Observation (CEACR) - adoptée 1989, publiée 76ème session CIT (1989)

Convention (n° 87) sur la liberté syndicale et la protection du droit syndical, 1948 - Norvège (Ratification: 1949)

The Committee notes the information set out in the Government's report. The Committee also notes the conclusions of the Committee on Freedom of Association in Case No. 1389 (251st Report of the Committee, approved by the Governing Body at its 236th Session (May-June 1987)) and in Case No. 1448 (262nd Report of the Committee, approved by the Governing Body at its 242nd Session (February-March 1989)).

Both of these cases involved complaints against legislative proscription of strike action in Norway. The Committee recalls that the Committee on Freedom of Association had to deal with very similar issues in Case No. 1099 (217th Report of the Committee, approved by the Governing Body at its 220th Session (May-June 1982)) and in Case No. 1255 (234th Report of the Committee, approved by the Governing Body at its 226th Session (May-June 1984)). In all four cases the Committee on Freedom of Association determined that the legislation in question was inconsistent with the principles of freedom of association.

The Committee has always taken the view that the right to strike is one of the essential means available to workers and their organisations for the promotion and protection of their economic and social interests (General Survey, 1983, paragraph 200). Any substantial interference with this right may impair the capacity of trade unions to further and defend the interests of their members and to organise their activities (General Survey, 1983, paragraph 226).

The Committee has nevertheless recognised that the right to strike may be attenuated in certain circumstances. It has, for example, accepted that, subject to appropriate safeguards, strike action may be proscribed in relation to public servants acting in their capacity as agents of the public authority, or in relation to essential services in the sense of those services whose interruption would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population (General Survey, 1983, paragraph 214). It has also accepted that the right to strike may be suspended for a limited period in situations of acute national crisis (General Survey, 1983, paragraph 206).

In its report, the Government states that the right to strike is recognised in Norway as an integral part of the right to free collective bargaining. It also acknowledges that on occasion the exercise of this right must inevitably cause inconvenience to third parties and to society as a whole. The Government goes on to point out that the supervisory bodies of the ILO have recognised that in some circumstances such consequences are so serious in nature as to justify the imposition of restrictions on the right to strike. In Norway such restrictions are not embodied in any permanent legislative enactment. Instead, each individual dispute is assessed on its merits. If the Government, after a thorough evaluation of the consequences of a strike, finds that they are of such a nature as to endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population, then it submits a Bill to Parliament proposing that the matter be referred to the National Wages Board for final arbitration. When the Parliament is not sitting, section 17 of the Constitution permits the King to attain the same objective by means of an ordinance. Such ordinances can remain in force only until the Parliament next meets.

According to the Government there is a broad political consensus as to the appropriateness of this course. This is reflected in the fact that in the few cases where the Parliament has adopted such measures, it has done so by a large majority.

In its report, the Government indicates that this procedure has been utilised on seven occasions since 1982, four of them in the oil industry.

As regards the effects of disputes in the oil industry, the Government refers to information provided in relation to Cases Nos. 1255 and 1389. In the Government's view this information established that intervention was justified by reason of the widespread economic dislocation which would result from a prolonged dispute in the oil industry, and by reason of the safety problems which could be engendered, or exacerbated, by a protracted work stoppage.

In its report, the Government also provides detailed information relating to the circumstances which in its opinion justified legislative intervention in the public sector (1984 and 1986) and in the chemical industry (1985).

The Committee recognises that these disputes may have involved a substantial measure of social or economic dislocation. However, as the Government itself has acknowledged, such disruption is an inevitable incident of the exercise of the right to strike (see also General Survey, 1983, paragraph 199). The Committee reiterates that it is only where the dislocation constitutes a danger to the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population or in a situation of acute national crisis that the public interest justifies curtailment of the right to strike.

The Committee also reminds the Government that in both Cases Nos. 1255 and 1389 the Committee on Freedom of Association found that the legislative interventions in question were not consistent with the principles of freedom of association. The Committee can only endorse these findings, and again draw the attention of the Government to the fact that it has consistently stated that legislative interference with the right to strike is justified only in relation to public servants acting in their capacity as agents of the public authority and in relation to essential services stricto sensu.

In addition, these prohibitions may also seriously erode the efficacy of the entire collective bargaining system.

The Committee would point out, however, that conciliation and arbitration procedures are not necessarily incompatible with the requirements of the Convention. They must, however, be designed to facilitate bargaining between the two sides. This in turn requires that it must be for the parties to decide whether or not they wish to refer any matters in dispute to binding arbitration. The discretionary powers assumed by the Government to introduce legislation which refers disputes for binding arbitration against the wishes of one or both of the parties is not consistent with this principle.

In the light of all of these considerations the Committee requests the Government not to have recourse to legislative intervention in relation to industrial disputes involving public servants who are not acting in their capacity as agents of the public authority, workers in the oil industry, and in other non-essential sectors.