have noted the competence granted in Uruguayan legislation to the Wage Boards to approve adjustments to wages of all kinds and draft legislation on working conditions.

Current regulations exceed the historical and legal nature of these tripartite bodies. Tripartite negotiation forums, through their own conception, should be limited to setting minimum wages for workers. Other types of wage increases and the regulation of working conditions should be dealt with exclusively through bipartite collective negotiation, without decisive state intervention, as provided for expressly by international labour Conventions.

The Committee of Experts, in its February 2026 report, regretted to note that despite its reiterated comments and the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association, there have been no changes or clarifications of the matter. The channelling of negotiations on wages above the minimum wage through a tripartite body, with the decisive participation of the State, is a direct violation of the principles of the autonomy of the parties and the voluntary nature of collective bargaining. It is a clear contravention of Conventions Nos 87 and 98, which guarantee freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining free from state interference.

We urge the Government of Uruguay to amend section 12 of Act No. 18.566 to restrict the competence of the Wage Boards, in line with the provisions of the aforementioned Conventions, which Uruguay ratified voluntarily.

Worker member, Argentina – I am speaking on behalf of the trade union confederations of Argentina represented by the Trade Union Confederation of the Americas (CSA). In this case, we consider it important for this debate to remain focused on what is effectively required by the Convention: the promotion of free and voluntary collective bargaining procedures through measures adapted to national conditions.

From this perspective, we understand that the case of Uruguay requires particularly careful consideration. The observations made focus on the compatibility of section 12 of Act No. 18.566 with Article 4 of the Convention. In view of this, it is important to recall that the Uruguayan system does not replace the willingness of the parties, nor does it substitute bipartite bargaining, but rather it establishes institutional mechanisms for the promotion of collective bargaining which are part of a tradition that has been upheld for decades and implemented by governments with different political orientations.

Wage Boards are a long-standing tool used for social organization and are not a state-imposed mechanism. Public intervention in this area does not replace the agreement between workers and employers for defining working conditions. On the contrary, it has contributed to maintaining one of the highest levels of collective bargaining coverage, recognized by the Committee of Experts itself.

Furthermore, according to the report of the Committee of Experts, the employers consider that the guidelines of the Executive Branch constitute interference in collective bargaining, which is incorrect. For example, in 2025, these guidelines set out wage increase percentages based on workers’ income. For a wage increase to be implemented, the support of at least one of the social partners is required. Therefore, this is not an imposition but rather an advance statement of their position.

We are concerned that an excessively restrictive interpretation of Article 4 may, in practice, lead to restrictions on instruments that have proven effective in extending collective rights, particularly in productive contexts with business fragmentation and objective difficulties for the spontaneous development of negotiations.

Furthermore, it should be recognized that the Government has implemented a series of regulatory adjustments aimed at addressing the observations made by the supervisory bodies, thereby introducing relevant amendments to the collective bargaining system, even in the absence of consensus with workers’ organizations. This process demonstrates a sustained willingness to engage in institutional dialogue and cooperation with the ILO supervisory mechanisms. The Convention protects collective autonomy, but it also requires the promotion of its effective exercise.

We understand that the Uruguayan model demonstrates that it is possible to reconcile state support, social dialogue and free and voluntary bargaining. We therefore encourage the Government to continue along this path together with the social partners.

Employer member, Chile – On behalf of my delegation, I would like to express our concern regarding the Uruguayan Government’s practice of imposing guidelines for collective bargaining in the Wage Boards, in violation of Article 5 of Convention No. 154.

Firstly, it is important to point out that the Government’s guidelines serve in practice as a bargaining floor. The Government delegates only vote in favour of agreements that comply with the established guidelines, thereby influencing the outcome of the negotiations. These guidelines are imposed across the board, without taking into consideration the specific characteristics of or the circumstances faced by each sector of activity. The guidelines are based on projections of future inflation to maintain real wages. However, they do not allow for the deduction of any additional percentage granted to be included if actual inflation turns out be lower than projected. In short, this amounts to government interference aimed at turning the Wage Boards into a tool for implementing economic policies, rather than what they should be: a forum for free bargaining.

Secondly, it should be noted that agreements are negotiated for the entire sector of activity in which the group in question operates, without taking into account differences in size or region, and with no objective and predictable mechanism for those employers who wish to opt out because they are unable to comply with the decision of the respective Wage Board. These circumstances pose a serious challenge to sectors and enterprises whose economic situation does not allow them to absorb increases designed for the sector average, with the resulting risk of affecting employment levels.

Thirdly, it should be pointed out that the current Government has resorted once again to one of the worst forms of interference: the inclusion in the guidelines of issues pertaining to working conditions. This exacerbates the situation, as it extends state interference beyond wages, encroaching on matters that should be covered exclusively by bipartite bargaining.

In short, the Government has appropriated collective bargaining and has replaced the autonomy of the parties with a tool for imposing and implementing its own economic agenda. In light of the above, we urge this Committee to recommend the Government of Uruguay to end this practice and ensure bargaining that is truly free and autonomous.

Worker member, Brazil – Freedom of association is a fundamental pillar and an essential condition for effective democracy, which establishes a balance of power in society and protects fundamental human rights. A free and open society necessarily involves the right of workers and employers to form their own organizations, to join them, and to organize their activities, which, of course, include collective bargaining and strike action.

Latin America, as we know, has a checkered past with regard to democracy, collective bargaining and social dialogue. Despite this, Uruguay is known for its tradition of social dialogue, demonstrating high levels of bargaining and coverage. In the Recurrent Discussion Committee on Social Dialogue and Tripartism this year, Uruguay was mentioned among the examples of countries with good practices.

This situation is not a coincidence. It is the result of a historical process lasting over eight decades and based on a high level of social and political consensus on the mechanisms used. It was only during the military dictatorship that collective bargaining was interrupted.

The tradition of collective bargaining with respect to wages and working conditions became regulated by legislation in 1943. Bargaining mechanisms were improved as a result of tripartite discussion at the ILO. This is, therefore, a true example of progress, one that strengthens collective bargaining mechanisms as a state institution, which has remained intact despite the changes in government over the years.

As indicated by the Government representative of Uruguay, the national system of collective labour relations ensures the “free and voluntary nature of collective bargaining”, in as much as the Executive Branch does not intervene whatsoever in the negotiation of collective agreements on working conditions, and that, with regard to collective bargaining in the Wage Boards, its intervention is limited to fixing wages by job category and by branch or sector of activity.

It is important to note that working conditions may be agreed upon only if there is agreement between employers’ and workers’ organizations, as provided by law. In other words, there is no possibility for the Executive to intervene in the determination of such content, which is left to the collective autonomy of the social partners in the world of work.

We are examining laws and practices that are adapted to national conditions and encourage and promote collective bargaining. They are primarily laws and practices that are effective. According to the data, the rate of consensus achieved was almost 84 per cent of the bargaining units or committees. We hope that the experience of Uruguay will serve to strengthen collective bargaining and benefit the working class in Brazil and across the world.

Employer member, Argentina – The employers of Argentina are honoured to participate in this discussion in order to contribute their view of the application of the Convention in Uruguay. While noting the clarifications provided by the Uruguayan Government and the advances reported, we note with regret the lack of progress in other aspects of this case, which has been before the Committee for a long time.

While we recognize the high number of agreements reached by the Wage Boards in Uruguay, we wish to draw attention to the fact that this does not mean that the collective bargaining system functions well. The adoption of an agreement is not synonymous with it having been reached through free bargaining.

As expressed by our colleagues, in the Uruguayan system, the parties sit down to negotiate under conditions that leave them with no real alternative. We note with concern that, during the most recent round of meetings to fix the minimum wage, the Government once again included guidelines on matters relating to working conditions.

In practice, no agreement that falls short of those guidelines receives a favourable vote from the Government. If an agreement is not reached, the Executive Branch establishes the wage increase by decree, setting the exact adjustment provided for in its guidelines. Moreover, an employer who votes against the agreement obtains the same economic outcome but loses the opportunity to include a labour peace clause that would provide predictability.

In these conditions, voting in favour is not an expression of agreement, but rather the only rational course of action within a system designed not to leave any margin. The consent obtained in this manner is tainted by the implicit threat of a government ruling.

It cannot be claimed that bargaining is free and voluntary if one of the parties does not have the effective possibility of influencing the outcome. A system that produces forced agreements is not a system that functions in accordance with the Convention. This is a system that conceals the parties’ lack of autonomy under the guise of consensus.

We urge this Committee to properly assess the conditions in which agreements are produced and to request the Government of Uruguay to review the regulations in force to ensure the autonomy of the contracting parties and truly voluntary bargaining.

Worker member, China – The Chinese trade unions have listened carefully to the intervention by the Government of Uruguay. We note the practices and the progress of Uruguay in implementing the Convention, particularly conducting collective bargaining through the tripartite Wage Boards. The Government has submitted information regarding the 11th round of Wage Boards which has reached consensus in many areas and we invite the Committee’s attention to these. The Chinese trade unions support Uruguay in continuing to advance social dialogue and collective bargaining, and hope that the ILO will provide the necessary technical assistance to the tripartite constituents of Uruguay in this process.

Employer member, Mexico – In the information provided, the Government of Uruguay indicates a high number of agreements in collective bargaining. However, it is clear that the data, on its own, cannot be interpreted as conclusive evidence of a system of fully consensual, free and voluntary collective bargaining among the parties, as required by Article 4 of the Convention. While the high number of agreements may reflect an apparently harmonious functioning of the model, it is necessary to examine the real conditions in which these agreements are reached. It is not enough to look at the formal outcome; it is necessary to examine whether the process allows for authentic and effective bargaining.

From this perspective, and according to the report, collective bargaining in Uruguay is carried out within a framework previously defined by guidelines on wages and working conditions established by the Executive Branch. These guidelines, in practice, serve as a defining factor in the final outcome of the bargaining.

It is furthermore noted that, if consensus is not reached in the Wage Boards, the likely scenario is that the Executive will intervene by means of decree, essentially reproducing the wage increase previously established in the official guidelines. This creates a situation in which the employers’ disagreement does not materially change the final economic outcome, but it can lead to a loss of tools that provide stability and predictability, such as labour peace clauses derived from a collective agreement.

In this context, the employers’ adherence to agreements cannot necessarily be interpreted as a fully free and autonomous expression of will. Instead, it could be understood within a framework of asymmetrical incentives, in which voting against an agreement does not represent a materially effective alternative, but rather conduct that may worsen the position of the employer without affecting the regulatory outcome. Consequently, a high percentage of agreements is not automatically a clear indicator of genuine consent or an effective balance among the negotiating parties.

The ratification of the Convention by Uruguay means not only formally recognizing the right to bargain collectively, but also ensuring material and institutional conditions allowing for genuine processes that are free from interference and are truly voluntary. When the setting of wages operates de facto under excessively centralized or rigid systems, the margin for genuine discussion is reduced, and bilateral dialogue tailored to the needs of each enterprise or productive sector loses its effectiveness.

I wish to conclude by echoing the requests made by the Committee of Experts, which insisted on the need to strengthen, in Uruguay, genuinely free, voluntary and participatory collective bargaining, which is in accordance with international labour standards and with the specific economic realities of each sector and their respective counterparts.

Government member, Brazil – The Government of Brazil expresses its support for the statement made by the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC) and fully aligns itself with the comments made therein. Additionally, in examining the information available and the various positions expressed in this case, we believe it is important to place this discussion in the broader context of the results achieved by the labour relations system in Uruguay and by the institutions that uphold it.

We note that the examination is based on specific aspects of the functioning of the Wage Board – a mechanism that is part of an institutionality with a long history that has performed a key role in the development of collective bargaining and social dialogue in Uruguay.

Iti s particularly important to highlight that this system has led to the achievement of one of the highest levels of collective bargaining coverage in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to the information provided, around 95 per cent of formal workers are covered by collective bargaining mechanisms. This result is a significant indicator of the strength of social dialogue and the efficiency of the country’s labour institutions.

Furthermore, we consider that Uruguay’s experience takes on an importance that goes beyond its national borders. Historically, Uruguay has been a regional reference point for social dialogue, labour institutionality and promotion of collective bargaining; and this experience has enabled it to contribute to the strengthening of the values and principles that this Organization promotes in Latin America and the Caribbean.

We also note that the bargaining processes carried out in Uruguay register high levels of agreement between the representative workers’ and employers’ organizations, reflecting the parties’ capacities to build consensus and reach balanced solutions through dialogue.

We also highlight Uruguay’s history of cooperation with the ILO supervisory bodies. The country has consistently demonstrated its willingness to consider the comments made and to work together with the Office and the social partners to strengthen compliance with its international obligations. This is in addition to the ratification of 112 international labour Conventions and an additional Protocol, including all the fundamental and governance Conventions, which reflects a sustained commitment to the principles and values upheld by the Organization.

We therefore urge that this process continues to evolve through social dialogue and technical cooperation, taking into consideration both the comments made and the positive results that the Uruguayan system has delivered for workers, employers and society as a whole.

Employer member, Plurinational State of Bolivia – I wish to speak on behalf of the employers of the Plurinational State of Bolivia to express our support for the Uruguayan employers’ organization in relation to this case.

Firstly, we must recognize the progress made by the country in recent years. The Committee of Experts itself has noted with interest a range of legislative amendments introduced recently that have addressed several of the observations made in the past by the ILO supervisory bodies.

We must also highlight, however, that the central question that has given rise to this case for more than a decade remains without a comprehensive solution.

The Committee of Experts has reiterated that the promotion of collective bargaining provided for in Article 4 of the Convention requires its free and voluntary nature to be guaranteed in full. It has also recalled that employment conditions must be the result of agreements reached between employers and workers’ organizations, preserving the parties’ autonomy in collective bargaining.

From our perspective, this principle is fundamental. The strength of collective bargaining is not measured by its coverage alone. It is also measured by its effective compliance with the principle of the negotiating parties’ autonomy.

When working conditions are defined by the parties themselves through freely reached agreements, trust, shared responsibility and the sustainability of labour relationships are strengthened.

We therefore encourage the Government and the social partners to continue working, through social dialogue, to finalize the legislative harmonization process and thereby ensure that national legislation complies fully with the principles of the Convention.

We are convinced that collective bargaining that is truly free and voluntary constitutes the best guarantee for balanced, modern and sustainable labour relations.

Employer member, Brazil – I wish to speak about an aspect that I believe clearly illustrates Uruguay’s lack of compliance in the area of freedom of association and the protection of fundamental rights. In Uruguay, occupations of workplaces by trade union organizations continues to be common practice. Although the right to strike is recognized as a fundamental right, its exercise cannot extend to depriving employers of the right to access their own premises or violate the right to work of workers not participating in such action.

The regulations in force in relation to the removal of workplace occupations in Uruguay grants excessive discretion to the Executive Branch to determine when to clear a premises. In this way, the effective protection of property rights, the right of management to access business premises and the right to work of non-striking workers is subject to a purely political decision, rather than being governed by objective, predictable criteria. This situation creates serious legal uncertainty for employers, who are left at the mercy of the will of the government of the day in order to regain control of their establishments.

A system that renders the protection of fundamental rights conditional on political considerations is incompatible with the principles of freedom of association and the guarantees for all parties in labour relations that are enshrined in Conventions Nos 87 and 98. We therefore encourage the Committee to take note of this situation and recommend the Government of Uruguay to adopt objective, expeditious mechanisms to ensure the removal of occupations of workplaces that violate the legitimate rights of employers and non-striking workers.

Observer, International Organisation of Employers (IOE) – Let us be clear: this case is no longer about differences in interpretation. It is about the persistent refusal to implement recommendations that have been repeated for over 15 years. For more than one and a half decades, the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association have consistently reported that fundamental aspects of the collective bargaining system in Uruguay are incompatible with the free and voluntary principle protected under Conventions Nos 98 and 87. The recommendations have been clear and the comments repeated but the problems that have been identified persist.

Collective bargaining belongs to employers and workers, and their representative organizations. It is not up to the State to determine its results or overrule the will of the parties. However, the supervisory bodies have been warning for years that there are mechanisms in Uruguayan legislation that grant the public authorities a role that is incompatible with the principles of free and voluntary collective bargaining. Most concerning is that, despite the time that has elapsed and the clarity of the comments made, the authorities have publicly stated that there are no plans to introduce the legislative reforms necessary to implement the ILO recommendations. This message should worry all of us because when the supervisory bodies’ recommendations can be ignored for 15 years without any repercussions, what is at stake is not only a country’s situation but also the credibility of the international labour standards system. Uruguay has a long tradition within this Organization and, precisely for that reason, we expect commitment and compliance.

Therefore, the IOE urges this Committee to firmly request the Government of Uruguay to initiate, without further delay, the legislative reforms necessary to implement the outstanding recommendations of the ILO supervisory bodies, particularly those aimed at ensuring that collective bargaining is carried out in a fully free and voluntary manner in conformity with Conventions Nos 98 and 87. After more than 15 years of repeated comments, the time has come to move from excuses to implementation.

Observer, Education International (EI) – I can tell you as a teacher that listening to the Government and listening to many of the members on these benches, that Uruguay should not be on the naughty step. Rather, they should be lauded for the amazing work that they have done in ensuring that it is possible to present this article and this way of working. They have been developing this way of working over many years, and I will quote Article 4 of the Convention: “Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary, to encourage and promote the full development and utilization of machinery for voluntary negotiation … by means of collective agreements.”

Uruguay has adopted measures appropriate to its national conditions. A country with a small population where most employment is concentrated in small and medium-sized enterprises with between one and four workers and five and ten workers, i.e. SMEs. It is therefore clear that national conditions make it necessary to take appropriate measures to encourage the use of voluntary bargaining procedures. This is what – as the Uruguayan Government representative pointed out – they have been doing for decades in Uruguay.

The national conditions stimulate and promote collective bargaining. It establishes areas of negotiation under the auspices and convening of a government framework, creating the scope of negotiation so that the parties voluntarily develop negotiation mechanisms.

This mechanism has allowed the country to have very high rates of collective bargaining coverage and, when it was not applied, the results were also clear, a deterioration of working conditions and a weakening of trade union organizations.

The Committee of Experts’ observation, I have to say, is a little muddled in that it welcomes the very high rate of collective bargaining coverage and recognizes the mechanisms that are there that support this and yet it has some claims for a need to change. Those modifications that are being asked for, that have been determined, are also part of the modifications which have required this welcome scenario of a high rate of collective bargaining. It also points out that any collective agreement on the fixing of conditions of employment should be the result of an agreement between employers or employers’ organizations, on the one hand, and workers’ organizations, on the other.

The point was clarified, both by the Government and the workers, pointing out that this negotiation is carried out in the tripartite sphere, but on any agreement on working conditions, it is of a bipartite nature, which is not taken into account in the conclusions offered.

It is not reasonable to allege a violation of freedom of bargaining in a country that has one of the highest rates of collective bargaining in the world. It is not logical to welcome a high rate of collective bargaining and yet question the framework which our Convention allows to bring us there.

The Uruguayan Education Minister spoke at the centenary event on Monday about the inclusion of domestic workers in the collective bargaining mechanism. Let us not break what is not broken. Reject this mendacious claim.

Government representative – I would like to begin these closing remarks with a celebration. I am truly delighted that, thanks to the distinguished Employer representative of Brazil, the right to strike is once again part of the Committee’s discussions after so many years. I presume that this is based on the sound idea and reasoning that strikes form part of the human right to freedom of association, as the International Court of Justice has recently ruled and as is also established in the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

In short, I believe it is very good news for everyone that the right to strike is once again part of the Committee’s deliberations, but I must also say that it is out of context, because Convention No. 87 is not the issue for which our country is appearing before the Committee; therefore, a detailed analysis of the case in question will have to be left for another occasion, though I repeat that I did not wish to omit making this point.

I wish to make further comments on some of the contributions, as I believe that some were extremely imprecise, and serious errors were made which detract from the quality of the debate. This is undoubtedly due to the number of hours we have been working, but it must be said that “opt-outs”, for example, which a distinguished Employer member was calling for, are provided for in Uruguayan law, namely section 15 of Act No 18.566. They are not referred to as “opt-outs”, which is a rather colloquial term, but if one reads section 15, one can easily conclude that this possibility is provided for.

Another error which, in my view, complicates understanding and detracts from the quality of the debate is to state or complain that section 14 of the Act regarding the parties authorized to negotiate was not replaced. Indeed, section 14 was not replaced. What was done was to delete the final part: I would like to clarify this to the Employer representative of Spain. What was done was to delete the final part of this section, which provided that higher-level trade unions could negotiate a collective agreement in the absence of an enterprise-level trade union.

That is what was amended, and therefore no further clarification is necessary, insofar as application and interpretation are restored to the effect that the parties authorized to negotiate are those set out in Article 2 of Convention No. 154.

What might perhaps be worth noting is that what the employers in Uruguay were seeking, when the deletion of the final part of section 14 was being debated, was either to enable collective bargaining by express provision through subjective agreements with non-unionized workers, or to expressly authorize the route of collective bargaining with elected workers’ representatives. The latter is not prohibited under our legislation, but it has no practical significance in labour relations in Uruguay.

And the final point I wish to clarify – because I also recognize that there is a significant lack of precision in this discussion – relates to a comment made by the Employer member of Guatemala that awards are decided by decree. That is absolutely incorrect. The decisions of the Wage Boards are adopted in the legal form of a tripartite resolution, never a decree, at least since 2009, when this very law which is the subject of challenge today was enacted.

In short, returning to the main thrust of our presentation on the merits of the system and how it safeguards the freedom and autonomy of the parties, it must be said – and here we return to a constitutional argument of this Organization – that this is the approach our country has adopted to tackle the needs referred to in the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia.

Since 1943, when the Wage Boards were established, extensive negotiations began not only on minimum wages by category – which has traditionally been the remit of these bodies – but also, gradually, the social partners themselves at the negotiating table voluntarily began to incorporate elements relating to working conditions and general pay rises.

It was not the Executive Branch of the 1940s, nor that of the 1950s or 1960s, which introduced this type of provision; it was a practice adopted by the parties themselves which was subsequently incorporated – or, one might say, legalized – in the 2009 Act, as until then the practice had no legal basis. If the Wage Boards were to be prohibited from negotiating working conditions and wage adjustments, as the employers want, this would trigger a consequence that nobody wants – neither the Government nor the workers, and even less so the employers – namely the fragmentation of collective bargaining into two stages: a first stage to negotiate minimum wages by category within the Wage Boards, and, once that negotiation is complete, a second stage – supposedly at a bipartite level – to negotiate working conditions and wage adjustments, thereby prolonging the process, increasing social unrest, and doubling the time taken to reach collective agreements.

Furthermore, the strength of tripartite and bipartite collective bargaining determines a very important factor, highlighted in many international studies: namely, that in Uruguay the rules governing the provision of dependent labour very often originate from collective bargaining, which endows the legal system with a highly distinctive feature that sets it apart from the regulatory models of other countries, as it affords considerable scope for collective autonomy to create legal norms outside the legalistic and codified model prevalent in most countries.

Restricting the possibility of negotiating working conditions and wage adjustments within the Wage Boards, as the employers are seeking to do, would also run counter to the tradition dating back to the 1940s. I would invite you all to review the analyses of the resolutions of the Wage Boards from 1943 onwards, and you will be able to verify, for example, that in 1948 the Wage Boards incorporated matters such as dismissal procedures and promotions in the case of the newspaper offices in Montevideo, uniform pay and work equipment, overtime pay, and provisions on working hours for medical staff in 1965; in short, a vast array of issues on which the social partners, exercising their freedom and autonomy, negotiated when the Wage Boards were convened.

This was a practice that had no legal basis and which the 2009 Act – so heavily criticized in this complaint – legalized: it incorporated it as a regulated matter rather than as a spontaneous practice without a legal foundation.

On this point, I would like to make two final observations and then offer some very brief conclusions: there is an obvious contradiction between the agreements reached in tripartite Wage Boards – which reflect the free will of the employers’ and workers’ organizations – and the fact that those same organizations, or some of those representative organizations – undoubtedly at enterprise level – subsequently raise objections at international level.

Those same employers’ organizations could choose to negotiate bilaterally (Uruguay offers a wide range of options for collective bargaining) with workers’ organizations, and as has already been established and stated in this room, in such cases, the much-resisted tripartite boards might not need to be convened if there were bilateral collective bargaining on minimum wages at sectoral level.

Much has already been said about the issue of wage guidelines. These are simply suggestions from the Executive Branch to the social partners; they are not binding, but merely the Executive’s positions on wage matters that it brings before the Wage Boards.

And now some very brief conclusions: Uruguay should never have been included on the shortlist of individual cases. Nor do we wish to be here, as the Uruguayan employers have said, and that is why the Government has sought channels of dialogue to resolve the matter internally. Of course discussions took place with the employers, of course discussions took place with the workers, and of course we made it clear to them that we do not like being in this position, which we consider unfair to say the least.

Furthermore, there is no valid reason whatsoever for a further terminological inaccuracy which is extremely serious, since the spokesperson of the Employers’ group stated that the Committee of Experts has claimed that the system in Uruguay is incompatible with Article 4 of the Convention. I invite you all to read the statement by the Committee of Experts submitted to this Committee; there is not a single indication, not a single mention of any incompatibility between the Uruguayan collective bargaining system and Article 4 of the Convention.

It is extremely important to be careful with language in this sort of debate, to ensure the quality of the discussions, and not to attribute to documents statements that they do not actually contain. The Government has come to uphold the democratic quality of labour relations built upon institutionalized tripartite social dialogue, involving, among other institutions – pardon the redundancy – the Wage Boards.

The social partners may negotiate wages, working conditions and all other matters at the tripartite or bipartite levels, as they freely choose. The law and practice governing Wage Boards date back to 1943 and currently ensure coverage of 95 per cent of people in dependent employment with regard to minimum wages.

We do not understand the criticism or why it is presented as a problem that there is 95 per cent – or 100 per cent, as I believe was even stated in this room – coverage in relation to minimum wages. It would appear that it is not viewed as positive that people in dependent employment have a minimum wage determined through machinery enabling participation and discussion, such as the Wage Boards.

They reflect a high degree of consensus, and we understand that our interpretation is in line with article 19(8) of the ILO Constitution, as has already been stated.

Finally, we share the view expressed by the Committee of Experts in its report on Uruguay – which was read out correctly, without inaccuracies or errors, and without attributing to the Committee of Experts statements it did not make – that the effective promotion of collective bargaining and its high level of coverage must be guaranteed; at the same time, we consider – and we wish to have this recorded in this room – that we may regard the Committee of Experts’ offer to receive technical assistance from the Office as a means of better demonstrating on the ground that we are in full compliance with the Convention; not merely through a literal interpretation of the legal provisions but also by complying, so to speak, with the functions and the evolution of the legal institutions, and by thus embodying the very aims and objectives of the ILO.

Employer members – Before I refer to the discussion, I must say that I am concerned about the views held by some of the participants. I also recognize that they are in the minority, but they have left the impression in this Committee room that it does not matter whether or not there is compliance with the Convention and with the observations of the Committee of Experts. This is despite the fact that they expressed these views after studying the case, listening to the Government and following the discussion. According to these participants, what matters is the outcome, and, frankly, such a stance is deeply worrying. They seem to forget that an agreement involves two parties. I ask you to reflect on this: if the outcome were the other way round, then we would indeed have to adhere to the Convention.

Think about it: the rules are what provide us with legal certainty and stability, and protect our rights and values – we must not forget that – and that is the remit of this Committee. Its remit is to draw up rules and then monitor compliance with them; it is nothing more than that. So it seems to me that we must be careful about what is proposed and what is sought, because these very same criteria might be applied to many other sensitive issues we face in this room – issues just as important as collective bargaining. I do not know where this line of thinking would lead us, but truly, I invite you to reflect on this; I do not wish to turn this into a debate.

The IOE reminded us that we are not at the initial stage of this discussion, and I fully agree with that; we already have a very clear decision. This is a discussion that has been going on for many years, as has been said. This decision has been made by the competent bodies of this Organization, and all of us sitting here are obliged to comply with those decisions, those proposals, those calls to action, and those incentives; in short, with everything we say here in this Organization, always with a view to compliance, given that the rules exist. Even the Office itself adheres strictly to this.

Before I begin to assess the discussion, I must address a few points raised by the Government representative, whom I thank for his candour, because the truth is that he has laid his cards on the table quite openly, saying, “We have taken a different path, a different approach, which has served us well for the benefit of the workers.” We welcome this; we are all in agreement on this; what we have all been seeking since this Organization was founded is the progress and welfare of workers; that is why we are sitting here, of our own free will – no-one is forcing us. So I truly welcome this, but we must not forget that we have obligations within a definitive legal and regulatory framework, which we have voluntarily adopted, regardless of the fact that it forms part of the fundamental principles and rights at work enshrined in the Convention.

Frankly, the issue of strikes is out of context; there is no mention of it whatsoever in the matter we are currently discussing. However, in the interests of everyone’s time, I would ask you to take it as given that we have already stated our position on this matter on other occasions; we are due to discuss it in November and, in the meantime, we will not be addressing the issue at all. If you wish, I would be happy to reiterate our position on matters relating to strikes, but I would ask that, in the interests of everyone’s time, we treat it as having been set out previously; we have already expressed it on other occasions and it is a statement which is practically one page long; I believe we can make better use of that time.

Please excuse me: while I welcome and applaud the fact that the Government representative has been open and has explained to us here how they view the situation, namely that the outcome is more important than compliance with the regulations, I believe that bringing discussions to the Committee that are taking place internally between the Government and the workers’ or employers’ organizations – or just the employers’ organizations – is unnecessary. We must stick to the matter at hand, and I would ask you to do the same: to stick solely to the discussion arising from the report. I shall not comment further on this.

I too saw within this openness – which the Government has shown us, and for which I am truly grateful – how he explained to us the historical development of this process we are currently part of, which dates back to the 1940s, through the Wage Boards – I suppose to determine minimum wages on a tripartite basis – and how, as practices were gradually established to incorporate other agreements and different conditions, they decided in 2009 to incorporate it into law. But that is contrary to the spirit of the Committee of Experts’ report – though it does not state this verbatim – but it does state verbatim what I have already read, which I shall not repeat; I quoted it verbatim and I assume it is recorded in the minutes – namely, what the Committee of Experts’ report says: that you must amend your law to bring it into line with the Convention.

I am not going to read the statement again; it has already been included in the discussion and I think that should suffice. But anyway, this historical element confirms that we are indeed in the situation that has been determined and assessed with, it seems to me, great thoroughness by the Committee of Experts, and it is exactly as reproduced in the report – actually in the reports – which on the last occasion urged the Government to make this amendment in consultation with the most representative organizations. So this shows that we are already in the midst of a discussion that goes back some time; I say this for newcomers who may not be familiar with the procedure we are following here. I will not go into the other aspects now; I will simply conclude by saying that, in light of the discussion, our group requests that the conclusions once again urge the Government, in consultation with the most representative workers’ and employers’ organizations, to adopt without delay the necessary measures to amend section 12 of Act No. 18.566, in order to ensure that national law and practice are fully in line with the Convention – as stated by the Committee of Experts and the report – and with the principles of collective bargaining developed by the ILO supervisory bodies. We are not going to get bogged down in semantics; that is the crux of the matter.

Therefore, for the purposes set out in the report – namely that the Government should consult the most representative organizations and act accordingly – we request that the report urge the Government to do so, without adding or omitting words, so as not to enter into a semantic discussion that will lead us nowhere.

Given the persistence of the observations made over so many years regarding a fundamental Convention, and in light of the debate we have had in this room, we have decided to request that a special paragraph be included in this case. We are aware of the scale of what we are asking for and proposing, but we believe that what the Committee of Experts has been saying for so long should not be sidestepped or overlooked. The only thing left to say in this room is that the report is wrong, we are on the right track and the outcome is positive, and that is that. I therefore believe we must emphasize this point, and I would ask you take this finding into account.

Finally, we encourage the Government to request technical assistance to facilitate the adoption of the necessary measures to address the observations that have been pending for a long time.

Worker members – As a conclusion to these Committee discussions, I would like to state and reaffirm that Uruguay is a country characterized by social dialogue, tripartite consultation and, above all, the full functioning of its democratic institutions.

As was stated at the outset, we are here to assess a regulatory system that consolidates collective bargaining as a genuine state policy, historically supported by the country’s political and social sectors throughout the ages.

The arguments put forward in this room confirm that this so-called state intervention, far from constituting unlawful interference or coercion, would operate as a mechanism to foster and promote voluntary bargaining in strict accordance with Article 4 of the Convention.

The facts regarding the economic and labour realities in Uruguay are decisive and refute any grounds for challenge. We reiterate that this is a productive sector in which the vast majority of enterprises have fewer than ten employees. Collective bargaining by sector of activity is the only viable tool for ensuring that workers are covered.

Attempting to fragment this system into exclusively enterprise-level bargaining would amount to leaving thousands of employees unprotected, thereby destroying a model which, as has been stated and reaffirmed here, boasts one of the highest coverage rates in the world.

Furthermore, the high level of the Uruguayan State’s compliance with the law has been demonstrated in response to the employers’ demands; over recent years, this regulatory framework has undergone profound changes that have addressed almost all the observations raised by the employers’ associations and, I reiterate, even some to which the workers’ organization was expressly opposed.

Section 12 of Act 18.566, the final point under discussion, is unequivocal and leaves no room for ambiguity: no working condition may be imposed without the explicit and mutual consent of both parties, which validates the free and voluntary nature of the system.

In this case, weakening or curtailing the powers of the current tripartite system would not constitute a technical improvement to the legislation; rather, it could directly undermine access to fair pay and decent working conditions, thereby running counter to the fundamental aims of this Organization. Limiting the scope of collective bargaining to each branch of activity would irreversibly weaken the bargaining power of the most vulnerable sectors of the economy, potentially leading to hidden precariousness.

This Committee, of course, cannot endorse interpretative criteria that render state protection mechanisms meaningless, since the lack of protection for workers in micro and small enterprises is in direct conflict with the founding mandate of the ILO to promote social justice and decent work through the strengthening – not the weakening – of tripartism.

According to the International Trade Union Confederation’s Global Rights Index, attacks on the rights to freedom of expression and assembly were recorded in 50 per cent of countries – a record figure for the index and an increase from the 45 per cent recorded the previous year, in 2025; 75 countries have arrested or detained workers whilst they were exercising their rights. The right to collective bargaining has been restricted in 80 per cent of countries – the same percentage as in 2025, among other equally discouraging indicators.

Workers in three out of every four countries have been denied the right to organize. The average score for the Americas has fallen even further compared with 2025, and two countries on that continent – my continent, our continent – have made it onto the list of the ten worst offenders in terms of trade union and human rights violations. Fortunately, on the same continent there is Uruguay, which has managed to climb one more rung and is now among the world’s best countries for labour relations.

Whilst the regulatory enforcement mechanism serves to highlight cases of serious non-compliance, on this particular occasion, it has, in our view, yielded a positive outcome. And here I would also refer to the statement made by the Employers’ spokesperson, who told us that we should also bear in mind that when our work has contributed to positive results, these are presented within our Committee as good examples for other governments.

While, in other cases within our own region, we had identified the systematic lack of social dialogue as the main cause of the climate of violence characterizing labour relations – marked by wage freezes, collective bargaining freezes and, in many cases, a refusal to ratify collective agreements unless certain conditions are met – and indeed interference by the State, the reality in Uruguay is at the opposite extreme.

That is why, first and foremost, we reiterate our conclusion that nothing is perfect and that everything must be monitored and subject to appropriate supervision, while recognizing that further action is needed in the future – what are referred to as outstanding issues in Colombia – but I also wish to emphasize that Uruguay, in all international forums, consistently reaffirms its commitment to the governance role of the ILO and is a very strong voice on the global governance stage in defence of multilateralism and the role of this Organization as a guarantor of decent work, even within the framework of the Sustainable Development Goals and the post-2030 debates.

This commitment to institutional leadership is clearly reflected in its recent track record, having led the Government group of the ILO Regional Conference for the Americas and now holding the presidency of this Conference.

I wish to emphasize – as I have said regarding other countries I have criticized – that when a country holds a position and fulfils it with honour, this too must be highlighted.

Furthermore, we wish to emphasize that the CSA chose to base itself in Montevideo precisely because Uruguay is a territory where it can carry out trade union activities across the entire region with complete peace of mind and full guarantees.

In my capacity as a representative of Argentina, which borders Uruguay, I have first-hand knowledge of and can personally attest to the merits of a regulatory, protective and balanced system such as that of Uruguay, which we regard as a model. Lastly, we particularly value the commitment shown by the Government of Uruguay, which, in its recent statement, has firmly and convincingly upheld its collective bargaining system in line with international standards, whilst also demonstrating a willingness to receive technical assistance – a stance that we support. This has been a request from the Government which we – employers and workers alike – must support. We would like to take this opportunity to encourage other governments in the region to adopt the same approach as the Government of Uruguay in creating the conditions – for both employers and workers – to ensure that the conclusions of this Committee open up positive avenues aimed at resolving the issues at hand.

Chairperson – The discussion of this case is now concluded. I would like to thank the Deputy Minister for his participation and also all the speakers who took part in the discussion.

Conclusions of the Committee

The Committee took note of the written and oral information provided by the Government and the discussion that followed.

The Committee noted the persistence of comments by this Committee and other supervisory bodies concerning Uruguay’s collective bargaining legislation and practice in relation to Convention No. 98.

Taking into account the discussion, the Committee urged the Government, in consultation with the most representative employers’ and workers’ organizations, to:

• take the necessary legislative measures, including amending section 12 of Act No. 18.566, to ensure full conformity of the law and practice with the principles of collective bargaining and the Convention.

The Committee encouraged the Government to avail itself of ILO technical assistance as necessary, and requested the Government to provide a report on progress made by 1 September 2026.

Government representative – The Government would like to thank the Governments and social partners for the interesting discussion which has taken place in the Committee; this has been a technical discussion related to the individual case.

Faithful to the tradition of social dialogue and tripartism, we welcome the conclusions of the Committee, incorporating them into the institutional frameworks of our labour relations system, with a view to reaching agreements that address the requests made, while maintaining, as called for by the Committee of Experts, the effective promotion of collective bargaining and its high level of coverage.

We reiterate what we have already indicated in our explanations to the Committee, namely the Government’s willingness to receive technical assistance.

Individual Case (CAS) - Discussion: 2019, Publication: 108th ILC session (2019)



Discussion by the Committee

Government representative – The Government of Uruguay stands before this Organization, with confidence and conviction, to examine Case No. 2699. Above all, we affirm that we have been, are and will be open to dialogue and negotiation with a view to making any changes to the system of collective bargaining and conflict prevention that are necessary, appropriate and reasonable, in accordance with our current realities and history, with our Constitution and laws, and with international standards, as long as there is a useful consensus that will allow us to progress towards extending and improving the system of collective bargaining and conflict prevention.

We will summarize our presentation in seven points. First, some general comments about our country; second, some background information regarding Article 4 of the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); third, the importance of historical negotiation in private sector activities; fourth, and most notably, the reality associated with the Uruguayan law in question, namely Law No. 18566 of 2009 on the system of collective bargaining; fifth, the decentralization of tripartite negotiations; sixth, the importance of tripartism in Uruguay, as is the case at the International Labour Organization (ILO); and seventh, conflict prevention and labour peace clauses.

In relation to the first point regarding our country, we understand that all topics should be considered within the context of the country where the activities are taking place and to which the topics relate. According to many different qualified institutions, Uruguay is first in Latin America on democracy, rule of law, prosperity, social inclusion, social progress, quality of life, low-level corruption, technological development, fixed broadband subscriptions per inhabitant, average internet speed and e-government; it is second on freedom of press; and third in Latin America on economic freedom. Fundamentally, these were statistics for 2017 and 2018. It is in this context that labour relations are conducted in the country.

It is a country which, for the first time in history, has had 17 consecutive years of economic growth, even during the international crisis of 2008 and 2009. This shows, and it is important to relate this to collective bargaining, that this is a country where a great deal remains to be done, but where global indicators show that collective bargaining and labour relations are improving. Uruguay is fourth in the world in terms of the number of ILO Conventions that it has ratified and enforced.

In the 14 years that our Government has been in power, the first of its kind in history, it has extended collective bargaining to all private sector workers and companies, including, for the first time, to paid rural, domestic and home-based workers. The measure also applies to public servants working, for instance, in the police, local governments, judiciary, electoral council and high courts. Those 14 years have led to a real and significant increase in wages which are now on average 55 per cent higher than the cost of labour. This has also led to a rise in the number of retirements as well as to pension increases in our country.

This period also coincided with a notable increase in formalization. In those 14 years, approximately 50 per cent more companies registered to pay social security and 60 per cent more workers registered for and were paying social security.

This has led to higher revenues, which has in turn increased consumption, brought poverty down significantly, and almost entirely eliminated extreme poverty and destitution. We can say with satisfaction that Uruguay has already achieved some of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and is fighting to achieve others.

A recent study carried out by consultants of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) entitled More Work to Do? Taking Stock of Latin American Labor Markets emphasizes that, under our Government, collective bargaining went from covering 28 per cent of workers in 2000 to covering 97 per cent of workers in 2005 and onwards. Similarly, the study concludes that collective bargaining seems to have had positive effects on employment and unemployment by helping to bring stability to labour relations, channelling demands in an orderly fashion and encouraging an environment conducive to moderation. We emphasize that this is not a government report, but one produced by a body to which we do not have commitments, as we did previously.

Furthermore, a recent 2018 report of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) emphasizes that collective bargaining systems that coordinate salaries in different sectors tend to produce less inequality and see better results in the workplace, including for vulnerable groups.

Another recent study based on data provided by the Catholic University, not the State University, shows that conflict was more prominent in Uruguay when collective bargaining bodies were rarely operational or not operational at all, than in the period since 2005 when they were indeed operational and collective bargaining was more widespread.

It is therefore necessary to stop and analyse the second point of our presentation, namely Article 4 of the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), one of the central elements of the complaint. We have read the proceedings from 1949 where Article 4 was discussed. Article 4 reads as follows: “Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary, to encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers or employers’ organisations and workers’ organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements.”

The 1949 proceedings emphasized the need to take into account national circumstances and the phrase “where necessary” was added to the Convention. At the time, the Netherlands had pointed out – in relation to the original draft of Convention No. 98, which was later amended following the efforts of the Netherlands – that the standard was too strict, as indicated by the country’s representative. It was then that the phrase “where necessary” was inserted in order to give governments sufficient leeway to decide whether to take appropriate measures.

Therefore, in our understanding, the system of labour relations and collective bargaining in Uruguay is in line with the Convention.

In Uruguay, two essential modalities are in place:

(a) bipartite or bilateral negotiation between representatives of the workers and employers, the product of which is a collective agreement; and

(b) tripartite negotiation in the wage councils, which dates back 76 years to 1943, and where participants have the power to fix a minimum wage for each occupational category and branch of activity as well as to make adjustments to salaries. The negotiation is attended by up of three government representatives, two worker representatives and two employer representatives.

Tripartite negotiation in the wage councils is a traditional modality, a national specificity and a way of promoting – not imposing – collective bargaining as a whole.

As the Netherlands argued in 1949, it is necessary to give governments freedom of action in this regard.

Overall, it is our understanding that the law in question is perfectly aligned with the provisions of the Convention, with its 1943 predecessor, as well as with the practices accepted peacefully by the employers and by governments of different political parties, over a 66-year period. It strikes us that these questions are being raised now, when it is our turn to govern for the first time in history. Nevertheless, we are and will be open to consider, through dialogue and negotiation, all the changes required to extend and improve collective bargaining and conflict prevention. Proof of that are the proposals presented successively over the years, but particularly in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security in different consultation processes. Tripartite agreements have been made with the Chamber of Industry and the Chamber of Commerce and the trade union centre PIT-CNT in March 2015 and May 2016, where, for example, the Government proposed solutions to all the points raised by the Committee on Freedom of Association in paragraph 1389 of Report No. 356 of March 2010.

As we mentioned, tripartite negotiation in the private sector has been in place in Uruguay since 1943. In addition to minimum wage fixing by category, other working conditions have always been under negotiation, including the number of public officials, the responsibilities assigned to certain positions, breaks, income schemes, job boards, unemployment insurance schemes, hours, workplace conditions, sanctions regimes and recourse, etc. Such negotiations took place at times when the wage councils were operational: from 1944 to 1968 and also from 1985 to the beginning of the 1990s and to the present day. These practices have never been questioned until now. What is more, business associations have participated in and subscribed to them.

The employers are questioning an issue that Law No. 18566 of 2009 did not introduce. It simply put into statutory law a national practice that has been in force since 1943. The law explicitly states that: “The wage council can establish working conditions if so decided by the representatives of the employers and the workers.” Therefore, it seems contradictory that the matter has arisen.

Working conditions are also being negotiated in a meeting of the wage councils currently under way, in which 231 bargaining units are taking part. Topics under negotiation include clauses on peace and conflict prevention in 80 per cent of cases; clauses on gender in 74 per cent of cases; clauses on miscellaneous items in 57 per cent of cases; care systems in 44 per cent of cases, and we could go on. The same happens in negotiations on salaries that are above minimum wage, which is another traditional practice in place since 1943, and to which there are many solutions. If a wage council of a particular sector does not establish or reach a resolution, only then can the Executive issue a decree. This happens absolutely exceptionally. During the above meeting in which 231 bargaining units have taken part, the Executive has issued a decree in only eight cases, which amounts to 3 per cent of the total.

What happened when negotiation was not promoted? When negotiation was not promoted, workers and employers were not covered or protected. Coverage extended to only 10 or 20 per cent of all workers and employers. Collective bargaining should therefore be promoted to ensure more solid conditions for businesses, increase legal certainty, manage company specificities, organize negotiations and ensure classification of activities, which is also done in a tripartite manner, not decided by the Government.

The law in question, operating in Uruguay since 2009, prioritizes bilateral negotiation over tripartite negotiation, as is clearly indicated in article 12 (“it will not be necessary to convene the wage council for activities and sectors with a collective agreement duly agreed by the representative organizations”) and in article 15 (“The parties can negotiate by branch or sector of activity, company or establishment, or at any other level deemed appropriate.”). This is how the system works in our country.

They can negotiate externally then simply present their agreement to be finalized and put to a vote, or they can register and publish it without any intervention from the Executive. Many agreements are adopted by majority and the majority can be made up only of employer and worker representatives. This occurs, for example, when agreements are made outside the scope of the guidelines of the Executive. The guidelines of the Executive are not obligatory and in the last few meetings the number of resolutions passed by a majority have increased even when the Executive has voted against or abstained. Once again, this shows that the parties have autonomy.

What has happened in the meeting that is currently under way? Of the 231 groups participating, all but one has concluded with certainty that they will sign the agreements next Monday. What has this meeting achieved? A total of 85 per cent of bipartite and tripartite agreements, that is to say that workers and employers have signed agreements in 85 per cent of cases. And only eight decrees were issued, as indicated above. The wage councils operate in a highly intensive, long-term and democratic way. They are usually operational for four months on average.

Tripartism is part of the history and essence of Uruguay, as it is of the ILO, not only in terms of collective bargaining, but also in terms of the labour framework agreement that we approved two years ago with the hope of securing the biggest investment in the history of Uruguay. The labour framework agreement was produced together with business associations of the metal and construction industries, their respective trade unions, the trade union centre, the investing company and the Government. This is how we work in Uruguay. This is how we work towards reform, ensure the day-to-day executive management of social security and health, promote professional development, and develop projects and laws. Participants include employers, workers, and, where appropriate, pensioners and beneficiaries of these important social protection systems.

Lastly, conflict prevention, peace clauses and workplace occupations are recognized by the Committee on Freedom of Association, for example, in Report No. 356 of March 2010, and in Uruguay by the chair in labour rights at the University of the Republic. We emphasize that, in the current meeting that is taking place, agreements have been signed in 80 per cent of cases, including agreements on conflict prevention and peace clauses, in addition to those that are already in force and have previously been signed.

Uruguay guarantees the right to strike in article 57 of its Constitution. We also guarantee and defend the rights of businesses and business people. The Government has been expressly pushing proposals in that regard. We emphasize, in particular, the proposals of September 2016 and March 2017, ratified in May 2018. Business associations responded negatively to these proposals. An agreement was announced publicly by the then Presidents of the Chamber of Industry, the Chamber of Commerce and the PIT-CNT on the occasion of the official presidential missions of the Republic of Germany and the Russian Federation but this was also rejected by trade union directors. Another preliminary agreement had been previously negotiated in Geneva in 2011 which was not ratified by the workers. Our legislation neither prohibits nor promotes occupations. Occupations should occur exceptionally, while, undoubtedly, at the same time protecting the freedom to work and company management. In Uruguay, occupations are given effect through summary proceedings in the judiciary which last three days.

In the last few days, some cases have attracted attention and rightly so. However, we have complete peace of mind because the Government has expressed itself publicly, in contrast to others. For example, in the case of a company that had received a court ruling prohibiting an occupation under workers’ control, the Ministry of Labour spoke out against such action one month before the judiciary.

We conclude by thanking those who have listened so attentively. We reaffirm the position of the Government of Uruguay: we have been, are and will be open to dialogue and negotiation with a view to making any changes to the system of collective bargaining and conflict prevention that are necessary, appropriate or reasonable, in accordance with our current realities and history, with our Constitution and laws, and with international standards, as long as there is a useful consensus that will allow us to progress towards extending and improving the system of collective bargaining and conflict prevention.

Employer members – We would like to thank the Government representative for being here with us and the rest of the delegation. We have listened attentively to their intervention and thank them for their remarks. This matter is not unimportant; it is a legislative matter on which this Committee already carried out an analysis in 2010. The Committee of Experts also presented observations in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2015 and 2018 precisely in reference to the Convention in question, which is a fundamental Convention. It is concerning that national legislation is not aligned according to the bodies overseeing this case. Furthermore, as indicated by the Minister, an opportunity had already arisen to evaluate the situation within the framework of the Committee on Freedom of Association, as part of Case No. 2699, which is still ongoing. The involvement of the two supervisory bodies in addition to the Committee on Freedom of Association means that the Government of Uruguay is obliged to listen to our different observations and recommendations.

In 2010, a number of issues were addressed, but the conclusions stated, and I quote, that tripartite negotiations regarding the matters in question should continue at the present Conference. It was also announced that a mission would be sent to Uruguay in August 2011 to determine concrete areas where progress could be made. Lastly, the Committee expressed hope that the necessary measures would be taken without delay to prepare a draft law that reflects the comments of the supervisory bodies, and thus aligning all legislation with the Convention.

In 2010, they said to do this without delay. We are in 2019 and the information contained in the report of the Committee of Experts is once again being brought to the fore. This is not a capricious matter but one which has been left unresolved for ten years. Therefore, we would like to amicably address some of the points in question.

The Committee on Freedom of Association, in paragraph 1389 of Report No. 356 of March 2010, analysed a number of topics in detail, some of which have improved while others are in exactly the same condition.

First, one topic is that pertaining to article 4 of Law No. 18566 on duty of information in the framework of the collective bargaining process. The Committee had the opportunity to refer to some points that I will not repeat. In the view of the Employers, information on many of those points can only be requested from trade unions with legal personality. The Committee says that it can be both those with and without legal personality in accordance with the new law. It should be possible to establish and determine the type of information that can be requested by trade unions wherever necessary or relevant.

Why are we referring to this? Because there are three levels within the framework of a negotiation by branch of activity, which is the type that is prioritized in Uruguay, as indicated by the Government on previous occasions. Given the branch of activity is almost exclusively prioritized, as the Minister has just demonstrated, the information provided should be limited to basic information and should not include detailed information company by company. The Employer members of Uruguay have a reasonable and justifiable concern in that regard. Why? Because negotiations in Uruguay are run by the so-called wage councils. It is precisely in this framework that companies can be put at risk if specific and detailed information is known about them, particularly because competition is what reigns in free enterprise. So, we dispute the matter in that regard.

A second topic has to do with the powers of the Higher Tripartite Council, which is the highest body governing labour relations in the private sector, precisely in the area of collective bargaining. The topic relates to article 10(d). The supervisory bodies have demonstrated points such as those described there. The Government is requested to take the necessary measures, including measures to amend existing laws, to ensure that collective bargaining is established by the parties and is not subject to voting under the auspices of a tripartite entity. We have clearly requested that the Higher Tripartite Council does not intervene in negotiations.

Competition is the third issue we would like to raise, as contained in article 12 of the Law. The Committee on Freedom of Association made some statements in that regard, followed by the ILO secretariat which also made some observations after providing assistance in 2017. It is incomprehensible that the Ministry of Labour maintains an in situ position arguing that:

“The current draft of the law does not affect the freedom to negotiate nor does it undermine ILO principles in that regard. For that reason, there is no reason to abolish it. In addition, abolishing it would greatly restrict the ability of the actors involved to reach agreements since the topics they could discuss would be limited to minimum wages, and there would be fewer bargaining tools.”

Yes, they would be limited to the minimum wage, but I would like to respectfully draw the attention of the Government of Uruguay to one point. The Government of Uruguay ratified the Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 131). Convention No. 131 relates to minimum wage fixing with special reference to developing countries. It is precisely within that framework that a tripartite intervention can take place, not in any other. In other cases, the will of two parties, the employers and workers, is required in an agreement. Going beyond the two parties, probably because it is customary to do so in Uruguay, is not compatible with the spirit of the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), and in particular, Article 4, as cited by the distinguished Minister. We find this point concerning because the Article allows for inappropriate interventions in the area of wage fixing. The wage councils have become an exercise in a kind of compulsory arbitration where representatives of the Executive set out and define the guidelines for negotiation. The reality is that the meetings are structured and guided by the wage councils.

In reality, the meetings, which are structured and guided by the wage councils, have shown that tripartite negotiation has eliminated space for free, voluntary, bipartite negotiation.

The law clearly favours tripartite negotiation, and this has, in practice, almost completely eliminated bilateral negotiation. Some argue that it is in the interests of small enterprises to ensure negotiation by branch.

We are gravely concerned by three factors. First, the Ministry is the body that sets the guidelines of negotiation for every meeting. Second, the role played by the Ministry gives the trade union movement a space to receive support for all of its stances. Third, working conditions have been proposed which, as I mentioned previously, do not fall under the above-mentioned tripartite framework. Therefore, we are gravely concerned by this issue, and it is absolutely vital to amend legislation in that regard.

The supervisory bodies highlighted some important points on article 14 of the Law on parties who can bargain collectively. The secretariat also gave a statement in its technical assistance report with which the employers disagree. We believe it is incorrect to suggest that the position of the employers would significantly change the system of collective labour relations in Uruguay, when it is simply about returning to the situation that existed before the law was approved.

Since 1966, labour law laid down rules on licences, and by extending them unanimously to all collective agreements, workers can now be represented by specially appointed delegates in the event that a trade union does not exist.

Lastly, I would like to refer to the automatic extension of collective agreements, as referred to in article 17.2 of the Law. The Committee, that is the Committee on Freedom of Association, has recalled that the duration of the collective agreements is, first and foremost, the decision of the parties concerned. But if the Government is considering taking action on this matter, legislation should be amended to reflect a tripartite agreement.

In this context, given that the complainants do not agree with the automatic extension of collective agreements, the Committee is inviting the Government to discuss with the social partners an amendment to the law with the aim of finding an acceptable solution for both parties.

Therefore, the employers are in favour of a rule ensuring that collective agreements are temporary. Collective agreements should not last for an indefinite period of time, they should have a time limit, and, as with all contracts, they should expire on a certain date. The social partners, not any third parties, should negotiate the terms and any extension to those terms. The time frame is one of the most important elements of a collective agreement. It is improper and inappropriate that the above-mentioned law regulates this topic. The rule should stipulate that once the time frame for the collective agreement expires, its provisions also expire, and the parties are free to negotiate a new collective agreement.

We believe that this last point, the last paragraph that I have just delivered, should be a guiding principle for all actions.

Lastly, some points highlighted in the above-mentioned law are relevant to the issue of strikes and picket lines. We will not refer to this topic because we, as the Employers’ group, do not believe it is covered in the Freedom of Association and the Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) or the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98). But we would like to draw your avid attention to the fact that a law relevant to workplace occupations was repealed, which has generated strong feelings in the business world, particularly among business people in Uruguay.

As a result, we would like to cordially invite the Government to consider this issue in the draft law that it will present for the consideration of Parliament.

These are, broadly speaking, the general topics that we wished to highlight. We cordially invite the Government of Uruguay to seriously consider presenting a legislative reform on the above-mentioned topics to the Congress or the Parliament as soon as possible.

Worker members – Firstly, we would like to thank the Government representative who has reported extensively on this situation, on implementation efforts, and on the situation in Uruguay. We have been analysing the implementation of the Convention in Uruguay. Since the Convention was ratified in 1954, the Committee of Experts has made ten observations on its implementation in law and in practice, but this is the first time it is subject to analysis by the Committee.

Protecting the right to organize and to bargain collectively in law and in practice is a fundamental pillar underpinning ILO Conventions and the legal system as a whole. In a country with a history such as that of Uruguay, balanced and fair governmental oversight of key issues, such as salaries and working conditions, is fundamental for debate and productive policymaking.

As representatives of the workers, we recognize the importance of tripartite and bipartite dialogue done in good faith, as the basis for maintaining a balance of power between employers and workers. We reaffirm that maintaining this balance is key to protecting the interests and rights of workers and the economy as a whole. Collective bargaining is a fundamental tool for constructing a fairer and more equitable society. In this way, the data from Uruguay is promising compared to other countries in and beyond the region.

In Uruguay, trade union density is high with 30 per cent of workers having joined a trade union and, as we have already heard, collective bargaining coverage stands at 90 per cent of workers, which is comparable to some of the more advanced countries in Europe. When collective bargaining was re-established through the wage councils in 2004, social and economic change took place in Uruguay. Poverty fell from 39 per cent to 10 per cent, real wages grew by 55 per cent, the unemployment rate dropped by 7 per cent and, as we have heard, informal employment fell significantly. These economic indicators are clearly a big improvement on the period from 1992 to 2004, when the Government at the time stopped convening wage councils, thereby restricting negotiations even in companies.

For the workers, the concrete results of collective bargaining in Uruguay are promising. The statistics and the facts show that collective bargaining is effective in practice. It is also having a dramatic impact on working conditions. It is through collective bargaining that trade union membership and representation become meaningful for workers. We note that this has been possible because the Government of Uruguay has made it a priority to establish strong collective bargaining institutions. We must ensure that this successful system continues to exist as any measure of significant change could destabilize it. The loss of one of its components could topple the entire model which is currently very effective.

It is quite clear that the social partners have complete autonomy to bargain collectively in a free and voluntary manner with the aim of improving salaries and working conditions. Indeed, this is exactly the objective of collective bargaining: to establish more favourable conditions for workers and in autonomous processes.

Uruguay has well-developed tripartite institutions, such as the wage councils. The workers support tripartite dialogue, including on the fixing of wages, according to the provisions of the Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 131). This Convention has been ratified by the Government of Uruguay and requires tripartite consultations to take place so that the parties can establish minimum wages in accordance with Article 4.

We take note of the comments that the Government made to the Committee of Experts, indicating that collective bargaining takes priority over the wage councils. It is worth noting that the wage councils are not able to convene when a collective bipartite agreement is already in place. Granting priority to collective agreements that offer better protections and conditions to workers than those established in other instances, should be considered an important measure to promote collective bargaining. At the same time, we take note of the fact that employers have expressed concern over the wage councils and the autonomy of the social partners in Case No. 2699 of the Committee on Freedom of Association. We also take careful note of the fact that the Government had responded to these concerns in a satisfactory manner by proposing various legislative amendments which are currently being discussed at national level.

The Workers’ group notes that the Committee of Experts considers that many of the amendments to Law No. 18566 are in line with commitments outlined in Article 4 of the Convention on promoting collective bargaining in a free and voluntary way. We welcome the fact that the Government of Uruguay has been proactive in discussing the concerns of the employers at national level as a result of the case before the Committee on Freedom of Association. This shows the importance that is attached to ILO standards and the supervisory system. Therefore, we join the Committee of Experts in noting with satisfaction the use of tripartite consultations and social dialogue to discuss the amendments with the most representative organizations. We hope that the Government continues to ensure that comprehensive and frank consultations are held, above all on topics related to the promotion of collective bargaining. The Committee on Freedom of Association has made it clear that draft laws that affect collective bargaining or work conditions are preceded by comprehensive and detailed consultations with the workers and the employers. However, as I mentioned before, it is important that any changes to the system of collective bargaining are made on the basis of a tripartite consensus. Any changes must be made with the aim of further improving coverage for the workers through the practice of collective bargaining. Therefore, we trust the Government to listen to all parties interested in improving access to collective bargaining. Throughout this process, we believe it is very important that the Government continues to keep the Committee of Experts informed of the progress made in consultations.

Approximately 100,000 private companies and 1 million workers are represented by chambers and trade unions in collective bargaining processes in Uruguay. It must be emphasized that collective bargaining has, for ten years, included domestic workers, which has, during this time, helped to increase the salaries of people working in this sector as well as to register and formalize this type of work in Uruguay’s state-owned social security institute, el Banco de Previsión Social. Another sector that participates in negotiations at the wage councils are rural workers. We consider this very important, especially if we take into account the fact that rural workers have been disadvantaged due to a lack of bargaining power and a lack of social dialogue.

To conclude, the data and figures presented here show that the system of collective bargaining in Uruguay has facilitated social dialogue, cooperation, stability, social cohesion, and has promoted a fairer distribution of wealth. Collective bargaining in Uruguay is a rights-based model which has allowed unionized workers to ensure a better distribution of economic growth, as all the indicators show.

Worker member, Uruguay – We are going to be completely honest or it will seem like we are hiding something from the audience of this gathering for the world of work. Some trade union movements are repressed, which not only undermines freedom of association but also puts the lives of some of our colleagues at risk. These are colleagues who have dedicated their whole lives to the workers’ cause, and we see how they are killed day in and day out in situations where their most basic rights are violated. Bearing that in mind, it strikes me as immoral to question the democratically adopted system of labour relations and collective bargaining in Uruguay.

Universal values are not just about class. If it were the employers who had endured the conditions that we have known, what the Colombian trade union movement has gone through for example, we would also be raising our voices in defence of human rights.

I am going to raise four issues from the point of view of the Uruguayan workers. Firstly, collective bargaining in Uruguay has a long history. Collective bargaining surged during periods of greater democracy in the country but became obsolete in the face of authoritarian style cuts. Secondly, I would like to point out that, during this long history, some of the elements inherent to “business sector complaints”, as we say in Creole, in the language of the workers, were much more consistent in other periods of collective bargaining in our country than they are today. Thirdly, there is a relationship between human development indicators in general and the productivity of workers at different levels of employment. This shows that there is a relationship between collective bargaining and the lives of the overwhelming majority in our country. Fourthly, if the situation is subject to criticism, which is to some extent penalizing, it means that we are being penalized for having a higher level of collective bargaining than the average. These are the four points that we are going to lay out.

First, the correlation between collective bargaining, democracy and long tradition has already been mentioned. The law on the wage councils, which introduced tripartite forms of negotiation in our country, was put in place in 1943. Industrial negotiation developed over a long period of time, in view of which the social partners were formed, not only among workers but also in business associations, through the introduction of collective bargaining by branch of activity, as established in law of 1943. But it came to an end in 1968 with the rise of authoritarianism and later the fascist dictatorship when the wage councils were suspended.

I would like to point out, and the agreement among delegates must emphasize this, that once democracy was recovered between 1985 and 1992, particularly under the Government of Mr Julio María Sanguinetti, but also at the beginning of the Government of Mr Lacalle, the wage councils were also operational but in their own unique way. They were not exactly the same as those established in the law of 1943, where, for example, the worker representatives and the employer representatives voted in the workplace. In this case, trade union membership was more representative. Between 1985 and 1990, tripartite negotiation was in place, but the so-called guidelines existed at that time, and the Executive had imposed criteria and ways to develop a collective agreement. This is very important because these were components of centralization and authoritarianism. The Executive did not approve any agreement signed freely and voluntarily by the parties if that agreement did not conform with the guidelines. Therefore, if any agreement was made privately between the business associations and the workers and their trade unions, it did not have an erga omnes effect, that is, it was not valid for all branches of activity.

During this period, the business sector did not file complaints. I imagine that mechanisms began to be developed in that regard so that businesses could complain about unfair competition. In the 1990s, under the pretext of free and voluntary negotiation, collective bargaining disintegrated and broke down almost entirely as a result of neoliberal policies that deregulated the economy, fostered indiscriminate trade liberalization, allowed for permanent workers to be substituted by one-man businesses, proliferated supplier companies with a temporary workforce, and gave barely 20 per cent of workers the right to collective bargaining.

Since 2005, a system of collective bargaining has been in place which, as already mentioned, is made up of two complementary systems. It is possible to reach a collective, bipartite agreement by branch of activity, and it is possible to have tripartite negotiations in the wage councils. There is nothing to prevent a bipartite agreement from being signed and there is nothing even to prevent companies from signing agreements. The level at which negotiations are held is determined by the parties. It is true that real wages cannot really decrease because there are three ways in which workers can get an increase: through a collective, bipartite agreement, through a wage council resolution, or through an executive agreement, vote, or decree. However, this already existed between 1985 and 1990 when the employers did not file any kind of complaint.

In effect, no agreement on working conditions can exist unless there is an agreement between workers and employers. The State cannot in itself make changes to working conditions. Indeed, for every wage council negotiation made in the wage councils, by branch of activity, there are thousands of company negotiations. The level of social dialogue and collective bargaining in Uruguay is enormously high.

In effect, we have requested that the right to information be enshrined in the law on collective bargaining. What information? Information which allows for industrial espionage? No, absolutely not. We mean information related to the economic performance of a particular branch and allows for the parties to negotiate in good faith with all the information on the table. We mean information that is necessary at the branch level, which is not the same as that at the company level, so that an agreement on working arrangements or on productivity can be signed in confidence, as the other side would request, and with the desire to manage things responsibly.

Generally speaking, we do not have problems with the automatic extension of collective agreements made with business associations. For example, the association for the metal industry in Uruguay and our trade unions agreed with permanent effect that 14 March would be a paid holiday.

Now, if a benefit is established within a collective agreement, that benefit is only valid for the duration of the collective agreement, usually two or three years. This is absolutely possible.

Therefore, I believe that there is a link between collective bargaining and democracy, given that we went from a complete absence of collective bargaining to representing at least 40 to 60 per cent of workers. Today, the level of employment is solid, the rate at which, let’s say, salaries are improving is solid, the level of formalization, social security, and decent work is also solid. Any attack on collective bargaining is an attack on people’s lives.

Independently of these opinions, as always, I conclude with the following thought: our trade union is open to participate in all conversations necessary to improve the collective bargaining system of our country.

Employer member, Uruguay – We are going to refer to the complaint to be presented in due course by the National Chamber of Commerce and Services of Uruguay and the Chamber of Industry of Uruguay, as the most representative employer organizations, and the International Organisation of Employers, regarding the collective bargaining law in Uruguay and its alignment with the Convention.

As previously mentioned, this case was first presented in 2009. Various supervisory bodies have issued decisions in relation to the case. For example, the Committee on the Application of Standards, which has a tripartite structure, dealt with the case in 2010, thus putting forward a vision on the observations made. The case also passed through the Committee on Freedom of Association which has a similar composition and similar guarantees for social partners. If we add the decisions of the Committee of Experts, a technical and independent body, we can be certain that Uruguay’s law is not in line with this Convention, which is essential and fundamental for this case.

Employers have not made this complaint on a whim; they have made it to ensure compliance with the Convention that our country ratified voluntarily. Ratification comes with the responsibility to align national legislation and practice with the Convention. Therefore, today we are not going to refer to the system of labour relations in Uruguay as a whole but to the collective bargaining law which was adopted by our country in 2008 but which is not in line with the Convention. The idea, and we thank the Government of Uruguay for presenting information before this Committee today, is to improve our legislative system and improve the practice of collective bargaining in our country. We would like to highlight this point unambiguously.

The case has been under the consideration of the supervisory bodies for many years. Unfortunately, the Government of Uruguay has not put forward a draft law that improves on the collective bargaining law in question. It is true that different negotiation bodies have been developed, fulfilling the tradition that the Minister himself referred to, and which are now in place in our country. However, there are no concrete results.

Although the Government has a majority in Parliament, it has not introduced a draft law amending the collective bargaining law, which should be the basis for the system. This is where the difficulty lies. Social dialogue should be effective and productive, it should not be subject to vetoes. Without doubt, the Government has the responsibility to take the above decision and fulfil the responsibilities to which it has committed by ratifying the Convention.

It is very bad that this case is taking so long to resolve. It is bad because, as mentioned before, it relates to a fundamental Convention. In our opinion, collective bargaining in our country prioritizes tripartite negotiation over bipartite negotiation, which is not in line with the Convention. Proof of that, and the Minister already said this, are the high levels of tripartite negotiation in Uruguay. It is necessary to analyse the marked and significant fall in bipartite negotiation in our country.

In addition, we object, and the observations of the supervisory bodies also point this out, to any intervention from the Government, the State, in the different areas of negotiation. One such intervention is fixing the levels at which the negotiations take place in the Higher Tripartite Council. Another is the idea of not referring exclusively to the negotiation of minimum wages and categories but instead establishing procedures to update them and setting salary increases for categories that do not receive the minimum wage. In those cases, strong intervention from the Government, the State, is inevitable, which is not in compliance with the Convention.

However, even though it is not subject to review in this case, there is also the issue of the occupations, which completes the picture on collective bargaining. We reject the notion that occupations are an extension of the right to strike. Since 1966, and for more than 50 years, occupations were understood by a decree adopted by the democratic Government as a violation of the right to property and to public order. Today, in line with a decree that we have disputed, we are told that it is an extension of the right to strike. Occupations are always violent, there are no peaceful occupations, at the very least, there is moral violence. Situations in which workplaces are occupied are part and parcel of the practical framework for collective bargaining in our country; as a result the employers are often forced into signing agreements in the wage councils. Therefore, the results of the negotiation are often neither free nor voluntary, but imposed.

We understand that Uruguay has a problem in light of all this. The stages of development highlighted here in this room point to an additional obligation: that of improving the system. In that regard, the Employers are committed to finding a solution that improves on the collective bargaining law.

By contrast, we understand that the supervisory system itself is being, indirectly, put into question in this case. This is a case where different supervisory bodies have ratified certain observations concerning a fundamental Convention, where those observations have been communicated to the Government concerned, where a direct contacts missions has been established and technical assistance provided, but where there has still been no change ten years on. It would seem that the observations and the supervisory system hold contempt for the facts of this case. We appear today in the best of spirits to find a solution, but we understand that the time has come to invite the Government of Uruguay to consult with the social partners and very swiftly present a draft law to amend the collective bargaining law. The law must also widely take into account the observations of the different supervisory bodies in relation to the full and effective implementation of the Convention not only in law but also in practice.

Government member, Mexico – On behalf of a significant majority of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC), we thank the Government representative as well as the social partners for taking the floor. First, we reiterate once again that key criteria have not been respected in developing the list of countries. The list is based on a geographical imbalance which is consistently affecting our region. This system is far from aligned with the best practices of the multilateral system. It is neither transparent, impartial nor objective. It is not tripartite in the house of tripartism nor does it foster social dialogue in the house social dialogue.

We have listened carefully to the intervention of the Government of Uruguay in which it outlined the different actions implemented to resolve the complaint of the Employers. We especially welcome progress made in relation to existing social and labour protections in Uruguay as well as the mechanisms of social dialogue and collective bargaining. The Government of Uruguay has promoted these practices at all times with a view to reaching a tripartite agreement on the points raised in the complaint, in line with ILO standards and principles. Similarly, we recognize the culture of dialogue and collective bargaining that traditionally exists in the country with the aim of finding solutions that are mutually acceptable for the social partners, in line with the principles of any democratic country and respectful of the national legal system and international standards. We encourage the parties to continue on this road so that they can find a definitive solution to the problem.

Government member, Spain – First, we would like to say that Spain strongly believes in the system of international standards of the International Labour Organization as well as the supervisory system. We also think that international standards require a supervisory system that is strong and independent. The supervisory system is key to ensuring compliance with the international standards of the ILO. Having said this, we would like to make two points with regard to this case. The first is that Spain supports and very much welcomes the efforts and initiatives carried out by the Government of Uruguay to amend Law No. 18566 of 2009, some of which are already in place, such as the establishment of the Higher Tripartite Council and other initiatives still under discussion. These amendments were put forward to address the different observations made by the supervisory bodies of the ILO in conformity with the Convention with a view to promoting free and voluntary collective bargaining.

Furthermore, Spain also welcomes the initiatives of the Government of Uruguay aiming to encourage discussions among social partners on new legislative measures to promote social dialogue and regulate other aspects related to strikes in the workplace. We know that Uruguayan law does not block bilateral or collective bargaining. Spain encourages the Government of Uruguay and the social partners to redouble their efforts to consolidate the existing legislative framework, thereby making it more clearly in line with the Convention. Technical assistance from the ILO secretariat would without doubt be helpful in that regard.

Worker member, Portugal – This statement is supported by the Galician Unions Confederacy (CIG) and the Basque Workers’ Solidarity (ELA). Uruguay is known and recognized today for its system of collective bargaining and social dialogue which is effective and in compliance with the fundamental principles and standards of the ILO. This system of collective bargaining and social dialogue is so effective that sectoral salaries have grown consistently since 2005 by 55 per cent. The minimum wage has also increased by 276 per cent.

It is worth emphasizing that growth in earned income is sustained by national economic growth, which has grown annually at a rate of 4.67 per cent. This shows that this system is not incompatible, nor does it compromise national development.

There is 100 per cent coverage of collective bargaining under the voluntary system currently in place. This statistic shows clearly that the system is inclusive, as it leaves no one behind.

In order to discuss the system of social dialogue established in Uruguay, we need to raise questions around the social dialogues that are in place in Europe. We know that introducing a system of collective bargaining which is not based on sectoral negotiation in countries with micro or small enterprises, as is the case in Uruguay, can reduce collective bargaining coverage among workers.

This system led to a fall in annual coverage which went from more from 1,800,000 workers to 250,000 workers between 2011 and 2015. Earned income levels also dropped with numbers in 2018 falling below those in 2009 according to a study carried out by the ILO itself which analysed the effects of austerity measures in Portugal.

The measures imposed had a devastating effect on the lives of workers leading to an increase in the level of social exclusion and working poverty. From 2005 to 2018, the sectoral system in Uruguay improved working conditions for more and more workers and integrated a large part of informal workers into the formal economy.

The system of social dialogue and collective bargaining in Uruguay operates on a sectoral basis and is inclusive of all. It prevents unfair competition among companies, guarantees protection of workers and ensures sustainable economic growth. It also respects the fundamental standards of the ILO, the Convention, and Article 4 in particular.

Employer member, Brazil – I would like to say in this short intervention that we are not happy to be discussing this case as it should already have been resolved constructively by the Government of Uruguay.

The Convention sets basic principles to ensure that collective bargaining is sustainable, feasible and effective. This is only possible if the parties are independent and autonomous, if the principle of free and voluntary negotiation is respected and if intervention from the public authorities is minimal.

The Worker members said at the outset that government oversight is acceptable. And I say, yes, government oversight is acceptable, but intervention is not. Despite the recommendations of ILO supervisory bodies, the Government of Uruguay insists on retaining legislative provisions that allow state intervention in bipartite dialogue, including in defining the terms and conditions of work.

We know that was not the objective of the ILO when it drafted the principles contained in Article 4 of the Convention. It is a historic undertaking for the ILO and its supervisory bodies to recommend that Uruguay change its law with a view to encouraging and stimulating free and voluntary negotiation. But ten years have passed, and the employers are yet to be granted appropriate conditions for negotiations, in line with the principles outlined in the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) and the Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154).

Last year, in a case similar to that of Uruguay, this Committee expressed concern over compulsory arbitration mechanisms, such as those in Greece. In the conclusions, the Committee recommended that the Greek authorities refrain from interference that restricts the right to free and voluntary negotiation. It cannot be the case in the world of work that the State is a participant in bipartite dialogue. Effective collective bargaining systems ensure that workers and employers participate equally in negotiations. Otherwise, the outcome will not be fair or equal.

Therefore, the employers of Brazil are concerned that negotiations in Uruguay are subject to disruption and interference and request the Committee to recommend that the Government align its practices with the principles governing Article 4 of the Convention.

Government member, Paraguay – We thank the Government of Uruguay and welcome the efforts it has made in recent years to find a solution acceptable to all parties within the framework of true tripartism and in line with the best traditions of this Organization. We welcome the 2019 report of the Committee of Experts which highlights the outcome of some of these efforts. Examples include the preparation of draft laws in 2016 and 2017, taking into account the employers and workers, as well as substantive consultations regarding legislative reforms on collective working relations, including an exchange of views on different draft texts. In this context, we support tripartite social dialogue and urge the Government, the employers and the workers to continue working towards a bill that reflects the interests of all those involved.

Worker member, Spain – The powers awarded to the wage councils in the Uruguayan collective bargaining law do not turn collective bargaining into a form of compulsory arbitration nor do they restrict the topics that can be negotiated. They do not infringe upon the right of workers’ organizations to negotiate working conditions freely with employers, let alone facilitate intervention from the authorities in negotiations. This is true for three fundamental reasons. First, the meetings of the wage councils, which are a space for tripartism and social dialogue, never prevent employers and workers from freely and voluntarily initiating a process of bipartite collective bargaining by branch of activity or production chain, as expressly established in article 11 of Law No. 18566. Second, it is only possible to regulate working conditions within the framework of the wage councils if it is so agreed voluntarily and freely by employers and workers at a prior date, as indicated in article 5 of Law No. 10449. Third, government actions in the wage councils is limited exclusively to fixing minimum wages and making general adjustments. This is true unless the parties conclude tripartite negotiations within the branch.

It seems that those who have pushed for this case to be debated by the Committee are trying to go back to a time in Uruguay where wage councils did not exist, where collective bargaining became so scarce that it was practically inexistent, where real wages fell by 50 per cent in some cases, where informal work reached unprecedented levels of 40 per cent, where employment increased and where working conditions for the working class deteriorated.

As a result, it is surprising that we are questioning in this case the actions of a Government that promotes tripartite social dialogue, minimum wage fixing, and sectoral collective bargaining, as the most appropriate way to ensure improved working conditions for Uruguayans.

We urge the Committee to consider all these questions in relation to a country that has ratified the highest number of ILO Conventions in the region and as a result has the highest level of prosperity and wealth per capita in Latin America.

The Government of Uruguay is clearly committed to the ILO which makes us sure that it will continue making efforts to align Law No. 18566 of 2009 with the Convention where it is objectively necessary.

Employer member, Mexico – Although my colleagues have expressed their points clearly, I must intervene to say that I am frankly surprised. I am surprised, first, by the defiance of the Government in light of the efforts, suggestions, demands and conclusions of the most important supervisory bodies of this Organization. Second, I am surprised by the complacency and compliance of this Committee of which we are all a part. I say this because it cannot be that the Government of Uruguay has maintained a position of resistance for almost 11 years, or rather, openly and clearly expressed its opposition to complying with the resolutions of this Committee. The Government has persistently failed to meet its obligations, which challenges and puts into doubt the effectiveness of all that we believe in.

If the point raised by the Government and supported by the Workers was valid, it is like saying that the practices of a country work well if any of the social partners consider it to, regardless of whether they are in line with regulations, or even of whether they violate ILO Conventions. Such a position is inadmissible.

Government intervention in collective bargaining affects and subverts social dialogue, and creates tension in relations between workers and employers, including within the groups themselves. This is unacceptable. The Convention ratified by Uruguay is clear. Unfortunately, the Government’s lack of will to fulfil the Convention is also unacceptable. With all due respect, the Government representative has incorrectly interpreted Article 4 of the Convention and is not in a position to justify a clear and deliberate lack of compliance with the Convention. This discussion has been and gone. This Organization has made it clear that working conditions must be set through an agreement between employers and workers. This is not in doubt. The Government should not raise this point again as it is not in question. The supervisory bodies have resolved and finalized it. That is, unless you wish to disregard what has already been decided.

Despite clear recommendations, the Government continues to ignore reality. As a result, I urge the Committee to strongly request that the Government of Uruguay adopt measures to ensure compliance with the Convention and the related observations as quickly as possible.

Worker member, Argentina – I have the honour of speaking on behalf of the three trade union centres in Argentina. The Committee is addressing the above-mentioned complaint of the Employers which suggests that tripartite negotiation within the framework of the wage councils is, in practice, a form of compulsory arbitration. The wage councils were established as a tripartite labour mechanism with the aim of fixing minimum wages by category and branch of activity. It is a body responsible for promoting social dialogue with a particular emphasis on collective bargaining and on the prevention and resolution of conflicts.

The Employers have wrongly said that tripartite negotiation carried out within the wage councils in practice amounts to compulsory arbitration, extending beyond the fixing of minimum wages. Article 12 of Law No. 18566 stipulates that the wage councils are tasked with fixing minimum wages by occupational category and upgrading the salaries of workers of a particular activity. The wage councils can also establish working conditions if so agreed by the employers and the workers of the respective wage group. These rules show above all that the most important principle and objective of the wage councils is to boost collective negotiation. In the event that the employers and workers do not reach an agreement, the fixing of minimum wages by occupational category and by wage increase is the only matter determined in a tripartite manner. For other issues subject to collective bargaining, the law states that wage councils are only able to establish working conditions if it is so agreed by the employers and the workers of the respective wage group. By no means is it possible to say that this is compulsory arbitration. The decision is put to a tripartite vote only after the State has encouraged negotiation between the workers and employers. The absence of wage councils weakened the trade union system and the individualization of labour relations which inevitably lead to a drop in real wages and to precarious working conditions.

I would like to remind the Employers that article 19, paragraph 8, of the ILO Constitution states that international standards are minimum standards and that nothing stops the parties from exceeding those standards. In Uruguay’s case, the situation does not go against the Convention but rather exceeds it since the most favourable standards are applied.

We should not lose sight of the fact that the wage councils have significantly improved the wages of workers with substantial increases in real wages and minimum wages. This has in turn led to fewer people working in the informal economy. These are achievements that are a direct consequence of labour relations in Uruguay, which should be an example for other countries in the region, and of the Trade Union Confederation of the Americas (CSA). We call on other countries to adopt a similar system with a view to improving productivity, decent work and social justice.

Government member, China – The Chinese delegation listened carefully to the intervention of the Government of Uruguay. We noted that in recent years the Uruguayan Government conducted reforms in regard to labour and social security legislation, promoting collective bargaining at national, industrial and enterprise level, signed collective agreements, and also achieved positive progress in health and employment, enhancing workers’ wages and reducing informal employment for the promotion and protection of workers’ rights.

We also noted the political willingness of the Government in promoting collective bargaining, and its efforts in bridging agreements between different parties with the assistance of the ILO.

We support the Uruguayan Government to continue to extensively communicate with the relevant parties to find solutions jointly. We also hope that the ILO can provide the necessary technical assistance to the Uruguayan Government to better fulfil its obligations on the Convention.

Observer, International Organisation of Employers (IOE) – I make this intervention in my capacity as Secretary-General of the International Organisation of Employers (IOE) which is a complainant in the case before the supervisory bodies. I would like to emphasize that, in contrast to what we have heard from some of the speakers, this is not a minor case requiring a small technical adjustment in the way that collective bargaining is currently regulated in Uruguay.

This case has arisen because the Government of Uruguay has deliberately and repeatedly failed to comply with the recommendations and guidelines of ILO supervisory bodies. It is a case which, I would say, shows a complete disregard for the supervisory bodies and a failure to comply over a ten-year period, despite calls from this Committee in 2010 to change and amend legislation in practice.

Collective bargaining legislation and practices in Uruguay are a clear example of the attitudes facing the business sector, namely attitudes that promote inference, meddling and even bullying. This interference obliges business organizations to support government dictates on salaries; salaries which should be freely negotiated by the parties, as is the case in all countries which fully respect the provisions, principles and basic rights promoted by the ILO, in the context of collective bargaining.

This interference determines and imposes realities that are above and beyond what has been decided by the parties, above and beyond the scope of the collective agreements. This interference denies legitimacy to the freely elected worker representatives and imposes external representatives indirectly onto businesses. Prolonged interference of this nature is having serious consequences: (1) the elimination of bilateral collective bargaining; (2) a climate of social dialogue that is deeply damaged; (3) a growing climate of conflict that is having adverse effects on social order; (4) a climate of conflict that is affecting investment, decent work, and above all, freedom of enterprise.

Prolonged interference of this nature is giving rise to radical protests and collective unionized actions that are completely unacceptable. They consist of systematic occupations in the workplace, which deny businesses the capacity to determine and organize their own operations.

It is therefore a very concerning and serious case, and this should be taken into account when preparing the conclusions. The IOE feels obliged to request further discussions on this case in the future, including within the framework of other supervisory mechanisms, if immediate progress is not made.

Worker member, Colombia – I am speaking on behalf of the workers of Colombia and Nicaragua. For the workers, it is completely incomprehensible that, on the occasion of the ILO Centenary, one of the countries most committed to the objectives and principles of this Organization, instead of being presented as an example of progress, as an example of a country which complies with international standards and promotes basic rights in the workplace, has been called before this Committee for fully respecting the right to unionize, for having one of the highest levels of collective bargaining in the world, the highest in the Americas, and for promoting and guaranteeing freedom of association itself. Reprimanding the country in this way is equivalent to reprimanding a country for abolishing forced or child labour. I would not know how to explain this to my children let alone to Colombian workers who are literally giving up their lives to defend workers’ rights and who are hit hard by the absence of freedom of association which has arisen as a result of state and business sector complacency. Summoning Uruguay in this way goes against the role of tripartism, as promoted by the ILO.

The Convention stipulates that States should promote and boost voluntary negotiation procedures, a mandate to which Uruguay has attached great importance, not only by respecting the guarantees outlined in the Convention but also by taking effective measures to raise collective bargaining levels. By doing so, Uruguay has effectively managed to improve coverage of collective bargaining, raise incomes for active and retired workers, achieve the lowest levels of inequality in Latin America, enhance relations between trade unions and employers, and attain a level of social dialogue that other countries in Latin America can only dream of as it seems impossible to achieve.

This situation has not only promoted the well-being of the Uruguay population but also advanced progress for businesses in the country. Collective bargaining in Uruguay is not only done by company, as is the case in most countries, but also by economic sector. This means that collective bargaining covers almost all workers and companies. This is in contrast to what happens in Colombia, for example, where barely 2 per cent of economically active people are protected. It is precisely this to which they are objecting.

It does not make sense to include Uruguay on the list of this Committee following a complaint from the employers when, along with trade unions and companies, employers themselves have been negotiating salaries and working conditions in the country for decades. It was the will of the employers and the outcome of social dialogue that enabled the country to achieve such advancements in negotiations. The employers should not be alleging violations to the Convention if they themselves have participated in those violations, while also enjoying protections and making progress that should be celebrated.

We welcome the fact that the employers are requesting, before this Committee, that the Government of Uruguay ensure immediate compliance with the recommendations issued by ILO supervisory bodies. We hope that they make the same request equally as passionately to other governments, such as those of Brazil, Argentina and Colombia, which have, repeatedly for years, been the subject of dozens of ILO observations, direct requests and conclusions on freedom of association but continue to flout them.

Government member, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela – The Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela thanks the Government representative for the information provided. The Uruguayan case is another example of the over-representation of Latin America and the Caribbean in the work of this Committee: six of the countries on the list are from our region, almost 60 per cent is from South America. As on previous occasions, the criteria for the selection of countries is not clear in this case. The list does not respect the principle of geographical distribution.

We emphasize in particular the efforts made by the Government of Uruguay to promote social dialogue and collective bargaining as a means of guaranteeing the rights of all parties. We also welcome the progress made by the country in the areas of social protection, labour relations and protection of rights.

As a result, we invite the Government of Uruguay to continue promoting tripartism, collective bargaining and social dialogue, as it has traditionally done, and I stress, as it has traditionally done.

Employer member, Guatemala – We are once again examining the case of Uruguay in relation to the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98). We are doing so because both the Committee of Experts and the Employers’ group have repeatedly expressed concern in that regard; because the ILO supervisory bodies have repeatedly asked this country to align its laws with this fundamental Convention. So far, this has not happened despite setting up tripartite dialogue, which did not produce the expected results. This obliges the Government of Uruguay to take the necessary steps to ensure that the observations of the supervisory bodies are finally put into statutory law.

The Committee of Experts has highlighted the need to ensure compliance with Article 4 of the Convention, that is, to promote free and voluntary collective negotiation. In that regard, we are particularly concerned that the legislation and practices in place in Uruguay allow for workplace occupations when there is a conflict. It is evident that this does not in any way promote free and voluntary negotiation. How can there be a free and voluntary negotiation if one of the parties is stripped of its property and the future of the company is put at risk? Clearly, this puts unfair pressure on one of the parties, in this case on the employer, to sign an agreement on the basis of expectations which would be unacceptable in the absence of such pressure. Therefore, I am wondering what freedom we are talking about. We are talking about a serious violation of one party’s right to property and freedom by forcing them into collective negotiations. It is crystal clear that the above-mentioned law on promoting free and voluntary negotiation is being violated. The violation not only affects the employer, but also, of course, seriously impacts workers who do not support the movement in question and who wish to continue working. This, therefore, has a harmful effect on the right to work, which should be guaranteed for all.

With these concerns in mind, we call on the Government of Uruguay to meet the obligations expected of them as Members of this Organization and as parties to the Convention, which is a fundamental Convention, and to align its laws and practices with that Convention, so that voluntary and free collective negotiation can take place effectively. The Government should do so without delay given that many years have passed since this case was examined for the first time by the supervisory bodies.

Worker member, Brazil – I am speaking on behalf of the worker members of Brazil, the United States, Cuba and the Latin American Association of Labour Lawyers. This case is a success case, despite what some might think. It is a success case because of the progress made by the Government of Uruguay in promoting collective bargaining in the country, because of the way in which the Government has acted in relation to the observations and requests made by the supervisory bodies.

We should recognize, just as the Committee of Experts did, the intense and productive nature of the social dialogue process and the tripartite agreements carried out in 2015. We urge all countries to use this case as a reference point.

Uruguay has widely and consistently redistributed its growing prosperity since 2005 and has reduced inequality and informal labour.

Key to those changes was the restoration of a robust system of collective bargaining which offers wide coverage for the productive sectors and includes groups previously excluded from the workforce, such as rural and domestic workers.

Meanwhile, the United States, a prosperous country in which only 7 per cent of the private workforce is covered by collective bargaining, and where there is no sectoral bargaining, has moved in the wrong direction when it comes to salaries, causing inequality and informal work over more than 30 years.

Additionally, while in many other countries, rural and domestic workers continue to be largely excluded from collective bargaining, they are included in Uruguay.

On the Centenary of the ILO, we should be recognizing countries which have adopted social dialogue and tripartite mechanisms to advance towards better social justice.

We wish to fervently reject the argument that the wage councils are a form of compulsory arbitration. No provision of Law No. 18566 makes it obligatory to hold bilateral negotiation in the tripartite council. The parties have a right to use the wage councils but are not obliged to.

Furthermore, article 19(8) of the ILO Constitution assures that the ratification of international standards does not prevent countries from developing other forms of law, whether from customary law or judicial decisions, which promote more favourable conditions than those outlined in international law. Therefore, it is not acceptable to argue that rights are being suppressed as this suggests that the conventional standards are being used as a tool to subvert more favourable local laws.

Government member, Costa Rica – The Government of Costa Rica thanks the Government of Uruguay for the timely information provided in relation to ensuring compliance with the Convention. We recognize the will of the Government of Uruguay to improve relations between workers and employers through tripartite dialogue. We value the efforts made towards reaching a social agreement that satisfies the interests of the workers and employers. Uruguay is one of the longest standing democracies on the continent with a proven record of respect for human rights, international law, dialogue and peaceful settlement of disputes.

Recently in 2009, Uruguay underwent its universal periodic review on human rights. We saw that its public policies and judicial and institutional system were protective of human rights, including the right to work. We were also informed about the most recent measures put in place to strengthen social policy and the labour market.

We trust in the Government of Uruguay to continue taking action to strengthen the implementation of internal standards, of principles outlined in the Convention and of ILO regulations.

Employer member, Chile – The Uruguayan case is interesting for all the constituents of the ILO because it refers, among other things, to a topic that is at the heart of this very important international organization: social dialogue.

This Convention is a fundamental ILO Convention that promotes and recognizes the value of social dialogue, but not just any social dialogue, one that is carried out collectively in a free and voluntary way.

Since 2010, the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Information have been requesting the Government of Uruguay to revise Law No. 18566 of 2009 which establishes the principles and fundamental rights within the collective bargaining system, as well as to take concrete measures to fully align legislation and practice with the Convention, particularly with Article 4. Unfortunately, this has not happened yet.

With respect to the powers of the Higher Tripartite Council on collective bargaining, the Committee on Freedom of Association has asked the Government to take the necessary measures “to ensure that the bargaining level is established by the parties and is not subject to voting in a tripartite body”.

With respect to the powers of the wage councils on salaries and working conditions, the Committee on Freedom of Information has highlighted the following: “recalling that it is up to the legislative authority to determine the legal minimum standards for conditions of work and that Article 4 of Convention No. 98 seeks to promote bipartite bargaining to fix conditions of work, the Committee hopes that in application of those principles, any collective agreement on fixing of conditions of employment will be the result of an agreement between the parties”.

It is a fact that the wage councils in Uruguay have become a form of compulsory arbitration, where the representatives of the Executive define the rules for negotiations and make proposals on working conditions, which makes it practically impossible for the parties to negotiate in a free and voluntary way.

In sum, the two above-mentioned situations are not in line with the Convention, because, not only do they fail to promote negotiations that are voluntary, free and bipartite, they also leave the door open for undue interference from the government in power.

Lastly, we join calls for the Committee of Experts to issue another observation for 2018 and respectfully ask the Government of Uruguay to propose a draft law in Parliament to guarantee that its laws and practices comply fully with the provisions of the Convention.

Government member, Dominican Republic – The Dominican Republic aligns itself with the statement delivered by GRULAC and supports the report presented by the Ministry of Labour of Uruguay. The Government of the Dominican Republic recognizes the will and actions carried out by the Government of Uruguay through its Ministry of Labour, which expressly show that the Government is complying with the provisions of Freedom of Association and the Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

The information provided shows Uruguay’s commitment to complying with international labour standards. As a result, we recognize the country’s efforts to reform national laws and administrative practices with a view to advancing labour principles and strengthening fundamental workers’ rights in different areas, thereby promoting tripartism in line with the provisions of the Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 144).

Employer member, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela – We welcome the fact that dialogues and tripartite agreements are in place in Uruguay to address proposed legislative reforms, in this case regarding occupations in the workplace, the scope of the wage councils, and whether the Government should accept technical assistance from the secretariat. These are circumstances which do not exist in Venezuela.

However, we are concerned that the Government is using subterfuge to interfere in labour relations and to promote a form of compulsory arbitration, setting out the rules of the negotiation or ultimately determining working conditions through mechanisms that should have the healthy and legitimate objective of promoting constructive and effective tripartite dialogue. This goes above and beyond the powers of the Government and is a violation of the Convention.

The right to organize and the right to free and voluntary collective bargaining should be prioritized in any effort to pursue tripartite dialogue. It is not for the Executive to approve, standardize or interfere in that dialogue as this would weaken agreements arising from collective bargaining. The role of the Government should be, above all, to promote bipartite dialogue with a view to fixing working conditions and facilitating the harmonious development of labour relations, in accordance with Article 4 of the Convention. The Convention seeks to prevent employers’ organizations from interfering in the affairs of workers’ organizations during the adoption of agreements. Therefore, it would never allow for the Government to interfere in or impose labour conditions. Dialogue and tripartite agreements cannot put free and voluntary collective bargaining at risk.

It would be absolutely absurd for the Government to impose working conditions through tripartite dialogue or arbitrary mechanisms, especially if the employers have found them to be unreasonable. Doing so would eventually impact the workers by limiting the capacity of the employers to offer them higher-standard, equitable and permanent working conditions, or worse, by affecting the sustainability of the company.

Let us hope that this practice is not repeated. Let us hope that Uruguay stops distorting tripartite mechanisms and begins using its resources in a healthy way to ensure balanced labour decisions, instead of finding creative ways to facilitate government interference that weaken or render illusory the true exercise of freedom of association and the right to free and voluntary collective bargaining.

We remind the Government of Uruguay of the need for constructive and effective tripartite dialogue. This should be enshrined in legislation in a way which always ensures compliance and full respect for freedom of association and for voluntary collective bargaining, in conformity with the Convention.

Government member, Argentina – We thank all the representatives and especially the Government of Uruguay for the information provided to us as well as all the Governments and social partners that have taken the floor. We would like to make two points during our intervention. The first has to do with the importance of the ILO supervisory system which is already guiding countries in their efforts to ensure compliance with international standards. We emphasize and agree with the statement by the representative of GRULAC who suggested that the list was not balanced geographically, and that our region was particularly affected. In the future, we would also like to see the Organization review the methodology used for preparing the list through tripartite social dialogue. Doing so would ensure that all those involved have the opportunity to improve the methodology by making it more transparent and objective. In this way, we can undoubtedly ensure that the most urgent, complex and important cases are brought forward based on the criteria and methodology. This would most certainly make the process fairer.

The second point we would like to make is that we have listened carefully to the intervention of the Government of Uruguay in which it detailed the actions it has implemented. For instance, it has ensured worker representation and prepared a report on the positive impact that its particular model of collective bargaining has had thus far. The Government of Argentina understands and values the effort made by the Government of Uruguay to attend these discussions and address the recommendations and considerations of the ILO. As has been already pointed out, we believe that all changes to the current system should be processed and made within the framework of tripartite social dialogue so that the positive aspects can be maintained. There is also, without doubt, a need to work through the methodology used to make those changes. We encourage the Government of Uruguay to continue working in the way it always has.

Employer member, Argentina – Collective bargaining is a fundamental pillar of decent work, it makes it possible to create trust and mutual respect among employers, workers and their organizations and contributes to maintaining stable and productive labour relations.

Our intervention is about the duration and validity of collective agreements. These two elements are essential and should be agreed by the contracting parties. The decisions made in these processes have special legitimacy and should never be undermined by standards which allow for the automatic extension of collective agreements.

Today the various forms of work are rapidly evolving. This emphasizes the need for effective social dialogue mechanisms to update labour relations and ensure respect for the principles and fundamental rights safeguarded by this Organization, without jeopardizing the creation of jobs linked to new technologies.

The Committee on Freedom of Association has recalled the following on this matter: “the duration of collective agreements is primarily a matter for the parties involved, but if government action is being considered any legislation should reflect tripartite agreement”. The amendments proposed by the Uruguayan Government to article 17 of Law No. 18566 were not the result of a tripartite agreement nor do not resolve the observations of the supervisory bodies since they propose that automatic extension be negotiated for all collective agreements. This can be interpreted as a new form of undue interference in collective bargaining.

Our sector would like to highlight the general rule which deems collective agreements temporary in nature. These agreements should have a prescribed time frame, this is one of their key characteristics. As with all contracts, once the time frame agreed by the contracting parties expires, so do its provisions, and the parties are then free to negotiate a new collective agreement.

In conclusion, we hope that the Committee will urge the Government of Uruguay to revise the benchmark standards with the participation of the social partners and take on board the comments of the supervisory bodies, guaranteeing respect for the autonomy of the contracting parties and compliance with the remaining principles and rights outlined in the Convention.

Employer member, Honduras – We are concerned that Uruguay is yet again the subject of complaints as a result of the Government’s failure to comply with a Convention that forms part of the very essence of the ILO. The Convention in question establishes the rules and guidelines for collective bargaining, ensuring it is trustworthy, actionable and effective. It also establishes the independence and autonomy of the parties who should be able to participate freely and voluntarily in negotiations.

Ten years after the case against the Government of Uruguay was first presented, the case is yet again subject to review because of a lack of engagement from the Government of Uruguay. The complaint was filed because the negotiation of wages by branch of economic activity in Uruguay does not comply with the principles of the Convention. It does not comply because the freedom to negotiate does not exist. The Government is therefore violating a fundamental right by denying employers and workers the right to reach agreements through collective bargaining. The labour administration system has in fact taken over this right.

With respect to the effects of the wage councils on salaries and working conditions, the Government has not proposed any legislative amendments and persistently refuses to recognize that the tripartite negotiations carried out within the framework of the wage councils are a form of compulsory arbitration, where representatives of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security set out and define how negotiations are carried out.

The Government has not been able to reach a tripartite agreement on the reforms requested eight years ago by the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts. The Government of Uruguay must now fulfil the obligation to present a draft law to Parliament which puts an end to its disregard for the principles outlined in international collective bargaining Conventions that it itself has ratified.

Despite the recommendations of the Committee of Experts, the Government of Uruguay continues to close its ears and keep the standards in question in force. We therefore request the following measures from the Committee. First, the Government of Uruguay must adopt, as soon as possible, the measures required to close the observation of the Committee of Experts. Second, the Government of Uruguay should hold tripartite meetings which lead to a draft law that aligns national laws and practices with the Convention. Third, the Government of Uruguay must report on the progress made on this case at the next session of the ILO Governing Body in November 2019.

Government member, Russian Federation – We are grateful to the representative of the Uruguayan Government for the information provided on the measures to comply with its obligations under the Convention. We have listened carefully to the explanations given about labour reforms carried out by Uruguay over many years. The figures speak for themselves. A considerable amount of work has been put into reinstating workers’ rights, to improving social security and to bringing down the number of jobs in the informal sector. We note with interest Uruguay’s experience in promoting collective bargaining at three levels in the High Tripartite Council, at branch and sectoral levels and in individual businesses and enterprises. As far as we can understand, the national legislation of Uruguay guarantees the right to collective bargaining. Furthermore, the holding of such negotiations in collective bargaining appears to be a traditional practice in the country. We agree with other delegations that consideration of questions of compliance with ILO Conventions is something that, while we are doing, we should take into account the law and practice of a country and the specific features of the legal system in that country.

It is important that the Government is demonstrating openness and a constructive approach to cooperation with the ILO and is conscientiously working to implement the recommendations made when this issue was considered last time. This is something which we should encourage. We urge that efforts be continued to strengthen social dialogue in Uruguay through cooperation with the ILO.

Employer member, Plurinational State of Bolivia – I will begin by pointing out that it is not about questioning or objecting to collective bargaining as an appropriate way of resolving conflicts. Indeed, allowing those who are involved in the conflict to exercise free will, should logically make it easier to reach agreements that are healthy, appropriate, and in line with the realities of all companies. Such a situation is not foreign or unknown to Uruguay.

However, in the case we are discussing today, it is sadly but strikingly clear that the concept of “conciliation” has become “imposition”. This is a serious matter on which everyone should reflect given that this has become the normal way of reaching agreements. It, of course, leaves the employers defenceless, making them susceptible and vulnerable to different levels of pressure, through strikes and other measures, which, far from facilitating agreements, only damage the integrity of companies and therefore of sources of employment.

The employers of Bolivia have complete empathy for the employers of Uruguay. Like them, we are also being forced into signing time-limited agreements every year with a view to expanding on the baseline set by the national government annually. It is precisely because of this unfortunate experience that we understand the effects of pressure and even extortion from the trade union representatives who are not acting in line with the legal implications of free and voluntary negotiation.

It is precisely because of this that governments cannot deny that the employers are essential actors in labour relations. Consequently, while it is known by all that labour standards are protectionist in nature, this should not prevent governments from offering the employers the same legal security and certainty required to reach agreements freely in accordance with all legislation. Governments should establish conditions and labour relations through free negotiation.

As soon as a party is coerced into signing an agreement, even if that coercion is simulated, as is the case when one party forces another into discretionary submission through labour arbitration, it undoubtedly perverts the objective and purpose of the Convention. As a result, it is essential that all laws are in line and in accordance with the Convention. In the case of Uruguay, an observation of the Committee of Experts has been reoccurring since 2010 because, unfortunately, the Government has thus far failed to review and align legislation accordingly.

Government member, Panama – The delegation of the Government of Panama thanks the Government representative for the comments. With all due respect, we believe that the present case reveals that the procedure for selecting cases to appear before the Committee is inadequate from the perspective of geographical equity. Indeed, five out of the 11 countries on the long list of cases before the Committee on the Application of Standards are from South America, which amounts to almost 50 per cent. Three of them were also then put on the shortlist, which amounts to 60 per cent of those named. Latin America and South America is over-represented compared to other regions and subregions. Furthermore, the procedure does not take into account other criteria for determining serious cases requiring immediate attention. Equally, we emphasize the efforts made by the Government to promote collective bargaining and social dialogue as well as to make progress on social protection.

We encourage the Government of Uruguay to continue using tripartism, consultation and other mechanisms of dialogue.

Government member, Plurinational State of Bolivia – The Plurinational State of Bolivia thanks the Government of Uruguay for the information presented regarding the Convention. In addition, we welcome the efforts made by Uruguay to extend different workers’ rights, including such rights as freedom of association, collective bargaining, outsourcing, and the labour process. We also highlight the uninterrupted growth in the real wages of workers, advances in job creation and improved social security. These important achievements are reflected in lower levels of poverty in Uruguay.

In light of the information provided by the Government of Uruguay, we consider it unfounded to be reviewing this case before the Committee. Therefore, we encourage the Government of Uruguay to continue taking measures that promote and protect the right to organize and the right to collective bargaining in the country.

Government representative – We thank the various representatives for their insights regarding the case of Uruguay. First, we would like to once again reaffirm our Government’s commitment to dialogue and collective bargaining in practice, in our convictions and in our political resolve, and are ready to make any appropriate and reasonable changes, if met with social consensus, as they say at the ILO, to extend and improve the system of collective bargaining and conflict prevention.

We support the reports of the ILO supervisory bodies, including the Committee of Experts, the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee on the Application of Standards and will listen, respond and do as they say. We have already acted in that regard. However, as we have expressly shown, in order for there to be social consensus, the parties have to be in agreement. In our first presentation, we explained how the Government has received a negative response to the many proposals that it has made, preventing us from reaching the social consensus needed to make changes. But, as noted, we have proposed solutions to every single recommendation made by the Committee on Freedom of Association in its report of March 2010, specifically in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018.

We would like to thank the Governments of Latin American and the Caribbean in particular which were almost unanimous in providing us with such important support at this meeting, which we were honestly not expecting. We are honoured, satisfied and proud that the governments of our region have supported our position and actions.

We would also like to thank the countries of other regions, such as Spain, China and the Russian Federation for their support and for their presentations. We did not expect this either and are honoured and thrilled in that regard. We are particularly grateful that these very important countries have devoted part of their very valuable time to our small country, which has, in our opinion, been unfairly placed on the list of cases to review. We come here with confidence, absolute conviction and peace of mind, and use the opportunity to demonstrate what we have done and what we are doing in Uruguay.

We would also like to thank workers around the world who have unanimously supported Uruguay. Honestly, dear workers, thank you very much because you have supported a country that is constantly seeking to improve, even though we make mistakes and are still lacking in certain areas. We urge you to support the system of collective bargaining, labour protection, social protection which we are developing in our country and which has been unfairly attacked by some today.

We would also like to highlight, and I say this with absolute conviction and sincerity, the presentation made by the employers of Uruguay. We believe that the presentation by the employers clarifies the expectations to take forward. In the same way, we regret and reject equally as forcefully, all presentations made by other Employer representatives who are unfamiliar with Uruguayan realities, and who have said things that are not true. They have not read the documents that we have presented, instead basing their views on ideological questions to attack a system of social protection and labour relations which, as has been shown, is creating and will continue creating better working conditions for both the workers and employers of Uruguay.

If this system of labour relations had failed, the number of companies registered to pay social security in Uruguay would not have risen by 50 per cent, and we would not have had 17 years of continuous economic growth for the first time in the history of our country. Growth rates rose above those for Latin America for most years.

We want to continue in the same vain. We are ready because we know that we need to make changes. We have made changes and proposals, and sometimes they have been blocked by one side and sometimes by another. Some speakers have said things that are not true. For example, it is not true that the Government is imposing working conditions in Uruguay. Working conditions in Uruguay can only be set by the workers and the employers.

Some have said that the Government is imposing guidelines on salary increases but this is not true. The Government proposes guidelines to discuss but it consults the parties before doing so and the guidelines are not obligatory. Where is the proof that the guidelines are not obligatory? Proof is the outcome of the current round of collective bargaining as well as that of previous rounds. What has happened in the current round of collective bargaining? A total of 85 per cent of agreements are agreements between employers and workers, and this is very important. But let’s do a more thorough analysis of the data. Out of the above-mentioned 85 per cent, 47 per cent is made up of tripartite agreements and 38 per cent of bipartite agreements, where both the employers and workers wanted to negotiate in a tripartite manner knowing that the Government was going to vote against or abstain. This shows that collective bargaining is free in Uruguay.

With regard to impartiality, the Government has, coincidentally but not by coincidence, voted with the employers in 5 per cent of cases and with the workers in 5 per cent of cases whenever it has had to vote with one party or another in this round of collective bargaining. This is the truth of what happens in Uruguay.

Some have spoken of pressure, but there is no record of the employers complaining about pressure in the proceedings of the wage councils or of other meetings. The employers did, however, make a statement in March 2018, a statement which we greatly appreciate, in which they say the following: “we have received the government guidelines, but, if it is true what the employers are saying, we will discuss it in the wage councils as long as it is recorded in the proceedings of the session of the Higher Tripartite Council in March 2018”.

Lastly, we would like to highlight the significance of what we have proposed. We have made long-standing proposals to progress on this issue and will continue doing so. It is for that reason that we welcome the statement by the Employer representative of Uruguay who highlighted the group’s willingness to work towards new measures that would make changes to the system of collective bargaining and conflict prevention, in consultation with the social partners. I repeat, the aim would be to extend and improve the system of collective bargaining and conflict prevention.

We are also pleased that there is a desire to discuss the right to strike before this Committee in Uruguay. We know that the employers do not want to discuss the right to strike at the ILO, they do not want to acknowledge it. And when we speak about occupations, we speak about the right to strike, therefore we welcome this development.

Therefore, we repeat that, in Uruguay, we prioritize bipartite negotiations, as is clearly indicated in Law No. 18566 and its articles. And proof of that is when we all meet here, we see how it works.

Therefore, we are and will be open to dialogue and negotiation with a view to changing and progressing, and we will continue doing so, with the help of the ILO wherever necessary, which we greatly value and appreciate. For us, it is also fundamental to respect the realities and history of our country.

Worker members – Uruguay shares fourth place with Norway in the ranking of member States with the highest number of ratified ILO Conventions. It has also been singled out on endless occasions as an example for others to follow on social dialogue.

It is our understanding that in the current system, the State does not force the parties to negotiate in the wage councils, nor does it impose so-called compulsory arbitration. We are pleased that, in its statement, the Government has assigned priority and importance to bipartite collective bargaining as well as to the Convention. Furthermore, it recognizes the possibility for the parties to negotiate bilaterally outside the wage councils. Any pre-signed agreement can then be presented before this body without any amendments from the Government. In addition, the social partners have the right to reject any call to appear before the wage council. They simply need to express their desire for bilateral collective negotiation or show that they are covered by another collective agreement that is still in force. Furthermore, even if the issue is called before the wage councils, the government representative cannot cast their vote if one of the parties does not attend, making it impossible to make a decision regarding the bargaining unit that was summoned.

One of the effects of this system is that it has given a strong boost to collective bargaining in general. In more concrete terms, outside the wage councils, the number of bargaining units increased substantially, the contents of the collective agreements became broader and, as we have previously mentioned, the right to collective bargaining was extended to sectors that previously did not have access to it. We reiterate the importance of the latter move for rural and domestic work.

As we have heard in the Government’s intervention, the system in Uruguay has also strengthened the purchasing power of wages and salaries, which has had a favourable effect, generating an upward trend in the periodic adjustment of retirements and pensions, as well as a notable increase in employment levels and in employment formalization with very positive impacts on the country’s economy.

The above-mentioned points lead the Workers’ group to ask the Government of Uruguay to redouble its efforts to promote tripartite consultations with the aim of reaching a consensus. I repeat, with the aim of reaching a consensus. However, the Government has indeed taken action and expressed commitment in that regard. The Workers’ group has also observed that it would be beneficial for the Committee of Experts to receive a more detailed explanation of the way the collective bargaining system works in Uruguay in law and in practice. Therefore, we would like to encourage the Government to provide the Committee of Experts with the data that was presented here and keep it informed of any progress made in tripartite consultations regarding potential legislative amendments.

Lastly, we take careful note of the comments made by the spokesperson of the Employers who rose questions related to the right to strike and how it is regulated by national legislation. The Employers stated that these discussions, these issues, are related to the right to strike and are relevant for the Committee on the Application of Standards. This is all fine, but it is also worth expressing the position of the Workers. We argue that the right to strike peacefully is protected by the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and also includes all other peaceful trade union measures, such as occupations.

Employer members – We are extremely grateful to all the participants of this rich discussion which has demonstrated the importance of this case. If it was a simple matter, as in other cases, it would have gone relatively quickly. The rich interventions clearly set forth the need to ensure compliance with the Conventions. They also highlight the interest of this Committee to ensure that governments address the recommendations of the supervisory bodies.

Hopefully the distinguished Minister will understand, because he does not often come to these sessions, that when we give messages of this nature, it is because we very much hope that substantial changes will be made.

Ten years have passed, and although goals have been set, there have been no results. I would also like to ask the Minister to take into account the views of those who did not make an intervention. Many Government representatives from other regions did not make an intervention, despite often doing so within this Committee, and this silence is worth a thousand words. It is necessary to implement change because much time has passed without any substantial improvement.

Furthermore, we would have liked the Government of Uruguay to have given us specific details on each of the issues that we have presented and not to have simply provided general statistics on progress made in the country. We do not deny this progress, but it does not mean that the country is in alignment or in compliance with the Convention. Uruguay is not complying with the Convention, and this Committee should emphasize the need to ensure compliance as soon as possible.

Language is not only expressed verbally but also in gestures. In this debate, we noticed many derogatory looks and messages directed at the spokesperson for the IOE during his statement. Similarly, we believe that the reply by the Minister was clearly false. I do not want to repeat that the representatives of the employers of Uruguay standing before his Committee are concerned that they will go back to our country and be treated in the same way as our spokesperson was treated here. It is clear that this legislative instrument that has been put in place inhibits social dialogue and understanding. Employers in Uruguay are somewhat fearful of the statistics related to the agreements in case they are forced to sign those agreements or face other reprisals.

Therefore, we reaffirm each and every word expressed by the spokesperson of the IOE. In the year of the Centenary, a violation persists, as it has done for a period of ten years. The regulation of collective bargaining in Uruguay is, in practice, a clear example of the attitude taken towards the employers: an attitude of interference, meddling and bullying.

As a result of interference, the employer organizations are being forced into supporting government dictates and are therefore losing the ability to determine salaries which should be freely negotiated by the parties, as is the case in all countries that fully respect ILO principles and fundamental rights, such as the right to collective bargaining, as outlined in the fundamental Conventions.

In this way, we would like to request, in an amicable but authoritative manner, that the Government of Uruguay adopt clear and precise attitudes. The conclusions of this Committee should urge the Government to develop and submit a draft law to Parliament which ensures that Law No. 18566 as well as all national practices are in full compliance with the Convention and with other fundamental standards, fully taking into account the decisions of the various supervisory bodies. It should do so before the next session of the Governing Body in November 2019 and following comprehensive and effective consultations held in good faith with the most representative social partners.

We also urge the Government to send a report to the Committee of Experts before 1 September 2019 outlining all the actions taken so that the Committee can evaluate the information this year.

We have the best intentions and always an attitude of goodwill, which is what this Organization considers as the basis of social dialogue. Social dialogue arises from harmonious and peaceful relations. But we feel obliged to defend our suggestions for the future which, crucially, are in line with the Constitution of this Organization so that the ILO supervisory bodies can make immediate progress, as we have requested.

As I already mentioned, strikes are not addressed under any of the ILO standards, but that does not mean that the right to strike does not exist. It is perfectly possible for Uruguay to address the issue, but not within this Committee. The Employers recognize the right to strike under national legislation, but not within the framework of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) or the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98). Our position has not changed, and it is shared by the majority of Governments that consider that the methods and practices used to exercise the right to strike should be regulated by each individual jurisdiction. In this way, Uruguay’s law on this matter should be subject to internal review within the country, but not to the ILO supervisory system, at least not to the Committee on the Application of Standards, and I would also add the Committee of Experts.

I would like to conclude by saying that, although we did not wish to do so, we are obliged by the attitude of the Government of Uruguay towards the Employers’ group today to request that the conclusions of this case are included in a special paragraph.

Conclusions of the Committee

The Committee took note of the information provided by the Government representative and the discussion that followed.

Taking into account the discussion that followed, the Committee urges the Government to:

- initiate legislative measures by 1 November 2019, after full consultation with the most representative employers’ and workers’ organizations, considering the recommendation of ILO supervisory bodies, to guarantee the full compliance of national law and practice with the Convention; and

- prepare, in consultation with the most representative employers’ and workers’ organizations a report to be submitted to the Committee of Experts before 1 September 2019, informing in detail on actions undertaken to progress in the full application of the Convention in law and practice.

Government representative – The Government of Uruguay would like to thank the social partners for the rich and interesting discussion held in this room in relation to our case. In this regard, we would like to highlight three main points. Firstly, at the moment, a pre-election process is under way in our country, which entails certain restrictions regarding the dates proposed by Parliament. During the proposed election period, Parliament is on recess. There may be, therefore, although it remains to be seen, some complications concerning the dates being mentioned and requested as, as I said, during the election process, national Parliament is on recess, which makes this a complex issue to resolve.

Secondly, we would like to inform the Committee that we have already convened a first meeting, to continue the social dialogue, for 26 June. We have invited partners from both sides. Lastly, we thank the Committee for the outcome.

Individual Case (CAS) - Discussion: 2011, Publication: 100th ILC session (2011)

A Government representative said that it was quite possible that most of the members present knew little about the real situation in his country, which for the 200 years of its existence had always been looked upon by the rest of the world as a country that respected and promoted democracy, save for two occasions when it had been interrupted by a military dictatorship – most recently between 1973 and 1984. Currently the Latin Barometer, an international indicator, rated the Uruguayan people as having most confidence in the democratic system in the region than almost any country in the world. Also, the United Nations human development index had identified it as one of the leading countries of the region. Uruguay had always been respectful of human rights, especially workers’ rights, and both its workers’ and its employers’ movements prided themselves on their total independence from the political authorities. Referring to the case under discussion and to Act No. 18566 on collective bargaining in particular, he observed that what was being questioned was not so much the Act itself as the model of social dialogue that Uruguay had followed since 1943, with the adoption of the Wages Councils (Act No. 10449). For as long as that Act had been on the statutes, real wages, national development and the employers’ sector had been sustainable and continued. It was only when the application of the Act was interrupted with the advent of the dictatorship in 1968 that economic growth had come to a halt. Between 1990 and 2004, the failure to apply the Act resulted in a 23 per cent drop in real wages, as well as in the systematic decline of collective bargaining, which was reduced to the bare minimum.

From 2005 onwards, successive governments promoted a policy of far-reaching social dialogue, described by the ILO Director-General as “exemplary”. It was this, among other things, which enabled Uruguay to avoid falling into recession during the recent world economic crisis and to maintain a moderate growth rate in 2009–10, which was currently on the rise again. As it was practiced in Uruguay, collective bargaining covered virtually 100 per cent of private sector workers. Its system of industrial relations traditionally involved collective bargaining at the branch level, rather than at the enterprise level, although the Act that was criticized did not prevent the conduct of bilateral collective negotiations as well. The comments did not suggest violations of the fundamental principles of the Convention or of basic human rights, such as in other cases discussed by the Committee. An examination of the agreements concluded in the course of the four rounds of negotiations held in the Wages Council revealed that 90 per cent of the decisions had been taken by majority vote and 80 per cent unanimously. Overall, during the past five years real wages had increased by around 24 per cent. The ILO’s Global wage report 2010 had described the system of collective bargaining as a model.

He observed that his Government had adopted measures to bring national legislation into line with all the comments of the Committee on Freedom of Association. It should be borne in mind that any legislative reform required not just the agreement of the social partners, but also needed to be discussed and approved by the National Parliament. First, in July 2010 the social partners had been invited to engage in a round of negotiations to examine the comments of the Committee on Freedom of Association. The employers, who had initiated the complaint, had stated that they were unable to attend because the process of collective bargaining was starting at the same time. Secondly, a tripartite commission had been set up towards the end of 2010 to study possible amendments to Act No. 18566. It had held its last meeting on 26 May 2011. Thirdly, an eight-point work agenda had then been agreed, and a sort of preliminary agreement had been reached on two of the points. Lastly, the tripartite commission had appeared before Parliament to give an account of its creation, agenda and works, with the request that once it had completed its work its findings should serve as an essential input for the possible reform of Act No. 18566. He added that the Committee on Freedom of Association, the Committee of Experts and the Director of the International Labour Standards Department had been duly informed of all those activities. Finally, he indicated that, during the week that the Conference Committee had been meeting, high-level tripartite discussions had been held in Geneva at the suggestion of the ILO, during which there had been intense negotiations during which a climate of dialogue had developed which was sufficient for the social partners to re-establish mutual trust, and a definitive agreement had almost been reached. The outcome would be useful to continue the negotiations at the national level. In the light of the foregoing, he requested the Committee to close its discussion of the case, or to reserve its position until such time as the measures that were being applied had time to bear fruit.

The Worker members indicated that the present case of Uruguay examined by the Committee was not being discussed at their initiative. They recalled that, according to the information provided by the Government to the Committee of Experts, it had initiated contacts and consultations with employers’ and workers’ organizations with a view to examining the recommendations made by the Committee on Freedom of Association in relation to the legislation. They added that the International Organisation of Employers, the Uruguayan Chamber of Industries and the National Chamber of Commerce and Services of Uruguay had presented a complaint in February 2009 to the Committee on Freedom of Association against the Government for failure to comply with its obligations under the Conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining. However, they noted that, in its 356th Report (March 2010), the Committee on Freedom of Association welcomed the Government’s aim of promoting collective bargaining, the increased coverage of collective agreements and their number, while making certain comments on the provisions which could raise difficulties in relation to their conformity with the principles of collective bargaining, or which should be interpreted in the light of those principles. The Government had followed the conclusions of the Committee on Freedom of Association by recently re-establishing a tripartite commission to examine the Committee’s conclusions. They considered that social dialogue and collective bargaining were working in Uruguay and recalled that the Committee of Experts had only requested the Government to reply to certain questions in its next report due in 2012.

The Employer members said that the employers’ organizations had submitted the present case to the various ILO supervisory bodies in view of the inaction of the Government. It was of a matter of great importance, as it was closely linked to the freedom to engage in free and voluntary collective bargaining, in full compliance with the autonomous will of the parties and with Article 4 of the Convention. The Act on collective bargaining in Uruguay, adopted in 2009, did not respect that autonomy and interfered to a very large and unacceptable extent in the will of the parties to determine the subjects of bargaining, the structure of bargaining, legitimacy to engage in bargaining, the duration of collective agreements and the free exercise of entrepreneurial activities. Such unjustified interference prejudiced all the parties, and not only employers. The complaint had at first been made by the employers’ organization with a view to prevention, in relation to the draft legislation, and had then been maintained due to the omissions of the Government. The complaint had been presented jointly by the International Organisation of Employers, the National Chamber of Commerce and Services of Uruguay and the Uruguayan Chamber of Industries. The conclusions of the Committee on Freedom of Association had been endorsed by the Committee of Experts and related to the following aspects: the process of reforming collective bargaining had been undertaken without full and frank consultations and was not the outcome of agreed solutions, or even a process of attempting to reach agreement. Although that might appear to be a matter covered by another Convention, it took on great importance in relation to the reform of collective bargaining in view of the requirement to promote voluntary negotiation, as set out in Article 4 of the Convention. Respect for collective autonomy needed to be demonstrated from the outset, in the reform of the system itself, but that had not occurred in the present case and consultation had been considered as a mere hurried procedure.

With regard to the content of the 2009 Act on collective bargaining, they indicated that, among other points, the new system broke with the principle of respect for what was agreed between the parties through negotiation, as it allowed a tripartite council (the Wages Council), in which decisions were adopted by simple majority, to focus collective bargaining on specific sectors, at the request of one party, and it could therefore, even though in a subsidiary manner, determine wages and other conditions of work at the branch level. The problem arose, on the one hand, through the emergence in the negotiations of a third party, the Government, which should not enter into matters that were essentially covered by bipartite bargaining and which could influence not only wages, but also other conditions of work that were normally included in the content of collective bargaining. Moreover, the majority could be obtained by the addition of the votes of the representatives of the Government and of any other of the parties and, one of the parties to a collective agreement could see its content changed or agreed to without its consent. The genuine nature of an agreement was undermined when it was modified or determined unilaterally by one of the parties with the support of a third that was not a party to the agreement. In these conditions, negotiations were no longer bipartite, free and voluntary. Moreover, the Higher Tripartite Council had been created, with the tripartite composition indicated above, which could consider the determination of matters relating to levels of tripartite and bipartite bargaining. That meant that the structure of collective bargaining was no longer a matter for the parties, as in practice it could be predetermined by the Government with the support of any other party. Accordingly, not only was the presence of an unrelated third party imposed, but the structure, and to a large extent the content of collective bargaining at the branch or sectoral level could be determined or modified without the agreement of one of the parties. The Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts had reminded the Government that the level of collective bargaining should be determined by the parties and should not be the subject of a vote in a tripartite body in which, moreover, the tripartite representation was not balanced. The Government would accordingly become an almost compulsory arbitrator. That had been the underlying element in the conclusions of the bodies which had examined the case and which recommended that the composition should include an equal number of members and that, in any case, a deadlock in the vote should be decided, not by the presence of the Government, but by an independent third person, preferably nominated by employers and unions.

Another matter of particular concern was the imposition of external legitimization for the negotiation of collective agreements at the enterprise level. That was a particularly serious matter in a country where there were a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises. At the enterprise level, workers should be free to choose their own representatives, and should have the possibility to have recourse to unorganized representatives in the absence of union representatives. What was not in accordance with the Convention was the fact that, in the absence of union representatives, the matter was legally required to be referred to the immediately higher trade union organization. They recalled that the Committee on Freedom of Association only admitted recourse to trade union representation at a higher level if such union representation already existed at the enterprise level. Another especially prejudicial aspect of Uruguayan legislation was the legal imposition of the automatic extension of the duration of collective agreements once they had expired, which was known as ultractividad. Such a crucial decision could affect the competitiveness of the economy and should be the subject of agreement between the parties or, if that could not be reached, of a tripartite agreement, although the achievement of such tripartite agreement had not even been attempted. There were other important and significant points, such as the lack of guarantees to ensure compliance with the duty of confidentiality, and supervision of the registration and publication of collective agreements, which in reality concealed an interest in a higher level of supervision of compliance with minimum legal provisions. Finally, one of the issues of most concern, if not the most worrying, was a Decree, which established the right of workers in the enterprise to occupy the workplace, and also envisaged a procedure or mechanism for legitimate occupation. That innovative right constituted unacceptable and excessive interference in the capacity to engage in voluntary bargaining, and undermined and distorted any negotiation, as in practice it compelled enterprises to close when a dispute occurred, as had occurred in Uruguay recently.

The fact that the Employers’ group had called for the inclusion of the present case in the list was not the product of a caprice, but of well-founded concern. The manner in which the system of collective bargaining had developed, its future negative impact on social and economic development and its proper functioning should be a matter of concern for all the social partners, and not just for employers. The Government had not yet put forward any proposal for the amendment of the Act. The only point on which it had expressed its intention to come to an accommodation was in relation to not using the system of voting to determine conditions of work in the Wages Council, although that had not yet taken the form of firm proposals. They trusted that the Government would demonstrate the will which would allow the employers to believe that the comments of the supervisory bodies would be taken seriously.

The Worker member of Uruguay said that, although all those who had spoken had expressed surprise at the inclusion of Uruguay in the list, he himself was not surprised. It was an almost constant pattern that any country that managed to make progress in the field of labour rights and the protection of workers and to strengthen democracy would provoke a reaction from national employers’ organizations and the International Organisation of Employers. He emphasized that the same organizations that kept silent in other cases where there was true denial of labour rights and violation of human rights, were alarmed when the workers of a small country and a great people achieved a balance that had always eluded them. Until 2005, no Uruguayan Government had worried about addressing the demands of the working classes. Now, only six years later, the country had almost 40 labour laws, putting workers on a more equal footing with other sectors in the world of work. They included acts on collective bargaining for workers in the public and private sectors, freedom of association, restricting the working day in the agricultural sector to eight hours, and constitutional protection for subcontracted workers, a landmark act on domestic workers, including rights to collective bargaining; and approval of the Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (No. 155). He added that everything could be improved, including acts, decrees and standards. Uruguay had not yet reached the peak, nor become world champion of workers’ rights, so much so that workers in the public and private sectors were clamouring for the Government to give effect to the Act on bargaining in the public sector. Perhaps for that reason, the ILO Director-General had declared in 2010 that Uruguay was an example to follow in tripartism, dialogue and industrial relations. The workers had not come to defend a Government that had its own means of doing so, but to show the fruits of such struggles, cooperation and determination and to demonstrate that, when combined with a Government that was sensitive to the demands of the great majority, it was possible to achieve the objectives of social justice and to move forward towards a better distribution of wealth. The comments of the supervisory bodies had already been taken into account in Uruguay and a tripartite commission had been established with equal numbers of members, which had agreed its agenda by consensus and was working in the suggested directions in the above areas. Furthermore, a high-level mission would visit Uruguay on 28 August and could verify on the spot how labour relations were working and the outcome of collective bargaining. In the last round of bargaining, 80 per cent of agreements had been approved unanimously. A few hours previously, efforts had been made in Geneva to conclude a tripartite agreement which, although it had not been completed for lack of time, remained valid in terms of its content. He wondered why such efforts had not been made before. Lastly, he strongly challenged the inclusion of the “Uruguay case” in the session.

The Government member of Argentina, speaking on behalf of the Government members of the Committee which were Member States of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean countries (GRULAC), said that, having listened carefully to the statement by the Government of Uruguay on the measures taken to continue building a culture of social dialogue and collective bargaining, GRULAC welcomed the efforts of Uruguay and encouraged it to pursue its activities towards a successful tripartite solution, keeping in mind that a National Tripartite Commission had been set up to examine the application of Act No. 18566 on collective bargaining, and that it had already invited an ILO mission to visit the country at the end of August to work with the Commission and hold talks with the Government and the social partners. GRULAC also took note of the efforts of the Government during the 100th Session of the International Labour Conference to forge an agreement between the parties.

The Employer member of Colombia said that he had examined the case of Uruguay in his capacity as a member of the Committee on Freedom of Association, when the issues raised had been of concern to the Employers’ group because of the way in which the legislation was being adopted. Since March 2010, when the Committee on Freedom of Association had presented its conclusions, the Employers had seen little progress. It was at the Employers’ insistence that the Government had begun to act. He referred to the Consultation (Industrial and National Levels) Recommendation, 1960 (No. 113), and in particular Paragraph 5(a), and cited paragraph 1071 of the Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee, according to which: “It is important that consultations take place in good faith, confidence and mutual respect, and that the parties have sufficient time to express their views and discuss them in full with a view to reaching a suitable compromise. The Government must also ensure that it attaches the necessary importance to agreements reached between workers’ and employers’ organizations.” He said that the principles laid down in the Recommendation and the principle that he had cited from the Digest had been undermined by the composition of the Tripartite Commission, which had unbalanced bipartite representation. In conclusion, he emphasized the importance of the high-level mission due to visit the country in August 2011.

The Worker member of France recalled that the Convention had a number of key objectives with a view to attaining free collective bargaining that determined workers’ conditions of employment at different levels, between workers’ organizations, on the one hand, and employers’ organizations, on the other, without interference by one organization in the affairs of another, and without the employers being able to make employment of a worker dependent on relinquishing union membership. The Convention thus protected the freedom of workers to join unions, and the independence and autonomy of both parties to the negotiations. The right to organize and the right to negotiate conditions of employment were clearly not being seriously challenged in Uruguay, although bilateralism was not being fully respected. That appeared to be the key issue in the complaint from the IOE and the employers in the country. However, the problem was that this did not seem to be the only reason. The competent public authorities could, especially by legislative means, extend the application of collective agreements to an entire branch or region or to the whole country; the provisions of such agreements were then binding on all the employers concerned and all the workers. Such provisions existed in many democratic countries and were in conformity with the Collective Agreements Recommendation, 1951 (No. 91), which was not a binding instrument. It should be added that the Convention did not go into the details of bargaining procedures or systems, which left much freedom of adaptation for national law and practice, in which there was considerable variety.

The comments of employers’ organizations concerned the powers – too extensive, in their view – of the tripartite wage council, which could summon employers’ and workers’ organizations to negotiations, especially on minimum wages, which was not – in itself – contrary to the relevant Convention ratified by Uruguay, namely the Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 131). Similarly, the legal minimum standards in terms of wages and conditions of employment could be the subject of tripartite negotiations within wage councils if the partners agreed, which was not in violation of Convention No. 98 or of Convention No. 131. The report of the Committee of Experts essentially quoted the conclusions of the Committee on Freedom of Association relating to two complaints from employers. However, it was difficult to understand exactly the complainants’ grievances other than with regard to the limitations on full bipartism, even though they might be opposed to wage councils dealing with conditions of work, which was an established fact also found in the conclusions of the Committee on Freedom of Association. First, the Committee of Experts asked the Government to amend the legislation to enable non-organized workers, in the absence of trade unions, to choose representatives to participate in bargaining on conditions of work in the enterprise; that was not a requirement of the Convention, but of Recommendation No. 91, a non-binding standard and the last resort when a union was unable to organize, but it should be noted that, in a context of employer pressure against the organization of employees, their autonomous bargaining capacity was drastically reduced, or even totally absent. It would be preferable for higher-level unions, such as branch unions, to have competence for bargaining at the enterprise or group level, which would offer real guarantees of independence vis-à-vis the employer and could help the workers to organize. It appeared that the complainants wished extended collective agreements to have a limited content, reduced to monitoring the application of legal minimum standards and the resolution of formal issues. That would amount to undermining the principle of the extension of agreements, the aim of which was to improve conditions of employment in the branch or country, which, in his opinion, was in line with the interests of employed persons and was a practice that existed in his country and had never been criticized as such by the Committee of Experts. Moreover, the employers disagreed with the fact that agreements that had expired remained in force until they had been replaced by new agreements. The principle of extending the validity of collective agreements therefore appeared to be just, in order to avoid the deterioration of conditions of employment if an agreement expired and the employer refused to negotiate a new one. The Committee of Experts had concluded by calling for the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association to be discussed by a tripartite body. However, the question arose as to the ulterior political motives of the complainant employers’ organizations which, instead of apparently defending the Convention, appeared to want to reduce the protective power of agreements which extended on a branch or national basis or, when such agreements expired, might refuse to negotiate agreements that were more favourable to the workers. It was to be hoped that the Committee of Experts, on the basis of the reply expected in the Government’s next report due in 2012, would undertake an autonomous analysis of current law and practice in order to draw its own conclusions.

The Employer member of Mexico said that the comments of the Committee of Experts on the case had caused him serious concern. Interference by the Government, leading to the restriction of one of the most important rights of the parties involved in industrial relations, was unacceptable. In an atmosphere of interference, he recalled that the matter at hand was one of principle. He was not satisfied with the information provided by the Government that it had “already begun a round of negotiations”. That was not enough. The Act violated the Convention and should be amended. Collective bargaining was a search for balance between both parties. It was intolerable to ignore this principle, and particularly to ignore the opinions of the supervisory body. He found it extraordinary that the workers had not expressed themselves in a different way, perhaps because they had not realized that, by means of this unique and invasive intervention, their acquired rights could be undermined by the decision of a third party outside of theirs involved in industrial relations.

The Worker member of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, speaking also on behalf of the Trade Union Confederation of the Americas – International Trade Union Confederation and the World Federation of Trade Unions, recalled that Uruguay was a country that had lived through one of the most cruel dictatorships during which it was unthinkable to speak of freedom of association, and particularly of collective bargaining. The trade union organization at that time had been clandestine, but gave rise to the Inter-Trade Union Assembly – Workers’ National Convention (PIT-CNT), the current name of which was adopted during the dictatorship, and which had defended workers in a context of far-reaching anti-union repression. The composition of the Tripartite Advisory Council was currently in accordance with the Convention and was made up of two representatives of the three sectors represented, precisely to comply with the requirements of the Committee on Freedom of Association. She recalled that, at the recent ILO American Regional Meeting held in Chile in December 2010, Uruguay had been cited as an example of social dialogue and of major progress in the field of social justice. She therefore wondered how it was possible that the present case was now being examined by the present Committee. She reaffirmed that what was actually happening in Uruguay was that, since the arrival in power of progressist governments in 2005, workers’ rights had been improved substantially, even above the requirements of ILO Conventions. More specifically, it was the only country in the world in which domestic workers benefited from collective agreements, and a large number of labour laws had been approved, including on freedom of association, the eight-hour day and collective bargaining in the public and private sectors. Workers were regaining rights which had been trampled underfoot by the dictatorship and by right-wing governments, supported by certain employers, who were now demanding respect for the right to organize and collective bargaining. Democracy was one of the treasures of the people of Uruguay. Those who were now denouncing the situation in the Conference Committee were those who had been in violation of democracy and social dialogue, and who had left the tripartite body on two occasions. Their absence had been due to the will of the employers. The report of the Committee of Experts indicated that most of the points covered by the complaint had been remedied and it also noted with satisfaction the adoption of the Act on collective bargaining in the public sector. In certain countries in Latin America, social progress was being achieved despite the intentions of certain employer sectors, which availed themselves of international mechanisms with a view to holding back such progress. That perhaps explained why the present case was being discussed, instead of others that had been cited.

The Employer member of Uruguay said that collective bargaining was the cornerstone of collective labour relations, and expressed regret that the process of dialogue had not been effective when it came to adopting the Act in question. The recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts, along with the analysis of the Governing Body, should be respected. In consequence, no other option remained but to consider amending Act No. 18566, particularly within the tripartite forum created in response to the observations made by the Committee of Experts. The case should not be set aside until the Government had incorporated the recommendations of both the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts.

An observer representing the International Organisation of Employers (IOE) said that the legal framework for the voluntary negotiation of collective agreements, and particularly the autonomy of the social partners, were fundamental to the principles of freedom of association embodied in Conventions Nos 87, 98 and 154, particularly when a country had ratified them, as was the case with Uruguay. When legislating on the system of collective bargaining, the concerns of all the social partners, including the employers, needed to be taken into account. The Act on collective bargaining, above all, needed to be the product of tripartite consensus, as it was the fundamental instrument that gave collective agreements their social legitimacy. She voiced the profound disquiet of the international employers’ community at the recent adoption of Act No. 18566, which consolidated the intervention of the State and undermined the principle of collective autonomy in labour relations. It was worrying that the Government should thus disregard the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts regarding the lack of compliance of the Act with the Convention. The IOE trusted that the consultations that had now been entered into with the social partners to consider the recommendations of the ILO’s supervisory bodies would be conducted in good faith and with a determination to reach solutions that were acceptable to all the parties concerned and welcomed the information that a direct contacts mission was to visit Uruguay at the end of August. She concluded by calling on the Government to: apply the principles of freedom of association and collective bargaining without delay; to examine the provisions of Act No. 18566 in detail and in the light of the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts so as to find solutions that were acceptable to all parties; draft a bill with the assistance of the Office that reflected those recommendations, and submit it to Parliament through a priority procedure; and analyze the issues raised by the Committee of Experts in its direct request on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) with a view to achieving acceptable solutions for all the parties.

The Government representative expressed regret at the employers’ misunderstanding of the situation. He underlined that the social partners were always consulted and that the Act had not been imposed on any of the parties. The Employers had withdrawn from the negotiations, which had obliged the Government to play a role in the matter. Since then, a number of meetings had been held. In fact, Uruguay had ample tripartite space to generate dialogue. With regard to the requirement for Government endorsement in relation to wage councils, he said that the new section 5 of the Act on wage councils stipulated they could establish working conditions if they were agreed between employers and workers. This had been fully explained to the Committee on Freedom of Association, which regrettably had focused on the bill, rather than the Act that had been adopted. With regard to the Higher Tripartite Council, it was composed of nine Government representatives and six representatives from each social sector, in accordance with the system followed in the ILO. Concerning the automatic prolongation of collective agreements, he underlined that collective agreements remained in force for the period agreed by the parties. If no duration had been agreed, a decision could be taken to prolong the application of an agreement, as established in the legislation of many other member States. He denied that the Government had approved a decree allowing occupation of the workplace. The original draft had contained a provision to that effect, but it had been withdrawn after the previous President had made a commitment to the employers of Uruguay. In reality, the Decree provided for a procedure for bringing an end to the occupation of a workplace. In fact, as the Committee on Freedom of Association had acknowledged, occupation of a workplace was a form of workers’ action. The Decree provided a means of ending workplace occupation if it restricted the exercise of fundamental rights. He concluded by affirming that the issues examined did not affect life or fundamental rights in the country, and that they should be resolved at the national level.

The Worker members noted the information supplied by the Government, and in particular its wish to establish a system of industrial relations at the national and sectoral levels ensuring solidarity between enterprises and workers. Apart from the Government’s willingness to comply with the recommendations of the supervisory bodies, reference should be made to the forthcoming ILO mission and the organization of a tripartite meeting during the work of the Conference aimed at restoring trust between the social partners. The forthcoming ILO mission should closely analyse the Employer members’ remarks and the Government should re-examine them and keep the Committee of Experts informed.

The Employer members hoped that the reference made by the Government representative to the deficiencies in the Employers’ knowledge was not symptomatic of its approach to dialogue. They indicated that the matters under examination were those addressed by the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association. Although the Government referred to an agreement concerning the modification of the tripartite Council, up to now there had only been indications of the intention to modify it, but no concrete proposals, which meant that it was still governed by the Decree in that respect. With regard to the automatic prolongation of collective agreements, they recalled that the Committee on Freedom of Association had indicated that their automatic extension should be the subject of tripartite agreement. They acknowledged that the provisions envisaging the right to occupy the workplace had been withdrawn from the draft text. At the same time, while recognizing the good economic performance of the country, they maintained that the present issue was a legal matter and that it was a serious question for employers, as any additional imposition, without the agreement of the parties, constituted unacceptable interference. In practice, through subsidiarity, external bodies were being legitimized, the structure of collective bargaining was being modified, the duration of collective agreements was being changed and the right to occupy the workplace was being established, which made it necessary to close down enterprises. They regretted the lack of will to amend the law. They nevertheless urged the Government to engage in sincere and full consultations with a view to carrying through that modification, for which purpose a draft text would need to be drawn up with the assistance of the Office. In that respect, they welcomed the mission and hoped that all the points raised would be addressed.

The Government representative specified that there had never been any question of a direct contacts mission, but that what had been agreed to was a mission.

Conclusions

The Committee noted the statements of the Government representative and the discussion that followed. It also noted the conclusions and recommendations of Case No. 2699 examined by the Committee on Freedom of Association.

The Committee observed that the Committee of Experts, in the same way as the Committee on Freedom of Association, had commented on certain provisions of Act No. 18566 of 2009 on collective bargaining relating to, among others: (i) the exchange of information necessary to allow the normal conduct of collective bargaining; (ii) the composition and powers of the Higher Tripartite Council; (iii) the possibility for wages councils to establish conditions of work; (iv) the parties engaged in bipartite collective bargaining; and (v) the effects and duration of collective agreements.

The Committee noted the statements of the Government representative according to which, as from 2005, successive governments had promoted a policy of in-depth social dialogue. He had recalled that the model of industrial relations in Uruguay traditionally consisted of collective bargaining at the branch level, and not the enterprise level, but that nevertheless the Act which had been the subject of the complaint did not prevent bilateral collective bargaining. He emphasized that any reform of the legislation would have to have, not only the agreement of the social partners, but also the approval of the National Parliament, which was sovereign and independent of the executive authority. The Government representative had indicated that, at the end of 2010, a tripartite commission had been established to examine possible reforms of Act No. 18566 and that an agenda had been agreed for its work. An ILO mission, headed by the Director of the International Labour Standards Department, had been organized and would visit the country in August. Finally, he had indicated that in accordance with the recommendations of the ILO, a high-level tripartite body had been established during the present International Labour Conference and that intense negotiations were being undertaken which had resulted, in his opinion, in a climate of confidence that was sufficient to re-establish confidence between the social partners, to such an extent that a definitive agreement had almost been reached.

The Committee noted the widespread exercise of trade union rights in the country and the respect for human rights, as well as the Government’s indication of its will to comply with the provisions of the Convention. The Committee welcomed the fact that tripartite negotiation on the matters under examination had continued during the present Conference and that an ILO mission would visit Uruguay in relation to those issues at the end of the month of August 2011. The Committee trusted that the mission would be able to note tangible progress. The Committee trusted that, with the objective of bringing the legislation fully into conformity with the Convention, the necessary measures would be taken without delay to prepare a bill that reflected the comments of the supervisory bodies.

The Committee requested the Government to send a report to the Committee of Experts this year containing information on any progress in relation to the matters raised and hoped that it would be able to note progress in the very near future.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2025, published 114th ILC session (2026)

The Committee notes the joint observations of the Chamber of Commerce and Services of Uruguay (CCSUY), the Chamber of Industries of Uruguay (CIU) and the International Organisation of Employers (IOE), received on 31 August 2023 and 28 August 2025, which concern matters addressed by the Committee in this comment, and also notes the Government’s reply in this respect.

Article 4 of the Convention. Promotion of free and voluntary collective bargaining. For several years, the Committee, together with the Committee on Freedom of Association (Case No. 2699) and the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, have been requesting the Government to revise Act No. 18.566 of 2009 (Act establishing the fundamental rights and principles of the collective bargaining system, hereinafter Act No. 18.566), with a view to ensuring the full compliance of the Act with the principles of collective bargaining and the Conventions ratified by Uruguay in this area.

The Committee recalls that, between 2015 and 2019, the Government submitted several proposals for legislative amendments to the social partners without reaching agreement. In 2022, the Government submitted to Parliament a Bill identical to that of 2019 which, while addressing some of the Committee’s observations, did not propose amendments or clarifications regarding the competence of the wage councils, which are tripartite bodies, in relation to adjustments made to wages that are above the minimum for the occupational category and working conditions (section 12 of Act No. 18.566). Trusting that the partial progress contained in the Bill would be incorporated in the current legislation, the Committee strongly encouraged the Government to continue working in tripartite bodies and to take the necessary further measures to amend section 12 so that the legislation fully guarantees both the free and voluntary nature of collective bargaining and the continued effective promotion thereof, thereby ensuring that the country’s existing collective agreements continue to offer a high level of coverage.

The Committee notes the Government’s indication that the Bill submitted in 2022 was approved and promulgated on 17 May 2023 as Act No. 20.145, which introduced the following amendments to Act No. 18.566:

• the addition of a final paragraph to section 4 of the Act, requiring employers’ and workers’ organizations to have legal personality in order to access and exchange certain types of information within the framework of collective bargaining;
• the repeal of section 10(d) of the Act, which established the competence of the Tripartite Higher Council to define the level of bipartite or tripartite negotiations;
• the removal of the final part of section 14 of the Act which, in the absence of a trade union represented in the enterprise, conferred bargaining power on higher-level trade unions;
• the repeal of section 17(2) of the Act so that, for each agreement, the issue of continuing effect is subject to negotiation; and
• the provision that the decisions of wage councils and collective agreements do not require the authorization, approval or adoption of the executive authorities in order to be recorded and published.

The Committee notes with interest the amendments introduced to Act No. 18.566, which respond to the various requests of the Committee and are in accordance with the Convention. The Committee notes that the CCSUY, the CIU and the IOE consider that, while these amendments respond to the requests of the supervisory bodies: (i) the Act should have clearly established that the termination of an agreement results in the end of the benefits provided for in that agreement; (ii) the Act should have specified who is authorized to sign a collective agreement in the absence of a trade union in the enterprise; and (iii) the Act should have imposed an obligation on the executive authorities to proceed immediately with the registration and publication of an award or agreement submitted by the parties. The organizations concerned indicate that the powers of the wage councils is a key aspect of which the amendment is still pending. The CCSUY, the CIU and the IOE state that the new Government that took office in March 2025 has resumed the previously abandoned practice of including, in its guidelines for negotiations in the wage councils, guidance on working conditions. The organizations concerned underscore that: (i) the wage councils must limit their wage-setting powers to the fixing of minimum wages; (ii) the updating of wages must be a matter exclusively for bilateral negotiation; and (iii) the inclusion of guidance with proposals on wage increases and the inclusion of working conditions constitute an act of interference by the State in collective bargaining, which undermines the free and voluntary nature of such bargaining.

The Committee notes that, for its part, the Government indicates that: (i) the State intervenes in the (tripartite) negotiations in the wage councils, which have the power to fix wages, given that this has been the method of fixing wages since 1943; (ii) the decisive factor for the possible establishment of working conditions by the tripartite body is that there must be agreement between the workers’ and employers’ organizations; (iii) section 12 of Act No. 18.566 did nothing more than legalize a practice that has been carried out since 1943; and (iv) collective bargaining in Uruguay has one of the world’s highest rates of objective coverage (with regard to the public and private sectors) and subjective coverage (with regard to the workers concerned).

The Committee notes this information. While it welcomes the very high collective bargaining coverage indicated by the Government, the Committee notes with regret that, despite its reiterated comments, and the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association, Act No. 20.145 did not include amendments or clarifications regarding the powers of the wage councils in relation to adjustments made to wages that are above the minimum for the occupational category, and working conditions (section 12 of Act No. 18.566). The Committee once again recalls that, while the fixing of minimum wages may be subject to decisions by tripartite bodies, Article 4 of the Convention seeks to promote bipartite bargaining for the setting of working conditions, whereby all collective agreements establishing working conditions shall result from an agreement between employers or employers’ organizations and workers’ organizations. The Committee also recalls that mechanisms may be established that guarantee both the free and voluntary nature of collective bargaining and its effective promotion, thereby ensuring that the country’s existing collective agreements continue to offer a high level of coverage. The Committee urges the Government to, in consultation with the social partners, take the necessary measures to revise section 12 of Act No. 18.566, so that, in accordance with the Convention, the legislation fully guarantees both the free and voluntary nature of collective bargaining and the continued effective promotion thereof. The Committee requests the Government to provide information on any progress in this respect and reminds the Government that it may avail itself of the technical assistance of the Office.

Act on legal personality. In its previous comment, the Committee noted that the Senate was considering a Bill on the legal personality of workers’ and employers’ organizations. The Committee requested the Government to duly consider the concerns of workers’ and employers’ organizations, guarantee that the system of legal personality does not hinder collective bargaining, ensure the confidentiality of data relating to trade union membership and, if the Bill is adopted, implement it in such a manner as to strengthen the effective promotion of collective bargaining.

The Committee notes that the Government indicates the promulgation, on 21 April 2023, of Act No. 20.127, creating a register of legal personality for workers’ and employers’ organizations, which will operate within the remit of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MTSS). The Committee observes that, in accordance with the Act: (i) registration is optional and serves to recognize legal personality, which is granted upon submission of the statutes of the organization; (ii) the recognition of legal personality does not constitute prior authorization or permission for the functioning of the organizations; (iii) once the legal personality has been recognized and the statutes registered, the recognition of the legal personality will be published in the Official Journal, and the information will be publicly accessible (the Government indicates that publication does not include the identification of the trade union members, but only the identification of those representing the organization for the purpose of registration with the MTSS); and (iv) the workers’ organizations that have not completed the procedure for the recognition of legal personality may not demand the withholding of union dues for deposit in the organization’s bank account, which also applies to the provisions contained in section 4(2) of Act No. 18.566 regarding the exchange of confidential information. The Committee notes that the CCSUY, the CIU and the IOE indicate that the requirement to have legal personality aims to ensure the responsibility of an organization in the event of failure to comply with the obligation of secrecy regarding shared confidential information. Furthermore, these organizations indicate that national doctrine, when analysing the Bill which is now law, warned that if a trade union lacked legal personality, any liability would fall directly on its members. The Committee requests the Government to provide information on the impact of the Act in practice and on the effect on the conduct of organizations’ activities, and consequently collective bargaining. It also reiterates its firm expectation that the Act will be implemented in such a manner as to contribute to maintaining and strengthening the effective promotion of collective bargaining.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2022, published 111st ILC session (2023)

The Committee notes the joint observations of the International Organisation of Employers (IOE), the Chamber of Commerce and Services of Uruguay (CNCS) and the Chamber of Industries of Uruguay (CIU) received on 31 August 2021 and 31 August 2022 dealing with matters addressed by the Committee in this comment and also notes the Government’s reply in this respect. The Committee observes that the OIE, CNCS and CIU indicate that in July 2022, the Government introduced a preliminary Bill on Social Security Reform that would allow the establishment of voluntary contributions to the social security system through collective bargaining and observe that such a measure could be approved by the wage councils, which are tripartite bodies. The Committee notes the Government’s indication in this regard that the preliminary Bill allows for the possibility of making voluntary social security contributions only through bipartite collective bargaining, without in any way promoting the involvement of the wage councils in the matter.

The Committee also notes the observations of the Inter-Union Assembly of Workers – Workers’ National Convention (PIT-CNT) received on 31 August 2022 relating to issues addressed by the Committee in this comment and reporting acts of anti-union discrimination, including the suspension for a period of 14 days of a shop steward for alleged statements in the press which, in the view of the enterprise, damaged its image. The Committee notes the Government’s reply to the observations of the PIT-CNT. Observing that, in its reply, the Government does not refer to the alleged suspension of the shop steward, the Committee requests the Government to provide information on the outcome of any complaints filed in this respect.

Article 4 of the Convention. Promotion of free and voluntary collective bargaining. For a number of years, the Committee, together with the Committee on Freedom of Association (Case No. 2699) and the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, has been requesting the Government to revise Act No. 18566 of 2009 (establishing the fundamental rights and principles of the collective bargaining system, hereinafter Act No. 18566) with a view to ensuring the full compliance of the Act with the principles of collective bargaining and the Conventions ratified by Uruguay in this area. In 2015, 2016 and 2017, the Government submitted several proposals for legislative amendments to the social partners without reaching agreement, and in 2019 it introduced a bill to Parliament which partially addressed the Committee’s comments and ended up being archived in 2020. The Committee recalls that, while the IOE, CNCS and CIU considered the proposed amendments contained in the Bill to be insufficient, the PIT-CNT was of the understanding that Act No. 18566 did not merit amendment. The Committee recalls that the 2019 Bill proposed to:

• –include a final sentence in section 4 of Act No. 18566, requiring trade unions to have legal personality so that they can receive information from companies within the framework of the collective bargaining process, with a view to facilitating the possibility of bringing proceedings for liability in the event of a violation of the duty of confidentiality;
• –remove section 10(d) of the Act establishing the competence of the Tripartite Higher Council to define the level of bipartite or tripartite negotiations;
• –remove the final part of section 14 of the Act which, in the absence of a trade union represented in the company, confers bargaining power on higher-level trade unions;
• –amend section 17(2) of the Act so that, for each agreement, the issue of continuing effect is subject to negotiation; and
• –clarify that the decisions of wage councils and collective agreements do not require the authorization, approval or adoption of the executive authorities in order to be recorded and published.

In its latest comments, the Committee noted that these proposed amendments were consistent with the obligation under Article 4 of the Convention to promote free and voluntary collective bargaining and noted with regret that, despite its reiterated comments, the Bill did not propose amendments or clarifications regarding the competence of the wage councils, which are tripartite bodies, in relation to adjustments made to wages that are above the minimum for the occupational category and working conditions (section 12 of Act No. 18566). The Committee recalled that although the establishment of minimum wages may be subject to decisions by tripartite bodies, Article 4 of the Convention seeks to promote bipartite negotiation for the setting of working conditions, whereby all collective agreements establishing conditions of employment shall result from an agreement between employers or employers’ organizations and workers’ organizations. The Committee recalled that mechanisms can be established that would guarantee both the free and voluntary nature of collective bargaining and the effective promotion thereof, while ensuring that the country’s existing collective agreements continue to offer a high level of coverage.

The Committee notes the Government’s indication that: (i) on 27 October 2020 during a meeting of the Higher Tripartite Council, the executive authorities raised the need to work on the comments of the ILO supervisory bodies in relation to Act No. 18566 and suggested that a special tripartite committee could be set up to assess and consider a new draft amendment to the Act, which was unanimously approved; (ii) between May 2021 and February 2022, various meetings of the special tripartite committee were held and on 3 May 2022, the Government submitted a bill to Parliament, based on the Bill introduced to Parliament in 2019 by the previous Government, which is currently under consideration by the Labour Legislation Commission of the Chamber of Representatives; and (iii) between June and August 2022, representatives of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and workers’ and employers’ delegations attended the Labour Legislation Commission to provide their opinion with regard to Bill. The Government indicates that it will continue to work in tripartite bodies to bring about reform of collective bargaining in wage councils that takes into account the comment on section 12 of Act No.18566 and that, in the meantime, practicable measures are under consideration to ensure that the work of all delegates assigned to the wage councils results in agreements or decisions that expressly enable bipartite negotiation in situations where that is justified.

The Committee notes that, in their observations, the IOE, CNCS and the CIU indicate that although the Bill submitted to Parliament on 3 May 2022 contains a number of developments and while they value the legislative initiative, the Bill does not include an important aspect for employers which concerns the government intervention in the negotiation of issues that relate exclusively to the scope of bipartite negotiation. These organizations indicate that they have proposed adjustments to the text and observe that the current text could be substantially modified during the parliamentary debates. The Committee notes that, according to public statements issued by the PIT-CNT and reflected in documents provided by the Government, the PIT-CNT flatly rejects the Bill as a retrograde step for workers’ rights that undermines collective bargaining.

The Committee takes due note of the establishment in 2020 of the special tripartite committee to address the comments of the ILO supervisory bodies in relation to Act No. 18566 and of the tripartite dialogue that has taken place within it. The Committee notes that the Bill which the Government submitted to Parliament on 3 May 2022 proposes the same amendments as the Bill introduced to Parliament in 2019. The Committee notes with regret that this Bill does not address an essential element that it has been highlighting for years concerning the amendment of section 12 of the law to ensure the bipartite nature of collective bargaining. Trusting that the partial progress contained in the Bill submitted to Parliament on 3 May 2022 will be incorporated in the current legislation as soon as possible, the Committee strongly encourages the Government to continue working in tripartite bodies and to take the necessary further measures to amend section 12 of Act No. 18566 such that, in accordance with the Convention, the law fully guarantees both the free and voluntary nature of collective bargaining and the continued effective promotion thereof, thereby ensuring that the country’s existing collective agreements continue to offer a high level of coverage. The Committee requests the Government to provide information on any developments in this regard and recalls that it may continue to rely on the technical assistance of the Office.

Bill on Legal Personality. The Committee notes the Government’s indication that, following discussions in the special tripartite committee, the Government drafted a Bill on the Legal Personality of Industrial Associations, which it introduced to Parliament on 3 August 2021 and which is currently under consideration in the Senate. The Government indicates that the Bill relates to the proposal to amend section 4 of Act No. 18566 and that employers have expressed the view that, while the legal personality requirement is a desirable amendment, the procedure for obtaining legal personality should be swift and simple. The Committee notes that the Bill provides for the establishment of a register in the Ministry of Labour, that registration, which is optional, would result in the recognition of legal personality and that only trade unions with legal personality could receive information from enterprises in the framework of the collective bargaining process.

The Committee notes the indication of the IOE, CNCS and CIU that while they believed that this could constitute a step forward, they did not consider it necessary to establish a special regime such as the one proposed, since the country already has specific legislation whereby not-for-profit organizations can obtain legal personality, to which no objections have been raised. The Committee notes that the PIT-CNT has expressed the view, in public statements, that the fact that the unions are required to have legal personality in order to access the information necessary for the development of sound bargaining in good faith goes beyond what the ILO supervisory bodies have proposed. The Committee notes that the Bill provides that the information contained in the register shall be publicly accessible and recalls in this respect that the confidentiality of the processing of data on trade union membership in context of the registration procedure must be guaranteed, not only because such data relate to the private life of workers, but also because their disclosure could potentially expose workers to reprisals.

The Committee requests the Government to take the necessary steps to ensure that the concerns of workers’ and employers’ organizations in relation to the Bill are duly addressed in the tripartite social dialogue and the parliamentary discussion. It also requests the Government to ensure that whatever system of legal personality is required of organizations, it does not have the effect of hindering their activities and, consequently, collective bargaining. The Committee further requests the Government to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the social partners, to review the Bill in order to ensure the confidentiality of data relating to trade union membership and expects that if the Bill as submitted to Parliament is adopted, it will be implemented in such a manner as to contribute to maintaining the effective promotion of collective bargaining. The Committee requests the Government to keep it informed of any developments in this respect.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2020, published 109th ILC session (2021)

The Committee notes the supplementary information provided by the Government in the light of the decision adopted by the Governing Body at its 338th Session (June 2020). The Committee proceeded with the examination of the application of the Convention on the basis of the supplementary information received from the Government and the observations submitted by the social partners this year, as well as on the basis of the information at its disposal in 2019.

The Committee notes the observations of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), received on 1 September 2019. It also notes the joint observations of the National Chamber of Commerce and Services of Uruguay (CNCS), the Chamber of Industries of Uruguay (CIU) and the International Organisation of Employers (IOE), received on 1 September and 22 November 2019, and also on 30 September 2020 which, like the observations of the ITUC, concern matters addressed by the Committee in this comment. The Committee also notes the Government’s replies to the observations of the employers’ organizations from 2019 and 2020.

Follow-up to the conclusions of the Committee on the Application of Standards (International Labour Conference, 108th Session, June 2019)

The Committee notes the discussions that took place in the Committee on the Application of Standards of the Conference (hereinafter: the Conference Committee), in June 2019, on Uruguay’s application of the Convention. The Committee notes that the Conference Committee urged the Government to: (i) initiate legislative measures by 1 November 2019, after full consultation with the most representative employers’ and workers’ organizations and taking into consideration the recommendation of the ILO supervisory bodies, in order to guarantee the full compliance of national law and practice with the Convention; and (ii) prepare, in consultation with the most representative employers’ and workers’ organizations, a report to be submitted to the Committee of Experts before 1 September 2019, providing detailed information on actions undertaken to make progress in the full application of the Convention in law and practice.

Article 4 of the Convention. Promotion of free and voluntary bargaining. For several years, the Committee, together with the Committee on Freedom of Association (Case No. 2699), has been requesting the Government to revise Act No. 18566 of 2009 (establishing the fundamental rights and principles of the collective bargaining system, hereinafter: Act No. 18566) with a view to ensuring the full compliance of the Act with the principles of collective bargaining and the Conventions ratified by Uruguay in this area. In its previous comments, the Committee noted that, in 2015, 2016 and 2017, the Government submitted to the social partners several proposals for legislative amendments, which the Government indicated had not achieved the necessary agreement between the parties.

In its last comment, the Committee noted from the Government’s report that: (i) on 29 October 2019, following various tripartite meetings, the Government submitted to Parliament a bill amending some aspects of Act No. 18566 of 11 September 2009; and (ii) the bill combined the proposals the Government made from 2015 up to the present time.

The Committee noted that, in their 2019 observations, the CNCS, CIU and IOE indicated that the proposed amendments contained in the bill were insufficient and that some of them should have been drafted differently. They also indicated that in the tripartite meetings the Government indicated that it would prepare a bill, so long as consensus was reached. The Committee also noted that, according to the Government, at the tripartite meetings that took place, the Inter-Union Assembly of Workers – Workers’ National Convention (PIT-CNT) indicated that while it was willing to engage in dialogue, it thought that Act No. 18566 did not warrant amendment. For its part, the ITUC indicated that more than 90 per cent of workers were protected by collective agreements and that care was required when taking measures that could destabilize this effective mechanism.

The Committee noted that the proposed amendments contained in the bill had already been submitted in the Government’s previous report. While recalling that it considered that those amendments were in compliance with the requirement of Article 4 of the Convention to promote free and voluntary collective bargaining, the Committee regretted to observe that, despite its repeated comments, the bill did not propose amendments or clarifications regarding the competence of the Wage Boards in relation to adjustments made to wages that are above the minimum for the occupational category and working conditions (section 12 of Act No. 18566). The Committee noted that the CNCS, CIU and IOE expressed concern in that regard.

The Committee took the opportunity to recall once more that although the establishment of minimum wages may be subject to decisions by tripartite bodies, Article 4 of the Convention seeks to promote bipartite negotiation for the setting of working conditions, whereby all collective agreements establishing working conditions shall result from an agreement between employers or employers’ organizations and workers’ organizations. The Committee also emphasized that mechanisms can be established that would guarantee both the free and voluntary nature of collective bargaining and the effective promotion thereof, while ensuring that the country’s existing collective agreements continue to offer a high level of coverage.

The Committee notes that, in their observations from 2020, after recalling their criticism of the bill, the CIU, IOE and CNCS point out that in March 2020 a new Government took office and that, having reached the close of the legislative session, the bill was shelved, thus losing its parliamentary status without any of its provisions being adopted or even addressed. The employers’ organizations express concern at the Government’s persistent failure to comply with the recommendations that this Committee has now been making for many years, and they highlight the need for the Government to present a new bill, which may or may not build on antecedents.

The Committee notes from the Government’s supplementary report that, 13 days after it took office, a health emergency was declared due to the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in restrictions on activities and meetings and rendering it impossible to make progress with regard to the issues raised in this comment. The Committee notes that the Government, in reply to the observations of the employers’ organizations, reaffirming its commitment to respect international standards, indicates that in November 2019, it set forth the outline of a government plan in a document entitled “Commitment for the Country”, in which includes it undertook to integrate the ILO’s observations into collective bargaining law by amending the current regulations. The Committee also notes, according to the Government, that: (i) it intends to initiate a new phase of dialogue, without ruling out the possibility of recourse to ILO technical assistance; (ii) during this new phase of dialogue, the Government would present a new bill, taking the draft already submitted and now shelved as input, together with the comments made in its regard by the social partners; and (iii) it was in the process of drafting a bill on the legal personality of trade union organizations, which it will shortly share with the social partners, and which will cover some areas of the observations.

While duly recognizing the particular difficulties caused by the pandemic that the Government has had to confront since taking office, the Committee regrets that to date no progress has been achieved in terms of integrating its recommendations into the legislation. However, taking due note of the commitment made by the Government to adjust the legislation in light of the Committee’s comments, the Committee strongly hopes that, after consulting the social partners, the Government will place before Parliament, as soon as possible, a bill that, conforming to the outline proposed in its latest comments, fully guarantees both the free and voluntary nature of collective bargaining and the continued effective promotion thereof, in accordance with the Convention. The Committee requests the Government to report on all progress in that regard and recalls that it can continue to count on the technical assistance of the Office. It also requests it to provide information on the bill on the legal personality of trade union organizations.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2019, published 109th ILC session (2021)

The Committee notes the observations of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), received on 1 September 2019. It in this regard, it notes the joint observations of the National Chamber of Commerce and Services of Uruguay (CNCS), the Chamber of Industries of Uruguay (CIU) and the International Organisation of Employers (IOE), received on 1 September and 22 November 2019, which, like the observations of the ITUC, concern matters addressed by the Committee in this comment.

Follow-up to the conclusions of the Committee on the Application of Standards (International Labour Conference, 108th Session, June 2019)

The Committee notes the discussions that took place in the Committee on the Application of Standards of the Conference (hereinafter: the Conference Committee), in June 2019, on Uruguay’s application of the Convention. The Committee notes that the Conference Committee urged the Government to: (i) initiate legislative measures by 1 November 2019, after full consultation with the most representative employers’ and workers’ organizations and taking into consideration the recommendation of the ILO supervisory bodies, in order to guarantee the full compliance of national law and practice with the Convention; and (ii) prepare, in consultation with the most representative employers’ and workers’ organizations, a report to be submitted to the Committee of Experts before 1 September 2019, providing detailed information on actions undertaken to make progress in the full application of the Convention in law and practice.

Article 4 of the Convention. Promotion of free and voluntary bargaining. For several years, the Committee, together with the Committee on Freedom of Association (Case No. 2699), has been requesting the Government to revise Act No. 18566 of 2009 (establishing the fundamental rights and principles of the collective bargaining system, hereinafter: Act No. 18566) with a view to ensuring the full compliance of the Act with the principles of collective bargaining and the Conventions ratified by Uruguay in this area. In its previous comment, the Committee noted that, in 2015, 2016 and 2017, the Government submitted to the social partners several proposals for legislative amendments, which the Government indicated had not achieved the necessary agreement between the parties. The Committee considered that, although the Government’s proposals did not include amendments or clarifications regarding the competences of the Wage Boards, in relation to adjustments to wages that are above the minimum in relation to the occupational category and working conditions, several of the amendments envisaged were in compliance with the obligations arising out of Article 4 of the Convention to promote free and voluntary collective bargaining. Underlining the contribution that such amendments could make in order to align Act No. 18566 to the Convention, the Committee requested the Government, after submitting the text for consultation with the social partners, to submit a bill to Parliament ensuring the full compliance of national law and practice with the Convention.

The Committee observes that the Government has provided a report in which it details the measures taken in order to advance with the application of the Convention in legislation and in practice. The Committee notes the Government’s indication that: (i) following the discussion that took place in the Conference Committee, five tripartite meetings were held and, in the course of these meetings, it submitted to the social partners two proposals for amendments to Act No. 18566; (ii) on 29 October 2019, the Government submitted to Parliament a bill amending some aspects of Act No. 18566 of 11 September 2009; and (iii) the bill combines the proposals the Government made from 2015 up to the present time. The Committee notes that the Government has provided a copy of the bill and that the preamble to the bill states that it incorporates some of the Committee’s main observations and that the Inter-Union Assembly of Workers – Workers’ National Convention (PIT-CNT), the CNCS and the CIU had been consulted, in various tripartite bodies, on the general subject matter addressed in the bill. The Committee observes that the bill proposes to:

• -include a final sentence in section 4 of Act No. 18566, requiring trade unions to have legal personality so that they can receive information from companies within the framework of the collective bargaining process, with a view to facilitating the possibility of bringing proceedings for liability in the event of a violation of the duty of confidentiality;
• -remove section 10(d) of the Act establishing the competence of the Tripartite High Council to define the level of bipartite or tripartite negotiations;
• -remove the final part of section 14 of the Act which, in the absence of a trade union represented in the company, confers bargaining power on higher-level trade unions;
• -amend section 17(2) of the Act so that, for each agreement, the issue of the continuing effect is subject to negotiation; and
• -clarify that the Wage Boards’ decisions and collective agreements do not require the executive authority’s authorization, approval or adoption in order to be recorded and published.

The Committee notes that, in their observations, the CNCS, CIU and IOE indicate that these proposed amendments are insufficient and that some of them should have been drafted differently. They also indicate that in the tripartite meetings that took place, the Government proposed to discuss a number of matters, and indicated that it would prepare a bill, so long as consensus was reached. In this regard, they affirm that, until the date on which the Government submitted its report, an agreement on the methodology had not been reached, making it practically unworkable to consult on a possible bill prescribed by the Conference Committee. The Committee also notes that, according to the Government's report, at the tripartite meetings that took place, the PIT-CNT indicated that, although it was willing to engage in dialogue, it thought that Act No. 18566 did not warrant amendment. For its part, in its observations, the ITUC indicates that more than 90 per cent of workers in Uruguay are protected by collective agreements and that care is required when taking measures that could destabilize this effective mechanism.

The Committee notes that the proposed amendments contained in the bill had already been submitted in the Government’s previous report. In its previous comments, the Committee considered that those amendments were in compliance with the requirement of Article 4 of the Convention to promote free and voluntary collective bargaining. The Committee recognizes the efforts made by the Government to comply with the Conference Committee’s request, since it initiated legislative measures before 1 November 2019 and submitted to Parliament a bill containing amendments addressing a range of observations that the Committee has been making over a number of years.

However, the Committee notes with regret that, despite its repeated comments and the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association, the bill does not propose amendments or clarifications regarding the competence of the Wage Boards in relation to adjustments made to wages that are above the minimum for the occupational category and working conditions (section 12 of Act No. 18566). The Committee notes that, in the preamble to the bill, the Government explains that the article was not amended because in the Wage Boards the working conditions must be agreed by the workers’ and employers’ representatives and the executive authority’s activity is limited to the determination of wage content. The Committee also notes that, according to the Government, in the tripartite meetings that took place before the bill was submitted, the PIT-CNT had been opposed to the amendment to section 12 of Act No. 18566.

The Committee notes that, in their observations, the CNCS, CIU and IOE express concern that the bill omits any reference to the amendment of the competence of the Wage Boards (section 12 of Act 18566). In this respect, the CNCS, CIU and IOE emphasize that the intervention of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (Ministry of Labour) in the Wage Boards in the setting of wage increases in the private sector constitutes genuine interference; that the final decision on the increase also lies with the Ministry of Labour since, so long as there is no tripartite agreement, this Ministry, together with the Ministry of Economic and Financial Affairs, establishes the increase by Decree and that, in practice, before each Wage Board is convened, the Ministry of Labour is involved in the negotiation of all the contents (including the working conditions), not only on wages.

In this regard, the Committee once again recalls that although the establishment of minimum wages may be subject to decisions by tripartite bodies, Article 4 of the Convention seeks to promote bipartite negotiation for the setting of working conditions, whereby all collective agreements establishing working conditions shall result from an agreement between employers or employers’ organizations and workers’ organizations. The Committee also emphasizes that mechanisms can be established that would guarantee both the free and voluntary nature of collective bargaining and the effective promotion thereof, while ensuring that the country’s existing collective agreements continue to offer a high level of coverage.

While it trusts that the advances contained in the bill submitted by the Government will be incorporated into the current legislation as soon as possible, the Committee requests the Government to take additional measures, in consultation with the social partners, to ensure both the free and voluntary nature of collective bargaining and the continued effective promotion thereof. The Committee requests the Government to provide information on all progress made in this respect and recalls that it may continue to avail itself of the technical assistance of the Office.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2018, published 108th ILC session (2019)

The Committee notes the joint observations of the International Organisation of Employers (IOE), the Chamber of Industries of Uruguay (CIU) and the National Chamber of Commerce and Services of Uruguay (CNCS), received on 31 August 2016, 2017 and 2018, which refer to the issues examined by the Committee in the present comment. The Committee notes the additional joint observations of the IOE, CIU and CNCS received on 28 November 2018. The Committee requests the Government to provide its comments thereon.

Article 4 of the Convention. Promotion of free and voluntary bargaining. Regarding the revision of Act No. 18566 of 2009 (establishing the fundamental rights and principles of the collective bargaining system, hereinafter Act No. 18566) requested by the Committee on Freedom of Association (Case No. 2699) and the Committee with a view to ensuring the full compliance of the Act with the principles of collective bargaining and the Conventions ratified by Uruguay in this area, the Committee recalls that, in its previous comments, it: (i) welcomed the tripartite agreement concluded in March 2015 through which a process of tripartite dialogue was initiated on this matter; (ii) noted the concerns of the employers’ organizations regarding the absence of progress in this dialogue; and (iii) firmly hoped that the dialogue process would lead to concrete measures being taken to bring the law and practice into full conformity with the Convention. In this regard, the Committee notes that, in their observations, the employers’ organizations: (i) refer to the regulatory proposals discussed in 2016 and 2017 by the Government and the employers within the framework of the above tripartite dialogue and the technical assistance provided in this respect by the Office through a Technical Note in October 2017; (ii) clearly set out their alternative proposals to those of the Government with regard to various aspects of the revision of Act No. 18566; (iii) assert that, with regard to the jurisdiction of the Wage Boards over remuneration and working conditions, the Government has not proposed any legislative amendments and still refuses to acknowledge that the tripartite negotiations that are held within the framework of the Wage Boards equate in practice to a form of compulsory arbitration in which representatives of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security set out and define the limits of the negotiation; and (iv) assert that, in so far as the Government has not achieved tripartite agreement on the reforms requested for eight years by the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee, it must now fulfil its obligation to submit to Parliament a draft bill that remedies the non-conformity with the principles derived from the international Conventions ratified by Uruguay in the area of collective bargaining.

The Committee duly notes that, in the framework of the tripartite discussions following the agreement of March 2015, the Government submitted to the social partners several proposals for legislative amendments in December 2015, September 2016 and March 2017. The Committee considers that several of the amendments to Act No. 18566, proposed by the Government with the aim of addressing the comments of the ILO supervisory bodies, are in compliance with the obligations arising out of Article 4 of the Convention to promote free and voluntary collective bargaining. The Committee refers in particular to the proposals: (i) to include a final phrase in section 4 of Act No. 18566, requiring that trade unions have legal status to be able to receive information from enterprises in the context of the collective bargaining process, with a view to facilitating the initiation of liability action in the event of violations of the duty of confidentiality; (ii) to remove section 10(d) of the Act, which establishes the jurisdiction of the Higher Tripartite Council to define the level of bipartite or tripartite negotiations; (iii) to remove the final part of section 14 of the Act, which attributes, in the absence of a trade union in an enterprise, negotiating capacity to higher-level trade unions; (iv) to amend section 17(2) of the Act so that the issue of continuing effect is subject to negotiation for each agreement, allowing for the establishment of total continuing effect, partial continuing effect, or a time frame for the extension of the effect of the agreement to allow its renegotiation; and (v) to clarify that the registration and publication of the decisions of the Wage Boards and collective agreements do not constitute any requirement for authorization, validation or approval from the Executive Branch.

While noting that some of these proposals are the subject of tripartite agreement or partial agreement, while others still have not been agreed upon, the Committee welcomes their formulation and emphasizes their potential contribution to bringing Act No. 18566 into conformity with the Convention. However, the Committee notes with regret that the Government’s proposed amendments still do not include amendments and clarifications regarding the jurisdiction of the Wage Boards, which are tripartite bodies, in relation to adjustments to wages that are above the minimum for the occupational category and of working conditions. The Committee notes in this respect: (i) the Government’s assertion that Act No. 18566 gives absolute priority to bipartite negotiation, as Wage Boards may not be convened if a collective agreement of the same level is in force in the same sector of activity; and (ii) the assertion by the employers’ organizations that tripartite negotiations held within the framework of the Wage Boards are equivalent in practice to a form of compulsory arbitration, which goes beyond the fixing of minimum wages. The Committee once again recalls in this respect that, while the fixing of minimum wages may be subject to decisions by tripartite bodies, Article 4 of the Convention seeks to promote bipartite bargaining for the determination of terms and conditions of work, and any collective agreement determining terms and of conditions of work must therefore be the result of an agreement between employers or their organizations and workers’ organizations. The Committee also emphasizes that mechanisms may be established that guarantee both the free and voluntary nature of collective bargaining and its effective promotion, thereby ensuring a high level of coverage of collective agreements.

In light of the above and taking due note of the tripartite dialogue undertaken since the conclusion of the agreement of March 2015, as well as of the formulation of legislative proposals that address some of its comments, the Committee requests the Government, after submitting the text for consultation with the social partners, to submit to Parliament a draft bill guaranteeing the full compliance of national law and practice with the Convention. Recalling that the Government may continue to avail itself of ILO technical assistance, the Committee firmly hopes that the Government will be able to report tangible progress in this regard in the near future.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2015, published 105th ILC session (2016)

The Committee notes two observations received in March and November 2013, in which the National Trade Union of Women Caregivers of Uruguay provides information on the work situation of women foster caregivers for abandoned children. The trade union indicates that, despite the fact that the women caregivers have an employment relationship with the Uruguayan State, as they provide services for the Institute for Children and Adolescents (INAU), a public organization in Uruguay, the State does not recognize the employment-related dimension of the relationship, ignoring a series of basic workers’ rights and arguing that the relationship linking the caregiver to the State is voluntary. The trade union emphasizes that, although the caregivers have no written employment contract, they are entitled to several work-related benefits, such as wages or remuneration, salary bonuses, seniority allowances, coverage by the health system and a taxable income for social security. However, other rights are not granted to them, such as annual paid leave, or insurance against industrial accidents or occupational diseases. The trade union’s main demand is therefore for a regularization of the work situation of women caregivers. The Committee notes the Government’s reply of 27 February 2015 in which it mentions that the foster caregivers are not public servants since they have not followed any of the legally established procedures for entrance into the public service and, owing to the type of tasks they perform, they are not part of a typical employment relationship. The Committee considers that, even if the women foster caregivers have no written contract with the INAU and have not followed any of the legally established procedures for entrance into the public service, there is a relatively stable link between the caregivers and the INAU through the provision of a temporary care service for children and adolescents in exchange for an economic contribution from the state organization. The Committee recalls that all workers must be able to form or join trade unions and to collectively negotiate the conditions in which they perform their work. In this connection, the Committee requests the Government, in consultation with the National Trade Union of Women Caregivers of Uruguay, to take the necessary measures to ensure that the rights of women caregivers are properly guaranteed under the Conventions relating to trade union rights ratified by Uruguay.

In addition, the Committee notes the observations of the International Organisation of Employers (IOE), the Chamber of Industries of Uruguay (CIU) and the National Chamber of Commerce and Services of Uruguay (CNCS) received on 1 September and 1 December 2015 relating primarily to Act No. 18566 (Act establishing the fundamental rights and principles of the collective bargaining system of September 2009). The employers’ organizations recall in particular that, within the framework of Case No. 2699, the Committee on Freedom of Association requested the Government, in consultation with the most representative organizations of workers and employers, to take measures to amend the Act in question to ensure its full conformity with the principles of collective bargaining and the relevant Conventions ratified by Uruguay. The employers’ organizations recall that, no legislative amendment has been made, but indicate that in March 2015 and on the new Government’s initiative, a tripartite agreement was signed between the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the workers’ representatives (Inter-Union Assembly of Workers–Workers’ National Convention (PIT–CNT)) and employers’ representatives (CNCS and CIU) aimed at initiating a tripartite dialogue to overcome differences regarding Act No. 18566. The IOE, the CIU and the CNCS also state that even though two tripartite meetings have been held and they are awaiting the results of the negotiations, no progress was made and the violation of fundamental labour standards continues.

Article 4 of the Convention. Collective bargaining. With regard to the observations of the employers’ organizations, the Committee recalls that in its previous comments it noted with interest the Government’s decision to forward to National Parliament a bill to amend Act No. 18566. The Committee notes the Government’s indication that: (i) on 4 March 2013, the executive power brought before National Parliament a bill introducing amendments to Act No. 18566 on collective bargaining but eventually the bill was not addressed by Parliament; (ii) in March 2015, only days after taking up its functions, the new Government signed an agreement with the workers’ representatives (PIT–CNT) and employers’ representatives (CNCS and CIU) aimed at initiating a constructive dialogue to overcome the differences regarding Act No. 18566; (iii) in the agreement the Government undertook to draw up a new bill to amend Act No. 18566; (iv) as follow-up to the agreement, tripartite meetings were held in which it was agreed that the main issues to be resolved are those mentioned in the report of the Committee on Freedom of Association on Case No. 2699; and (v) the Government proposed the participation of an external consultant who held various meetings with representatives of the social partners to gather their opinions on the possible alternatives that could be presented as a result of his or her work. The Committee notes with interest the tripartite agreement and the dialogue process which was initiated as a result thereof. The Committee also notes that the Government makes reference to a request for ILO technical assistance to support the work planned in a tripartite context over the coming months. Lastly, the Committee notes the information provided by the Government in relation to the matters raised in the Higher Tripartite Council meetings and the current status of collective bargaining in the wage councils.

The Committee welcomes the tripartite agreement concluded in March 2015 and firmly hopes that it will mark the beginning of a fruitful tripartite dialogue process in which, taking into account the comments made by the Committee on Freedom of Association and the present Committee, concrete measures will be taken to bring the law and the practice into full conformity with the Convention. The Committee emphasizes the importance that the parties concerned reach an agreement on the pending issues as soon as possible, as it is essential that the rules governing employment relationships are supported by the social partners. Noting with concern that the employers’ organizations indicate that no progress was made since the signature of the tripartite agreement, the Committee requests the Government to provide detailed information on the development of the tripartite dialogue process undertaken with respect to Act No. 18566 on collective bargaining and on the bill being drawn up in this regard.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2012, published 102nd ILC session (2013)

The Committee notes the Government’s reply to the observations dated 4 August 2011 from the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), alleging acts of anti-union discrimination and obstacles to collective bargaining. The Committee notes in particular the Government’s statement that: (1) the occasional disputes relating to allegations of obstacles to collective bargaining were settled through collective agreements which strengthened social dialogue and maintained the validity of the agreements on minimum wages which had been concluded in the wages councils; and (2) as regards one of the allegations concerning anti-union discrimination, the administrative authority is already taking action and the file is now with the Legal Division for examination and, as regards the allegations relating to the UPM cellulose plant, the Government indicates that to be able to make any response it needs to know the name of the subcontracting company where the anti-union acts are alleged to have occurred. Finally, the Committee notes the ITUC comments dated 31 July 2012 concerning obstacles to collective bargaining and non-compliance with collective agreements in the health sector. The Committee requests the Government to send its observations in this respect.

The Committee also notes the comments from the International Organisation of Employers (IOE), the Chamber of Industry of Uruguay (CIU) and the National Chamber of Commerce and Services of Uruguay (CNCS), mainly relating to Act No. 18566 of September 2009 concerning collective bargaining. The employers’ organizations recall in particular that the Committee on Freedom of Association asked the Government to take steps, in consultation with the most representative workers’ and employers’ organizations, to amend the aforementioned Act in order to implement the conclusions formulated and ensure full conformity with the principles of collective bargaining and the Conventions ratified by Uruguay in this field. They add that: (1) consultation of the organizations cannot be an obstacle to compliance with international labour standards since this would make it easier for a government to avoid having to take action in response to observations by the supervisory bodies; (2) in reply to draft amendments to the Act proposed by the Government, the employers submitted another draft which expresses the content of the seven points covered by the observations of the supervisory bodies; (3) they observe with concern that the position adopted by a single sector cannot act as a veto on the strict fulfilment of the obligations assumed by the Government as a result of ratifying an international labour Convention, and affirm that the holding of consultations with a view to amending the Act requires achieving a consensus among the parties but can never entail sine die (indefinite) negotiations and, if agreement proves impossible, the Government must comply with the instructions of the ILO; (4) the time that has passed without achieving any progress cannot act as legitimation for violation of a Convention, and negotiations cannot be either fruitless or endless; agreements are signed in order to be fulfilled, and the same applies to the recommendations of the supervisory bodies; (5) the principles of the ILO must be applied immediately and any delay in bringing a law into line with an international Convention owing to the search for consensus cannot be allowed to turn into legitimation with regard to fulfilling them, and any other achievements that a government may cite in the sphere of macroeconomic policy or the exercise of full democracy are worthless if the price to be paid for them is the violation of international Conventions; and (6) the Government has had many possibilities throughout this period for amending the Act so as to bring it into conformity as directed by the supervisory bodies but, at its own discretion and in an arbitrary manner, it has decided not to do so; it is the Government’s responsibility to comply with the instructions of the ILO. The Committee notes the information provided by the Government in reply to these matters.

Article 4 of the Convention. Collective bargaining. In its previous comments, the Committee noted the adoption of Act No. 18566 of September 2009 concerning collective bargaining, and the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) in Case No. 2699, which raised problems of conformity of the abovementioned Act with the Convention (see 356th Report, paragraph 1389). These were referred to in the following conclusions:

• -I. With respect to the exchange of information necessary to allow the normal conduct of the process of collective bargaining and the fact that in the case of confidential information, its communication carries the implicit obligation of secrecy, and breach thereof would give rise to civil liability of those who are in breach (section 4), the CFA noted that, according to the complainant organizations, this provision did not guarantee penalties for any excesses on the part of trade union representatives, and considers that all the parties to the negotiation, whether or not they have legal personality, must be liable for any breaches of the right to secrecy of the information which they receive in the framework of collective bargaining. The CFA requests the Government to ensure that this principle is respected.
• -II. As regards the composition of the Higher Tripartite Council (section 8), the CFA considers account could be taken of an equal number of members for each of the three sectors, and also the appointment of an independent chairperson, preferably nominated jointly by the workers’ and employers’ organizations, who could break the deadlock in the event of a vote. The CFA requests the Government to hold discussions with the social partners on the modification of the law so as to arrive at a negotiated solution to the number of members of the Council.
• -III. With respect to the powers of the Higher Tripartite Council, particularly the power to consider and decide on questions related to the tripartite and bipartite bargaining levels (section 10(d)), the CFA has emphasized on many occasions that “the determination of the bargaining level is essentially a matter to be left to the discretion of the parties”. The CFA requests the Government to take the necessary measures including the amendment of existing legislation to ensure that the bargaining level is established by the parties and is not subject to voting in a tripartite body.
• -IV. As regards the possibility of wages councils establishing conditions of work for each case to be agreed by the employers’ and workers’ delegates in the respective wage group (section 12), the CFA recalls, firstly, that under ILO standards, the fixing of minimum wages may be subject to decisions by tripartite bodies. On the other hand, recalling that it is up to the legislative authority to determine the legal minimum standards for conditions of work and that Article 4 of the Convention seeks to promote bipartite bargaining to fix conditions of work, the CFA hopes that in application of those principles, any collective agreement on fixing of conditions of employment will be the result of an agreement between the parties, as the section in question appears to envisage.

The Committee noted in this connection the Government’s statement in its report that the competence of the wages councils was aligned with the provisions of section 83 of Act No. 16002 of 25 November 1988, covering conditions of work, but extended to the latter only when there was agreement between the social partners, which meant that a tripartite body may not vote on matters pertaining to conditions of work, but does have a vote when it comes to determining minimum wages by category. (The Committee understands that these matters have been cleared up between the parties.)

• -V. With respect to the subject of bipartite collective bargaining and in particular the fact that, in company collective bargaining where there is no workers’ organization, bargaining authorities should pass to the representative higher-level organization (section 14, last sentence), the CFA observes that the complainant employers’ organizations consider that the absence of a trade union does not mean the absence of collective relations in the company. The CFA considers, on the one hand, that bargaining with the most representative higher-level trade union organization should only take place if it has a number of members in the company in accordance with the national legislation. The CFA recalls, on the other hand, that the Collective Agreements Recommendation, 1951 (No. 91), gives pre-eminence to workers’ organizations as one of the parties to collective bargaining, and refers to representatives of non-organized workers only in the case of absence of such organizations. In these circumstances, the CFA requests the Government to take the necessary measures to ensure that future legislation takes these principles fully into account.
• -VI. As regards the effects of the sectoral collective agreement (which is binding once it has been registered and published by the Executive Power (section 16)), the CFA requests the Government to ensure that the process of registration and publication of the collective agreement only involves checks on compliance with the legal minima and questions of form.
• -VII. As regards the duration of collective agreements and, in particular, the maintenance in force of all the clauses of the agreement which have expired until a new agreement replaces it, unless the parties have agreed otherwise (section 17, second paragraph), the CFA recalls that the duration of collective agreements is primarily a matter for the parties involved, but if government action is being considered, any legislation should reflect tripartite agreement. In these circumstances, taking into account that the complainant organizations have expressed disagreement with the whole idea of automatic continuing effect of collective agreements, the CFA invites the Government to hold discussions with the social partners on amendments to the legislation in order to find a solution acceptable to both parties.

The Committee recalled in its previous observation that, in the framework of the ILO’s mission to the country in August 2011, a tripartite agreement was drawn up between the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and representatives of the workers’ sector (Inter-Union Assembly of Workers–Workers’ National Convention (PIT–CNT)) and the employers’ sector (National Chamber of Commerce and Services of Uruguay and Chamber of Industry of Uruguay), thereby setting in motion a new dialogue on the comments made by the Committee on Freedom of Association, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations and the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards.

The Committee notes the Government’s statement that: (1) maintaining its practice of respecting the decisions of the supervisory bodies, it has worked tirelessly for more than two years to reach a consensual solution with the occupational sectors in relation to the comments made on various aspects of Act No. 18566; (2) countless formal and informal meetings were held to discuss different conciliation techniques and an ILO mission was received; (3) in view of the fruitless efforts made and the ongoing refusal to find a solution based on social dialogue, the Government considers that it has been patient and proactive enough in this situation, exhausting all the mechanisms at its disposal to reach an agreement; (4) hence, aware of its obligations and responsibilities, it considers the process of prior consultation of the social partners to be concluded and proposes to send a Bill for consideration by the National Parliament to seek a definitive solution to this dispute; and (5) this information and the Bill in question were sent to the social partners in communications dated 8 November 2012. The Committee notes with interest the decision to bring a Bill before Parliament relating to the pending issues with a view to overcoming the problems identified and welcomes the indication that the Bill will be submitted to Parliament in November.

The Committee expresses the hope that the new Act to be adopted will take full account of the aforementioned principles and the comments previously made by the Committee. The Committee requests the Government to provide information in its next report on all further developments in this regard.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2011, published 101st ILC session (2012)

Follow-up to the conclusions of the Committee on the Application of Standards (International Labour Conference, 100th Session, June 2011)

The Committee notes the comments made by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) dated 4 August 2011, alleging acts of anti-union discrimination and obstacles to collective bargaining. The Committee requests the Government to send its observations on this matter.

The Committee notes the discussion that took place within the Committee on the Application of Standards at the International Labour Conference at its June 2011 session, particularly that in its conclusions: (1) it noted the widespread exercise of trade union rights in the country and the respect for human rights; (2) it welcomed the fact that negotiations on the matters under examination had continued during the Conference and that an ILO mission would visit Uruguay in relation to these issues; and (3) it trusted that this mission would be able to note tangible progress and that, with the objective of bringing the legislation fully into conformity with the Convention, the necessary measures would be taken without delay to prepare a bill that reflected the comments of the supervisory bodies.

The Committee noted that an ILO mission visited the country in August 2011 and that during this mission, the Government and the social partners reached an agreement setting in motion a new stage of dialogue on the matters under examination.

Article 4 of the Convention. In its previous comments, the Committee noted the adoption of Act No. 18566 of September 2009 concerning collective bargaining, and the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association in Case No. 2699, which raised problems of conformity of the abovementioned Act with the Convention (see 356th Report, paragraph 1389). These were referred to in the following conclusions:

• I. With respect to the exchange of information necessary to allow the normal conduct of the process of collective bargaining and that in the case of confidential information, its communication carries the implicit obligation of secrecy, and breach thereof would give rise to civil liability of those who are in breach (section 4), the Committee considers that all the parties to the negotiation, whether or not they have legal personality, must be liable for any breaches of the right to secrecy of the information which they receive in the framework of collective bargaining. The Committee requests the Government to ensure that this principle is respected.
• II. As regards the composition of the Higher Tripartite Council (section 8), the Committee considers that an equal number of members could be taken into account for each of the three sectors, and also the appointment of an independent chairperson, preferably nominated by the workers’ and employers’ organizations jointly, who could break the deadlock in the event of a vote. The Committee requests the Government to hold discussions with the social partners on the modification of the law so as to arrive at a negotiated solution to the number of members of the Council.
• III. With respect to the powers of the Higher Tripartite Council and in particular considering and pronouncing on questions related to the tripartite and bipartite bargaining levels (section 10(d)), the Committee has emphasized on many occasions that “the determination of the bargaining level is essentially a matter to be left to the discretion of the parties” (see Digest of the decisions and principles of the Committee on Freedom of Association, 5th edition, 2006, paragraph 989). The Committee requests the Government to take the necessary measures including the amendment of existing legislation to ensure that the bargaining level is established by the parties and is not subject to voting in a tripartite body.
• IV. As regards the possibility of wages councils establishing conditions of work for each case to be agreed by the employers’ and workers’ delegates in the respective wage group (section 12), the Committee recalls, firstly, that under ILO standards, the fixing of minimum wages may be subject to decisions by tripartite bodies. On the other hand, recalling that it is up to the legislative authority to determine the legal minimum standards for conditions of work and that Article 4 of the Convention seeks to promote bipartite bargaining to fix conditions of work, the Committee hopes that in application of those principles, any collective agreement on fixing of conditions of employment will be the result of an agreement between the parties, as the section in question appears to envisage.
• The Committee had noted in this connection the Government’s statement in its report that the competence of the wages councils was aligned with the provisions of section 83 of Act No. 16002 of 25 November 1988, covering conditions of work, but extended to the latter only when there was agreement between the social partners, which meant that a tripartite body may not vote on matters pertaining to conditions of work, but does have a vote when it comes to determining minimum wages by category. (The Committee understands that these matters have been cleared up between the parties.)
• V. With respect to the subject of bipartite collective bargaining and, in particular, that in company collective bargaining where there is no workers’ organization, bargaining authorities should pass to the representative higher level organization (section 14, last sentence), the Committee observes that the complainant organizations consider that the absence of a trade union does not mean the absence of collective relations in the company. The Committee considers, on the one hand, that bargaining with the most representative higher trade union-level organization should only take place if it had a number of members in the company in accordance with the national legislation of each country. The Committee recalls, on the other hand, that the Collective Agreements Recommendation, 1951 (No. 91), gives pre eminence to workers’ organizations as one of the parties to collective bargaining, and refers to representatives of non-organized workers only in the case of absence of such organizations. In these circumstances, the Committee requests the Government to take the necessary measures to ensure that future legislation takes these principles fully into account.
• VI. As regards the effects of the collective agreement and, in particular, that the collective agreement by sector of activity concluded by the most representative organizations is of mandatory application to all employers and workers at the respective bargaining level once it has been registered and published by the Executive Power (section 16), the Committee, taking into account the concern expressed by the complainant organizations, requests the Government to ensure that the process of registration and publication of the collective agreement only involves checks on compliance with the legal minima and questions of form, such as, for example, the determination of the parties and the beneficiaries of the agreement with sufficient precision and the duration of the agreement.
• VII. As regards the duration of collective agreements and, in particular, the maintenance in force of all the clauses of the agreement which have expired until a new agreement replaces it, unless the parties have agreed otherwise (section 17, second paragraph), the Committee recalls that the duration of collective agreements is primarily a matter for the parties involved, but if government action is being considered any legislation should reflect tripartite agreement (see Digest, op. cit., paragraph 1047). In these circumstances, taking into account that the complainant organizations have expressed disagreement with the whole idea of automatic continuing effect of collective agreements, the Committee invites the Government to discuss with the social partners on amendments to the legislation in order to find a solution acceptable to both parties.

The Committee is pleased to note in the Government’s report that: (1) in the framework of the ILO’s mission to the country in August 2011, a tripartite agreement was drawn up between the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and representatives of the workers’ sector (Inter-Union Assembly of Workers – Workers National Convention (PIT–CNT)) and the employers’ sector (National Chamber of Commerce and Services of Uruguay), thereby setting in motion a new dialogue on the comments made by the Committee on Freedom of Association, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations and the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards; and (2) the dialogue process, which is the result of a tripartite agreement, was due to start on 10 October 2011 and the Government will send a progress report or draft legislation envisaging possible amendments to Act No. 18566 to the International Labour Standards Department so that it might make comments. The Committee notes with interest that the Government has indicated in a recent communication that following the dispositions provided for in the tripartite agreement abovementioned, it has invited the social partners to a meeting on 28 October 2011 in order to continue the work as planned by the tripartite agreement and it has presented to the social partners a modification proposal to Act No. 18566 in accordance with the conclusions of the Committee on Freedom of Association. (The Government has also sent the employers’ sector’s contribution and the comments from the workers as regards the said proposal.) The Committee trusts that, in the course of the tripartite dialogue initiated, the necessary measures will be taken, taking into account the comments of the Committee on Freedom of Association and of this Committee on Act No. 18566 and the matter relating to the occupation of workplaces, to ensure that law and practice is in full conformity with this Convention. The Committee stresses the importance of the parties reaching an agreement as rapidly as possible on the matters pending, given that it is vital that the regulations governing labour relations should be shared by the social partners with a view to future action. The Committee requests the Government to keep it informed on the matter in its next report.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2010, published 100th ILC session (2011)

The Committee takes note of the Government’s detailed reply to the comments of 2008 by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). It also notes the comments of 30 August 2010 by the International Organization of Employers (IOE), the Uruguayan Chamber of Industries (CIU) and the National Chamber of Commerce and Services of Uruguay (CNCS), objecting in particular to certain provisions of Act No. 18566 on collective bargaining.

The Committee notes the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association in Case No. 2699, in which the complainants alleged that the abovementioned Act was inconsistent with the Convention.

Article 4 of the Convention. In its previous comments the Committee noted that, according to the Government, the national legislation lacks a single comprehensive text regulating collective bargaining and, consequently, part of the doctrine holds that there are two models of collective bargaining in the country: the typical model and the model that has grown out of the convening of wages councils. The Committee pointed out in this connection that decisions fixing minimum wages may be taken by tripartite bodies, but emphasized that according to the principles of free and voluntary collective bargaining between parties, laid down in Article 4 of the Convention, other conditions of work should be set by workers’ and employers’ organizations without interference from public authorities.

The Committee notes that in its report the Government states that with the adoption of Act No. 18566 of September 2009, the limitation mentioned in its last report has been resolved and the promotion requirement set in the Convention has now been met.

The Committee notes in this connection that the Committee on Freedom of Association drew up the following conclusions regarding Act No. 18566 [see 356th Report, Case No. 2699, para. 1389]:

I.      with respect to the exchange of information necessary to allow the normal conduct of the process of collective bargaining and that in the case of confidential information, its communication carries the implicit obligation of secrecy, and breach thereof would give rise to civil liability of those who are in breach (article 4), the Committee considers that all the parties to the negotiation, whether or not they have legal personality, must be liable for any breaches of the right to secrecy of the information which they receive in the framework of collective bargaining. The Committee requests the Government to ensure that this principle is respected;

II.    as regards the composition of the Higher Tripartite Council (article 8), the Committee considers that an equal number of members could be taken into account for each of the three sectors, and also the appointment of an independent chairperson, preferably nominated by the workers’ and employers’ organizations jointly, who could break the deadlock in the event of a vote. The Committee requests the Government to hold discussions with the social partners on the modification of the law so as to arrive at a negotiated solution to the number of members of the Council;

III.   with respect to the powers of the Higher Tripartite Council and in particular considering and pronouncing on questions related to the tripartite and bipartite bargaining levels (article 10, paragraph (d)), the Committee has emphasized on many occasions that “the determination of the bargaining level is essentially a matter to be left to the discretion of the parties”. [See Digest of the decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee, fifth edition, 2006, para. 989.] The Committee requests the Government to take the necessary measures including the amendment of existing legislation to ensure that the bargaining level is established by the parties and is not subject to voting in a tripartite body;

IV.   as regards the possibility of wages councils establishing conditions of work for each case to be agreed by the employers’ and workers’ delegates in the respective wage group (article 12), the Committee recalls, firstly, that under ILO standards, the fixing of minimum wages may be subject to decisions by tripartite bodies. On the other hand, recalling that it is up to the legislative authority to determine the legal minimum standards for conditions of work and that Article 4 of Convention No. 98 seeks to promote bipartite bargaining to fix conditions of work, the Committee hopes that in application of those principles, any collective agreement on fixing of conditions of employment will be the result of an agreement between the parties, as the article in question appears to envisage;

The Committee notes in this connection the Government’s statement in its report that the competence of the wages councils is aligned with the provisions of section 83 of Act No. 16002 of 25 November 1988, covering conditions of work, but extends to the latter only where there is agreement between the social partners, which means that a tripartite body may not vote on matters pertaining to conditions of work, but does have a vote when it comes to determining minimum wages by category.

The conclusions of the committee continue as follows:

V.    with respect to the subject of bipartite collective bargaining and, in particular, that in company collective bargaining where there is no workers’ organization, bargaining authority should pass to the representative higher level organization (article 14, last sentence), the Committee observes that the complainant organizations consider that the absence of a trade union does not mean the absence of collective relations in the company. The Committee considers, on the one hand, that bargaining with the most representative higher trade union level organization should only take place if it had a number of members in the company in accordance with the national legislation of each country. The Committee recalls, on the other hand, that the Collective Agreements Recommendation, 1951 (No. 91), gives pre-eminence to workers’ organizations as one of the parties to collective bargaining, and refers to representatives of non-organized workers only in the case of absence of such organizations. In these circumstances, the Committee requests the Government to take the necessary measures to ensure that future legislation takes these principles fully into account;

VI.   as regards the effects of the collective agreement and, in particular, that the collective agreement by sector of activity concluded by the most representative organizations is of mandatory application to all employers and workers at the respective bargaining level once it has been registered and published by the Executive Power (article 16), the Committee, taking into account the concern expressed by the complainant organizations, requests the Government to ensure that the process of registration and publication of the collective agreement only involves checks on compliance with the legal minima and questions of form, such as, for example, the determination of the parties and the beneficiaries of the agreement with sufficient precision and the duration of the agreement;

VII.  as regards the duration of collective agreements and, in particular, the maintenance in force of all the clauses of the agreement which has expired until a new agreement replaces it, unless the parties have agreed otherwise (article 17, second paragraph), the Committee recalls that the duration of collective agreements is primarily a matter for the parties involved, but if government action is being considered any legislation should reflect tripartite agreement [see Digest, op.cit., para. 1047]. In these circumstances, taking into account that the complainant organizations have expressed disagreement with the whole idea of automatic continuing effect of collective agreements, the Committee invites the Government to discuss with the social partners on amendments to the legislation in order to find a solution acceptable to both parties.

The Committee notes the Government’s statement that contacts and consultations are being sought with workers’ and employers’ organizations with a view to examining the recommendations made by the Committee on Freedom of Association regarding the law and that a tripartite body is to meet shortly to deal with the recommendations in depth. The Committee expresses the firm hope that, in consultation with the social partners, the legislation will be brought fully into conformity with the Convention, and requests the Government to provide any information on this matter in its next report. The Committee underlines in this regard, the information provided by the Government regarding the beginning of the tripartite discussions.

Public sector. In its previous observation the Committee took note of the information supplied by the Government on the preparation of a bill on collective bargaining in the public sector and asked the Government to report on progress towards its enactment. The Committee notes with satisfaction that, according to the Government, Act No. 18508 on collective bargaining in the context of industrial relations in the public sector has been adopted and is in keeping with the Framework Agreement on collective bargaining in the public sector concluded on 22 July 2005 by the Executive and the Inter-Union Assembly of Workers – National Convention of Workers (PIT–CNT).

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2008, published 98th ILC session (2009)

The Committee notes the comments made by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), dated 29 August 2008, which refer to anti-union dismissals and an act of violence against a leader of the Uruguayan Federation of Commercial and Industrial Employees (FUECI). The Committee requests the Government to send its observations on these matters with its next report.

Article 4 of the Convention. The Committee notes that the Government reports that: (1) the national legislation does not include a single and complete text regulating collective bargaining and, consequently, part of the doctrine maintains that in Uruguay there are two collective bargaining models: the typical model and the model set up as a result of the convening of wages councils; (2) the re-establishment of wages councils in 2005 has revitalized both unionization and collective bargaining; (3) wages councils are tripartite bodies which have the task of setting minimum wages by category and branch of activity, and, although their basic task is to set minimum wages and categories, both through the application of other sections of Act No. 10449 (which establishes an entire system of collective bargaining for wages councils) and through practice, their powers have been expanded in the sense that they act as conciliation bodies in collective disputes, negotiating other working conditions and regulating trade union leave, etc; (4) in 2005, three bodies were set up at the general level: the Higher Tripartite Council, the Higher Rural Council and the body for negotiation in the public sector and, as a consequence, 20 groups of wages councils have been set up covering nearly 200 negotiating areas; (5) the results were widely successful and, in more than 95 per cent of them, agreement was reached and, in the rest, matters were resolved by vote; a framework agreement was concluded in the public sector and several in the rural sector, and a third round of negotiations is planned for this year.

In this regard, while observing that the objective of wages councils in Uruguay has historically been to promote collective bargaining, the Committee observes that the possibility of a vote being held in the tripartite councils for setting conditions of employment infringes upon the principle of free and voluntary negotiation, which constitutes an essential aspect of the principles of freedom of association. The Committee recalls that setting minimum wages may be the subject of decisions by tripartite bodies. However, with regard to other conditions of work, the Committee emphasizes that, in accordance with the principles of free and voluntary collective bargaining between parties, established under Article 4 of the Convention, conditions of work should be set, without interference by the public authorities, by workers’ organizations and employers or their organizations. In these circumstances, the Committee requests the Government to take measures to promote collective bargaining as outlined above.

Finally, the Committee notes that the Government reports that the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the Planning and Budget Office and the Inter-Trade Union Assembly–Workers' National Convention (PIT–CNT) prepared a draft law on collective bargaining for the public sector which is being considered by the National Parliament. The Committee requests the Government to provide information on any progress made with regard to the draft law in question.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2006, published 96th ILC session (2007)

The Committee takes note of the Government’s report.

1. Comments of the PIT-CNT. The Committee recalls that, reacting to comments by the PIT-CNT, it asked the Government in its last observation: (1) to provide information on the average time span between the initiation of an investigation of a complaint of anti-union discrimination and the imposition of sanctions or the closure of the case and to state the total number of such complaints lodged in the last two years, and (2) to provide information on the number of collective agreements by enterprise and by branch, including in the public sector and in the public administration, with an indication of the sectors and number of workers covered and, if possible, a full list of the collective agreements concluded in the country.

The Committee notes that, according to the Government: (1) measures have been taken (more employees have been appointed and trained, consultation and reception areas for complainants have been opened in the General Labour Inspectorate, and a database set up) to ensure that complaints of breach of trade union rights are dealt with as promptly as possible and that as a result of the measures, they are now processed within 4 months on average; (2) in 2005, 36 complaints were filed, 25 were resolved, penalties were applied in one case and 11 are pending. In 2006, at 6 June 15 complaints had been filed, seven resolved, no penalties had been applied and eight were pending; and (3) with regard to collective bargaining, the Wages Councils were convened. The sectors involved were industry, commerce and services, and the rural and public sectors.

2. Article 1 of the Convention. Protection from anti-union discrimination.  In its previous observation, the Committee took note of Decree No. 186/004 which provides, in section 6, that acts of anti-union discrimination are to be treated as very serious offences, for which substantial penalties are envisaged in sections 13 to 16, which may even, in the event of repeated offences, result in the temporary closure of the enterprise. It also noted that there is no specific procedure for cases of trade union repression, and complaints are therefore dealt with under Decree No. 500/91, which covers all types of administrative procedures. The Committee asked the Government to take steps to ensure that complaints of violations of trade union rights are examined as rapidly as possible. The Committee notes with interest the adoption of Act No. 17940, which provides for the invalidation of any act or omission, the aim of which is to make the worker’s employment contingent on his not joining or his resignation from a union, or to dismiss a worker or cause him any other form of injury because of his membership of a union or his participation in union activities. The Committee notes with particular interest that the abovementioned Act also provides for the worker to be reinstated, by means of a special procedure.

Article 4. Promotion of collective bargaining. In its previous observation, the Committee asks the Government to inform it of the number of collective or other agreements concluded in the public sector, indicating the institutions concerned. The Committee notes with interest that, according to the Government three bodies have been set up for negotiating at a general level: the Higher Tripartite Council, the Higher Rural Council and the Higher Council for the Public Sector. It notes that as a consequence, 20 groups of wage committees have been set up covering more than 180 negotiating areas and that in 95 per cent of them, agreement was reached. Furthermore, a framework agreement was concluded in the public sector.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2004, published 93rd ILC session (2005)

The Committee notes the Government’s report.

The Committee recalls that in its previous observation it noted the comments made by the PIT-CNT referring to the lack of rapid and effective machinery against acts of anti-union discrimination and the impossibility of carrying out collective bargaining in the major sectors, particularly in the services and commercial sectors. On that occasion, the Committee requested the Government to: (1) provide further particulars on the average time which elapses between the initiation of investigations of complaints of anti-union discrimination and the imposition of sanctions, or the closure of the case, with an indication of the total number of complaints of acts of anti-union discrimination lodged over the past two years; and (2) to provide information on the number of collective agreements concluded by enterprise and by economic branch, including the public sector and the public administration, with an indication of the sectors and number of workers covered and, if possible, with a full list of the collective agreements concluded in the country.

Article 1 of the Convention. With regard to matters relating to acts of anti-union discrimination, the Committee notes with interest Decree No. 186/004, which provides in section 6 that acts of anti-union discrimination are considered to be very grave offences, for which substantial penalties are envisaged in sections 13 to 16, which may even, in the event of repeated offences, result in the temporary closure of the enterprise. The Committee also notes the Government’s information that: (1) there is no specific procedure for cases of trade union repression, and complaints are consequently dealt with in accordance with Decree No. 500/91, which covers any type of administrative procedure (the Government adds that in view of the variety of forms of evidence which may be produced it is difficult to assess the average duration of procedures); and (2) ten complaints were dealt with by the General Labour Inspectorate in 2002, nine in 2003 and four during the first half of 2004 (according to the Government, the ten complaints lodged in 2002 have been resolved, five of the complaints submitted in 2003 are still being dealt with and four have been resolved and, of those lodged in 2004, three are still being dealt with and one has been resolved). In this regard, the Committee notes that administrative procedures may last more than 12 months. The Committee considers that cases of violations of trade union rights should be examined rapidly so that the necessary corrective measures can be really effective. In these conditions, the Committee requests the Government to take measures to ensure that complaints of violations of trade union rights are examined as rapidly as possible. The Committee requests the Government to provide information in its next report on any measure adopted in this connection.

Article 4. The Committee notes the Government’s indication that: (1) between 1 January 2003 and 21 July 2004, some 155 agreements were concluded covering various enterprises and branches of activity (for metalworkers and transport workers); and (2) there is no information available concerning the total number of workers covered by each of these agreements. In this respect, the Committee requests the Government to provide information in its next report on the number of collective agreements or other accords concluded in the public sector, with an indication of the institutions concerned.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2003, published 92nd ILC session (2004)

The Committee notes the comments made by the trade union congress PIT-CNT in May 2003 reiterating comments that it had made previously. The Committee also notes the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association in Case No. 2087 [see 328th Report, paras. 606-616] concerning in particular the delays in administrative procedures in cases of denunciations of anti-union discrimination.

The Committee notes that the PIT-CNT refers to the lack of rapid and effective machinery against acts of anti-union discrimination and the impossibility of carrying out collective bargaining in the major sectors, and particularly in the services and commercial sectors. Moreover, in its previous observation, the Committee requested further information on collective bargaining in the public sector.

As it did in its previous observation, the Committee requests the Government to provide further particulars on the average time which elapses between the initiation of investigations of complaints of anti-union discrimination and the imposition of sanctions, or the closure of the case. The Committee also requests the Government to indicate the total number of complaints of acts of anti-union discrimination lodged over the past two years.

The Committee also requests the Government to provide information on the number of collective agreements concluded by enterprise and by economic branch, including the public sector and the public administration, with an indication of the sectors and number of workers covered and, if possible, with a full list of the collective agreements concluded in the country.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2001, published 90th ILC session (2002)

The Committee notes the Government’s report. The Committee recalls that in its previous observation it noted the comments of the Workers’ National Congress of Uruguay (PIT-CNT) on the application of the Convention.

Articles 1 and 3 of the Convention. The PIT-CNT indicates that dismissals for trade union reasons are common in Uruguay and emphasizes the lack of effective procedures for the reinstatement of trade union leaders and workers dismissed because of their trade union membership or activities, or for endeavouring to establish trade union organizations. The PIT-CNT also indicates that rapid and effective machinery has not been established to protect workers’ organizations and workers in the exercise of lawful trade union activities.

In this respect, the Government states that Uruguay has complied with the obligations deriving from the Convention and that reinstatement has not been applied as a sanction in the event of anti-union dismissals due to the absence of legal standards requiring such a measure. The Government adds that the prohibition of dismissal does not necessarily imply that the latter is null and void. Dismissal makes the employer liable to sanctions which, in the case of anti-union dismissals, are supplemented with a view to discouraging such dismissals and providing better protection to workers who are in a more delicate situation. The Government also indicates that practical factors prevent reinstatement, especially in the case of Uruguayan enterprises, which are generally small. The Government had indicated that in 1999 only one denunciation was received for anti-union acts, which was dismissed.

The Committee notes these statements and requests the Government to provide more particulars on the average time which elapses between the initiation of the investigation of denunciations of anti-union discrimination and the imposition of sanctions, or the closure of the case.

Article 4. The PIT-CNT states that collective bargaining is currently impossible in major sectors in Uruguay. Instead of real collective agreements, the practice has become generalized among some employers of requiring all the workers to sign giving their consent at the end of a document establishing conditions of work.

The PIT-CNT adds that, as from 1992, the tripartite councils established by the executive authorities to approve agreements negotiated by employers and workers to make them compulsory for the whole sector are no longer convened, rendering it impossible to conclude collective agreements at the sectoral level. Negotiation has only been possible since then at the enterprise level. Finally, the PIT-CNT states that in Uruguay public servants and teaching staff do not have the right to collective bargaining.

In this regard, the Government indicates that there are no legal restrictions of any type on collective bargaining. Concerning the failure to convene the tripartite councils, it recognizes that as from the establishment of democracy a system had been introduced for the negotiation of wages every four months, but that this was a transitional stage in the promotion of collective bargaining rendered necessary by the period of time for which it had not existed. Nevertheless, with the re-establishment of individual and collective freedoms, it was understood that this stage had been completed. In its view, this does not imply that the right to collective bargaining is restricted. Finally, with regard to collective bargaining in the public sector, the Government indicates that not only is it not prohibited, but that it exists in practice.

The Committee notes this information and requests the Government to provide information on the number of collective agreements concluded by enterprise and by sector, including the public sector, with an indication of the sectors and numbers of workers covered.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2000, published 89th ILC session (2001)

The Committee notes the Government’s report.

The Committee observes that the Inter-Trade Union Assembly - Workers’ National Convention (PIT - CNT) has sent comments on the application of the Convention, attached to the Government’s report and communicated separately. The Committee requests the Government to send its comments in this respect.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1994, published 81st ILC session (1994)

The Committee notes with interest the information supplied by the Government in its report that the National Public Education Board (ANEP) and the authorities have agreed upon measures to raise the wages and other benefits of teaching and non-teaching staff.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1991, published 78th ILC session (1991)

The Committee takes note of the Government's report and regrets that it does not contain a reply to the communication dispatched on 15 August 1989 by the Association of Secondary School Teachers (ADES) which reported that teachers were in a difficult situation regarding the level of their wages. According to that organisation, teachers' wages are determined by the State since there is no legal framework for collective bargaining.

For many years the Committee has been calling for the adoption of measures to encourage and promote procedures for the voluntary negotiation of collective agreements by employers and organisations of public servants not engaged in the administration of the State with a view to the regulation by such means of their terms and conditions of employment, so as to ensure the full application of Articles 4 and 6 of the Convention. The Committee notes with interest that according to indications in the Government's report, representatives of the Government and of the Inter-Union Workers' Assembly (PIT-CNT) have continued dialogue with a view to identifying machinery to enable public servants not engaged in the administration of the State to bargain their terms and conditions of work collectively.

The Committee notes that, according to the Government's report, there has been progress in this regard and that a collective agreement for the banking sector - which includes the state bank whose employees are public servants in state commercial bodies - has been drawn up.

The Committee hopes that progress will continue to be made and that, in the near future, organisations of public servants in autonomous undertakings and decentralised services (public companies), including teaching establishments and, generally, organisations of public servants not engaged in the administration of the State, will be able to rely on legislation granting them the right to collective bargaining.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1990, published 77th ILC session (1990)

The Committee takes note of the communication from the Association of Secondary School Teachers (ADES) dispatched on 15 August 1989, reporting that teachers were in a difficult situation with regard to the level of their wages and that, as their remuneration is determined by the State, there is no legal framework for collective bargaining, which is contrary to Convention No. 98.

Since the Government has not yet replied to the comments of the ADES, the Committee feels that it would be more appropriate to deal with this question at its session next year when it will have examined the Government's observations.

In addition, the Committee recalls that, for a number of years, it has been drawing attention to the fact that public servants other than those engaged in the administration of the State are being deprived of their right to bargain collectively (Articles 4 and 6 of the Convention).

The Committee emphasises once again that public servants not engaged in the administration of the State should enjoy the right to negotiate their conditions of employment, including wages, collectively. However, the Committee notes that under the Constitution, Legislative Decree No. 10388 of 1943 setting the conditions of service of the public service and the Special Rules issued under section 40 of Legislative Decree No. 10388, the status of public servant applies not only to public servants in the strict sense of the term but also to employees of autonomous bodies and decentralised services, including teachers, employees in commercial and industrial establishments and bank employees, and that these employees are deprived of the right to collective bargaining.

In its previous observation, the Committee noted that a Bill to issue regulations under article 65 of the Constitution had been prepared, establishing representative committees in autonomous bodies, but that it did not deal with collective bargaining.

The Committee trusts that the Government will take the necessary measures to ensure recognition of the right of public servants who are not engaged in the administration of the State to negotiate their conditions of employment collectively, in accordance with Article 4 of the Convention and requests it to provide information in its next report on any progress made towards ensuring compliance with the Convention in this respect.